

P A P E R S

RELATIVE TO THE

COMMENCEMENT OF NEGOCIATIONS

FOR

PEACE WITH FRANCE,

In AUGUST, SEPTEMBER, and OCTOBER,

1800.

LONDON:

Printed by A. STRAHAN, Printers-Street, 1800.

LIST OF PAPERS.

- No. 1. *LETTER from M. Otto to Lord Grenville, dated Hereford Street, Aug. 24, 1800.—And Translation.*
- No. 2. *Letter from M. Otto to Lord Grenville, dated London, 24 Aug. 1800—And Translation.*
- No. 3. *Letter from Lord Grenville to Commissioner George, dated Downing Street, August 26, 1800.*
- No. 4. *M. Otto's full Powers, dated Paris, 20 Aug. 1800.—And Translation.*
- No. 5. *Letter from Lord Grenville to Commissioner George, dated Downing Street, August 28, 1800.*
- No. 6. *Minute of Instructions to Captain George, dated August 28, 1800.*
- No. 7. *Letter from Commissioner George to Lord Grenville, dated Park Place, August 29, 1800.*
- No. 8. *Letter from Lord Grenville to Commissioner George, dated Downing Street, August 29, 1800.*
- No. 9. *Letter from Lord Grenville to M. Otto, dated Downing Street, August 29, 1800.*
- No. 10. *Note from Lord Grenville to M. Otto, dated Downing Street, Aug. 29 1800.*
- No. 11. *Letter from M. Otto to Lord Grenville, dated Hereford Street, 30 Aug.—And Translation.*
- No. 12. *Note from M. Otto to Lord Grenville, dated Hereford Street, 30 Aug.—And Translation.*
- No. 13.

- No. 13. *Letter from Lord Grenville to Captain George, dated Downing Street, September 2, 1800.*
- No. 14. *Letter from M. Otto to Lord Grenville, dated Hereford Street, 4th September.—And Translation.*
- No. 15. *Note from M. Otto to Lord Grenville, dated Hereford Street, 4th Sept. 1800.—And Translation.*
- No. 16. *Letter from Lord Grenville to Evan Nepean, Esq. dated Downing Street, September 4, 1800.*
- No. 17. *Letter from Evan Nepean, Esq. to Lord Grenville, dated London, September 4, 1800.*
- No. 18. *Copy of the Projet.—And Translation.*
- No. 19. *Note from Lord Grenville to M. Otto, dated Downing Street, September 5, 1800.*
- No. 20. *Note from M. Otto to Mr. Nepean, dated Thursday Evening, September 4, 1800.*
- No. 21. *Letter from M. Otto to Captain George, dated London, 5th September 1800.—And Translation.*
- No. 22. *Letter from M. Otto to Lord Grenville, dated Hereford Street, 19 Fruëidor, 8th Year.—And Translation.*
- No. 23. *Note from Lord Grenville to M. Otto, dated Downing Steet, September 7, 1800.*
- No. 24. *Note from Lord Grenville to M. Otto, dated Downing Street, September 7, 1800.*
- No. 25. *Copy of the Counter-Projet.*
- No. 26. *Letter from M. Otto to Lord Grenville, dated Hereford Street, 8th September 1800.—And Translation.*
- No. 27. *Letter from M. Otto to Lord Grenville, dated Hereford Street, 16th Sept. 1800.—And Translation.*
- No. 28.

- No. 28. *Note from M. Otto to Lord Grenville, dated Hereford Street, 16th Sept. 1800.—And Translation.*
- No. 29. *Letter from Lord Grenville to M. Otto, dated Downing Street, September 20, 1800.*
- No. 30. *Note from Lord Grenville to M. Otto, dated Downing Street, September 20, 1800.*
- No. 31. *Letter from M. Otto to Lord Grenville, dated London, 21st September 1800.—And Translation.*
- No. 32. *Copy of the Projet.—And Translation.*
- No. 33. *Letter from M. Otto to Lord Grenville, dated Hereford Street, 23d Sept. 1800.—And Translation.*
- No. 34. *Note from M. Otto to Lord Grenville, dated Hereford Street, 22d Sept. 1800.—And Translation.*
- No. 35. *Note from Lord Grenville to M. Otto, dated Downing Street, September 24, 1800.*
- No. 36. *Letter from Lord Grenville to Mr. Hammond, dated Downing Street, September 24, 1800.*
- No. 37. *Note from Lord Grenville to M. Otto, dated Downing Street, September 25, 1800.*
- No. 38. *Note from Lord Grenville to M. Otto, dated Downing Street, September 25, 1800.*
- No. 39. *Letter from Mr. Hammond to Lord Grenville, dated Downing Street, September 25, 1800.*
- No. 40. *Letter from M. Otto to Mr. Hammond, dated Hereford Street, 26th September 1800.—And Translation.*
- No. 41. *Note of M. Otto.—And Translation.*
- No. 42. *Note from Mr. Hammond to M. Otto, dated Downing Street, September 16, 1800.*

No. 43.

- No. 43. *Letter from M. Otto to Mr. Hammond, dated Hereford Street, 28th September 1800.—And Translation.*
- No. 44. *Letter from M. Otto to Mr. Hammond, dated Hereford Street, 6th October 1800.—And Translation.*
- No. 45. *Letter from Mr. Hammond to M. Otto, dated Downing Street, October 8, 1800.*
- No. 46. *Letter from M. Otto to Mr. Hammond, dated Hereford Street, 8th October 1800.—And Translation.*
- No. 47. *Letter from Mr. Hammond to M. Otto, dated Downing Street, October 9, 1800.*
-

- Appendix A. *Extract of a Letter from the Baron de Thugut to M. Talleyrand, dated Vienna, August 11, 1800.—And Translation.*
- B. *Note from Lord Minto to the Baron de Thugut, dated Vienna, Aug. 9, 1800.—And Translation.*
- C. *Letter from General Kleber to His Excellency Caimakam of the Sublime Porte, dated Cairo, 10th April 1800.—And Translation.*
- D. *Letter from Baudot to the First Interpreter of the Sublime Porte, dated Camp of Jaffa, April 11, 1800.—And Translation.*

PAPERS, &c.

(No. 1.)

No. 8, Hereford-Street, le 6 Fructidor, An. 8

(24 Août 1800.)

Milord,

QUELQUE scrupuleux que j' aie été jusqu'ici suivre en tous Points la Marche tracée pour mes Communications Officielles avec le Ministère de Sa Majesté, le Secret. & la Célérité qu' exigent celles qui font l'Objet de la Note ci-jointe me paroissent justifier des Relations plus directes. J'aime à croire d'après cela, que Votre Excellence ne désapprouvera pas le Parti que je prends aujourd'hui de lui communiquer, sans Intermediaire, les Intentions du Gouvernement François touchant les Ouvertures qui lui ont été faites par Monsieur le Baron de Thugut.

Si Sa Majesté agrée les Propositions renfermées dans la Note ci-jointe, je vous prie, Milord, de nommer le plutôt possible la Personne qui sera chargée de traiter avec moi, & qui sans Doute apportera, dans cette Negociation importante, l'Esprit de Conciliation qui seul pourra rétablir la Paix

B

& la

& la bonne Intelligence entre les deux Gouvernemens.

J'ai l'Honneur d'être avec la Consideration la plus respectueuse, &c.

(Signe) OTTO.

(TRANSLATION.)

No. 8, Hereford Street, le 6 Fruc. An. 8.

(Aug. 24, 1800.)

My Lord,

HOWEVER scrupulous I may have hitherto been to follow in all Respects the Path traced for my Official Communications with the Ministry of His Majesty, yet the Secrécy and Dispatch requisite for those which form the subject of the enclosed Note, appear to me to justify a more direct Communication. I flatter myself, therefore, that your Excellency will not disapprove of the Step I now take of communicating to you, without any Intervention, the Intentions of the French Government respecting the Overtures which have been made to it by Baron Thugut.

If His Majesty should accept the Propositions contained in the enclosed Note, I beg, my Lord, that you would appoint, as soon as possible, the Person who shall be employed to treat with me; and who without doubt will be guided in this important Negotiation by that spirit of Conciliation which
alone

alone can contribute to the Restoration of Peace and good Understanding between the two Governments.

I have the Honor to be, with the most respectful Consideration,

My Lord,

Your Excellency's most humble
and most obedient Servant,

(Signed) OTTO.

(No. 2.)

A Son Excellence Milord Grenville, Secrétaire d'Etat au Departement des Affaires Etrangères.

SA Majesté Imperiale ayant fait, communiquer au Gouvernement de la République Françoisse une Note de Lord Minto, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plenipotentiaire de Sa Majesté le Roi de la Grande Bretagne près la Cour de Vienne, de laquelle Note il resulte, que le Desir de Sa Majesté Britannique seroit de voir terminer la Guerre qui divise la France & l'Angleterre; le Souffigné est spécialement autorisé à demander au Ministère de Sa Majesté des Eclaircissemens ulterieurs sur la Proposition qui a été transmise par la Cour de Vienne; & en même Tems, vû qu'il paroît impossible que dans le Moment où l'Autriche & l'Angleterre prendroient une Part commune aux Negociations,

ations, la France se trouvât en Suspension d'Armes avec l'Autriche & en Continuation d'Hostilité avec l'Angleterre; le Souffigné est autorisé pareillement à proposer qu'un Armistice Général soit conclu entre les Armées & les Flottes des deux Etats, en prenant à l'Egard des Places assiégées & bloquées des Mésures analogues à celles qui ont eu Lieu en Allemagne, par Rapport aux Places d'Ulm, de Philipsbourg, & d'Ingolstadt.

Le Souffigné a reçu de son Gouvernement les Pouvoirs nécessaires pour négocier & conclure cet Armistice Général. Il prie son Excellence Milord Grenville de placer cette Note sous les Yeux de Sa Majesté Britannique, & de lui transmettre la Réponse de Sa Majesté.

(Signé) OTTO.

Londres, le 6 Fructidor, An 8.

(24 Août 1800.)

(TRANSLATION.)

To his Excellency Lord Grenville, Secretary of State for the Department of Foreign Affairs.

HIS Imperial Majesty having communicated to the Government of the French Republic a Note from Lord Minto, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Great Britain, at the Court of Vienna, from which Note it appears that

that the Desire of His Britannic Majesty is to see a Termination of the War which divides France and England, the Underigned is specially authorized to demand from His Majesty's Ministry farther Explanations respecting the Proposition which has been transmitted by the Court of Vienna ; and, at the same Time, as it appears impossible that at the Moment when Austria and England take a common Share in the Negotiations, France should find herself under a Suspension of Arms with Austria, and a Continuation of Hostilities with England, the Underigned is in like Manner authorized to propose that a General Armistice be concluded between the Armies and the Fleets of the Two States, adopting, with respect to the Places which are besieged and blockaded, Measures analogous to those which have taken place in Germany relative to Ulm, Philipsbourg, and Ingolstadt.

The Underigned has received from his Government the Powers necessary for negotiating and concluding this General Armistice. He begs his Excellency Lord Grenville to lay this Note before His Britannic Majesty, and to transmit to him His Majesty's Answer.

(Signed) OTTO.

London, the 6th Fruc. An. 8.

(Aug. 24, 1800.)

(No. 3.)

Sir, Downing Street, Aug. 26, 1800.

I AM to request that you will endeavour, as soon as you can, to see M. Otto, and to ask him from me, Whether he has any Objection to deliver to you, sealed up for me, the Papers to which his last Communication refers, as his doing so will expedite his receiving the Answer to it.

You will, at the same Time, apprise him, that you are not informed of the Particulars of that Communication, or of its Tendency; and that *You* have been charged to make this Inquiry, in order to avoid drawing any Attention to it.

(Signed) GRENVILLE.

Commissioner George.

(No. 4.)

BONAPARTE, Premier Consul de la République François, en vertu de l'Article 41 de la Constitution, donne au Citoyen Otto, Commissaire du Gouvernement pour l'Echange des Prisonniers en Angleterre, Pouvoir de proposer, consentir, & signer, conformément à ses Instructions, un Armistice Général entre la République Française & Sa Majesté le Roi de la Grande Bretagne.

Fait

Fait à Paris, au Palais du Gouvernement, le 2
Fructidor, An 8 de la Republique.

(Signé) Par le Premier Consul, BONAPARTE.

(Signé) { Le Secretaire d'Etat,
HUGUES B. MARET.

(TRANSLATION.)

M. Otto's full Powers.

BONAPARTE, First Consul of the French Republic, in virtue of the 41st Article of the Constitution, gives to the Citizen Otto, Commissary of the Government for the Exchange of Prisoners in England, Power to propose, to consent to, and to sign, conformably to his Instructions, a General Armistice between the French Republic and His Majesty the King of Great Britain.

(Signed) By the First Consul, BONAPARTE.

(Signed) { The Secretary of State,
HUGUES B. MARET.

Done at Paris, at the Palace of the
Government, the 2d Fructidor,
Year 8 of the Republic.

(No. 5.)

Sir, Downing Street, Aug. 28, 1800.

I HAVE the King's Commands to desire that you will, as soon as you can after the Receipt of this Letter, see M. Otto; and that you will return

B 4

to

to him the Original of the Paper which he delivered to you on Tuesday last.

In making proper Acknowledgments to him for his Attention on this Occasion, you will mention, that the Paper I had wished to see was not this, but Lord Minto's Note referred to in that which M. Otto addressed to me by Order of his Government on the 24th Instant; but that, while you were with M. Otto, I received, by a Messenger from Vienna, the Copy of Lord Minto's Note, together with that written on the same Subject by M. de Thugut to M. Talleyrand.

I enclose to you for your Information a Copy of the former, and an Extract of the latter of those Papers, which you will return to me after you shall have seen M. Otto. The Reason of my communicating them to you is, to enable you to converse with M. Otto on the subject of them, in Conformity with the instructions contained in the Minute herewith enclosed, which you are at Liberty in the Course of your Conversation to shew to M. Otto, as containing the Heads of what you are charged to communicate to him.

You will of Course carefully confine your Conversation within the Limits of that Paper; and you will as soon as possible deliver to me a written Minute of what shall have passed between you and M. Otto on the Subject. I am, &c.

(Signed) **GRENVILLE.**

Commissioner George.

(No. 6.)

Minute of Instructions to Capt. George,
August 28, 1800.

I. **T**O declare that the Note presented, at Vienna by Lord Minto contains the Expression of His Majesty's Sentiments, and that the King is ready to act in Conformity to it.

II. To inquire whether any Answer has been returned by the French Government to the Proposal contained in M. Thugut's Letter to M. Talleyrand respecting a Place for the meeting of Plenipotentiaries to carry on Joint-Negotiation: or whether M. Otto is authorized to agree with this Government on that Point, agreeably to the Suggestion contained in M. Thugut's Letter.

III. To express in that Case that either of the Places named by M. de Thugut would be agreed to by His Majesty, and a proper Person sent thither on His Majesty's Part to meet the Plenipotentiaries of Austria and France, provided that the French Government is willing to enter into sufficient Engagements for the Freedom of direct Communication by Couriers with such Place of Negotiation.

IV. That with respect to the Proposal of an Armistice, the King would see with great Satisfaction the Moment when he could with Propriety adopt any Measure, the immediate Effect of which would be to put a Stop, at least for a Time, to the Calamities of War; but that an Armistice, as applying to Naval Operations, has at no Period ever been agreed

agreed on between Great Britain and France during the Course of their Negotiations for Peace, or until the Preliminaries have been actually signed: That it cannot therefore be considered as a Step necessary to Negotiation; and that from the Difficulties to which its Execution must unavoidably be expected to give rise, it might more probably tend to obstruct than to facilitate the Success of those Endeavours which the two Parties might employ for the Restoration of Peace: That the Circumstances of a Naval War are obviously not such as to admit of such equal Arrangements as are easily established with regard to Military Operations when suspended by such an Agreement: That it appears, therefore, at all Events premature to enter even into the Discussion of this Question, until from the Course of the Negotiations it shall more clearly appear how far they are likely to lead to a satisfactory Issue: And that no Decision could in any Case be taken here on such a Subject unless the French Government had previously explained in what Manner it is conceived that the Principles of the Regulations adopted in the German Armistice with respect to blockaded Towns, can be applied to the Naval Ports and Arsenals of France, so as to carry bonâ fide into Execution, as to the respective Maritime Forces, the Objects which those Stipulations have in View with respect to the Military Positions occupied by the two Armies.

(No. 7.)

Park-Place, Aug. 29, 1800.

My Lord,

IN Obedience to His Majesty's Commands communicated to me by your Lordship in your Letter of Yesterday's Date, I called upon M. Otto, and had a particular Conversation with him on the Subject of the Papers delivered to me by your Lordship. I made a proper Acknowledgment to him for the Readiness which he shewed to comply with your Lordship's Wish of communicating the Paper you wished to see, which he conceived to be the one I had the Honor to deliver to your Lordship; and he appears fully sensible of the Attention shewn him on that Occasion. I declared to him,

1st, That the Note presented at Vienna by Lord Minto contains the Expression of His Majesty's Sentiments, and that the King is ready to act in Conformity to it.

2d, I enquired whether any Answer had been returned by the French Government to the Proposal contained in M. Thugut's Letter to M. Talleyrand respecting a Place for the Meeting of Plenipotentiaries to carry on joint Negotiations, and was informed by him that the Place of Meeting was fixed at Luneville.

3d, I informed M. Otto that either of the Places named by M. Thugut would be agreed to by His Majesty, and a proper Person sent thither on His Majesty's Part to meet the Plenipotentiaries of Austria and France, provided that the French Government

vernment is willing to enter into sufficient Engagements for the Freedom of direct Communication by Couriers with such Place of Negotiation ; which he promises to communicate immediately to the French Government by Courier.

4th, I also informed M. Otto of the very substantial Reasons that will prevent His Majesty from agreeing to a General Armistice previous to the signing of Preliminaries, as detailed in the Minute which I had the Honor to receive from your Lordship ; and was answered by him, that he has every Reason to think, and is personally convinced, that the Continuation of the German Armistice will depend upon the Conclusion of the English Armistice, the Advantages of the latter being considered by France as an Equivalent for the very obvious Disadvantages of the German one. He observed, that the Regulations contained in the German Armistice do not extend to such Places as were not actually blockaded or attacked by the French ; judging therefore from Analogy, such Places only as are actually blockaded by the English Forces could be comprehended in the proposed Armistice, therefore Belleisle, Malta, and Alexandria should be put on the same footing as Ulm, Philipsburg, and Ingolstadt.

M. Otto has been instructed to require an Answer to the Proposal for a General Armistice before the 3d of September, which makes him conclude that Hostilities may again commence about that Time, should the proposed Armistice be positively refused

refused on the Part of His Majesty. He farther observed that as long as Hostilities on the Continent are carried on, there can be no firm Basis on which to ground Negotiation, as every Change on either Side would occasion a new Subject of Discussion.

M. Otto farther remarked, that if a General Armistice should be agreed on, he is authorized to enter into any Security that may be thought necessary for the Commerce of Great Britain; and that the great Importance of the Subject obliges him to enquire whether he is to have a written Answer on the Subject of the General Armistice, or whether he is to consider the present verbal Communication as definitive against it.

I have the Honor to be, &c.

(Signed) R. GEORGE.

Right Honourable Lord Grenville.

(No. 8.)

Sir, Downing Street, Aug. 29, 1800.

AS M. Otto expressed to you a Desire to receive in Writing the Answer of the King's Government to his Note, I transmit to you the enclosed, which I request you will communicate to him.

I am, &c.

(Signed) GRENVILLE.

Commissioner George.

(No. 9.)

Sir, Downing Street, Aug. 29, 1800.

I ENCLOSE to you, by the King's Command, the Answer which His Majesty has thought proper that I should return to the different Points contained in the Note which I had the Honour to receive from you.

The Mode which you adopted for the Transmission of that Paper was perfectly satisfactory to His Majesty's Government; but as Captain George has, from his Situation, the Opportunity of unobserved Intercourse with you, I will request you to transmit to me, through him, any further Communications with which you may be charged by your Government respecting this Business.

(Signed) GRENVILLE.

M. Otto.

(No. 10.)

NOTE.

M. OTTO having apprised His Majesty's Government, through Captain George, that the Proposal made by the Court of Vienna for fixing Luneville as the Place for carrying on the proposed Negotiation for a General Peace has been acceded to by the French Government, it only remains on that Head to express His Majesty's Agreement to the same Proposal; and to declare, that in consequence thereof a proper Person shall be

be sent to Luneville, on His Majesty's Part, to meet the Plenipotentiaries of Austria and France, as soon as the Passports for such Minister and his Suite shall be received : Provided that the French Government is willing to enter into the necessary Engagements, that His Majesty's Plenipotentiary shall be at Liberty to communicate freely, and in the usual Manner, by Courier, with this Country, and with the Dominions of His Majesty's Allies.

With respect to the Proposal for a General Armistice by Sea and Land between Great Britain and France, the King would see with great Satisfaction the Moment when he could with Propriety adopt any Measure, the immediate Effect of which would be to put a Stop, at least for a Time, to the Calamities of War ; but an Armistice, as applying to Naval Operations, has at no Period ever been agreed on between Great Britain and France, during the Course of their Negotiations for Peace, or until the Preliminaries have been actually signed ; such a Step cannot therefore be considered as necessary to Negotiation, and from the Disputes to which its Execution must unavoidably be expected to give Rise, there is just Reason to apprehend that it might more probably tend to obstruct than to facilitate the Success of those Endeavours which the two Parties might employ for the Restoration of Peace. Besides this, it is to be considered, that the Circumstances of a Naval War are obviously not such as to admit of such equal Arrangements as are easily established with regard to Military Operations, when suspended by such an Agreement. It
appears

appears therefore at all Events premature to enter even into the Discussion of this Question, until from the Course of the Negotiations it shall more clearly appear how far they are likely to lead to a satisfactory Issue. But in any Case no Decision could be taken here on such a Subject, unless the French Government had previously explained, in what Manner it is conceived that the Principles of the Regulations adopted in the German Armistice with respect to blockaded Towns can be applied to the Naval Ports and Arsenals of France and her Allies now blockaded by His Majesty's Fleets, so as to carry bonâ fide into Execution, as to the respective Maritime Forces, the same Objects which those Stipulations have in view with respect to the Military Positions occupied by the Armies in Germany and Italy.

(Signed) **GRENVILLE.**

Downing Street, Aug. 29, 1800.

(No. 11.)

Hereford-Street, No. 8, le 30 Aout 1800.

(12 Fruct, An 8.)

Milord,

J'AI reçu Hier au Soir la Lettre et la Note que Votre Excellence m'a fait l'Honneur de m'adresser et je me suis empressé de les envoyer sur le champ à Douvres par un Courier extraordinaire.

Je ne puis qu'être très flatté de l'Approbation que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté a bien voulu donner

donner au Mode que j'avois adopté pour mes Communications Politiques. Celui que Votre Excellence me propose à le double Avantage de la Célérité et du Secrèt ; et je le suivrai toutes les Fois que les Ordres de mon Gouvernement me mettront dans le Cas d'enprofiter. J'ai l'Honneur d'être, &c.

(Signé) OTTO.

(TRANSLATION.)

No. 8, Hereford Street, Aug. 30, 1800.

(12th Fruc. An 8.)

My Lord,

I RECEIVED Yesterday Evening the Letter and the Note which your Excellency did me the Honor to address to me; and I immediately transmitted them to Dover by an extraordinary Messenger.

I cannot but be extremely flattered by the Approbation which His Majesty's Government has been pleased to give to the Mode which I had adopted for my political Communications. That which your Excellency proposes to me combines the double Advantage of Dispatch and of Secrecy, and I shall follow it as often as Orders from my Government shall afford me an Opportunity of

c

pro-

profiting by it. I have the Honor to be, with the most respectful Consideration,

My Lord,

Your Excellency's most humble
and most obedient Servant,

(Signed) OTTO.

(No. 12.)

NOTE.

SON Excellence Milord Grenville, ayant bien voulu informer le Souffigné de l'Intention de Sa Majesté d'envoyer un Plenipotentiaire à Luneville pour prendre Part aux Négociations qui seront entamées, aussitôt que les Passeports necessaires, auront été expédiés par le Gouvernement François, & qu'on aura donné l'Assurance d'une Correspondence libre de ce Plenipotentiaire avec la Cour, & avec les Pays appartenants aux Alliés de Sa Majesté, le Souffigné a expédié sur le Champ un Courier extraordinaire pour communiquer ces Dispositions à Son Gouvernement.

Les Sentimens de Conciliation & d'Humanité qui ont influé sur cette Décision du Cabinet sont un heureux Présage du Rétablissement de la bonne Harmonie entre deux Pays qui, par le Genie, les Talens, & l'Industrie de leurs Peuples, sont si fortement intéressés à chérir les Arts & les Jouissances de la Paix. C'est pour atteindre plus promptement ce But si ardemment désiré par l'Europe

l'Europe entière, que le Souffigné avoit été chargé de soumettre au Gouvernement Britannique le Projet d'une Trêve Maritime ; mais les Ministres de Sa Majesté ayant jugé qu'il seroit *prématuré d'entrer même en Discussion sur cet Objet*, il doit respecter les Motifs qui leur paroissent militer contre une pareille Négociation, quoiqu'il ait eu tout Lieu d'esperer que l'Adhésion de Sa Majesté à cette Proposition auroit pû devenir le Gage de la Continuation des deux Armistices conclus en Allemagne & en Italie, le Gouvernement François ne pouvant consentir long Tems à sacrifier les Avantages que lui donne sa Position militaire sur le Continent, sans être assuré d'un Sacrifice analogue de la Part de la Grande Bretagne. Si par la Force impérieuse des Circonstances, le Resultât des Négociations de Luneville étoit soumis aux nouvelles Chances de la Guerre, il est à presumer que les Instructions & Délibérations respectives n'auroient plus pour Base un Etat de Chose connu & apprécié de toutes Parts, & que les Dispositions pacifiques manifestées par les Puissances Belligerantes ne produiroient pas des Effets aussi prompts & aussi salutaires, qu'on auroit pû en esperer d'une Trêve Générale.

Les Apprehensions du Souffigné touchant le Renouvellement probable des Hostilités en Allemagne & en Italie, nonobstant les Négociations, qui de Concert avec Sa Majesté seront entamées à Luneville, sont confirmées par l'Ordre qu'il

a reçu de solliciter une Réponse avant le 3 Septembre.

(Signé) OTTO.

Hereford Street, le 12 Fruët. An 8.

(30 Août 1800.)

(TRANSLATION.)

NOTE.

HIS Excellency Lord Grenville having been pleased to inform the Underfigned of the Intention of His Majesty to fend a Plenipotentiary to Luneville in order to take a Share in the Negotiations which shall be entered upon, as soon as the necessary Passports shall have been transmitted by the French Government, and as soon as Assurance shall have been given respecting the free Correspondence of this Plenipotentiary with his Court and with the Countries belonging to the Allies of His Majesty, the Underfigned immediately dispatched an extraordinary Messenger in order to communicate these Dispositions to his Government.

The conciliatory and humane Sentiments which have had an Influence in producing this Decision of the Cabinet, are a happy Prefage of the Re-establishment of good Harmony between two Countries which, from the Genius, the Talents, and the Industry of their People, are so strongly interested in cherishing the Arts and the Enjoyments of

of Peace. It is with a View to attain more speedily this End so ardently desired by all Europe, that the Underfigned was directed to submit to the British Government the Projet for a Maritime Truce; but the Ministers of His Majesty having judged that it would be *premature to enter even upon the Discussion of this Object*, it his Duty to respect the Motives which appear to them to militate against such a Negotiation, although he may have had every Reason to hope that the Adherence of His Majesty to that Proposal might have become the Pledge of the Continuance of the two Armistices concluded in Germany and Italy; the French Government not being able to consent, for any Length of Time, to sacrifice the Advantages afforded to it by its military Position upon the Continent, without the Assurance of an analogous Sacrifice on the Part of Great Britain.

If, through the imperious Force of Circumstances, the Result of the Negotiations of Luneville should be subjected to the future Fortune of War, it is to be presumed that the respective Instructions and Deliberations would no longer have for a Basis a State of Things known and appreciated on all Sides, and that the pacific Dispositions manifested by the Belligerent Powers would not produce Effects as prompt and salutary as might have been hoped for from a general Truce.

The Apprehensions of the Underfigned, relative to the probable Renewal of Hostilities in Germany and in Italy, notwithstanding the Negotiations

which, in Concert with His Majesty, shall be commenced at Luneville, are confirmed by the Order which he has received to solicit an Answer before the 3d of September.

(Signed) OTTO.

Hereford Street, the 12th Fruct. Year 8.

(30th Aug. 1800.)

(No. 13.)

Downing Street, Sept. 2, 1800.

Sir,

I AM to desire that you will apprise M. Otto, that the King has been pleased eventually to make Choice of Mr. Grenville to represent his Majesty at Luneville, and of Mr. Garlike, now His Majesty's Secretary of Legation at Berlin, to act as His Majesty's Secretary to Mr. Grenville's Mission. It will therefore be necessary that a separate Passport for Mr. Garlike should be furnished by the French Government, such as will enable him to proceed directly from Berlin to Luneville. You will add, that it will be a Matter of Convenience to His Majesty's Government, and to Mr. Garlike personally, if that Passport, instead of being sent through London, were transmitted, through the French Minister at Berlin, to the Earl of Carysfort, His Majesty's Minister at that Court.

I wish

I wish you farther to remark to M. Otto, that it is usual in the opening of Negotiations for Peace, that such previous Explanations should take place as may enable the respective Ministers to arrive nearly at the same Time at the Place of Negotiation ; and that as the Communication on this Point may be received here so much sooner from Paris than from Vienna, His Majesty's Government would wish to be informed through you of the Period which may be fixed for the Arrival of the Austrian and French Plenipotentiaries at Luneville, in order that no Delay may take place on His Majesty's Part in the opening of the Negotiation.

I am, &c.

(Signed) GRENVILLE.

To Captain George.

(No. 14.)

Hereford Street, 4 Sept.
(17 Fruct.)

Milord,

M. GEORGE n'étant pas encore revenu de Margate, où il a conduit sa Famille, j'espère que votre Excellence ne désapprouvera pas que je vous fasse passer directement les Communications très importantes que j'ai reçues ce Matin par un Courier extraordinaire. Je dois ajouter que si Sa Majesté consent à l'Armistice proposé, je suis chargé de remettre le Passeport, et de donner toutes les

c 4

Affurances

Affurances demandées pour le Plénipotentiaire qui pourra être nommé.

J'ai l'Honneur d'être, avec la plus haute Considération,

Milord,

De Votre Excellence

Le très humble et très obéissant Serviteur,

(Signé) OTTO.

(TRANSLATION.)

Hereford Street, 4th Sept.

(17 Fruct.)

My Lord,

MR. GEORGE not being yet returned from Margate, whither he has conveyed his Family, I hope that your Excellency will not disapprove of my transmitting to you directly the very important Communications which I received this Morning by an extraordinary Courier. I should add that, if His Majesty consent to the proposed Armistice, I am directed to deliver the Passport, and to give all the Assurances demanded for the Plenipotentiary who shall be appointed.

I have the Honor to be with the highest Consideration, &c.

(Signed) OTTO.

(No. 15.)

NOTE.

LE Souffigné ayant communiqué à Son Gouvernement la Note en Date du 29 Août, que Son Excellence Milord Grenville lui a fait remettre, se trouve chargé de lui presenter les Observations suivantes :

Des Preliminaires de Paix avoient été conclus et signés entre Sa Majesté imperiale et la Republique Françoisse, l'Intervention de Lord Minto, qui a demandé que l'Angleterre fût admise dans les Négociations, a empêché la Ratification de Sa Majesté Imperiale.

La Suspension d'Armes, qui n'avoit eu Lieu sur le Continent, que dans l'Espoir d'une prompte Paix entre l'Empereur et la République, devra donc cesser et cessera en Effet au 24 Fructidor (11 Sept.), puisque la France n'avoit sacrifié qu' à cette Esperance les immenses Avantages que lui avoit assurés la Victoire.

L'Intervention de l'Angleterre complique tellement la Question de la Paix, qu'il est impossible au Gouvernement François de prolonger plus long Tems l'Armistice sur le Continent, à moins que Sa Majesté Britannique ne le rende commun entre les trois Puissances.

Si donc le Cabinet de St. James veut continuer de faire Cause commune avec l'Autriche, et si son Desir d'intervenir dans les Negociations est sincère,
Sa

Sa Majesté Britannique n'hésitera point à adopter l'Armistice proposé.

Mais si cet Armistice n'est point conclu avant le 24 Fructidor (11 Sept.), les Hostilités auront été récommencées avec l'Autriche ; et le Premier Consul ne pourra plus consentir à l'Égard de cette Puissance qu' à une Paix séparée et complète.

Pour satisfaire aux Explications demandées relativement à l'Armistice, le Souffigné est chargé de faire connoître à Son Excellence Milord Grenville, que les Places qu'il s'agit d'affimiler à celles d'Allemagne sont Malthe et les Villes maritimes de l'Égypte.

S'il est vrai, qu'une longue Suspension d'Armes entre la France et l'Angleterre pourroit paroître defavorable à Sa Majesté Britannique, il ne l'est pas moins qu'un Armistice prolongé sur le Continent est essentiellement defavantageux à la République Françoisé ; desorte qu'en même Tems que l'Armistice Maritime seroit pour le Gouvernement François une Garantie du Zéle que mettroit l'Angleterre à concourir au Retablissement de la Paix, l'Armistice Continental en seroit une pour le Gouvernement Britannique de la Sincerité des Efforts de la France ; et comme la Position de l'Autriche ne lui permettroit plus alors de ne pas rechercher une prompté Conclusion, les trois Puissances auroient dans leurs Intérêts propres des Raisons determinantes pour consentir sans Delai aux Sacrifices, qui peuvent être reciproquement nécessaires pour operer la prochaine Conclusion d'une Paix Générale

rale

rale et solide, telle qu'elle est le Vœu et l'Espoir du
Monde entier.

(Signé) OTTO.

Hereford Street, 17 Fruct. An 8.

(4 Sept. 1800.)

(TRANSLATION.)

NOTE.

THE Underfigned having communicated to his
Government the Note dated the 29th of August,
forwarded to him by his Excellency Lord Grenville,
is directed to submit to him the following Obser-
vations :

Preliminaries of Peace had been concluded and
signed between his Imperial Majesty and the
French Republic. The Intervention of Lord
Minto, who demanded that England should be ad-
mitted to take Part in the Negotiations, prevented
their Ratification by his Imperial Majesty.

The Suspension of Arms, which had taken place
solely in the Hope of a speedy Peace between the
Emperor and the Republic, ought then to cease,
and will in Fact cease, on the 24 Fructidor (11
Sept.) since France had sacrificed to that Hope
alone the immense Advantages which Victory had
secured to her.

The Intervention of England renders the Ques-
tion of Peace so complicated, that it is impossible
for the French Government to prolong farther the
Armistice

Armistice upon the Continent, unless his Britannic Majesty will consent to render it common to the three Powers.

If then the Cabinet of St. James's desires to continue to make a common Cause with Austria, and if its Desire to take Part in the Negotiations be sincere, His Britannic Majesty will not hesitate to adopt the proposed Armistice.

But if this Armistice be not concluded before the 24 Fructidor (11 Sept.), Hostilities will have been renewed with Austria, and the First Consul will no longer be able to consent, with regard to that Power, to any but a separate and complete Peace.

In order to satisfy the Explanations demanded relative to the Armistice, the Undersigned is directed to acquaint Lord Grenville, that the Places which it is proposed to assimilate to those of Germany, are Malta and the maritime Towns of Egypt.

If it be true that a long Suspension of Arms, between France and England, would appear unfavourable to His Britannic Majesty; it is not less so, that an Armistice prolonged upon the Continent would be essentially disadvantageous to the French Republic; so that at the same Time that the Naval Armistice would be to the French Government a Pledge of the Zeal which would be employed by England in promoting the Re-establishment of Peace, the Continental Armistice would be one also to the British Government of the Sincerity of the

the Efforts of France; and as the Position of Austria would no longer admit of her not diligently seeking for a Conclusion, the three Powers would have, in their own private Interests, decisive Reasons for consenting without Delay to the Sacrifices which may be reciprocally necessary in order to bring about an early Conclusion of a general and solid Peace, such as may answer the Wish and the Hope of the whole World.

(Signed) OTTO.

Hereford Street, 17 Frucht. Year 8.

(4th Sept 1800.)

(No. 16.)

Downing Street, Sept. 4, 1800.

Sir,

IT appearing by a Note received this Day from M. Otto, that the French Government has determined to make the Continuance of the Armistice between Austria and France, and the Commencement of the Negotiations for Peace, dependent on the Conclusion of an Armistice with this Country; it is judged proper, in order that the ultimate Decision on so important and extensive a Question may be taken with the fullest Knowledge of all the Considerations by which it ought to be governed, that you should see M. Otto, and enquire of him, Whether, (as his Note of the 30th ultimo appears to intimate) he is furnished with a Projet of a Treaty of Naval Truce? and in that Case, Whether he

is

is willing to communicate it to you for the Information of His Majesty's Government?

You will further inquire, Whether he is empowered and instructed to include in such Treaty His Majesty's Allies?

And lastly, if his Projet should contain no Article applicable to the Question of moving the French and Spanish Ships now in Brest to any other Station in or out of Europe, you will enquire, Whether M. Otto is authorized to enter into Negotiation for the Purpose of including proper Stipulations on that Subject in any Treaty of the Nature which his Government has proposed.

I am, &c.

(Signed) GRENVILLE.

Evan Nepean, Esq.

(No. 17.)

London, Sept. 4, 1800.

My Lord,

SINCE I had the Honor of communicating to your Lordship the Conversation that had passed between me and M. Otto on the Subject of the Proposal for a Naval Armistice, and the Readiness he had expressed of furnishing me with a Copy of the Projet, I have received from him the enclosed Note and the Projet therein referred to. I have the Honor to be, &c.

(Signed) EVAN NEPEAN.

Lord Grenville.

(No. 18.)

PROJET.

I.

IL y aura Suspension d'Hostilités entre les Flottes et Armées de la République Françoisise et celles de la Grande Bretagne.

II.

Les Batimens de Guerre et de Commerce de l'une et de l'autre Nation pourront librement naviguer sans être soumis à aucune Visite et en suivant l'Usage établi avant la Guerre.

III.

A dater du Fructidor, tous les Batimens de l'une et de l'autre Nation, qui feroient pris, seront rendus.

IV.

Les Places de Malthe, Alexandrie, Belleisle, seront assimilées aux Places d'Ulm, de Philipsbourg, et d'Ingolstadt, c'est à dire que tous les Batimens Neutres ou François pourront y entrer librement pour y porter des Vivres.

V.

Les Escadres qui bloquent Brest, Cadiz, Toulon, Fleffingue, retourneront dans leurs Ports ou du moins se tiendront hors de Vue de la Terre.

Trois

VI.

Trois Officiers Anglois seront expédiés, l'un directement à l'Amiral qui commande dans la Méditerranée, l'autre au Commandant de l'Escadre devant Malthe, le troisième au Commandant du Blocus d'Alexandrie, pour leur donner Connoissance du présent Armistice, et leur porter l'Ordre de s'y conformer. Les dits Officiers traverseront la France pour arriver plutôt à leur Destination.

VII.

Sa Majesté Catholique et la République Batave sont comprises dans le présent Armistice.

(TRANSLATION.)

PROJET.

I.

THERE shall be a Suspension of Hostilities between the Fleets and Armies of the French Republic and those of Great Britain.

II.

The Ships of War and Merchant Vessels of each Nation shall enjoy a free Navigation without being subject to any Search, and shall observe the Usage established previous to the War.

III.

All Vessels of either Nation, captured after the of Fructidor, shall be restored.

The

IV.

The Places of Malta, Alexandria, Belleisle, shall be assimilated to the Places of Ulm, of Philipburgh, and of Ingolstadt; that is to say, all Neutral or French Vessels shall have Permission freely to enter them in order to furnish them with Provisions.

V.

The Squadrons which blockade Brest, Cadiz, Toulon, Flushing, shall return into their own Harbours, or at least shall keep out of Sight of the Coast.

VI.

Three English Officers shall be dispatched, one directly to the Admiral commanding in the Mediterranean, another to the Commander of the Squadron before Malta, the third to the Commander of the Blockade of Alexandria, to notify to them the present Armistice, and to convey to them Orders to conform themselves thereunto. The said Officers shall pass through France, in order the more expeditiously to arrive at their Destination.

VII.

His Catholic Majesty and the Batavian Republic are included in the present Armistice.

(No. 19.)

NOTE.

THE only Motive which could lead this Court to entertain the Discussion of a Proposal so unusual in itself, and so disadvantageous to the Interests of Great Britain, as that of a Maritime Truce to precede Negotiation, is the Desire of contributing to facilitate the Conclusion of a General Peace; and the Termination of the Armistice on the Continent, by the Act of the French Government, would put an End to all Inducements to such a Measure on the Part of this Country.

The Necessity of receiving the King's Commands, on the Projet communicated by M. Otto, must prevent the Underfigned from transmitting any Reply to that Paper before Sunday next. It is therefore for M. Otto to determine whether he will not think it proper immediately to write to his Government, to remark, that if France has proposed an Armistice with Great Britain for the Purpose of its leading to general Negotiation and Peace, that Object can only be attained by at least such a Prolongation of the Continental Armistice as will allow the Time required for receiving the Answer to the Proposal made here.

(Signed) GRENVILLE.

Downing Street, Sept. 5, 1800.

(No. 20.)

(No. 20.)

Thursday Evening Sept. 4, 1800.

CITIZEN Otto presents his Compliments to Mr. Nepean, and, according to his Desire, encloses a Sketch of the Treaty proposed by his Government.

(No. 21.)

Londres, 18 Fructidor, An 8.
(5th September 1800.)

Monfieur,

J'AI reçu la Lettre que vous m'avez fait l'Honneur de m'adresser pour me prevenir que Sa Majesté avait jugé convenable de nommer provisoirement M. Grenville pour prendre Part aux Négociations eventuelles de Luneville. Ce Choix ne pourra qu'être tres-agréable au Gouvernement Français. Lorsque le Résultat des Communications actuelles aura rendu nécessaire le Voyage de M. Grenville, je lui remettrai le Passeport que j'avais déjà demandé, et je suis Chargé de donner au Nom de mon Gouvernement toutes les Assurances que M. Grenville pourra désirer pour la Promptitude et l'Inviolabilité de sa Correspondance.

D 2

Quant

Quant à M. Garlike, il sera très facile de lui envoyer directement à Berlin le Passeport qui lui fera nécessaire. J'en ferai la Demande à mon Gouvernement.

Les Arrangemens à prendre dans le Cas d'un Congrès eventuel pour que les Ministres respectifs arrivent à peu-près dans le même Tems dans le Lieu des Conférences, sont tellement conformes aux Procédés ordinaires en pareil Cas, qu'ils ne feront point negligés. La Proximité de Paris me donnera la Facilité de donner au Ministère Britanique tous les Renseignemens qu'il pourra désirer à ce Sûjet, bien avant le Tems où il pourroit les recevoir de Vienne. J'ai l'Honneur d'être,

Monfieur,

Votre très-humble et obéissant Serviteur,

(Signé) OTTO.

Capt. George.

(TRANSLATION.)

London, the 5th Sept. 1800.

(18 Fruct. Year 8.)

Sir,

I HAVE received the Letter which you have done me the Honor to address to me, acquainting me that His Majesty had thought proper provisionally
to

to appoint Mr. Grenville to take Part in the eventual Negotiations at Luneville. That Choice cannot fail to be very agreeable to the French Government. As soon as the Result of the present Communications shall have rendered the Journey of Mr. Grenville necessary, I shall deliver to him the Passport for which I had previously applied; and I am directed to give, in the Name of my Government, every Assurance which Mr. Grenville can desire respecting the Promptitude and the Inviolability of his Correspondence.

With respect to Mr. Garlike, it will be very easy to send to him directly to Berlin the Passport necessary for him, and I shall request it of my Government.

The Arrangements to be taken in the Case of an eventual Congress, in order that the respective Ministers may arrive about the same Time at the Place of the Conferences, are so conformable to the ordinary Proceedings in similar Cases, that they will not be neglected. The Proximity of Paris will afford me the Facility of giving to the British Ministry every Information which it may desire upon that Subject, long before it could procure it from Vienna.

I have the Honor to be, &c.

(Signed) OTTO.

(No. 22.)

LE Souffigné a reçu Hier à 4 Heures après-Midi la Note que Son Excellence Lord Grenville lui a fait l'Honneur de lui adresser. Elle lui a paru d'une si haute Importance qu'à la même Heure il l'a transmise à Son Gouvernement par un Courier extraordinaire. Il espère qu'elle arrivera assez-tôt pour produire l'Effet que Son Excellence a eu en Vue, et si Elle sert à prolonger pendant quelques Jours les Armistices du Continent, il se félicitera beaucoup d'avoir été à même d'y contribuer.

Il prie Son Excellence d'agréer l'Hommage de sa respectueuse Considération.

(Signé) OTTO.

Hereford-Street, 19 Fructidor, An 8.

(6 Sept. 1800.)

(TRANSLATION.)

THE Undersigned received Yesterday, at four o'Clock in the Afternoon, the Note which his Excellency Lord Grenville did him the Honor to address to him. It appeared to him to be of such high Importance, that at the same Hour he transmitted it by an extraordinary Messenger to his Government. He hopes that it may arrive in Time to produce the Effect which his Excellency has had in View: and if it serves to prolong for a few
Days

Days the Continental Armistices, he will congratulate himself very much on having had it in his Power to contribute thereunto.

He begs his Excellency to accept the Homage of his respectful Consideration.

(Signed) OTTO.

Hereford Street, 19 Frucht. Year 8.
(6th Sept. 1800.)

(No. 23.)

NOTE.

LORD Grenville presents his Compliments to M. Otto, and sends him herewith the Official Answer to his last Communication on the Subject of an Armistice, together with the Counter-Project therein referred to.

He requests M. Otto to accept the Assurance of his high Consideration.

Downing-Street, Sept. 7, 1800.

D 4

(No. 24.)

(No. 24.)

NOTE.

THE Underfigned has had the Honour to lay before the King the Official Answer of the French Government which he received from M. Otto on the 4th Instant ; and also the Projet of an Armistice communicated on the same Day.

The Spirit of that Answer is unhappily but little consonant with those Appearances of a conciliatory Disposition which had before been manifested. If it be really practicable in the present Moment to restore permanent Tranquillity to Europe, this Object must be effected by very different Means than those of such a Controversy as that Paper is calculated to produce.

Some Reply is however indispenfably necessary to the Assertions there advanced, which if now passed over might hereafter be considered as admitted.

The Articles which an Austrian Officer, charged with no such Commission, was persuaded to sign at Paris, do indeed appear to His Majesty little calculated to terminate the Calamities of Europe.

But whatever be the Tendency of the Conditions which the French Government has there specified, there can be no Pretence for representing them as Preliminaries concluded by Austria or annulled by the Intervention of His Majesty.

The Engagements by which the Courts of London and Vienna have agreed not to treat except in Concert

cert with each other, were concluded before there was any Question of these pretended Preliminaries of Peace. And the first Intimations which his Majesty received of their Signature were accompanied by the express Declarations of his Ally, that they were wholly unauthorized, and must be considered as absolutely null.

The French Government could indeed expect no other Determination to be taken by His Imperial Majesty. The want of all Powers, or Instructions for such a Treaty, on the Part of the Austrian Officer, was at the Time distinctly notified by him to those who treated with him, and is declared even on the very Face of the Paper which he signed.

With respect therefore to the supposed Demand of His Majesty to be admitted to those Negotiations, nothing more is necessary to be said. The Note delivered to M. de Thugut by Lord Minto, sufficiently explains the Part which His Majesty is really disposed to take in any Negotiation which may be regularly set on Foot for General Peace.

The King has always been persuaded that the Result of such a Negotiation can alone effectually re-establish the Tranquillity of Europe.

Experience has confirmed this Opinion; and it is only from the Conviction of its Truth that His Majesty has now been induced to wave his strong Objections to the first Proposal of a Naval Armistice, and to enter into the Discussion of the Conditions on which it may be established.

His

His Majesty, judging from the Experience of so many former Negotiations, considers such an Armistice as in no Degree likely either to expedite or to facilitate an Arrangement of the direct Interests of Great Britain and France.

He views it in no other Light than as a temporary Advantage which it is proposed to him to yield to his Enemy, in order to prevent the Renewal of Continental Hostilities, and thereby to contribute to the Conclusion of a General Peace.

And on this Ground, notwithstanding the many Disadvantages which he is sensible must result to this Country from such a Measure, he is resolved to give to his Allies and to all Europe this new Pledge of the Sentiments by which he is actuated; — provided that his Enemies are disposed to regulate the Conditions of such an Armistice, as far as the Nature of the Case will allow, in Conformity to the obvious and established Principle of such Arrangements.

This Principle is, that the respective Position of the two Parties should remain during the Continuance of the Armistice such as it was at its Commencement; and that neither of them should by its Operation acquire fresh Advantages or new Means of annoying his Enemy, such as he could not otherwise obtain. The Difficulty of doing this with the same Precision in the Case of Naval Operations, as by Land, has already been adverted to in a former Note; and it constitutes a leading Objection to the Measure itself.

But

But the French Projet, instead of attempting to remove or lessen these Difficulties, departs at once and in every Article from the Principle itself, although expressly recognized and studiously maintained in the Continental Armistice which is there referred to as the Foundation and Model of this Transaction.

It is proposed, in Effect, that the Blockade of the Naval Ports and Arsenals of the King's Enemies should be raised; that they should be enabled to remove their Fleets to any other Station, and to divide or to collect their Force as they may judge most advantageous to their future Plans: The Importation both of Provisions and of Naval and Military Stores is to be wholly unrestrained.

Even Malta and the Ports of Egypt, though expressly stated to be now blockaded, are to be freely victualled, and for an unlimited Period, in direct Contradiction to the Stipulations of the German Armistice respecting Ulm and Ingolstadt, to which Places it is nevertheless professed to assimilate them: And this Government is expected to bind itself towards the Allies of France even before any reciprocal Engagement can be received from them; while at the same Time, all mention of the King's Allies is on the other Hand totally omitted.

To a Proposal so manifestly repugnant to Justice and Equality, and so injurious not only to His Majesty's Interests, but also to those of his Allies, it cannot be expected that any Motive should induce the King to accede.

The

The Counter-Projet which the Undersigned has the Honor to transmit to M. Otto contains Regulations in this Respect more nearly corresponding with that Principle of Equality on which alone His Majesty can consent to treat.

Even those Articles are in many important Points, and particularly in what relates to the actual Stations of His Majesty's Squadrons, very far short of what His Majesty might justly demand from a Reference to the general Principle above stated, from Analogy, to the Conditions of the Continental Armistice, or from the relative Situation of Naval Force : And a Confidence is reposed in the good Faith of His Enemies, which, although it can never be claimed in Transactions between Belligerent Powers, His Majesty is nevertheless willing to hope He shall not find to have been misplaced on the present Occasion.

If M. Otto is empowered to accede to these Stipulations, a proper Person will immediately be authorized to sign them on His Majesty's Part ; if not, he is requested to transmit them without Delay to his Government.

(Signed) **GRENVILLE.**

Downing Street, Sept. 7, 1800.

(No. 25.)

(No. 25.)

COUNTER-PROJET.

IT having been agreed that Negotiations for a General Peace shall be immediately set on foot between the Emperor of Germany, His Britannic Majesty, and the French Republic, and an Armistice having already been concluded between the Forces of His Imperial Majesty and those of the French Republic, it is agreed that an Armistice shall also take place between the Forces of His Britannic Majesty and those of the French Republic, on the Terms and in the Manner following : That is to say,—

Article I.

All Hostilities, both by Sea and Land, between the Forces of the two Contracting Parties shall be suspended, and shall not be renewed until after Fourteen Days Notice given of the Termination of the Armistice. This Notice, in so far as relates to the Parts of Europe North of Cape St. Vincent, must be given by one of the two Governments to the other, and is to be reckoned from the Day in which the same shall be received by the Government to whom it is given. In the Mediterranean or other Parts of the World, the Notice must be given by the respective Commanding Officers. But in case of the Renewal of Hostilities between
Austria

Austria and France, the Armistice between Great Britain and France is likewise to be considered as terminated, so soon as such Renewal of Hostilities shall be known to the Officer commanding the British Forces; except only in so far as relates to Prizes of Merchant Vessels, which shall be regulated by the third Article of this Convention.

Article II.

Orders shall immediately be sent by the two Governments to their Officers in the different Parts of the World, to conform themselves to this Agreement; Sea-Passes shall be given to the Ships which are to carry these Orders; and His Britannic Majesty's Officers to be sent for that Purpose through France, shall be furnished with the necessary Passports and Facilities to expedite their Journey.

Article III.

All Prizes made in any Part of the World, during the Continuance and Operation of the Armistice, by any Officers having actually received due Notice of this Agreement, shall be restored; and generally, whether such Notice shall have been received or not, all Prizes made in the Channel, or in the North Seas, after twelve Days, (to be reckoned from the Exchange of the Ratifications of this Convention,) shall be restored; and the same Periods shall be allowed in this Respect for the

the other Parts of the World, as were stipulated by the 22d Article of the Preliminaries of the last Peace.

Article IV.

Malta, and the Maritime Towns and Ports of Egypt shall be placed on the same Footing as those Places which, though comprised within the Demarcation of the French Army in Germany, are occupied by the Austrian Troops ; consequently nothing shall be admitted by Sea which can give additional Means of Defence ; and Provisions only for fourteen Days at a Time, in Proportion to the Consumption, as it shall be ascertained by Commissaries to be named for the Purpose, who shall have Power to establish the necessary Regulations for giving Effect to this Stipulation, conformably to the Principles of the 4th Article of the Convention concluded between the Austrian and French Generals in Germany.

Article V.

The Blockade of Brest, Toulon, and any other of the Ports of France by His Majesty's Fleets, shall be discontinued ; and all British Ships shall be instructed not to interrupt or obstruct the Trade or Navigation of any Ships sailing to or from the Coasts of France, except in the Article of Naval or Military Stores, which are not to be brought thither by Sea during the present Armistice. None of the Ships of War now stationed in the said
Ports

Ports respectively shall, before the Renewal of Hostilities, be removed to any other Station.

Article VI.

The Allies of the two Parties shall severally be at Liberty to accede to this Armistice, if they so think fit; provided that they also engage to observe a like Armistice, on Conditions similar to those here specified, towards such of the Allies on the other Side as shall also accede to it.

The Periods or Terms to be fixed for the Commencement of the Armistice in the different Quarters of the World, as with respect to each of the said Allies, are to be regulated in Conformity to the Stipulations contained in the 3d Article of this Convention as between Great Britain and France; and the said Periods or Terms, are to be reckoned from the Day on which the Accession of such Power to the Armistice shall have been duly notified by such Power to the Party with whom it is at War. Such Notification, duly authenticated by the Government on whose Part it is made, may either be transmitted directly by Couriers or Flags of Truce, or through the Channel of the two Contracting Parties, to each other reciprocally. The Naval Ports and Arsenals of the Allies of France are, during such Armistice, to be placed on the same Footing with those of France; and the Notices which are to precede the Renewal of Hostilities, as well as all other Matters relating to such

such Armistice, are to be regulated according to the Terms of this Convention.

Article VII.

This Convention shall be ratified, and the Ratifications shall be exchanged within the Term of ten Days, or sooner if the same be practicable.

(No. 26.)

Hereford Street, 21 Fruct. An 8.

Milord,

(8 Sept. 1800.)

J'AI reçu Hier à onze Heures du Soir la Note et le Contre-Projet que Votre Excellence m'a fait l'Honneur de m'adresser. Les Principes renfermés dans ces deux Pièces sont à plusieurs Egards si peu analogues aux Propositions que j'ai été chargé de faire, et qui avaient pour Objét de compenser par un Armistice Britannique les Inconvéniens qui pourraient résulter pour la France de la Prolongation eventuelle de l'Armistice Allemand, que je ne puis prendre sur moi de les admettre avant d'avoir reçu des Instructions ultérieures. Je me suis donc conformé aux Intentions de Votre Excellence en envoyant ces deux Pièces à mon Gouvernement le plus promptement possible.

J'ai l'Honneur d'être, avec la Considération la plus respectueuse,

Milord,

De Votre Excellence,

Le très-humble et très-obéissant Serviteur,

(Signé) OTTO.

E

(TRANS-

(TRANSLATION.)

Hereford Street, 21 Fruc. 8.

My Lord, (Sept. 8, 1800.)

I RECEIVED Yesterday at Eleven o'Clock at Night the Note and the Counter-Project which your Excellency did me the Honor to address to me. The Principles contained in these two Pieces are in several Respects so little analagous to the Proposals which I have been directed to make, and the Object of which was to compensate by a British Armistice the Inconveniencies which might result to France from the eventual Prolongation of the German Armistice, that I cannot take upon myself to admit them without previously receiving farther Instructions. I have therefore complied with your Excellency's Intentions, by transmitting to my Government those two Pieces with as little Delay as possible. I have the Honor to be, with the most respectful Consideration, &c.

(Signed) OTTO,

(No. 27.)

Hereford Street, le 29 Fructidor, An 8.

Milord, (16th Sept. 1800.)

J'AI l'Honneur d'adresser à Votre Excellence la Réponse que mon Gouvernement m'a chargé de faire à la Note que vous m'avez fait l'Honneur d'adresser.

Le Premier Consul, espérant qu'il est encore possible de rapprocher les Intérêts des deux Gouvernemens

vernemens et leur Vœux pour une Paix prompte et solide, et voulant donner de son Côté une nouvelle Preuve de ses Dispositions pacifiques, a expédié l'Ordre de retarder encore pour quelques Jours l'Attaque que l'Armée Française avait été chargé de faire sur toute la Ligne.

Je donnerai verbalement soit à Votre-Excellence elle-même soit à la Personne qu'elle jugera à-propos de nommer pour cet Effet, des Explications satisfaisantes sur les principales Objections renfermées dans Votre Note de 7 de ce Mois ; et je me flatte qu'elles produiront le Résultat que Votre Excellence a eu en Vue en me faisant connoître les Intentions de Sa Majesté. La haute Importance de ces Communications m'autorise à vous supplier de les faciliter autant qu'il dépendra de vous.

J'ai l'Honneur d'être avec la plus respectueuse Considération,

Milord,

De Votre Excellence,

Le très-humble et très-obéissant Serviteur,

(Signé) OTTO.

(TRANSLATION.)

Hereford Street, Sept. 16, 1800.

My Lord,

(29 Fruc. 8.)

I HAVE the Honor to address your Excellency the Answer which my Government has directed me to make to the Note which you did me the Honor to address to me.

E 2

The

The First Consul, hoping that it is still possible to approximate the Interests of the two Governments, and their Wishes for a speedy and solid Peace, and being willing to give, on his Part, a fresh Proof of his pacific Dispositions, has dispatched Orders for deferring for some Days longer the Attack which the French Army had been directed to make upon the whole Line.

I shall give verbally either to your Excellency yourself, or to such Person as you shall judge proper to appoint for that Purpose, satisfactory Explanations respecting the principal Objections contained in your Note of the 7th of this Month; and I flatter myself that they will produce the Effect which your Excellency had in View by making known to me the Intentions of His Majesty. The high Importance of those Communications authorizes me to entreat that you would give them every Facility in your Power. I have the Honour to be, with the most respectful Consideration,

My Lord,

Your Excellency's most obedient .

and most humble S^{er}vant,

(Signed) OTTO.

(No. 28.)

NOTE.

LE Souffigné a transmis à Son Gouvernement la Note de Son Excellence Milord Grenville, en Date du 7 Septembre. Le Contre-Projet qui y était joint, ayant été placé sous les Yeux du Premier

Premier Consul, il a reconnu que cet Armistice, tel qu'il était proposé, ne présentait aucun Avantage pour la République Française, et dès-lors ne pouvait pas la compenser des Inconveniens graves qu'entraînerait pour elle la Continuation de l'Armistice Continentale: D'où il résulte que le Contre-Projet ne pourrait être admis qu'autant qu'il serait simplement Question de prélude à un Arrangement particulier entre la France et l'Angleterre par une Trêve également particulière aux deux Etats; mais l'Effet de la Trêve Maritime proposée devant être de servir à la République Française de Compensation pour la Trêve Continentale, la première doit lui offrir des Avantages égaux aux Inconveniens que la seconde lui apporte.

Le Souffigné est donc chargé de faire deux Propositions entre lesquelles Sa Majesté Britannique pourra choisir celle qui lui paraîtra s'accorder d'Avantage avec l'Intérêt de ces Etats ou avec ses Relations Continentales.

La première est que le Projet d'Armistice soit rédigé et admis dans les Termes analogues à ceux qui ont été proposés par le Ministère de Sa Majesté Britannique, mais uniquement dans la Supposition que cet Armistice serait indépendant des Evénemens du Continent, et seulement relatif à une Négociation particulière qui s'ouvrirait sur-le-Champ entre les deux Puissances.

La seconde est, que Sa Majesté Britannique continue à faire Cause commune avec l'Empereur,

mais qu'alors Elle consente que la Trêve Maritime offre à la République Française des Avantages égaux à ceux que la Trêve Continentale assure à la Maison d'Autriche.

Et à cet Egard, la Comparaison est facile à établir.

Par l'Armistice Continental, la Cour de Vienne acquiert le Moyen de réorganiser Ses Armées, de convertir en Hommes, en Armes, en Munitions de toute Espece, les Subsidés que l'Angleterre lui paie; de fortifier, d'approvisionner, ses Places de seconde et troisième Ligne qui se trouvaient en mauvais Etat, parceque la Marche rapide des Armées Françaises n'avaient pas été prévue. Ainsi Asoppo, Palma Nova, Venise, Veronne, et Lintz, avaient été négligées; chaque Jour leurs Fortifications se relèvent. Ulm, Ingolstadt, quoque bloquées améliorent leur défensive: et c'est l'Armistice qui leur procure cet Avantage; car au Moment où ces Places se sont trouvées investies, l'Ennemi ne pensait qu'à assiéger les nôtres, et par conséquent les siennes n'étaient pas préparées à une Attaque aussi prochaine.

Par l'Armistice Continental l'Impression des Victoires des Armées Françaises diminue, leur Effet s'affaiblit. Six Mois de Repos suffiroient pour que le moral & le matériel des Armées Autrichiennes se trouvaient rétablis, pour que les Vaincus ne fussent plus frappés de l'Ascendant des Vanqueurs, & pour que cette Chance de Supériorité, si bien acquise à la République, fut encore pour elle à ressaisir.

Ce

Ce feroit également par Suite de l'Armistice Continental que le Royaume de Naples en Proie à tous les Genres de Calamités, à tous les Germes d'Insurrection, peut se réorganiser & offrir de nouvelles Ressources aux Ennemis de la France.

C'est à la Faveur de l'Armistice, enfin, que des Lévées d'Hommes se font en Toscane, dans la Marche d'Ancone, que partout l'Autriche se prépare de nouveaux Moyens de Défense, que partout sa Position, qui peut-être étoit désespérée, s'améliore, tandis que les Avantages de la République ou s'atténuent ou disparaissent.

Déjà le Premier Consul a fait à l'Amour de la Paix un assez grand Sacrifice de ces Avantages. S'il continuait à ne point en tirer Parti, ce ne seroit plus Modération mais faiblesse ; ce ne seroit plus le Moyen d'arriver à la Conclusion de la Paix, mais celui de perpétuer la Guerre.

Peut-être au Jugement des Hommes d'Etat le Gouvernement Français a-t-il déjà trop différé à user de la Chance qui lui étoit favorable ; mais il ne l'a fait que sur les Assurances positives qui lui avoient été données d'une Paix prompte & séparée.

Aujourd'hui que les deux Cours Alliées insistent pour une Négociation commune & une Paix Générale le Gouvernement Français sent trop bien qu'un Ouvrage aussi compliqué n'est pas l'Affaire de quelques Jours, & il doit éviter de se mettre dans une Position qui seroit diamétralement contraire à l'Accélération des Négociations, en don-

nant aux Puissances Ennemies, & principalement à l'Autriche, un Intérêt réel à prolonger les Discussions pour acquérir chaque Jour les Moyens de se présenter avec plus d'Avantage sur le Champ de Bataille, & par conséquent avec plus de Prétensions au Congrès.

C'est pour éviter en Partie un inconvénient aussi manifeste, que la France tient à ce que l'Armistice Maritime soit stipulé de Façon à être l'Equivalent de l'Armistice Continental, & à mettre de son Côté l'Angleterre dans le Cas de désirer la Conclusion de la Paix.

Les Avantages que la République Française peut & doit se proposer de l'Armistice Maritime sont la libre Navigation de ses Bâtimens, & les Facilités nécessaires pour ses Communications avec les Iles de France, & de la Réunion et avec ses Colonies d'Amérique; & quand Elle en seroit Usage pour envoyer quelque mille Hommes de plus en Egypte, les Places de l'Empereur n'acquièrent-elles point pareillement chaque Jour une nouvelle Force sur le Continent ?

Quand à l'Approvisionnement des Ports mêmes de la République, la France ne manque pas de Moyens intérieurs de Circulation, & cet Objet n'est pour Elle que d'un petit Intérêt. Quand le Gouvernement Britannique propose que les Ports & les Places bloquées ne puissent recevoir que pour quatorze Jours de Vivres, songe-t-il que la plupart de ces Etablissmens sont encore loin de manquer de Vivres, & que d'ailleurs la Saison qui s'approche
en

en faisant qu'un Blocus Maritime est presque toujours illusoire, rend tout-à-fait inutile la Faveur proposée ?

Que si enfin on considère combien la Grande Bretagne, si Elle veut sincèrement la Paix, a peu d'Intérêt à empêcher que la France conserve & consolide le petit Nombre d'Établissemens d'outre Mer qui lui restent ; combien par de nouvelles Acquisitions de ce Genre l'Angleterre accroît encore l'Inquiétude, la Jalousie de l'Europe, & la Disposition qu'Elle montre à ne pas regarder indifféremment l'Extension sans Bornes de la Puissance & du Commerce Anglois, on sera porté même en Convenant des Avantages que la République Française doit trouver dans une Trêve Maritime, à ne pas croire que cette même Trêve puisse être si éminemment défavantageuse à l'Angleterre que son Gouvernement paroît le supposer.

En conséquence le Souffigné est chargé de se référer à la double Proposition que la présente Note renferme.

S'il s'agit d'une Négociation, & d'une Paix séparée, l'Armistice peut être admis, tel qu'il est proposé par le Ministère de Sa Majesté Britannique.

S'il s'agit d'une Négociation commune, & d'une Paix Général, l'Armistice doit être stipulé tel qu'il est proposé au Nom du Gouvernement François, & qu'il sera de nouveau détaillé par le Souffigné.

(Signé) OTTO.

Hereford Street, 29 Fruc. An 8.

(16 Sept. 1800.)

(TRANS-

(TRANSLATION.)

NOTE.

THE Underfigned has transmitted to his Government the Note of his Excellency Lord Grenville, dated the 7th of September. The Counter-Projet which accompanied it having been laid before the First Consul, he has observed that the Armistice, such as it was proposed, did not offer any Advantage to the French Republic, and consequently could not compensate to it for the serious Inconveniences which would result to it from the Continuance of the Continental Armistice: Hence it follows, that the Counter-Projet could be admitted inasmuch only as the Question might simply be to settle the Preliminaries of a particular Arrangement between France and England by a Truce alike particular to the two States; but the Effect of the proposed Maritime Truce being intended to serve as a Compensation to the French Republic for the Continental Truce, the former ought to afford to it Advantages equal to the Inconveniences which it experiences from the latter.

The Underfigned is therefore directed to make two Proposals, of which His Britannic Majesty may choose that which may appear to Him most consonant to the Interest of His Dominions or to His Continental Relations.

The first is, that the Projet for an Armistice be drawn up and admitted in Terms analagous to those

those which have been proposed by the Ministry of His Britannic Majesty, but solely under the Supposition that this Armistice should be independent of the Events of the Continent, and relative only to a separate Negotiation to be immediately opened between the two Powers.

The second is, that His Britannic Majesty should continue to make Common Cause with the Emperor, but that, in that Case, he should consent that the Maritime Truce may offer to the French Republic Advantages equal to those secured to the House of Austria by the Continental Truce.

And with this View the Comparison may be easily settled.

By the Continental Armistice the Court of Vienna acquires the Means of re-organising its Armies, of converting into Men, Arms, Ammunition of every Kind, the Subsidies paid to it by England; of fortifying and victualling its places of the second and third Line, which were in a bad State, in consequence of the rapid March of the French Armies having not been foreseen. Thus Asoppo, Palmanova, Venice, Verona, and Lintz, had been neglected; every Day their Fortifications are repairing. Ulm, Ingolstadt, although blockaded, are improving their Means of Defence; and it is the Armistice which procures to them this Advantage; for at the Moment when those Places were invested, the Enemy thought only of besieging

ing ours, and consequently their own were not prepared for so early an Attack:

By the Continental Armistice, the Impression made by the Victories of the French Armies diminish, their Effects are weakened. Six Months of Repose would suffice to restore the moral and physical Strength of the Austrian Armies; to allow the conquered to recover from the Impression of Ascendancy acquired by the Conquerors, and to make it necessary once more to regain that contingent Superiority so well earned by the Republic.

It would also follow as a Consequence of the Continental Armistice, that the Kingdom of Naples, now a Prey to every kind of Calamity, and containing all the Seeds of Insurrection, might be re-organized, and furnish fresh Resources to the Enemies of France. It is by means of the Armistice, in a Word, that Men are raising in Tuscany and in the Marshes of Ancona; that Austria is everywhere preparing new Means of Defence; that everywhere she is ameliorating her Position, which perhaps was desperate, whilst the Advantages of the Republic are diminishing or disappearing.

The First Consul has already made to the Love of Peace a sufficiently great Sacrifice of those Advantages: if he should continue to derive no Benefit from them, it would no longer be Moderation, but Weakness; it would no longer be the Means of arriving at the Conclusion of Peace, but that of perpetuating the War. Perhaps in the Judgment of Statesmen the French Government may have
already

already too long delayed to avail itself of the Contingency which was favourable to it, but it has only done so upon the positive Assurances which had been given to it of a speedy and separate Peace.

At this Moment, when the two allied Courts insist upon a joint Negotiation and a General Peace, the French Government is too well aware that so complicated a Work is not to be accomplished in a few Days, and it ought to avoid putting itself in a Position which would be diametrically opposite to the Acceleration of the Negotiations, by giving to the inimical Powers, and principally to Austria, a real Interest to prolong the Discussions, in order daily to acquire the Means of appearing with greater Advantage in the Field of Battle, and consequently with greater Pretensions at the Congress.

It is with a View of avoiding, in Part, so manifest an Inconvenience, that France requires that the Maritime Armistice should be stipulated in such a Manner as to be equivalent to the Continental Armistice, and as to place England on its Side, in the Situation of being desirous of the Conclusion of Peace. The Advantages which the Republic can and ought to expect from the Naval Armistice, are the free Navigation of her Ships, and the Facilities necessary for her Communications with the Islands of France and Reunion, and with her American Colonies; and although she should make use of it to send a few thousand Men more to Egypt, do
not

not the Places belonging to the Emperor daily acquire in like Manner fresh Strength upon the Continent ?

With respect to the victualling the Harbours of the French Republic itself, internal Means of Circulation are not wanting; and this Object is but of small Importance to it. When the British Government proposes that the Harbours and Places blockaded should only receive Provisions for fourteen Days, is it aware that the greater Part of those Establishments are still far from wanting Provisions? and besides that, the Season is drawing near which, by rendering a Naval Blockade almost always illusory, makes the proposed Favour quite useless.

That if, besides, it be considered how little it is the Interest of Great Britain, if it be sincerely desirous of Peace, to prevent France from preserving and consolidating the small Number which remain to her of foreign Settlements, and how much England, by making new Acquisitions of this Nature, would augment still farther the Uneasiness and Jealousy of Europe; and the Disposition which it evinces not to see with Indifference the unlimited Extension of the Power and Commerce of England, it will be acknowledged, at the same Time, that the Advantages to be derived to the French Republic from a Maritime Truce are admitted; that this Truce would not be so eminently disadvantageous to England as her Government appears to imagine.

The Undersigned is, in consequence, directed to refer to the double Proposition contained in the present Note.

If

If a separate Negotiation and Peace be the Object, the Armistice may be agreed to in the Form in which it is proposed by the Ministry of his Britannic Majesty.

If a joint Negotiation and a General Peace be the Object, the Armistice must be stipulated in the Manner in which it is proposed in the Name of the French Government, and as it will be subsequently detailed by the Underigned.

(Signed) OTTO.

Hereford Street, 29 Fruc. An 8.

(Sept. 16, 1800.)

(No. 29.)

Lord Grenville to M. Otto.

Sir, Downing Street, Sept. 20, 1800.

I ENCLOSE to you the Answer to the last Note which I have had the Honor to receive from you,

You will there observe that His Majesty is very far from thinking it proper for him to accede to the Principle which is again urged in that Note as the Foundation of a Naval Armistice.

While this fundamental Difference subsists, there can be little Reason to hope that any Advantage could

could arise from discussing the Details of such a Measure.

The Counter-Projet which I had the Honor to transmit to you, is considered here as going to the full Extent of Concession which can with any Colour of Reason be asked by France, or which could be admitted by this Country, even in that View in which alone there can be any Question of Naval Armistice.

If you are authorized to make any such new Proposals as shall be really consistent with those Principles which form the only admissible Basis for such a Transaction, I am confident you will not be unwilling, in a Matter of so much Importance, to transmit them to me in Writing.

Should they then appear to His Majesty's Government to afford any sufficient Grounds for further Discussion of this Point, I shall very readily receive the King's Commands for authorizing a proper Person to converse with you on the Subject of those Communications.

I have the Honor to be, &c.

GRENVILLE.

(No. 30.)

(No. 30.)

NOTE.

THE Note enclosed in M. Otto's Letter of the 16th Instant has been laid before the King.

His Majesty has not seen in that Paper any fresh Suggestions on the Subject of a Naval Armistice which can at all vary the Answer transmitted to M. Otto on the 7th Instant.

Neither His Majesty's known Engagements to His Allies, nor His Desire, so recently expressed, to contribute to the Restoration of general Tranquillity in Europe, will admit of His separating His Interests from those of the Powers with whom He is connected in the Prosecution of the War; much less could He entertain the Idea of consenting, for such a Purpose, to any Naval Armistice; a Measure which He has already declared to be totally inapplicable to a separate Discussion of the Interests of Great Britain and France.

This Proposal being therefore one which the French Government must have known that His Majesty could not accept, the supposed Alternative professed to be offered to His Majesty's Choice, amounts to nothing more than to the simple Renewal of a Demand already rejected. No fresh Inducement is stated which should now dispose His Majesty to consent to those Conditions of Armistice for joint Negotiation which He had before considered as wholly inadmissible.

F

From

From Information received since the last Communications on this Subject took place, His Majesty has observed with equal Surprise and Concern that the Orders for giving Notice of the Termination of the Continental Armistice must actually have been dispatched from Paris at the very Time when the Continuance of that Armistice was proposed to His Majesty as the Condition and Inducement for a Maritime Truce. And if in Addition to this Circumstance His Majesty were to collect the present Dispositions of His Enemies from the Terms respecting His Conduct and Views with which their recent Communications with His Allies are filled, the Conclusion must be extremely unfavourable to the Existence of any Disposition to Conciliation.

His Majesty is however still willing to wave all Reference to these Considerations, and to regulate His Conduct by the Motives which He has already explained. He still looks, therefore, to a Naval Armistice on suitable Conditions, as to a Sacrifice which He may be induced to make in order to prevent the Renewal of Hostilities on the Continent, and thereby to facilitate those joint Negotiations for General Peace which might perhaps be accelerated by such an Arrangement, although they are by no Means necessarily dependent on it.

But when it is required that the Extent of the Sacrifice which His Majesty is to make should be regulated neither by any fair Standard of Equality, nor by the ordinary Rules which govern such

Trans-

Transactions; when, without any Reference to the Interests of His own People, He is called upon to proportion His Concessions to the exaggerated Estimates which His Enemies have formed of the Benefits derived to His Allies from the Continental Armistice; and when, on such Grounds as these, Conditions are insisted on which even these could not warrant, it becomes necessary to state distinctly that His Majesty neither recognizes this Principle, nor, if He did, could He agree in this Application of it.

His Majesty is not, indeed, called upon to appreciate the relative Advantages which the Prolongation of the Continental Armistice might really afford to each of the Belligerent Powers. But even of those Circumstances which are enumerated by the French Government as exclusively advantageous to Austria, many are evidently beneficial to both Parties, and are so nearly to an equal Extent.

If during the Interval of Repose which has already elapsed, the Austrian Armies have been re-established, recruited, and reinforced, France has not been inattentive to the same Measures. If the Subsidies which His Majesty has furnished are applied by His Ally to the Formation or Transport of Magazines; France has appropriated to similar Purposes the rigorous Contributions exacted from those Countries which the Existence of an Armistice has not exempted from that Calamity. The Places in the Rear of the Austrian Army may have been repaired;

but the Position of the French Armies has also been strengthened, and even the blockaded Towns may perhaps suffer more from the increased Length of the Blockade, than they can profit by any internal Measures for improving their Defences.

Into other Points of Comparison His Majesty forbears to enter. No Part of the varied Successes of the Continental War appear to him to entitle His Enemies to presume on any Ascendant over the Spirit of the Austrian Armies.

But were the Assertions of the French Government in these Respects better grounded than His Majesty conceives them to be, the Principle itself would still be inadmissible. It is impossible that His Majesty can admit that Compensation is to be demanded from Him for the Extent of those Advantages, whatever they might really be, which His Ally might derive from the Continuance of the Armistice; yet even such Compensation is in a great Degree offered by His Majesty. In consenting to a Naval Armistice on such Terms as have already been acceded to on His Majesty's Part, He has made considerable Sacrifices, and placed within the Reach of His Enemies great and obvious Advantages which their Representation in vain endeavours to depreciate; He has thereby given to all Europe a strong Pledge of His Concern for the general Welfare, and to His Enemies a decided Proof of pacific Disposition.

But to yield to the present Demand would be to sacrifice those Means of present Defence, and

those Pledges of future Security which have been acquired by such great and memorable Efforts, and which He can never be expected to forego till the Result of those Negotiations, in which He has declared his Readiness to concur, shall have crowned his Endeavours for the Happiness of His People by the Restoration of safe and honourable Peace.

(Signed) GRENVILLE.

Downing Street, Sept. 20, 1800.

(No. 31.)

Londres, le 4 Jour Compl. An 8.

(21 Sept. 1800.)

Milord,

J'AI reçu Hier à 10 Heures du Soir la Lettre et la Note que Votre Excellence m'a fait l'Honneur m'adresser, et j'y ai vu avec le plus vif Regret que Sa Majesté et Son Ministère ne sont pas encore disposés à accéder aux Principes de Conciliation renfermés dans la Note que j'ai eu l'Honneur de Vous remettre le 16 de ce Mois.

Ce n'est pas seulement pour discuter ces Principes, mais pour proposer à Votre Excellence de nouveaux Moyens de Rapprochement que j'ai cru devoir lui demander une Entrevue par ma Lettre du 16; et j'avais tout Lieu d'espérer que les Explications dans lesquelles je servis entre auraient pu efficacement

lever les Difficultés qui s'opposent encore à la Conclusion d'un Armistice Général.

Vous desiréz, Milord, que je vous donne ces Explications par écrit. Elles portent sur deux Points, qui dans Votre première Note sont représentés comme les plus importans : Le Mouvement des Escadres de la République pendant l'Armistice et le Sort des Alliés de la Grande Bretagne.

Je suis autorisé à consentir que les Vaisseaux de Ligne Français ne sortent point des Ports vù ils se trouvent actuellement, et si Sa Majesté insiste à faire comprendre ses Alliés dans l'Armistice proposé, je pourrai encore consentir à les faire jouir des mêmes Avantages que ceux de la République.

Les Intentions du Premier Consul se trouvent de nouveau Détaillées dans le Projet que j'ai l'Honneur de Vous adresser ci-joint, et pour ne pas différer une Communication de cette Importance, je remets à un autre Moment la Reponse que je dois à la Note de Votre Excellence.

J'observerai seulement que quand même l'Armistice Autrichien eut été rompu dans cet Intervalle, il seroit facile le faire reprendre aux Armées respectives leurs anciennes Positions dans le Cas où Sa Majesté accederoit aux dernières Propositions qui lui sont faites.

J'ai l'Honneur d'etre, &c.

(Signé) OTTO.

(TRANS-

(TRANSLATION.)

London, the 4th Complimentary Day,
Year 8. (Sept. 21, 1800.)

My Lord,

I RECEIVED Yesterday at Ten o'Clock at Night, the Letter and the Note which your Excellency did me the Honor to address to me; and I have learnt from them with the deepest Regret, that His Majesty and His Ministry are not yet disposed to accede to the Principles of Conciliation contained in the Note which I had the Honor to transmit to you on the 16th of this Month.

It was not merely with a View to discuss those Principles, but in order to propose to your Excellency fresh Means of Reconciliation, that I felt it my Duty to request, in my Letter of the 16th, to have an Interview with you; and I had every Reason to hope that the Explanations into which I should have entered would effectually have obviated the Difficulties which are still opposed to the Conclusion of the General Armistice.

You desire, my Lord, that I should give you those Explanations in Writing. They relate to two Points, which in your first Note are represented as being the most important: The Power of altering the Positions of the Squadrons of the Republic during the Armistice, and the Fate of the Allies of Great Britain.

I am authorized to consent that the French Ships of the Line shall not go out of the Harbours where
F 4 they

they are at present ; and if His Majesty insists upon his Allies being included in the proposed Armistice, I am authorized also to consent that they should enjoy the same Advantages as those of the Republic.

The Intentions of the First Consul are anew detailed in the Projet which I have herewith the Honor to enclose ; and in order not to delay a Communication of such Importance, I defer until another Opportunity my Answer to your Excellency's Note.

I shall only observe, that even if the Austrian Armistice should have been broken in this Interval, it would be easy to make the respective Armies resume their former Positions in the Event of His Majesty's acceding to the last Proposals which have been made to Him. I have the Honor to be, with the most respectful Consideration, &c.

(Signed) OTTO.

(No. 32.)

(No. 32.)

PROJET.

ATTENDU qu'il est convenu que des Negotiations pour une Paix Général seront immédiatement entamées entre la République Française & ses Alliés d'une Part, & Sa Majesté Imperiale, Sa Majesté Britannique, & leurs Alliés, de l'autre, & que l'Armistice qui a déjà été conclu entre les Armées de la République Française & celles de Sa Majesté Imperiale peut-être prorogé si un Armistice équivalent est conclu entre les Forces de la République Française & celles de Sa Majesté Britannique, les deux Gouvernemens ont arrêté de conclure le dit Armistice aux Conditions suivantes :

Article I.

Toutes Hostilités par Terre & par Mer entre les deux Parties seront suspendues & ne seront renouvelées qu'après une Notification préalable d'un Mois avant la Fin de l'Armistice. Dans toutes les Parties du Monde l'Armistice ne pourra être rompu que par l'Ordre même des Gouvernemens Contractants, & les Hostilités ne pourront recommencer qu'un Mois après la Notification qui aura été faite par le Général ou Officier commandant de l'une des deux Nations à celui de l'autre Nation.

Article II.

Il sera immédiatement envoyé par les deux Gouvernemens des Ordres aux Officiers Commandants dans

dans les différentes Parties du Monde-pour qu'ils se conforment à cette Convention. On donnera des Passeports aux Avisos qui porteront ces Ordres, et les Officiers de Sa Majesté Britannique qui traverseront la France pour cet Objet recevront les faufs Conduits et les Facilités nécessaires pour accélérer leur Voyage.

Article III.

Toutes les Prises faites dans aucunes des Parties du Monde pendant la Durée de l'Armistice, par aucun Officier ayant actuellement reçu la Notification de cette Convention seront restituées. Et en général (que cette Notification ait été faite ou non) toutes les Prises faites dans la Manche ou dans les Mers du Nord après douze Jours à compter de l'Echange des Ratifications de cette Convention seront rendues, et à cet Egard, les Termes seront fixés pour les autres Parties du Monde conformément aux Stipulations du 22 Article des Préliminaires de la dernière Paix; d'où il résulte qu'à compter du Jour du dit Echange tous Batimens de Commerce de l'une ou de l'autre Nation pourront se mettre en Mer et naviguer librement comme avant la Guerre.

Article IV.

Malthe et l'Egypte seront assimilées aux Places d'Allemagne qui quoique bloquées par l'Armée Française ont été appellées à jouir du Bénéfice de l'Armistice Continental. Il sera fourni à Malthe
pour

pour quinze Jours de Vivres à la Fois et à Raifon, de dix milles Rations par Jour. Pour l'Egypte, Six Fregates Françaises pourront partir du Port de Toulon, débarquer à Alexandrie, et en revenir fans qu'elles puiffent être vifitées et fans qu'aucun Empêchement puiffe être mis à leur traversée foit par les Vaiffeaux Anglais foit par ceux des Alliés de la Grande Bretagne. Un Officier Parlementaire Anglais s'embarquera à cet Effet sur une des Fregates et traversera la France pour se rendre à Toulon.

Article V.

Le Blocus de Brest, de Toulon, et de tout autre Port Français sera levé, et tous les Capitaines Britanniques recevront l'Instruction de ne pas interrompre le Commerce de tout Bâtiment entrant ou fortant. Cependant aucun Vaiffeau de Ligne à deux et trois Rangs de Batterie actuellement mouillé dans les fufdits Ports ne pourra en sortir avant le Rénouvellement des Hostilités pour prendre une autre Station : Mais les Frégates, Corvettes, et autres petits Bâtiments de Guerre pourront librement sortir et naviguer, et lorsqu'ils se rencontreront en Mer avec les Vaiffeaux de Sa Majesté Britannique, ils conserveront les Usages établis avant la Guerre,

Article VI.

Les Troupes de Terre à la Solde de Sa Majesté Britannique ne pourront débarquer dans aucun
Port

Port d'Italie pendant la Durée du présent Armistice.

Article VII.

Les Alliés de la France savoir, l'Espagne, la République Batave, et Gênes participeront au Bénéfice du présent Armistice. (Si Sa Majesté Britannique insiste à faire comprendre ses Alliés dans l'Armistice, ils jouiront des mêmes Avantages que ceux de la France.)

Article VIII.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée, et les Ratifications seront échangées dans le Terme de dix jours ou plutôt s'il est possible,

(TRANSLATION.)

PROJET.

IN Consideration of its having been agreed that Negotiations for a General Peace shall be immediately opened between the French Republic and its Allies on one Side, and His Imperial Majesty, His Britannic Majesty, and their Allies, on the other Side; and that the Armistice which has already been concluded between the Armies of the French Republic and those of His Imperial Majesty may be prolonged, if an equivalent Armistice should

should be concluded between the Forces of the French Republic and those of His Britannic Majesty, the two Governments have agreed to conclude the said Armistice upon the following Conditions :

Article I.

All Hostilities both by Sea and Land between the two Nations shall be suspended, and shall not be renewed until after a Month's Notification prior to the End of the Armistice. In all Parts of the World the Armistice shall not be broken without the express Order of the contracting Governments; and Hostilities shall not be renewed until a Month after the Notification which may have been given by the General or Commanding Officer of one of the two Nations to that of the other Nation.

Article II.

Orders shall be immediately transmitted by the two Governments to the Commanding Officers in the several Parts of the World, directing them to act in Conformity with this Convention. Passports shall be given to the Persons who shall carry out these Orders; and the Officers of His Britannic Majesty who shall travel through France for this Purpose shall receive Safe Conducts and the necessary Facilities for accelerating their Journey.

Article III.

Article III.

All Prizes made in any Part of the World during the Continuance of the Armistice, by any Officer having actually received the Notification of this Convention, shall be restored. And generally (whether this Notification shall have been made or not) all Prizes made in the Channel, or in the North Seas, after twelve Days, to be computed from the Exchange of the Ratifications of this Convention, shall be restored; and, in regard to this Object, the Terms shall be fixed for the other Parts of the Word conformably to the Stipulations of the 22d Article of the Preliminaries of the last Peace; whence it results, that, computing from the Day of the said Exchange, all trading Vessels of either Nation shall have the Power of putting out to Sea, and of navigating freely as before the War.

Article IV.

Malta and Egypt shall be assimilated to the Places in Germany, which, although blockaded by the French Army, have been permitted to enjoy the Benefit of the Continental Armistice. Malta shall be furnished with Provisions for fifteen Days at a Time, at the Rate of ten thousand *Rations* per Diem. With regard to Egypt, six French Frigates shall have the Liberty of sailing from Toulon, of unlading at Alexandria, and of returning without being searched, and without suffering any Opposition

sition during their Passage, either from English Ships or from those of the Allies of Great Britain. An English Officer of Rank shall for this Purpose embark on board one of the Frigates, and shall travel through France on his Way to Toulon.

Article V.

The Blockade of Breſt, of Toulon, and of every other French Port shall be raised; and all British Captains shall receive Instructions not to interrupt the Trade of any Vessel either entering therein or going out thereof. No Ship of the Line, however, of two or three Decks, actually at Anchor in the said Ports, shall be at Liberty to go out before the Renewal of Hostilities, for the Purpose of changing its Station; but Frigates, Sloops, and other small Ships of War, may freely go out and navigate, and in the Event of their meeting at Sea with Ships belonging to His Britannic Majesty, they shall observe the Customs established before the War.

Article VI.

The Land Forces in the Pay of His Britannic Majesty shall not have the Power of disembarking in any Port of Italy during the Continuance of the present Armistice.

Article VII.

The Allies of France, namely, Spain, the Batavian Republic, and Genoa, shall participate in the
Benefit

Benefit of the present Armistice. (If His Britannic Majesty insist upon including His Allies in the Armistice, they shall enjoy the same Advantages with those of France.)

Article VIII.

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the Ratifications shall be exchanged in the Space of ten Days or sooner if it should be possible.

(No. 33.)

Hereford Street, 23 Sept. 1800
(2 Vendemiaire, An 9.)

Milord,

J'AI l'Honneur d'adresser à Votre Excellence la Réponse à la Note qu'elle a bien voulu me transmettre le 20 de ce Mois. Je vous prie d'agréer en même Temps l'Hommage des Sentiments respectueux avec lesquels j'ai l'Honneur d'être,

Milord,

De Votre Excellence,
Le très-humble et très obeissant Serviteur,

(Signé) OTTO.

(TRANS-

(TRANSLATION.)

Hereford Street, Sept. 23, 1800.

My Lord, (2 Vendemiaire, 9.)

I HAVE the Honor to address to your Excellency the Answer to the Note which you had the Goodness to transmit to me on the 20th of this Month.

I beg that you would at the same Time accept the Homage of those Sentiments of Respect with which I have the Honor to be, &c.

(Signed) OTTO,

(No. 34.)

NOTE.

DANS tout le Cours de la Négociation dont le Souffigné a été chargé, il a eu Lieu de regretter que le Défaut de Communications plus directes avec le Ministère de Sa Majesté l'ait mis dans l'Impossibilité de donner à ses Ouvertures Officielles les Développement nécessaires. Le Résultat de ses dernières Communications, auxquelles repond la Note qu'il a eu l'Honneur de recevoir le 20 de ce Mois, rend cet Inconvenient bien plus sensible encore.

La première Partie de cette Note paraissant mettre en Doute la Sincérité des Dispositions du Gouvernement

vernement Français d'entamer des Négociations pour une Paix Générale, le Souffigné doit entrer à ce Sujet dans quelques Détails, qui justifieront pleinement la Conduite du Premier Consul.

L'Alternative proposée d'une Paix *séparée* dans le Cas où Sa Majesté n'agrèerait pas les Conditions d'un Armistice Général, loin de dévoiler un Défaut de Sincérité, fournit au contraire la Preuve la plus forte des Dispositions conciliantes du Premier Consul ; elle est une Conséquence nécessaire de la Déclaration faite par le Souffigné le 4 de ce Mois. En Effet, il a eu l'Honneur de prévenir le Ministère Britannique, " Que si cet Armistice n'est pas conclu avant le 11 Septembre, les Hostilités *auront été recommencées* avec l'Autriche, et que dans ce Cas le Premier Consul ne *pourra plus consentir à l'Egard de cette Puissance, qu'à une Paix séparée et complète.*" Cet Armistice n'a pas été conclu à l'Epoque indiquée ; il étoit donc naturel de s'attendre éventuellement à une *Paix séparée* avec l'Autriche, et dans le même Hypothèse à une *Paix également séparée avec la Grande Brétagne*, à moins qu'on ne pense que les Calamités qui accablent depuis huit Années une grande Partie de l'Europe doivent se perpetuer, et n'avoir d'autre Terme que la Destruction totale de l'une des Puissances Belligérentes.

Ce n'est donc pas le Gouvernement Français qui propose à Sa Majesté de séparer ses Intérêts de ceux de ses Alliées, mais ayant vainement tenté de les réunir dans un Centre commun, et les trouvant *separés de fait* par le Refus de l'Angleterre de déposer

poser sur l'Autel de la Paix quelques Avantages particuliers, dont la France avait déjà fait le Sacrifice, le Premier Consul a donné une nouvelle Preuve de ses Dispositions en indiquant un autre Moyen de Conciliation que le Cours des Evénemens amenera tôt où tard.

Conformément à l'Avis que le Souffigné a donné le 4 de ce Mois, on a notifié en Effet la Cessation de l'Armistice Continental à l'Epoque qui avait été fixée; mais le Contre-Projet du Ministère Britannique, expédié par le Souffigné le 8 de ce Mois, étant arrivé à Paris le 10, et Sa Majesté Impériale ayant paru convaincue que Son Allié ne se refuserait point à un Armistice admissible, le Premier Consul s'est décidé de nouveau à faire retarder de huit Jours la Reprise des Hostilités. Les Ordres ont été expédiés sur le Champ aux Armées d'Allemagne et d'Italie, et dans le Cas où ces Ordres fussent arrivés trop tard dans cette dernière Contrée, et qu'à la Suite de quelque Opération Militaire, les Généraux Français eussent eu quelques Succès, il leur était ordonné de reprendre la Position qu'ils occupaient le Jour même du Renouveau des Hostilités.

Le simple exposé de ces Faits suffira sans Doute pour démontrer que le Gouvernement Français n'a jamais pu avoir l'Intention de masquer par des Négociations simulées une nouvelle Attaque contre l'Autriche, et qu'au contraire il a apporté dans toute cette Négociation la Franchise, la Loyauté, qui seules peuvent assurer le Rétablissement de la Tranquillité générale que Sa Majesté et son Ministère ont tant à-Cœur.

En vain chercheroit on les Preuves d'une Intention contraire dans quelques Expressions refermées dans les Communications Officielles du Gouvernement Français avec les Alliés de Sa Majesté. S'il s'agissait surtout d'une des dernières Lettres écrites à Monsieur le Baron de Thugut, que le Souffigné aurait pu communiquer lui-même s'il en eut trouvé l'Occasion, cette Lettre prouverait que le Gouvernement Français, toujours Ami de la Paix, n'a paru se plaindre des Intentions de la Grande Brétagne, que parcequ'il avait tout Lieu de les croire contraires à un Systême solide de Pacification.

Le Souffigné n'est entré dans ces Détails que parcequ'à la veille des Négociations qui pourraient être entamées, il importe aux Conseils des deux Puissances d'être réciproquement convaincus de la Sincérité de leurs Intentions, et que l'Opinion qu'ils peuvent avoir de cette Sincérité, est le Seul Garant du Succès des Négociations.

Quand au second Point de la Note que le Souffigné a eu l'Honneur de recevoir, il doit se référer à sa Lettre du 16, par laquelle il a prevenu Son Excellence Lord Grenville qu'il était chargé de donner des *Explications satisfaisantes* touchant les principales Objections du Gouvernement Britannique à l'Armistice proposé, en le priant instamment de faciliter des Communications verbales avec le Ministère. Il était donc difficile de croire que le Gouvernement Français s'en tiendrait sans *aucune Modification* à ses premières Ouvertures, car dans ce Cas il eut été très-inutile de solliciter une Entrevûe pour donner des *Explications satisfaisantes*.

En

En parlant des Compensations requises pour faire cadrer l'Armistice Naval avec la Trêve Continentale, le Ministère de Sa Majesté trouve qu'il y a de l'*Exagération* dans la Balance établie par le Gouvernement Français ; une Discussion formelle sur cet Objet serait sans doute déplacée. Après les Succès variés d'une Guerre qui a produit tant d'Evènemens extraordinaires, il est difficile de douter de l'Influence morale de ces Evènemens sur les Armées, sur les Peuples, sur les Gouvernemens eux-mêmes ; et les Inductions que l'on peut en tirer dans le Moment actuel paraissent justifier l'Opinion que le Souffigné a cru devoir manifester. S'il y a de l'*Exagération* dans cette Opinion, elle est partagée par les Ennemis de la République eux-mêmes, qui ont tout employé pour prolonger la Trêve, et qui ne se sont fait aucun Scrupule de se servir même de la Voie des Négociations simulées pour gagner du Temps. Les Préliminaires, signés par M. le Comte de St. Julien et défavoués par Sa Cour, en font un Exemple mémorable, et il faut bien que la Continuation de l'Armistice Continental soit un Sacrifice pour la République, puisqu'on a tout fait pour le lui arracher.

Mais en admettant même l'Existence de ce Sacrifice le Ministère de Sa Majesté déclare formellement que l'on ne saurait exiger de lui un Sacrifice analogue.—Il n'appartient certainement pas à la France de juger jusqu'à quel Point les Engagemens pris par Sa Majesté envers ses Alliés peuvent gêner ses Dispositions à cet Egard, mais le Droit de la

France demander le Prix du Sacrifice qu'Elle a fait, et qu'Elle est encore prête à faire, paraît incontestable. Le Premier Consul a donné à l'Europe des Gâges réitérés de ses Dispositions pacifiques, il n'a cessé de les manifester envers les Cabinets intéressés dans cette Lutte, et quand même sa Modération relèverait les Espérances des Ennemis du Gouvernement Français, Elle sera toujours l'unique Guide de ses Actions.

Malgré cette Différence dans la Manière de considérer plusieurs Questions accessoiress, et Préliminaires de la Pacification projetée, le Souffigné doit se féliciter de trouver dans toutes les Communications qu'il a eu l'Honneur de recevoir jusqu'ici les même Assurances des Dispositions de Sa Majesté de travailler au Rétablissement de la Tranquillité de l'Europe; et il negligera aucune Occasion de faire valoir ces Dispositions près de son Gouvernement.

(Signé) OTTO.

Hereford Street, 22d Septembre 1800.

(1 Vendem. An 9.)

(TRANSLATION.)

NOTE.

DURING the whole Course of the Negotiation with which the Undersigned has been charged, he has had Cause to regret that the Want of more direct

direct Communications with His Majesty's Ministry has rendered it impossible for him to give to his Official Overtures the necessary Explanations. This Inconvenience is rendered still more striking by the Result of his last Communications, to which the Note which he had the Honor to receive on the 20th of this Month is an Answer.

The first Part of this Note appearing to intimate a Doubt respecting the Sincerity of the Dispositions of the French Government to begin Negotiations for a General Peace, the Undersigned cannot avoid entering into some Details upon this Subject, which will fully justify the Conduct of the First Consul.

The proposed Alternative of a *separate Peace*, in the Event of His Majesty's not accepting the Conditions for a General Armistice, far from evincing a Want of Sincerity, furnishes, on the contrary, the strongest Proof of the conciliatory Dispositions of the First Consul: It is a necessary Consequence of the Declaration made by the Undersigned the 4th of this Month. In Effect, he has had the Honor to apprise the British Ministry " That if
 " that Armistice be not concluded before the 11th
 " of September, Hostilities *will have been renewed*
 " with Austria, and that in that Case the First
 " Consul *will no longer be able, with regard to this*
 " *Power, to consent to any except a separate and com-*
 " *plete Peace.*"

That Armistice was not concluded at the Date fixed upon; it was therefore natural eventually to

expect a *separate Peace with Austria*, and, according to the same Supposition, a Peace in like Manner *separate with Great Britain*, unless it is thought that the Calamities with which a great Part of Europe has been for eight Years past oppressed, should be continued without other Hope of Termination than that of the complete Destruction of one of the Belligerent Powers.

It is not therefore the French Government which proposes to His Majesty to separate his Interests from those of his Allies ; but having in vain attempted to unite them in a common Center, and finding them separated *in Fact* by the Refusal of England to lay down on the Altar of Peace some special Advantages of which France had already made a Sacrifice, the First Consul has given a fresh Proof of his Dispositions, by pointing out another Means of Reconciliation which the Course of Events will bring about sooner or later.

In Conformity with the Advice which the Underfigned had transmitted on the 4th of this Month, Notification was given of the Cessation of the Continental Armistice at the Term which had been fixed upon, but the Counter-Projet of the British Ministry, dispatched by the Underfigned upon the 8th of this Month, having reached Paris on the 10th, and His Imperial Majesty having appeared to be convinced that his Ally would not withhold his Consent to an admissibile Armistice, the First Consul determined again to retard for eight Days the Renewal of Hostilities. Orders were immediately
 dispatched

dispatched to the Armies of Germany and Italy, and in the Event of those Orders arriving too late in the last mentioned Country, and of the French Generals having obtained Successes in consequence of any Military Operation, they are ordered to resume that Position which they occupied on the precise Day on which Hostilities were recommenced.

The simple Relation of these Facts will without Doubt be sufficient to prove that the French Government never can have intended to cover, by pretended Negotiations, a fresh Attack upon Austria; and that, on the contrary, it has acted throughout this Negotiation with that Frankness and Loyalty which can alone ensure that Re-establishment of general Tranquillity which His Majesty and His Ministry have so much at Heart.

It would be in vain to look for Proofs of a contrary Intention in some Expressions contained in the Official Communications of the French Government to the Allies of His Majesty. More especially if such Proofs were attempted to be drawn from one of the last Letters written to Baron Thugut, which the Underigned might have communicated himself, if he had found an Opportunity; that Letter would prove that the French Government, always a Friend to Peace, appeared to complain of the Intentions of Great Britain only because it had every Reason to believe them contrary to a solid System of Pacification.

The Underigned has entered into these Details only because, on the Eve of Negotiations which
may

may be entered upon, it is of Importance to the Councils of the two Powers to be reciprocally convinced of the Sincerity of their Intentions, and because the Opinion which they may have of that Sincerity is the only Pledge for the Success of the Negotiations.

With respect to the second point in the Note which the Underfigned has had the Honor of receiving, he is to refer to his Letter of the 16th, in which he informed his Excellency Lord Grenville that he was directed to give *satisfactory Explanations* relative to the principal Objections of the British Government to the proposed Armistice, and entreated him at the same Time, to facilitate the Means of verbal Communications with the Ministry. It was therefore difficult to believe that the French Government would adhere, without *any Modification*, to its first Overtures; for, in that Case, it would have been quite useless to solicit for an Interview, in order to give satisfactory Explanations.

In speaking of the Compensations requisite, in order to place the Naval Armistice upon a Footing with the Continental Truce, His Majesty's Ministry think that there is some Preponderance in the Balance settled by the French Government; a formal Discussion upon this Point would undoubtedly be displaced. After the various Successes of a War which has produced so many extraordinary Events, it is difficult to doubt of the moral Influence of those Events upon Armies, upon Nations, upon Governments themselves; and the Deductions which
may

may be drawn from it at present, appear to justify the Opinion which the Undersigned has felt it his Duty to state. If there be any Exaggeration in this Opinion, it is shared with the Enemies of the Republic themselves, who have employed every Effort to prolong the Truce, and who have not scrupled to use the Means of pretended Negotiations in order to gain Time. The Preliminaries signed by the Count de St. Julien, and disavowed by his Court, are a memorable Example of this ; and the Prolongation of the Continental Armistice must necessarily be considered as a Sacrifice on the Part of the Republic, since every Effort has been employed to extort its Consent to it.

But even whilst His Majesty's Ministry admit the Existence of this Sacrifice, they formally declare that an analogous Sacrifice cannot be expected to be made on the Part of His Majesty. It certainly does not become France to judge how far His Majesty's Engagements with His Allies may counteract His Inclination in this Respect; but France appears to have certainly an undoubted Right to demand the Price of the Sacrifice which she has made, and which she is still willing to make. The First Consul has given to Europe repeated Pledges of his pacific Dispositions; he has never ceased manifesting them to the Cabinets interested in this Contest; and even although the Hopes of the Enemies of the French Republic should be excited by his Moderation, it shall always be the sole Guide of his Actions.

Not-

Notwithstanding this Difference in the Manner of viewing several Questions accessory and preliminary to the proposed Pacification, the Undersigned cannot but congratulate himself on finding, in all the Communications which he has hitherto had the Honor of receiving, the same Assurances of His Majesty's Disposition to employ His Efforts towards the Re-establishment of the Tranquillity of Europe; and he will neglect no Opportunity of placing this Disposition in its strongest Light to his Government.

(Signed) OTTO.

Hereford Street, Sept. 22, 1800.
(1 Vendemiaire, Year 9.)

(No. 35.)

NOTE.

Downing-Street, Sept. 24, 1800.

LORD Grenville presents his Compliments to M. Otto, and has the Honor to acquaint him, that, in consequence of his Desire for an Opportunity of conversing with a Person of Confidence on the Part of this Government respecting the different Proposals which have been made as to the Conditions of a Naval Armistice, His Majesty has been pleased to give Authority to Mr. Hammond to meet M. Otto for that Purpose.

It is the sincere Wish of His Majesty's Government, that the Result of their Conversation on this Subject

Subject may tend to facilitate the great Work of a General Pacification on a solid and permanent Basis.

Lord Grenville requests M. Otto to be assured of his high Consideration.

(No. 36.)

To Mr. Hammond.

Sir, Downing-Street, Sept. 24, 1800.

M. OTTO having been empowered by the French Government to negotiate a Convention for an Armistice between this Country and France, with a View to Negotiations for General Peace; and having expressed an earnest Desire to enter into verbal Explanations on this Subject with some Person properly authorized on His Majesty's Part; the King, willing to omit nothing which can contribute to the great Work of restoring solid and permanent Tranquillity to Europe, has been pleased to make Choice of you for the Purpose of meeting M. Otto, and of receiving from him such verbal Communications as he may wish to make in Addition to what has already passed in Writing respecting the different Projets proposed on either Side for a Naval Armistice.

This Letter will point to you the Reasons which induce His Majesty to consider M. Otto's second Projet as unsatisfactory in all the material Points in which it differs from the Counter-Projet prepared here by His Majesty's Command.

You

You will state to M. Otto His Majesty's Decision in this Respect, and you will enter without Reserve into the Discussion of the Grounds on which it rests. His Majesty has no other Object in View in this Transaction than to contribute to the Restoration of General Peace. He is not unwilling for this Purpose to sacrifice some present Advantage, in the Opinion that by so doing he consults the permanent Interests of His People ; but He can neither consent, at the Opening of a Negotiation for Peace, to place himself in a Condition of Inferiority to His Enemies, such as the Result of the War in which He is engaged by no Means warrants ; nor does he think that the Object of Peace itself would be promoted or accelerated by rendering the intermediate Situation of His Enemies, under Colour of an Armistice, such as they might be desirous to prolong, rather than to terminate it by any admissible Conditions of Peace.

His Majesty sees, in the last Projet of the French Government, little Progress towards an Accommodation ; it is indeed stated in M. Otto's Letter to me of the 21st Inst. that satisfactory Explanations are there given on the two most important Points which had been insisted on by His Majesty.

The Admission of His Majesty's Allies to partake in the same Terms of Armistice in which France claims to include her Allies, is indeed not only an important, but an indispensable Condition of any such Agreement ; but there can be no Ground for representing this equal and necessary Arrangement
as

as a Concession on the Part of France, rather than on the Part of His Majesty. And with respect to the other Point stated by M. Otto, (that which relates to the French Ships of War,) the Offer of France still falls very short both of the King's Demand, and of what would be necessary even to assimilate the Naval Armistice to that of the Continent. The Article in its present Shape is therefore so far from containing any Facility which could soften or remove the other Obstacles in the Way of an amicable Conclusion of this Business, that it must still be regarded in Justice as an unequal and inadmissible Claim on the Part of the King's Enemies.

On other Points of no less Importance, the new Projet adheres to the former Demand, and even in one Instance brings forward a fresh Pretension which had not before been stated.

In examining in Detail the several Articles of the proposed Convention, some verbal Differences between the English Counter-Projet and the second French Projet, are not intended to be here adverted to.

If the more important Points of the Negotiation were satisfactorily adjusted, it would be necessary to make some Remarks on these, and possibly also to propose, for the Sake of Precision, a few verbal Alterations or Additions to the original Articles: But none of these appear likely in that Case to create any serious Difficulty.

It might be sufficient to include under this Reserve the two Variations made in the Preamble of the Convention.

But

But it may perhaps be more proper for you to state at this Time the following Observations respecting them, viz.

1. That the Mention of the respective Allies, in the Form in which those Words are introduced into the French Preamble, seems to imply of Necessity, not only that the Negotiations shall (as is the King's Intention) be carried on with a View to a General Peace alone, so as to include in the final Adjustment all the Allies on both Sides, but also that those Allies should immediately be called upon to take Part by their Ministers in the proposed Negotiations: a Question which His Majesty conceives may more conveniently be reserved to future Discussion, instead of being prejudged by the Terms of any separate Agreement for an Armistice between Great Britain and France.

2. The Expressions used in the French Project respecting the Continental Armistice appear unbecoming towards the King's Allies, and cannot therefore be agreed to by His Majesty.

3. The Word "*Equivalent*," as there inserted, seems to assume, as the Basis of the Naval Armistice, that Principle of full Compensation to which the King has already refused His Consent.

It should in like Manner be mentioned by you, that, in the first Article, the Omission of the Words "*Forces of*" seems to imply a more complete Suspension of the State of War between the two Powers than accords with the Nature of an Armistice, or is consistent with the Conditions, (particularly those respecting

respecting the Transport of Naval and Military Stores) on which His Majesty judges it necessary for Him to insist.

In the remaining Part of this Article very material Changes are made in the Conditions offered by His Majesty. These are,

1. The extending the Term of Notice for the Cessation of the Armistice, from fourteen Days to one Month.

2. The requiring that this Notice of one Month should in all Cases be given only in consequence of Orders from the respective Governments, and by the Commanding Officer of one Country to the Commanding Officer of the other, in the different Parts of the World respectively.

3. The total Omission of the Clause by which the Continuance of the Naval Armistice was made to depend on that of the Continent.

It is probable that the two first of these Alterations are principally proposed in the same View which led to the Omission of this last Clause; and the Effect of the Whole would be, that if the Armistice with Austria should at any Period be terminated by France, His Majesty would still for some considerable Time be restrained from assisting His Ally.

The bare Statement of such a Condition is sufficient to shew that it never can be admitted by His Majesty, who is bound by the Spirit of His Engagements to assist His Ally immediately on the Renewal of Hostilities; and to whom no other Inducement

H

has

has or could be offered for acceding to a Naval Armistice, except that of preventing the Renewal of Hostilities on the Continent.

The last Clause in the English Article must therefore be absolutely insisted on, and no Variation can be admitted in the other Parts of it which shall be inconsistent with the Object of that Stipulation.

The Term of fourteen Days is in fact longer than that which is provided in either of the two Conventions of Armistice in Italy and Germany, and appears fully sufficient for all the Purposes which such a Provision is fairly intended to answer; and as His Majesty enters into any Stipulation for Naval Armistice in the sole Hope of a speedy Conclusion of the intended Negotiations, He does not think proper to bind Himself for so long a Period as a Month, should He have the Mortification of finding that His Enemies refuse to adopt those Principles of Negotiation on which alone He judges that permanent Tranquillity can be restored to Europe.

The French Government has in all its Communications expressed the same Hope and Desire for the speedy Conclusion of Peace, and has even professed an Anxiety to render this Object more peculiarly interesting to His Majesty. There can therefore be no Reason to wish on either Side that the Term of Notice should be prolonged so much beyond the Necessity of the Case.

The third Article of the Counter-Projet was drawn with a Reference to the corresponding Articles
in

in the Preliminaries of Peace in 1763 and 1783, from which it differs only by the more explicit Statement of that which is understood to have been the established Practice of the Courts of Admiralty on both Sides with respect to such Ships of War as should have made any Prizes after having actually received Notice of the Cessation of Hostilities.

The Addition to this Article proposed in the French Projet is objectionable ;

First, Because there seems to be no Necessity for explaining the general Effect of a Speculation which has in the Practice of the two last Negotiations for Peace been found sufficiently distinct, and has fully answered the Purpose intended by it.

Secondly ; Because the Explanation there given is not a just Conclusion from the Premises. It is indeed true, that by the Effect of this Article Ships clearing out directly from Great Britain or France might immediately after the Exchange of the Rati- fications sail in full Security, because they might carry out with them Notice of the Armistice ; but the same Thing would not be true of Ships in other Parts of the World, as these (under the express Terms of this Article) could not be entitled to Restitution if captured, unless Proof were given that actual Notice of the Armistice had been received by their Captors, or unless the Period assigned by this Article for the Part of the World where the Capture took place had expired before the actual Capture.

3. The Expression of navigating freely as before the War might be construed to extend to the Ad-

mission of the Ships of one Country into the Ports of the other respectively; to which, for obvious Reasons, the King would not think proper to agree. And these Words are besides inconsistent both with the Stipulations on which His Majesty thinks it necessary to insist respecting the Transport of Troops and of Naval and Military Stores, and even with those which France proposes as to the blockaded Places.

The fourth Article of the French Projet still maintains the Contradiction of professing to assimilate the blockaded Places to those of Germany, and of applying to them at the same Time Conditions which are the very Reverse of those adopted in the German Armistice.

The Manner in which that Armistice is spoken of in this Article affords another Instance of Expressions unnecessarily and improperly offensive to the King's Allies.

There seems no Reason for altering this Paragraph of the Counter-Projet, which is perfectly distinct, and conveys no Implication injurious to either Party.

The King cannot agree that 10,000 Rations *per Diem* shall be assumed as the Consumption of Malta. If the Fact be so, it will appear to the Commissaries who will be named for that Purpose, in Conformity to those Stipulations of the German Armistice to which France professes the Intention of assimilating this Article.

But a still more material Objection arises to the Proposal respecting Egypt.

If

If the Situation of the French Army in that Country were to become Matter of Discussion between the two Governments, His Majesty and His Allies have a Right, on every Principle of good Faith as practised between civilized Nations, to require that the French should evacuate Egypt on the Terms stipulated in the Convention of El Arish; those Stipulations having been ratified both by the Turkish Government and by the French Commanding Officer; and His Majesty having also instructed his Admiral commanding in those Seas to accede to them as soon as they were known here. This Demand would be made with the more Reason, because, even subsequent to the Recommencement of Hostilities in Egypt (under Circumstances to which His Majesty forbears to advert,) an Official Engagement was entered into by General Kleber in his Letter to the Kaimakan, dated the 10th April 1800, by which that General, then commanding in Chief the French Army in Egypt, and consequently possessing full Powers to bind his Government in this Respect, formally undertook that the Convention of El Arish should be executed so soon as the King's Acquiescence in it should be notified to him.

But when, instead of performing this Engagement, the French Government, under a Pretence of assimilating Egypt to the blockaded Places of Germany, requires that six Frigates shall carry thither, without Molestation or Search, and even under the open Protection of a British Officer, whatever Articles the French Garrisons there may

be most in need of, it is natural to ask by what Article in the German Armistice Ulm or Ingolstadt are to receive in covered Waggon as many Troops, as much Provisions, and as great a Quantity of every Species of Arms, Ammunition, and Stores, as might be conveyed to Egypt in six French Frigates? And this Comparison is still more striking, when it is considered that by the German Armistice the blockaded Places are expressly restrained from receiving, during the Armistice, any Thing which can supply additional Means of Defence: And on the other Hand, that the Proposals for the Evacuation of Egypt originated on the Part of the French themselves, who now desire to avail themselves of the Benefit of an Armistice to strengthen that very Position which, by an Agreement made in consequence of their own Request, they have actually engaged to abandon.

This Part of the French Article is therefore wholly inadmissible. It contains a Pretension unjust in itself, injurious to His Majesty's Interest, and repugnant both to the general Principle of the Negotiation, and to that which is specified in the very Beginning of the Article itself: And it implies a Breach of Faith on His Majesty's Part towards an Ally to whom he is bound by a solemn Treaty.

Besides all these Considerations, His Majesty has no Power to restrain, by such an Engagement as is here proposed, the Ships of the Ottoman Porte from resisting the Admission of this Supply into Egypt, unless His Ally had acceded to the Armistice, which,

which, if it be concluded on such Terms as these, there can be no Reason to expect.

The Manner in which this particular Subject of Egypt is spoken of both in the Projet and in M. Otto's Note of the 16th Instant, makes it necessary that you should distinctly declare that the Offer which was contained in the Counter-Projet goes in this Respect to the very utmost Extent that His Majesty's Regard for the Interests of his Subjects can admit of. And His Majesty is confident that no Want of Conciliation can justly be imputed to Him on Account of His having at once brought forward explicitly and without Reserve the Whole of those Concessions which it appeared possible for Him to make.

This Observation applies equally to the remaining Articles of the Projet.

In the fifth Article His Majesty finds himself obliged to insist that the Freedom of Navigation there stipulated for on the Part of His Enemies shall not be extended to the Transport of Troops or of Naval and Military Stores. The Justice of this Exception and its Necessity are too obvious to require any farther Explanations in Addition to those contained in the Official Notes; and it follows as a Consequence of this Principle, as well as from the Nature of the Subject itself, that the Restriction as to the sailing of Ships of War would be wholly illusory, were it, as now proposed, confined to Ships of the Line only.

It would, indeed, neither be indifferent in Practice nor just in Principle, that France should be enabled

during the Armistice to change the Stations of all her Frigates ; but when it is considered how much it is the Usage of the French Marine to employ those Vessels for the Transport of Troops and Military Stores, the two Parts of this Article become so blended with each other that they cannot be separated ; and His Majesty cannot depart from the latter without equally abandoning the former.

The Naval Supply of the Articles which are here in question, is indeed stated in one of M. Otto's Notes to be a Point of small Moment to France. If it be so, she can with less Reason insist on a Point which can in this Case only be insisted on with a View to affect those general Principles which are connected with all the most important Maritime Interests of Great Britain.

The sixth Article contains a new Demand on the Part of France, superadded to all the Pretensions advanced in her first Projet. It rests on no just or equitable Principle ; for while France would restrain His Majesty from strengthening by the Addition of more Troops the Forces of His Allies in Italy, she reserves the Power of augmenting her own Armies there, or of assisting her Allies elsewhere, precisely as it may suit her future Plans of Operations.

The French Government now possesses, de Facto, no Means to prevent the Transport of His Majesty's Troops by Sea ; and it is not reasonable that it should acquire the Right of doing so by the Terms of an Armistice which conveys to His Majesty no fresh Means of impeding the future Operations of His

His Enemies beyond those which are already in His Power, but which even concedes to them considerable Advantages of which they are not now in Possession.

It remains only to speak of the Alterations made in that Article which regards the Allies on both Sides.

His Majesty's Objections to the Form proposed on the Part of France for this Article were detailed in my Answer to the first Projet.

If France considers her Allies in the Light of independent Powers, and is in the future Negotiations to treat on that Footing respecting her own Interests and theirs, it is necessary that this Principle should equally be adhered to in the preliminary Arrangements which precede the Negotiation. It has not appeared to His Majesty by the Communication of any regular or official Act, that the French Government has any Authority to treat in this Respect for Spain or Holland. His Majesty, on His Side, has received no such Authority from His Allies; and it would be inconsistent with good Faith were He, without such Authority, to engage in their Name for an Armistice with France in any other Form than that which is usual in such Cases; namely, that they shall be at Liberty to accede to the Convention if they think fit. In that Form His Majesty is ready to admit the Article as with respect to the Allies of France, and in that Form only can He agree to include His own Allies in this Engagement.

If

If the Article were concluded in the Terms now proposed by France, His Majesty would be bound by the Obligations of good Faith to observe the Armistice towards Spain and Holland, while on the other Hand He could have no reciprocal Claim on those Powers, grounded either in Justice or in the Law or Practice of Nations. Nor could He require the Restitution even of a single Merchant Vessel captured by a Spanish or Dutch Ship of War.

Those Powers, if regarded by France as Independent, cannot be bound by her Act; and must be admitted as Contracting Parties acceding by a regular Diplomatic Transaction to the Terms of the Armistice, before they can be considered as under any Obligation to fulfil those Terms.

These Considerations are indeed so obvious, that it is not easy to imagine, in what View the French Government has proposed to alter the Article from the Form in which His Majesty had offered to consent to it.

I have now only to add, that should the Armistice be concluded, His Majesty would think it necessary, for the Purpose of accelerating the Negotiation, (an Object of which the French Government has declared itself to be also very desirous), to limit a Period for its Continuance beyond which it would not be His Majesty's Intention, nor would it be consistent with the essential Interests of his Dominions to extend it.

The Power of doing this will be reserved to either Party by the Terms of the Convention. Nor does

this Power result only from the Articles as here proposed : It is equally reserved to both Parties by the Effect of the present French Projet ; and there is, therefore, no Necessity for specifying in the Convention itself either His Majesty's Intention in this Respect, or (still less) the precise Period of such Limitation.

But it may appear on His Majesty's Part more consistent with that Openness which His Majesty is desirous to observe in this whole Transaction, that you should express this Intention to M. Otto in this Stage of the Business, reserving to a subsequent Period the formal Notification to be duly made in His Majesty's Name, agreeably to the Terms of the Convention.

You are at Liberty to communicate to M. Otto in the Course of your Discussions the Whole or any Part of this Letter, and to allow him to take either a Copy or such Extracts from it as he may wish.

(Signed) GRENVILLE.

Mr. Hammond.

(No. 37.)

NOTE.

LORD Grenville presents his Compliments to M. Otto, and has the Honor to send him herewith the official Answer to his Communication of the 23d Instant.

He

He requests M. Otto to accept the Assurances of his high Consideration.

Downing Street, Sept. 25, 1800.

(No. 38.)

NOTE.

IT is by no Means the Wish of the British Government to prolong a written Controversy on the Circumstances to which the first Part of M. Otto's Note of the 23d Instant principally relates : It is however necessary, in order to vindicate the Accuracy of the former Statement which the Underigned was directed to make, that the Dates of those Facts should, in Reply to M. Otto's Note, be more particularly detailed ; but this will be done without adding any fresh Comment upon them.

The first Proposal made to His Majesty, on the Part of France, for a Naval Armistice grounded on that of the Continent, was dated on the 24th of August.

The Notices for terminating the Continental Armistice were given by the French Generals on the 27th and 29th of August ; the Orders for that Purpose must therefore have been actually sent from Paris before the 24th.

His Majesty's Answer was transmitted by the Underigned to M. Otto on the 29th, the very Day on which the last of the Notices was given in Germany. That Answer referred to the Austrian Armistice

justice as still existing ; and it was not till the 4th of September that the first Intimation was received here of the Measures taken in Germany for giving Notice of its Termination.

With respect to the Letter of M. Talleyrand to the Baron de Thugut, to which M. Otto refers, it was also dated the 24th August. The French Government, so far from being at that Time entitled to consider His Majesty's Intentions as hostile to the Re-establishment of a solid System of Pacification, was then actually in Possession of the Notification given in His Majesty's Name, through His Ally, of His Readiness to concur in immediate Negotiations for that very Purpose.

It will be with real Pleasure that His Majesty will see the Conclusions which appeared to him to result from these Facts disproved by the Event. The best Evidence which the French Government can now give of the Sincerity of its Dispositions for Peace, will be found in the Facilities it may afford for expediting both the Commencement and the successful Termination of that Negotiation into which the King and His Ally the Emperor of Germany have already expressed their Willingness to enter, and which can alone, by a general and comprehensive Arrangement of the Interests of all the Parties concerned in this extensive War, afford to Europe the Hope of solid and permanent Tranquillity.

With respect to the supposed Case, in which it is stated, that France would not agree to treat with Austria but for a separate Peace, the Fortune of
War

War can alone decide on the Means of realizing such a Pretension; but whenever it shall be insisted on by France, after the Experience of what has already passed, it will afford to all other Powers, not a Presumption only, but the painful and decided Conviction, that the French Government has no real Desire to put a final and conclusive Period to the Calamities of Europe. No Man who considers the past Events of this Contest with Attention, or who is capable of judging with Accuracy of the present Situation of Affairs, can believe that if the present War is to be terminated only by a Succession of separate Treaties between the different Powers now engaged in it, any permanent or solid Basis of general Tranquillity could be established.

As His Majesty has, in Compliance with M. Otto's Wishes, authorized a proper Person to confer with him respecting the different Proposals for a Naval Armistice, it is unnecessary to add any Thing here on that Subject. This Step affords a new Proof of His Majesty's Dispositions to lend himself to every reasonable Facility which can contribute to a General Pacification, and every Part of His Majesty's Conduct will be found conformable to those Dispositions.

Downing-Street, Sept. 25, 1800.

(No. 39.)

(No. 39.)

Downing Street, Sept. 25, 1800.

My Lord,

I HAVE the Honour to inform your Lordship that, in Obedience to His Majesty's Commands signified to me in your Lordship's Letter of Yesterday, I have this Morning had a Conference with M. Otto on the Subject of the proposed Armistice between Great Britain and France.

Having suggested to M. Otto whether it might not tend to facilitate the Discussion, that we should read over the Counter-Projet transmitted by your Lordship to him on the 7th of this Month, and the Projet delivered by him on the 21st in Answer to it; and that I should state to him, from the Instructions which I had received from your Lordship, the Objections on the Part of His Majesty's Government to the several Articles of that Projet; and M. Otto having acquiesced in this Suggestion, we pursued regularly this Course of Proceeding.

As it does not appear necessary that I should enter into any Detail of the Conversation which took place between us on those Parts of the Projet which M. Otto conceived that the French Government would relinquish, it will be sufficient for me to observe on this Part of the Subject,

1st, That M. Otto conceived that the French Government would, in forming a regular Convention for an Armistice, have no Objection to adopting the Preamble in the Counter-Projet instead of that which was proposed in the French Projet.

2dly, That

2dly, That concurring in the Opinion that the Phrase in the 4th Article, "*Apellée à jouir du Benefice de l'Armistice Continental,*" might be (for the same Reasons which applied to particular Passages of the Preamble) liable to a Construction offensive to His Majesty's Allies, he doubted not that the French Government would consent to omit that Phrase in the 4th Article.

3dly, That he doubted not that the French Government would have no Difficulty in agreeing to omit the concluding Clause of the 3d Article, from the Words "*d'ou il resulte,*" to the End.

With respect to the Clause in the 1st Article of the Counter-Projet, by which the Duration of the Naval Armistice is made to depend on the Continuance of the Continental Armistice, M. Otto conceived that, by allowing the Officers commanding the British Forces to recommence Hostilities as soon as the Cessation of the Continental Armistice should be signified to them, too great a Latitude was left to their Discretion; and that it therefore seemed most adviseable that, in that Event, the Cessation of the Naval Armistice should be signified from Government to Government, as would be the Case whenever, for any Reason, either Great Britain or France might think it for their Interest that the Naval Armistice should cease. But upon my Representation of the Advantages which France, on the one Hand, would derive from her local Position and the Facility of collecting its Forces on any Point which it might determine to attack, and the Delay, on the other, which would necessarily occur

occur in the Receipt of the Intelligence in England of the Rupture of the Armistice in any distant Part of the Territory of her Allies, M. Otto agreed to refer this Subject to future Consideration.

We then proceeded to the 4th and 5th Articles ; on which M. Otto remarked, that they contained the only Points to which his Government attached much Importance ; and, such were its Sentiments respecting them, that he conceived that it would not consent to any Armistice of which they did not form a Part. With respect to the Calculation of the Provisions for Malta at the Rate of 10,000 Rations per Diem, M. Otto did not specify any Data on which that Calculation was founded, but remarked briefly, that the Quantity of Rations was not to be exactly apportioned to the precise Return of the Garrison, but that a certain Number of Rations, in Proportion to their respective Ranks, was to be allowed to the General and Staff Officers ; and that although a considerable Number of the Inhabitants had been sent from the Forts occupied by the French Troops, there still remained many for whose Wants Provision was to be made. He was however of Opinion that there might not be much Difficulty in arranging this Point in the Manner proposed in the Counter-Projet, founded on the Stipulations in the German Armistice relative to Ulm and Ingolstadt.

On the Subject of that Part of the Fourth Article of the French Projet, which requires that six Frigates should be allowed to sail from Toulon for Egypt, and be exempted from Search, M. Otto
read

read to me Part of a Dispatch from M. Talleyrand, expressive of the Interest which the whole French Nation takes in that Part of the Army now in Egypt, and assigning the Desire of contributing to the Comfort and Security of that Army as the principal Inducement to the Conclusion of the Armistice on the Part of the French Government. M. Otto added, that he would not conceal from me that the Reinforcement which France intended to send to Egypt amounted to 1200 Men, and that the Supply of Military Stores consisted chiefly of 10,000 Muskets. The Language of M. Otto in this Part of our Conversation, and of M. Talleyrand's Letter, appeared to me to be so decisive and peremptory, that I was induced to inquire of him distinctly, whether I was to understand that this Stipulation was a Point from which the French Government would not recede? M. Otto replied, that, in his Opinion, the French Government would not recede from it.

On my adverting to the Variation in the 5th Article between the Counter-Projet and the French Projet, by which the latter stipulates, that the French Frigates and smaller Ships of War should be allowed freely to sail from and return to the Ports of France which have hitherto been in a State of Blockade, M. Otto remarked, that the Motive which induced the French Government to insist on this Clause was the Desire of opening a secure Mode of Communication between France and her distant Possessions. To this Insinuation I replied, that if such was the sole Object which France had in view,
it

it might be as effectually attained by the Employment of unarmed Vessels as of Ships of War. M. Otto did not appear desirous of urging this Point much farther, but concluded this Part of the Conversation by expressing his Conviction, that the French Government would insist upon this Point, and considered itself as having gone to the utmost extent of Sacrifice which could with Justice be required from it, in consenting that the Ships of the Line should not alter their Position. With respect to that Part of the Counter-Project which restrains the Conveyance by Sea of Naval or Military Stores, M. Otto is of Opinion that the French Government would agree to that Restriction.

The 6th Article in the French Project, although entirely new, was not considered by M. Otto as likely to be insisted upon by his Government; but he declined giving any positive Opinion to that Effect, until he had had farther Time for the Consideration of its Tendency.

M. Otto's principal Objection to the Form in which the Article marked 6 in the Counter-Project is worded, was founded on an Opinion, that unless Great Britain and France assumed the Right of including their respective Allies in the Naval Armistice, without waiting for their express Concurrence in it, much Delay would necessarily arise, and the two Powers (Great Britain and France) might be involved in fresh Hostilities in consequence of either of them deeming it expedient to attack the Allies of the other. He afterwards intimated a Persuasion, that the Article might be amended by inserting a

Clause which should fix a specific Period in which the Allies of Great Britain or France should signify their Accession to or Dissent from the Naval Armistice.

Towards the Close of our Conversation, M. Otto acquainted me that he would state to me in Writing the Objections to the Counter-Projet which he had received from your Lordship, and his Observations on the Objections that had been made by me to the Projet which he had delivered.

I have now endeavoured to give your Lordship a faithful Account of the Substance of my Conference with M. Otto. The very ample Instructions with which I was provided, and which (as I have mentioned in the Beginning of this Letter) I read to M. Otto, precluded me from adding many Observations; and as I have promised to communicate to that Gentleman Extracts of such Part of my Instructions as relate to the 4th and 5th Articles, the two essential Subjects of Difference between us, he will have the Means of retracing in his Recollection the precise Grounds of the Objections to his Proposal which have occurred to His Majesty's Government:

Before I conclude this Letter, I cannot avoid mentioning, that in the Course of our Conversation, M. Otto threw out the most pointed Assertions of the Determination of France, in the Event of the Naval Armistice not being concluded, to pursue the Course of her Victories in Germany and in Italy, and of the Facilities that the Conquest of Naples and Sicily (Events which he regarded as speedy and inevitable

inevitable) would afford to the French Government of obtaining by Force those Objects relative to Egypt and Malta which it had expected to acquire through the Naval Armistice. Of these Assertions, though frequently repeated, I judged it proper to take no Notice, but to recal his Attention to the Subject immediately under Discussion.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

GEO. HAMMOND.

The Right Hon. Lord Grenville.

(No. 40.)

Hereford Street, 4 Vendemiare, An 9.

Monfieur,

(26 Sept. 1800.)

JE m'empresse de vous envoyer le Refumé des Observations que j'ai eu l'Honneur de vous faire sur les principaux Points contestés ; je désire bien sincèrement que Votre Ministère les trouve satisfaisantes. Je vous prie en même Tems de vouloir bien m'adresser, comme nous en sommes convenus, Copie des Raifonnemens auxquels répondent ces Observations.

J'ai l'Honneur d'être avec haute Considération,
&c.

(Signé) OTTO.

M. Hammond, Sous Secrétaire d'Etat.

(TRANSLATION.)

Hereford Street, 4 Vendemiaire, Year 9.
(Sept. 26, 1800.)

Sir,

I LOSE no Time in sending you the Substance of the Observations which I had the Honor of making to you upon the principal contested Points ; I most sincerely wish that your Ministry may think them satisfactory. I beg of you, at the same Time, to have the Goodness to address to me, as was agreed upon between us, a Copy of the Reasonings to which these Observations are in Answer. I have the Honor, &c.

(Signed) OTTO.

Mr. Hammond.

(No. 41.)

LE Citoyen Otto n'ayant trouvé dans les Observations qui lui ont été faites par Monf. Hammond, que trois Objets qui lui paroissent réellement de Nature à retarder la Conclusion de l'Armistice proposé, s'est réservé de les prendre en Considération et d'y répondre par écrit.

Après avoir murement réfléchi sur le Bût de la Trêve Maritime sur la Position actuelle de la France.

I *

et

et de ses Ennemis, sur l'Influence que cette Négociation doit avoir à l'Egard de la Pacification Générale, il doit faire sur les Points contestés les Observations suivans :

1. L'Article 4, en accordant dix milles Rations par Jour à la Garnison de Malthe, n'a pas seulement en Vue les Troupes effectives de la République, mais toutes les Personnes attachées à la Garnison, et même les Habitans de la Place. Le Citoyen Otto ne croit pas qu'il soit possible de diminuer cette Quantité, cependant pour écarter autant que possible l'Objection qui lui a été faite, et pour se rapprocher de plus en plus de la Façon de voir du Gouvernement Anglais, il consent à borner cette Evaluation au premier Mois, Delai nécessaire pour donner aux Commissaires respectifs la Facilité de convenir de la Quotité suffisante pour l'Entretien de la Garnison & de la Place.

Le second Point renfermée dans l'Article 4 touchant l'Expedition libre de Six Frégates pour l'Egypte paroît avoir donné plus d'Inquiétude encore que le Précédent, il a été l'Objet d'une Discussion plus animée. A cet Egard le Citoyen Otto ne peut s'empêcher d'observer de nouveau, que si le Gouvernement François a proposé d'assimiler les Places d'Egypte à celles d'Ulm et Ingolstadt, il n'a pû le faire, et il ne l'a fait effectivement que par l'Analogie qu'il y a entre ces Places à l'Egard du Blocus; car sous tout autre Rapport la Comparaison eut été inexacte. En Effet Personne n'ignore que les Places d'Egypte ne sont pas comme Ulm et

Ingolstadt dans le Cas d'être *approvisionées*, puisqu'on ne sauroit les empêcher de tirer des Pays environnans toutes les Subsistances qui leur sont nécessaires ; que d'ailleurs ces Places ne sont pas tellement bloquées qu'Elles puissent tomber facilement au Pouvoir des Ennemis. On n'a donc pû entendre par cette Comparaison que l'Intention de faire accorder à ces Places bloquées par les Forces Ennemis, des Avantages analogues à ceux qui ont été accordés aux Places d'Allemagne, et ces Avantages ne peuvent être déterminés que par les Stipulations spéciales de la Convention qu'il s'agit de conclure. Le Passage libre de Six Frégates ne sauroit ajouter considérablement à la Défense de l'Armée d'Egypte ; il servira seulement à prouver à cette Armée que le Gouvernement François s'occupe de son Sort, jusq'ua ce qu'il puisse être définitivement fixé par un Traité de Paix. En se rappelant les Circonstances qui ont suivi la Capitulation signée par Sir Sidney Smith, le Citoyen Otto ne sauroit se convaincre de l'Inconvenance d'un pareil Arrangement relativement à la Porte, et il voit à Regret que les Observations qui Lui ont été faites par Mons. Hammond ne lui présentent aucun Motif suffisant pour renoncer à cette Demandé, dont le Succès peut seul établir une Sorte d'Analogie entre les Places d'Egypte et celles d'Ulm et d'Ingolstadt.

2. L'Article 5 du nouveau Projet diffère sous plusieurs Rapports de celui du Contre-Projet du Ministère Britannique ; mais il diffère bien plus encore du premier Projet que le Citoyen Otto a eu
l'Honneur

l'Honneur de remettre, en ce qu'il admet qu'aucun Vaisseau de Ligne actuellement mouillé dans les Ports de Brest et de Toulon ne pourra en sortir pendant la Durée de l'Armistice. Le Gouvernement François pense que, surtout dans la Saison actuelle, cette Concession va aussi loin qu'Elle peut aller, et qu'en admettant qu'aucun Navire armé ne sortira des dits Ports, ils laisseroient ces Ports réellement dans le même Etat où ils se trouvent dans ce Moment-ci, même dans un Etat moins favorable, puisque le Moment n'est peut-être pas bien éloigné où les Forces Britanniques n'empêcheront pas ces Vaisseaux de sortir. Tout ce que le Citoyen Otto pourra accorder à l'Egard de cet Article, c'est qu'aucune Munition navale ne puisse être importée par Mer dans les Ports de Toulon et de Brest, mais il doit insister que les Frégates et Corvettes puissent en sortir librement. Si cette Concession donne à la France l'Avantage de communiquer efficacement avec ses Colonies, il est l'Equivalent de celui que l'Angleterre retire de l'Armistice pour son Commerce, qui, à l'Ombre de cette Convention, pourra se porter dans toutes les Parties du Monde sans être inquiété par les Corsaires François.

Que si l'on vouloit encore en appeller à une Comparaison entre l'Armistice Continental et la Trêve Maritime, cette Comparaison seroit entièrement au Désavantage de la France. Sur le Continent, les Armées Françoises et Autrichiennes jouissent réciproquement de la même Liberté de prendre en de çà de la Ligne de Démarcation les Positions
qui

qui leur paroissent les plus avantageuses ; par l'Armistice Maritime au contraire, l'Angleterre conserve *seule* le Droit de disposer de ses Escadres tandis que les Vaisseaux de Ligne François restent dans leurs Ports, et ne peuvent entrer dans aucune Combinaison hostile contre la Grande Bretagne.

3. L'Article 6 du nouveau Projet touchant les Troupes Angloises qui pourront être débarquées en Italie, a été considéré comme une Prétension nouvelle de la France, puisqu'elle n'en avait fait aucune Mention dans son premier Projet ; mais cette Prétension (si Elle peut-être appelée ainsi) n'est que la Suite naturelle d'une Concession également nouvelle faite par la France, en offrant de comprendre dans l'Armistice les Alliés de la Grande Bretagne. Il seroit en Effet impossible de faire jouir le Roi de Naples des Avantages de cette Trêve, et lui laisser en même Tems la Faculté de se renforcer et de préparer de nouveaux Moyens d'Attaque contre la République.

Le Citoyen Otto doit se borner à ces Observations qui lui paroissent le plus importantes. D'autres Objections qui lui ont été faites, et qui ne portent en grande Partie que sur la Rédaction de la Convention projetée, pourront être facilement levées.

(TRANS-

(TRANSLATION.)

CITIZEN Otto having observed, in the Remarks made to him by Mr. Hammond, three Points only which appear to him to be really of a Nature to retard the Conclusion of the proposed Armistice, reserved them for future Consideration, and an Answer in Writing.

After having maturely reflected upon the Object of the Maritime Truce, upon the actual Position of France and of her Enemies, upon the Influence which this Negotiation must have with regard to a general Pacification, he feels it his Duty to make the following Observations upon the disputed Points :

1. The fourth Article, in granting 10,000 Rations per Diem to the Garrison of Malta, has not only in view the effective Troops of the Republic, but all the Persons attached to the Garrison, and even the Inhabitants of the Place. The Citizen Otto does not think that it is possible to diminish that Quantity ; nevertheless, in order to remove, as much as possible, the Objection which has been stated to him, and to accommodate himself as much as possible to the Manner in which the Subject is viewed by the English Government, he consents to limit that Estimate to the first Month, a Period necessary to afford to the respective Commissioners, the Means of agreeing upon the Amount which

which may be necessary for the Support of the Garrison of the Place.

The second Point contained in the 4th Article, respecting the Liberty of dispatching six Frigates to Egypt, appears to have given still more Uneasiness than the preceding one, and has given rise to a more animated Discussion. Upon this Subject Citizen Otto cannot avoid again remarking, that, if the French Government proposed to assimilate the Places in Egypt to those of Ulm and Ingolstadt, it could only do so, and has in Truth only done so, from the Analogy that there is between these Places with respect to the Blockade; for, in every other Respect, the Comparison is inexact; in fact, Nobody is ignorant that the Places of Egypt are not, like Ulm and Ingolstadt, in Want of being *virtualled*, since they cannot be prevented from drawing from the surrounding Countries all the Subsistence they require; that, besides, those Places are not blockaded in such a Manner as to make it probable that they should fall into the Hands of the Enemies. By that Comparison therefore it could only be meant that there should be granted to the Places blockaded by the Forces of the Enemies, Advantages analogous to those which have been granted to the Places in Germany, which Advantages can only be ascertained by the special Stipulations of the Convention which it is proposed to conclude. The free Passage of six Frigates cannot add any considerable Strength to the Army of Egypt; it will only serve to prove to that Army that the French

French Government takes an Interest in its Fate, until it shall be definitively settled by a Treaty of Peace. In reviewing the Circumstances which have followed the Capitulation signed by Sir Sidney Smith, Citizen Otto cannot perceive the Impropriety of such an Arrangement, relatively to the Porte, and he sees with Regret that the Observations made to him by Mr. Hammond do not offer any adequate Motive for relinquishing that Demand; the Acquiescence in which can alone establish any Kind of Analogy between the Places of Egypt and those of Ulm and Ingolstadt.

2. The fifth Article of the new Projet differs in several Respects from that of the Counter-Projet of the British Ministry; but it differs much more still from the First Projet which Citizen Otto had the Honor of presenting, inasmuch as it admits that no Ship of the Line now at Anchor in the Ports of Brest and Toulon, shall go out thereof during the Continuance of the Armistice. The French Government is of Opinion that this Concession, and more especially in the present Season, goes as far as it can go; and that by admitting that no armed Vessel should go out of the said Ports, they would leave those Ports really in the same State in which they are at present; indeed in a State even less favourable, since the Time is perhaps not far off when the British Forces will not prevent those Vessels from going out. All that Citizen Otto can concede, with regard to this Article, is, that no Naval Stores shall be imported by
Sea

Sea into the Ports of Toulon and Brest ; but he must insist upon the free Egress of Frigates and Sloops. If this Concession give to France the Advantage of an effectual Communication with her Colonies, it is an Equivalent to that derived from this Armistice to the Commerce of England ; which under the Protection of this Convention can extend itself to all Parts of the World, without being molested by French Privateers.

That, besides if a Reference were made to the Comparison between the Continental Armistice and the Maritime Truce, that Comparison would be found to be entirely to the Disadvantage of France. Upon the Continent, the French and Austrian Armies reciprocally enjoy the same Liberty of taking, within the Line of Demarcation, those Positions which appear most advantageous to them : By the Maritime Armistice, on the contrary, England preserves alone the Right of disposing of her Squadrons, whilst the French Ships of the Line remain in their Ports, and cannot enter into any Hostile Combination against Great Britain.

3. The sixth Article of the new Projet, respecting the English Troops which may be allowed to land in Italy, has been considered as a new Pretension on the Part of France, since she had made no Mention of it in her first Projet ; but this Pretension (if it can be called so) is only the natural Consequence of a Concession alike new, made by France, in offering to include in the Armistice the Allies of
Great

Great Britain. It would indeed be impossible to allow the King of Naples to enjoy Advantages from this Truce, and to leave him also the Power of re-inforcing and of preparing fresh Means of Attack against the Republic.

Citizen Otto confines himself to these Observations which he deems of most Importance. Other Objections which have been made, and which in great Measure relate to the Form of drawing up the proposed Convention, might be easily obviated.

(No. 42.)

NOTE.

Downing Street, Sept. 26, 1800.

MR. Hammond is directed to acquaint M. Otto that the Observations contained in his Note this Day received by Mr. Hammond, have been laid before His Majesty's Government.

The King's Servants regret that M. Otto's Instructions are not sufficiently extensive to enable him to furnish the Means of Accommodation on those Points which prevent the Conclusion of a Naval Armistice.

The only Object which His Majesty has had in View in this Discussion has been repeatedly stated, as well as those Considerations which appear to
Him

Him necessarily to limit the Extent of the Concessions which it is possible for Him to make in this Respect.

It is not conceived that any Advantage can arise from a new Statement of the same Topics, especially as it is not doubted that M. Otto in his Report of the different Arguments stated by Mr. Hammond in their Conference, will bring them in the fullest Manner under the Consideration of his Government. In offering these Concessions, His Majesty has given a strong Proof of his Willingness to make a considerable Sacrifice of the particular Interests of this Country in order to facilitate those Negotiations for General Peace in which He has expressed His Readiness to concur. He still perseveres in the same Dispositions, and will be willing to join in any proper Steps to be taken for that Purpose.

M. Otto.

(No. 43.)

Hereford Street, le 6 Vendemiaire,
(28 Sept. 1800.)

Monfieur,

J'AI reçu la Note, que vous m'avez fait l'Honneur de m'adresser le 26, et je me suis empressé d'en transmettre le Contenu à mon Gouvernement,
de

de même que les Observations renfermées dans la Pièce que j'ai l'Honneur de vous renvoyer ci-joint.

Le Ministère de Sa Majesté a rendu Justice à mes Intentions en se persuadant que j'enverrois en France un Compte détaillé et exact de la Conversation que j'ai eu l'Honneur d'entretenir avec vous. Je n'ai rien négligé pour faire connoître au Premier Consul toute l'Etendue des Observations que vous avez été chargé de me communiquer. Quelque soit le Résultat de cette Tentative des deux Gouvernemens de retablir la Tranquillité générale de l'Europe, je dois me féliciter d'avoir été près du Ministère de Sa Majesté l'Organe des Dispositions pacifiques de la France, & d'avoir été chargé de transmettre à mon Gouvernement l'Assurance des Dispositions également conciliantes de Sa Majesté.

J'ai l'Honneur d'être avec la plus haute Considération,

Monfieur, &c.

(Signé) OTTO.

M. Hammond, Sous Secrétaire d'Etat.

(TRANSLATION.)

Hereford Street, 6 Vendemiaire.

(Sept. 28, 1800.)

Sir,

I HAVE received the Note, which you did me the Honor to address to me on the 26th, and I lost no Time in forwarding the Contents to my Government ; and also the Observations contained in the Piece which I have now the Honor to return inclosed.

His Majesty's Ministry has done Justice to my Intentions, in being persuaded that I would send to France a detailed and exact Account of the Conversation which I had the Honor of having with you. I have done every Thing in my Power to make the First Consul acquainted with the whole Extent of the Observations which you were directed to communicate to me.

Whatever may be the Result of this Attempt of the two Governments to re-establish the general Tranquillity of Europe, I ought to congratulate myself for having been, to the Ministry of His Majesty, the Organ of the pacific Dispositions of France ; and for having been charged to transmit to my Government the Assurance of the equally conciliatory Dispositions of His Majesty. I have the Honor to be with the highest Consideration,

(Signed) OTTO.

To Mr. Hammond, Under Secretary of State.

(No. 44.)

(No. 44.)

Hereford Street, 14 Vendemiaire, An 9.

(6 Oct. 1800.)

Monfieur,

MONSIEUR George n'étant pas encore de retour, j'ai l'Honneur de m'adresser directement à vous pour vous demander une Entrevue dans Park-Place, ou dans tout autre Endroit que vous jugerez à propos de defigner.

J'ai l'Honneur d'être, &c.

(Signé) OTTO.

M. Hammond, Sous Secrétaire d'Etat.

(TRANSLATION.)

Hereford Street, 14 Vendemiaire, Year 9.

(Oct. 6, 1800.)

Sir,

MR. George not being yet returned, I have the Honor to address myself directly to you, to request that you will meet me in Park-Place, or in any other Place which you shall think proper to appoint. I have the Honor to be, &c.

(Signed) OTTO.

Mr. Hammond.

K 2

(No. 45.)

(No. 45.)

Sir, Downing Street, Oct. 8, 1800.

IN endeavouring to make, for the Information of His Majesty's Ministers, as accurate a Representation as I could of the Purport of the Communication which you Yesterday made to me verbally, I have felt so much Anxiety lest, in an Affair of such Importance, there should be any Mis-statement on my Part of what you said; that I cannot help expressing to you my earnest Desire that you would send me a written Minute of the Substance of this Answer in the same Manner as has been done in all the other Stages of this Discussion.

I have the Honor to be, &c.

(Signed) GEO. HAMMOND.

M. Otto.

(No. 46.)

Hereford Street, le 16 Vendemiaire, An 9.

(8 Oct. 1800.)

Monfieur,

J'AI reçu la Lettre que vous m'avez fait l'Honneur de m'adresser ce Matin pour me demander la Substance par Ecrit de la Communication que j'ai été chargé de vous faire, vûque l'Importance de l'Objet dont il s'agit vous fait craindre de n'avoir pas

pas complètement saisi le Sens de cette Communication. Je m'empresse en conséquence de vous en adresser le Résumé.

Les dernières Notes échangés et plusieurs Evénemens importans, qui ont complètement changé les Bases sur lesquelles devoit s'établir l'Armistice proposé, ayant mis un Terme à la Négociation entamée j'ai eu l'Honneur de vous informer, que nonobstant les Circonstances qui s'opposent à la Conclusion d'une Trêve Maritime, le Premier Consul est invariablement disposé à recevoir les Ouvertures qui pourront être relatives à une Négociation particulière entre la France et la Grande Bretagne, et que le Mode d'une pareille Ouverture dépend entièrement du Choix de Sa Majesté ; que lorsque le Roi jugera à propos d'envoyer pour cet Effet un Plénipotentiaire à Paris, je suis autorisé non seulement à y consentir, mais à lui remettre le Passeport nécessaire : Que si d'une autre Côté Sa Majesté préfère que les Négociations préliminaires soient entamées à Londres il me sera envoyé pour cet Effet des Pouvoirs spéciaux.

J'ai l'Honneur d'être avec une haute Considération,

Monseigneur, &c.

(Signé) OTTO.

M. Hammond, Sous Secrétaire d'Etat.

(TRANSLATION.)

Hereford Street, 16 Vendemiaire, Year 9.

(Oct. 8, 1800.)

Sir,

I HAVE received the Letter which you did me the Honor to address to me this Morning, requesting that I would acquaint you in Writing with the Substance of the Communication which I have been directed to make to you, the Importance of the Object to which it relates rendering you apprehensive lest you should not completely have seized the Meaning of the Communication, I hasten therefore to transmit the Substance of it to you.

The last Notes which were exchanged, and several important Events, which have completely changed the Basis upon which the proposed Armistice was to have been established, having put an End to the Negotiation on Foot, I had the Honor to inform you, that notwithstanding the Circumstances which are opposed to the Conclusion of a Maritime Truce, the First Consul is invariably disposed to receive any Overtures relative to a separate Negotiation between France and Great Britain, and that the Mode of such Overture entirely depends upon the Option of His Majesty: That when the King shall think proper to send for that Purpose a Plenipotentiary to Paris, I am authorized not only to consent to it, but to deliver to him the necessary Passport.—That if on the contrary

rary His Majesty should prefer that the preliminary Negotiations should be begun at London, special Powers will be sent to me for that Purpose.

I have the Honor, &c.

(Signed) OTTO.

Mr. Hammond.

(No. 47.)

Sir, Downing Street, Oct. 9, 1800.

I HAVE the Honor to acknowledge the Receipt of your Letter of Yesterday's Date; and I am directed in return to acquaint you,

That His Majesty's Government entirely agrees in the Opinion there expressed, that all further Discussion of the Terms of a Naval Armistice would be superfluous, as the only Object which it was proposed to His Majesty to secure by such an Arrangement has in the mean Time been made the Ground of separate Sacrifices required from his Ally.

With respect to the Proposal of opening Negotiations for a separate Peace, His Majesty, retaining always the sincere Desire which he has uniformly expressed for the Restoration of General Tranquillity in Europe, must at the same Time renew his former Declarations of an invariable

Determination to execute with Punctuality and good Faith his Engagements with his Allies ; and must therefore steadily decline to enter into any Measures tending to separate his Interests from those of the Powers who shall continue to make Common Cause with him in the Prosecution of the War.

I am, &c.

(Signed)

GEO. HAMMOND,

M. Otto.

APPENDIX.

A.

Extrait d'une Note du Baron de Thugut à Monsieur Talleyrand, en Date du Vienne, le 11 Août 1800.

L'EMPEREUR m'a ordonné, Monsieur, de faire parvenir au Premier Consul, par votre Canal, l'Invitation pour l'Assemblée immédiate de Plénipotentiaires respectifs, qui de bonne Foi et avec Zèle s'occupent à concerter, sous le moindre Délai possible, les Moyens du Rétablissement de la Tranquillité générale, après lequel l'Europe souffrante soupire vainement depuis si long Tems ; Sa Majesté ose se flatter de trouver dans cette Mesure le prompt Accomplissement de ses Vœux pacifiques d'autant plus sûrement, que le Roi de la Grande Bretagne, son Allié, vient de lui faire déclarer qu'il est prêt à concourir de son Côté aux mêmes Négociations, ainsi qu'il conste par la Copie ci-jointe de la Note Officielle remise ici par Lord Minto, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté Britannique. Il ne s'agit donc

donc plus que du Choix du Lieu pour la Réunion des Plénipotentiaires, dont il fera sans Doute facile de convenir, et pour lequel Sa Majesté pense qu'àfin de faciliter les Communications des Plénipotentiaires avec leurs Gouvernemens respectifs, il ferait à-propos de préférer un Point à-peu-près central, tel que Shelestat, Luneville, &c. ou tel autre Endroit, sur lequel pour gagner du Temps, le Gouvernement Français pourrait s'entendre directement avec le Gouvernement Britannique. D'après la Déclaration que j'ai l'Honneur de transmettre ici à votre Excellence d'Ordre exprès de Sa Majesté, et d'après les Dispositions également pacifiques de Sa Majesté Britannique, il ne dépendra désormais que du Gouvernement Français d'accélérer l'heureux Moment qui doit rendre le Repos à l'Europe si cruellement déchirée par une Guerre destructive.

(Signé) Baron de THUGUT.

M. Talleyrand.

(TRANS)

A.

(TRANSLATION.)

Extract of a Note from Baron Thugut to M. Talleyrand, dated Vienna, the 11th August 1800.

THE Emperor has ordered me, Sir, to convey to the First Consul, through your Channel, the Invitation for the immediate Meeting of the respective Plenipotentiaries, who with good Faith and Zeal are occupied in concerting, with as little Delay as possible, the Means of re-establishing general Tranquillity, after which suffering Europe has long sighed in vain; His Majesty flatters Himself, that through that Measure His pacific Wishes will be speedily accomplished with the more Certainty, because the King of Great Britain, His Ally, has just caused it to be declared to Him that He is ready, on His Part, to concur in the same Negotiations, as it appears by the enclosed Copy of the Official Note delivered here by Lord Minto, His Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary. It only remains, therefore, to agree upon the Place at which the Plenipotentiaries shall meet, which will doubtless be easily settled. In order to facilitate the Intercourse of the Plenipotentiaries with their respective Governments, His Majesty thinks that it would be advisable to give the Preference to some Place nearly central, such as Schellstat, Luneville, &c. or some other

other with respect to which, in Order to save Time, the French Government might come to an Understanding directly with the British Government. According to the Declaration which, by His Majesty's express Order, I have now the Honor to transmit to your Excellency, and according to the equally pacific Dispositions which His Britannic Majesty has testified, it will henceforward depend upon the French Government alone to accelerate the happy Moment of the Restoration of Repose to Europe so cruelly mangled by a destructive War.

(Signed) Baron de THUGUT

M. Talleyrand.

B.

LE Souffigné Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plenipotentiaire de Sa Majesté Britannique n'a pas manqué de transmettre à sa Cour toutes les Communications qui lui ont été faites d'Ordres de l'Empereur par Son Excellence Monsieur le Baron de Thugut, relativement aux Correspondences qui ont eu Lieu entre Sa Majesté l'Empereur et le Gouvernement Français, sur des Ouvertures de Paix. Le Souffigné s'est trouvé en consequence chargé de

de temoigner la Satisfaction qu'a donnée à Sa Majesté cette Marque de Confiance de la Part de Sa Majesté Imperiale et Royale. Le Souffigné ne differe pas, d'après les Autorisations qu'il vient de recevoir, de declarer que Sa Majesté Britannique, desirant donner à l'Empereur et à toute l'Europe les Preuves les plus evidentes de son Union parfaite et cordiale avec Sa Majesté Imperiale et Royale, et du Prix qu'Elle attache à la Conservation constante du Concert et de l'Amitié intime qui sont si heureusement établis entre leurs Couronnes et leurs Peuples, est disposée à concourir avec l'Autriche aux Négotiations qui pourront avoir Lieu pour une Pacification Générale, et à envoyer ses Plenipotentiaires pour traiter de la Paix de Concert avec Sa Majesté Imperiale et Royale, aussitot que l'Intention du Gouvernement Français d'entrer en Négociation avec Sa Majesté Britannique lui sera connue.

Le Souffigné fait avec Empressement cette Occasion de renouveler à Son Excellence les Assurances de sa Considération la plus distinguée.

(Signé) MINTO.

Vienne, ce 9 d'Août 1800.

(TRANS-

B.

(TRANSLATION.)

THE Underfigned, His Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, did not fail to transmit to his Court all the Communications which have been made to him by the Emperor's Direction, by his Excellency Baron Thugut, relative to the Correspondence which has taken place between His Majesty the Emperor and the French Government respecting Overtures for Peace. The Underfigned has in consequence been directed to intimate the Satisfaction which His Majesty has received from this Mark of Confidence on the Part of His Imperial and Royal Majesty. The Underfigned does not delay, after the Authority which he has just received, to declare that His Britannic Majesty, desirous at all Times of giving to the Emperor and to all Europe the clearest Proofs of His perfect and cordial Union with His Imperial and Royal Majesty, and of the Value which he attaches to the constant Preservation of the intimate Concert and Friendship which are so happily established between their Crowns and their Subjects, is disposed to concur with Austria in the Negotiations which may take place for a general Pacification, and to send His Plenipotentiaries to treat for Peace in Concert with His Imperial and Royal Majesty, as soon as the Intention of the French Government
to

to enter into a Negotiation with His Britannic Majesty shall be known to Him.

The Underfigned eagerly feizes this Occasion of renewing to his Excellency the Affurance of his moft diftinguifhed Confideration.

(Signed) MINTO.

Vienna, Aug. 9, 1800.

C.

Kleber Général en Chef, Commandant l'Armée Française en Egypte, à fon Excellence le Caïmakam de la Sublime Porte, Illuftre parmi les Grands, Eclairés et Sages ; que Dieu lui donne une longue Vie pleine de Gloire et de Bonheur.

Salut et Amitié.

VOTRE Excellence a fans Doute été informée de la Marche et du Réfultat des Négociations que j'avais conclues avec Son Alteffe le Suprême Vizir Youffef Pacha ; et d'après les Affurances qui m'en ont été données par des Perfonnes de Marque de votre Nation, je dois penfer que le Traité d'El-Arifh a obtenu l'Approbation de Sa Majefté l'Emperor Selim II. Plusieus Articles de ce Traité avaient déjà reçu leur Execution, et l'Armée Française particulièrement rempliffoit avec Fidélité fes Engagemens.

J'étais fur le Point d'évacuer le Caire, lorsque je reçus de Lord Keith, Commandant en Chef la Flotte Anglaife dans la Méditerranée, une Lettre, qui excita la Surprife et furtout l'Indignation de
tous

tous les Français. J'en joins ici la Copie : cet Ecrit, qui suppose l'Ignorance absolue de ma Position, et l'Oubli de ce qu'on doit à ses Allies, rendait illusoires non seulement la Convention d'El-Arifh, mais encore toute Espèce de Traité que je pourrais à l'avenir conclure avec la Sublime Porte ; à l'Egard des Conditions injurieufes que cette Lettre renferme, votre Excellence comprendra facilement que l'Armée Française en Egypte ne peut jamais se trouver dans le Cas d'y fouscrire.

J'avais fait Part de ces Observations au Suprême Vizir, et je lui propofais de différer l'Evacuation de Caire jusqu'à ce que cette Difficulté inattendue fut levée. Je ne pouvais demander une Garantie plus modérée de l'Execution de nos Conventions ; Son Alteffe s'y est refusée, et Elle a préféré d'abandonner au Hafard d'une Bataille la Poffeffion d'un Pais qui lui étoit toute affurée. Cette Bataille a eu Lieu 29 Ventofe, et le Ciel, protégeant la Justice de ma Cause, m'a donné la Victoire. Cependant le Dêfir fincère que j'ai toujours eu de rétablir les Liens d'Amitié et d'Intérêt qui ont uni pendant tant de Siècles les Deux Nations, n'est point altéré par cet Evènement. La Sublime Port me trouvera encore difpofé à la remettre en Poffeffion de l'Egypte aux Conditions ftipulées à El-Arifh, fauf quelques Modifications, que les Circonftances actuelles ont rendu neceffaires. Ainfi une nouvelle Effufion de Sang ferait absolument fans Objet, et une Négociation regulière, et dont l'Effet ne ferait pas arrêté par des Ordres imprévus,

prévus, rendrait à l'Empire Ottoman des Provinces que l'on s'efforcera inutilement de nous enlever par la Voie des Armes. Si votre Excellence partage ces Sentimens de Paix et de Concorde, elle les fera connaître à Sa Majesté l'Empereur Selim II. et sans Doute elle en obtiendra, l'Ordre de renouer, sans Délai, des Conférences qui nous conduiront au But que nous avons un égal désir d'atteindre. Je prie votre Excellence de croire à la haute Consideration que j'ai pour Elle.

(L. S.)

(Signé)

KLEBER.

Du Caire, le (10 Avril) 20 Germinal, An 8 de la République Française, repondant au 14 du Mois de la Lune Zykadé l'An de l'Egyre
1214.

C.

(TRANSLATION.)

General Kleber, Commander in Chief of the French Army in Egypt, to his Excellency the Caimakam of the Sublime Porte, Illustrious amongst the Great, the Enlightened, and the Wise; may God grant to him a long Life, full of Glory and of Happiness.

Health and Friendship.

YOUR Excellency has, without Doubt, been informed of the Progress and Result of the Negotiations which I have concluded with his Highness the Supreme Vizir Yousséf Pacha; and according to the Assurances to that Effect which I have

L

have

have received from Persons of Distinction of your Nation, I have Reason to think, that the Treaty of El-Arish has obtained the Approbation of His Majesty the Emperor Selim the Second.

Several Articles of this Treaty had already been executed, and the French Army in particular was faithfully fulfilling its Engagements.

I was upon the Point of evacuating Cairo, when I received from Lord Keith, Commander in Chief of the English Fleet in the Mediterranean, a Letter, which excited the Surprise, and above all, the Indignation of all the French. I herewith annex a Copy of it: This Paper, which evinces the most perfect Ignorance of my Situation, and the Neglect of every Thing due to Allies, rendered illusory not only the Convention of El-Arish, but also of every Kind of Treaty which I might thenceforward conclude with the Sublime Porte. With regard to the injurious Conditions contained in that Letter, your Excellency will readily perceive, that the French Army in Egypt can never be reduced to subscribe to them.

I had communicated these Observations to the Grand Vizir, and I proposed to him to postpone the Evacuation of Cairo until this unexpected Difficulty should be removed. I could not demand a more moderate Pledge of the Execution of our Conventions; his Excellency refused to consent to this Proposal, and chose rather to expose to the Fate of a Battle, the Possession of a Country which was absolutely assured to him. This Battle took Place on the 29th of Ventose, and Heaven, protecting

protecting the Justice of my Cause, conferred Victory on me. Nevertheless, the sincere Desire which I have always had, to re-establish the Ties of Friendship and of Interest, which, during so many Centuries, have united the Two Nations, is not altered by that Event. The Sublime Porte will still find me disposed to deliver up to him the Possession of Egypt upon the Conditions stipulated at El-Arish, with the Exception of some Modifications, which the existing Circumstances have rendered necessary. Thus all Motive for a fresh Effusion of Blood would be obliterated, and a regular Negotiation (the Effect of which would no longer be prevented by unforeseen Orders) would restore to the Ottoman Empire those Provinces of which it would be in vain to attempt to deprive us by Force of Arms. If your Excellency shares these Sentiments of Peace and Concord, you will communicate them to His Majesty the Emperor Selim the Second, and without Doubt, you will obtain Orders to resume, without Delay, those Conferences which would conduct us to the Object which we are equally desirous of attaining. I beg your Excellency to believe in the high Consideration I entertain for you.

(L. S.) (Signed) KLEBER.

Cairo, the 20th Germinal, Year 8 of the French Republic, (10th of April 1800,) which answers to the 14th of the Month of the Moon Zyskade in the Year of the Ægira 1214.

D.

Au Camp de Jaffa, 15 Avril 1800.

**Baudot, Premier Aide-de-Camp du General Kleber,
Commandant en Chef de l'Armée Française en
Egypte.**

**A Monsieur le Premier Interprète de la Sublime
Porte.**

Monsieur le Prince,

JE n'ai cessé dans toutes les Conversations que j'ai eues avec vous, de vous répéter que l'Intention ferme et bien prononcée du General Kleber, a toujours été d'exécuter scrupuleusement le Traité d'El-Arish. J'y ajoute avec Confiance, connaissant le Caractère loyal et franc de ce Général, et le vrai Désir qu'il a de donner au Suprême Vizir des Preuves positives de sa bonne Foi, que quelques soient les Chances de la Guerre, l'Armée Française évacuera l'Egypte, aussitôt que les Passports nécessaires du Gouvernement Anglais seront arrivés, ainsi que le Nombre des Bâtimens stipulé pour le Transport des Troupes.

J'ai l'Honneur d'être, &c.

(Signé) **BAUDOT,**

D.

(TRANSLATION.)

At the Camp of Jaffa, 15th April 1800.

Baudot, First Aid-de-Camp to General Kleber,
Commander in Chief of the French Army in
Egypt.

To the First Interpreter of the Sublime Porte.

Prince,

IN all my Conversations with you, I have continually repeated to you, that the firm and clearly expressed Intention of General Kleber has always been scrupulously to execute the Treaty of El-Arish. I add, with Confidence, from my Knowledge of the loyal and open Character of that General, and the real Wish which he has to give to the Supreme Vizir the most positive Proofs of his good Faith, that, whatever may be the Fortune of War, the French Army shall evacuate Egypt immediately after the Arrival of the necessary Passports from the English Government, and of the Number of Vessels stipulated for the Transport of the Troops.

I have the Honour, &c.

(Signed) BAUDOT.

