

St. Paul, Foreign Office

P A P E R S

RELATIVE TO THE

DISCUSSION WITH FRANCE

In the Year 1806.

L O N D O N :

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No. 1.

LETTER from Mr. Secretary Fox to
M. Talleyrand, dated Downing-Street,
20th February 1806.

Monfieur Le Miniftre,

Downing-Street,
20 Fevrier 1806.

Je le crois de mon devoir en qualité d'honnête
homme de vous faire part le plutót possible d'une
Circonftance affez étrange qui eft venue à ma
Connoiffance. Le plus court fera de vous narrer
tout fimplément le fait comme il eft arrivé.

Il y a quelques Jours qu'un Quidam m'annonça
qu'il venoit d'arriver à Gravesend fans Paffoport,
qu'il me pria de lui en envoyer un, parcequ'il
venoit récemment de Paris et qu'il avoit des
choses à m'apprendre qui me feroient du plaifir.
Je l'envoye chercher, et il arrive chez moi le lende-
main. Je l'entretiens tout feul dans mon Cabinet,
où après quelques discours peu importans, ce fcelerat
à l'audace de me dire que pour tranquillifer toutes
les Couronnes il falloit faire mourir le Chef des
François, et que pour cet objet on avoit loué une
maifon à Paffy d'où on pourroit à coup fur et
fans

B

sans risque exécuter ce projet detestable. Je n'ai pas bien entendu si ce devoit être par le Moyen des fusils en usage ou par des armes à feu d'une Construction nouvelle.

Je n'ai pas honte de vous avouer, M. Le Ministre, à vous qui me connoissez, que ma confusion étoit extrême de me trouver dans le cas de converser avec un Assassin déclaré. Je l'ordonnai de me quitter instamment, donnant en même tems des Instructions à l'Officier de Police qui le gardoit de le faire sortir du Royaume au plutôt.

Après avoir réfléchi plus mûrement sur ce que je venois de faire, je reconnus ma faute en le laissant partir avant que vous en fussiez informé, et je le fis retenir.

Il y a apparence que tout ceci n'est rien, et que ce misérable n'a eu d'autre chose en vûe que de faire le Fanfaron en promettant des choses qui d'après sa façon de penser me feroient du plaisir.

En tout cas j'ai cru qu'il falloit vous avertir de ce qui s'est passé avant que je le renvoyasse. Nos loix ne nous permettent pas de le detenir long tems, mais il ne partira qu'après que vous aurez eu tout le tems de vous mettre en garde contre ses Attentats, supposé qu'il ait encore de mauvais desseins, et lorsqu'il partira, j'aurai soin qu'il ne débarque que dans un port le plus éloigné possible de La France.

Il s'est appellé ici Guillet de la Gevillière, mais je crois que c'est un faux nom qu'il a pris. A son
premier

premier abord je lui fis l'honneur de le croire un Espion,

J'ai l'honneur d'être avec le plus parfait Attachement,

M. Le Ministre,
Votre très obéissant Serviteur,
(Signé) C. J. FOX.

(Translation.)

Sir, Downing-Street, 20th Feb. 1806.

I THINK it my Duty as an honest Man to communicate to you, as soon as possible, a very extraordinary Circumstance which is come to my Knowledge. The shortest Way will be to relate to you the Fact simply as it happened.

A few Days ago, a Person informed me, that he was just arrived at Gravesend without a Passport, requesting me at the same Time to send him one, as he had very lately left Paris, and had something to communicate to me which would give me Satisfaction. I sent for him—he came to my House the following Day—I received him alone in my Closet; when, after some unimportant Conversation, this Villain had the Audacity to tell me that it was necessary for the Tranquillity of all crowned Heads to put to death the Ruler of France; and that for this Purpose, a House had been hired at Passy, from which this detestable Project could be carried into Effect with Certainty, and without Risk. I

did not perfectly understand if it was to be done by a common Musket, or by Fire Arms upon a new Principle.

I am not ashamed to confess to you, Sir, who know me, that my Confusion was extreme in thus finding myself led into a Conversation with an avowed Assassin; I instantly ordered him to leave me, giving, at the same time, Orders to the Police Officer who accompanied him, to send him out of the Kingdom as soon as possible.

After having more attentively reflected upon what I had done, I saw my Error in having suffered him to depart without having previously informed you of the Circumstance, and I ordered him to be detained.

It is probable that all this is unfounded, and that the Wretch had nothing more in view than to make himself of Consequence, by promising what, according to his Ideas, would afford me Satisfaction.

At all Events, I thought it right to acquaint you with what had happened, before I sent him away. Our Laws do not permit us to detain him long, but he shall not be sent away till after you shall have had full Time to take Precautions against his Attempts, supposing him still to entertain bad Designs; and when he goes, I shall take Care to have him landed at a Seaport as remote as possible from France.

He calls himself here Guillet de la Gevrillière, but I think it is a false Name which he has assumed.

At

At his first Entrance, I did him the Honour to believe him to be a Spy.

I have the Honour to be, with the most perfect Attachment,

Sir,

Your most obedient Servant,

(Signed) C. J. FOX.

No. 2.

LETTER from M. Talleyrand to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated Paris, March 5, 1806.—Received March 19th.

Monfieur, Paris, le 5 Mars 1806.

J'AI mis la lettre de Votre Excellence sous les yeux de Sa Majesté. Son premier mot, après en avoir achevé la lecture, a été: " Je reconnois là
" les principes d'Honneur et de Vertu qui ont
" toujours animé Monsieur Fox. Remerciez le de
" ma part." Je ne me permettrai pas, Monsieur, d'ajouter rien aux propres expressions de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale. Je vous prie seulement d'agréer l'affurance de ma plus haute Considération.

(Signé) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

(Translation.)

Sir, Paris, 5th March 1806.

I Have laid your Excellency's Letter before His Majesty. His first Words, after having read it, were, " I recognize here the Principles of Honour

“ and of Virtue, by which Mr. Fox has ever been
“ actuated. Thank him, on my Part.” I will
not allow myself, Sir, to add any Thing to the
Expressions of His Imperial and Royal Majesty. I
only request you to accept the Assurances of
my distinguished Consideration.

(Signed) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND,

No. 3.

EXTRACT from a Letter from M. Talley-
rand to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated Paris,
March 5, 1806.—Received March 19th.

A Paris, le 5 Mars 1806.

IL pourra vous être agréable de recevoir des Nou-
velles de ce Pays. Je vous envoie le discours
que l'Empereur a prononcé au Corps Législatif.
Vous y verrez que nos dispositions sont toujours
pacifiques. Je ne vous demande pas quelles sont
celles qui prévalent chez vous : Mais si les avan-
tages de la paix y sont appréciés ; vous savez sur
quelles bases, elle peut être discutée.

(Translation.)

Paris, 5th March 1806.

IT may be agreeable to you to receive News from
this Country.

I send you the Emperor's Speech to the Legisla-
tive Body. You will therein see that our Wishes
are

are still for Peace. I do not ask what is the prevailing Inclination with you ; but if the Advantages of Peace are duly appreciated, you know upon what Basis it may be discussed.

No. 4.

EXTRACT from a Speech delivered by the Chief of the French Government to the Legislative Body on the 2d of March 1806.

JE désire la paix avec l'Angleterre. De mon côté, je n'en retarderai jamais le moment. Je serai toujours prêt à la conclure, en prenant pour bases les stipulations du Traité d'Amiens.

(Translation.)

I Desire Peace with England. On my Part, I shall never delay it for a Moment. I shall always be ready to conclude it, taking for its Basis the Stipulations of the Treaty of Amiens.

No. 5.

LETTER from Mr. Secretary Fox to
M. Talleyrand, dated Downing Street,
March 26, 1806.

- Monsieur, Downing Street, ce 26 Mars 1806.

L'AVIS que votre Excellence m'a donné des dispositions pacifiques qui prévalent chez vous, et des bases sur lesquelles, la paix peut être discutée, m'a induit à mettre sous les yeux du Roi, cette partie de sa lettre particulière.

Sa Majesté a déclaré, plus d'une fois à Son Parlement, Son desir sincère d'embrasser la première occasion de rétablir la paix sur des bases solides ; qui pourront se concilier avec les intérêts et la sûreté permanente de Son peuple. Ses dispositions sont toujours pacifiques ; mais c'est à une paix sûre et durable que Sa Majesté vise ; non à une trêve incertaine, et par là même, inquiétante, tant pour les parties contractantes, que pour le reste de l'Europe.

Quant aux stipulations du traité d'Amiens, que l'on propose comme bases de la Negociation ; on a remarqué ici que, cette phrase a été interpretée de trois ou quatre différentes manières ; et que par conséquent des explications ultérieures seroient nécessaires ; ce qui ne manqueroit pas de causer un grand délai, quand même il n'y auroit pas d'autres objections.

La véritable base d'une telle Negociation entre deux grandes puissances, qui dédaignent également
toute.

toute idée de chicane, devrait être une reconnaissance reciproque, de part et d'autre, du principe suivant : savoir : que les deux parties auroient pour objet ; que la paix soit honorable pour toutes les deux et leurs alliés respectifs ; et en même tems de nature à assurer, autant qu'il est en leur pouvoir, le repos futur de l'Europe.

L'Angleterre ne peut negliger les intérêts d'aucun de Ses Alliés ; et Elle se trouve unie à la Russie par des liens si etroits, qu'Elle ne voudroit rien traiter, bien moins conclure, que de concert avec l'Empereur Alexandre ; mais en attendant l'intervention actuelle d'un plénipotentiaire Russe, on pourroit toujours discuter, et même arranger, provisoirement, quelques uns des points principaux.

Il pourroit sembler que la Russie, à cause de Sa position éloignée, aît moins d'intérêts immédiats que les autres Puissances à discuter avec la France : mais cette cour, à tous égards si respectable, s'intéresse, comme l'Angleterre, vivement à tout ce qui regarde le sort, plus ou moins independant, des différens Princes et États de l'Europe.

Vous voyez, Monsieur, comme on est disposé ici, d'aplanir toutes les difficultés qui pourroient retarder la discussion dont il s'agit. Ce n'est pas, assurément, qu'avec les ressources que nous avons, nous ayons à craindre, pour ce qui nous regarde, la continuation de la guerre.—La Nation Angloise est, de toute l'Europe, celle, peut être, qui souffre le moins de sa durée ; mais nous n'en plaignons pas moins, les maux d'autrui.

Faisons

Faisons donc ce que nous pouvons, pour les finir ;
et tachons, s'il se peut, de concilier les intérêts
respectifs, et la gloire des deux pays, avec la tran-
quillité de l'Europe, et la félicité du Genre humain.

Je suis, &c.

(Signé) C. J. FOX.

A Monsieur M. Talleyrand.

(Translation.)

Sir, Downing Street, March 26, 1806.

THE Information which your Excellency has
given me of the pacifick Disposition that pre-
vails (in your Councils), and of the Basis upon
which Peace may be discussed, has induced me to
lay that Part of your private Letter before the
King.

His Majesty has repeatedly declared to His
Parliament His sincere Desire to embrace the first
Opportunity of re-establishing Peace upon a solid
Basis, such as may be compatible with the Interests
and permanent Security of His People : His Wishes
are uniformly pacifick ; but it is a safe and lasting
Peace that His Majesty has in View, not an un-
certain Truce, which from its very Uncertainty
would be the Source of Disquietude as well to the
Contracting Parties as to the other Powers of
Europe.

With regard to the Stipulations of the Treaty
of Amiens, which are proposed as the Basis of the
Negotiation, it has been observed here, that this
Phrase

Phrase has been interpreted in Three or Four different Ways, and consequently, that further Explanations would be necessary, which could not fail to produce great Delay, even did no other Objections exist.

The true Basis of such a Negotiation between Two great Powers, equally despising every Idea of Chicane, would be the reciprocal Recognition of the following Principle; viz. That the Object of both Parties should be a Peace, honourable for both, and for their respective Allies; and at the same time, of a Nature to secure, as far as is in their Power, the future Tranquillity of Europe.

England cannot neglect the Interests of any of her Allies; and she is united to Russia by such close Connections, that she would not treat, still less conclude upon any Thing, but in Concert with the Emperor Alexander; but whilst awaiting the actual Intervention of a Russian Plenipotentiary, some of the principal Points might however be discussed, and even provisionally arranged.

It might seem, that Russia, on account of her remote Situation, should have fewer immediate Interests to discuss with France than other Powers; but that Court, so respectable in every Point of View, interests herself, like England, warmly in every Thing that concerns the greater or less Degree of Independence enjoyed by the different Princes and States of Europe.

You see, Sir, how inclined we are here to remove every Difficulty that might retard the Discussion

cussion in question. With the Resources that we possess, it is most assuredly not on our own Account that we need fear a Continuance of the War. Of all the Nations of Europe, England, perhaps, is that which suffers the least by its Prolongation ; but we do not the less commiserate the Misfortunes of others.

Let us then do all in our Power to terminate them, and let us endeavour, if it be possible, to reconcile the respective Interests and the Glory of the Two Countries with the Tranquillity of Europe, and the Happiness of the Human Race.

I am, &c.

(Signed)

C. J. FOX.

No. 6.

LETTER from M. Talleyrand to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated Paris, April 1st, 1806.—Received April 7th.

Monseigneur, Paris le 1^{er} Avril 1806.

A L'heure même où j'ai reçu votre lettre du 26 Mars, je me suis rendu auprès de Sa Majesté, et je me trouve heureux de vous informer qu'Elle m'a autorisé à vous faire sans délai la réponse suivante.

L'Empereur n'a rien à désirer de ce que possède l'Angleterre. La paix avec la France est possible et peut être perpétuelle, quand on ne s'immiscera point dans ses affaires intérieures et qu'on ne voudra

voudra ni la contraindre dans la législation de Ses Douanes et dans les droits de Son Commerce, ni faire supporter aucune insulte à Son Pavillon.

Ce n'est pas vous, Monsieur, qui avez montré dans un grand nombre de discussions publiques une connoissance exacte des affaires générales de l'Europe et de celles de la France, qu'il faut convaincre que la France n'a rien à désirer que du repos et une situation qui Lui permette de Se livrer sans aucun obstacle aux travaux de son industrie.

L'Empereur ne pense pas que tel ou tel Article du Traité d'Amiens ait été la cause de la guerre. Il est convaincu que la véritable cause a été le refus de faire un Traité de Commerce, nécessairement nuisible aux manufactures et à l'industrie de Ses Sujets.

Vos Predecesseurs nous accusoient de vouloir tout envahir. En France, on accuse aussi l'Angleterre. Eh bien ! nous ne demandons que l'égalité. Nous ne vous demanderons jamais compte de ce que vous ferez chez vous, pourvû qu' à votre tour, vous ne nous demandiez jamais compte de ce que nous ferons chez nous. Ce principe est d'une réciprocité juste, raisonnable et respectivement avantageuse.

Vous exprimez le désir que la Négociation n'aboutisse pas à une paix sans durée. La France est plus intéressée qu'aucune autre Puissance à ce que la paix soit stable. Ce n'est point une Trêve qu'Elle a intérêt de faire, car une Trêve ne feroit que Lui préparer de nouvelles pertes. Vous savez très bien que les Nations, semblables en ce point
à chaque

à chaque homme considéré individuellement, s'accoutument à une situation de guerre, comme à une situation de Paix : Toutes les pertes que la France pouvoit faire Elle les a faites : Elle les fera toujours dans les six premiers mois de la guerre.

Aujourd'hui notre Commerce et notre Industrie se sont répliés sur eux mêmes et se sont adaptés à notre situation de guerre. Dès lors, une Trêve de deux ou trois ans seroit en même tems tout ce qu'il y auroit de plus contraire à nos intérêts commerciaux et à la politique de l'Empereur.

Quant à l'intervention d'une Puissance étrangère, l'Empereur pourroit accepter la médiation d'une Puissance qui auroit de grandes forces maritimes, car alors sa participation à la paix seroit réglée par les mêmes intérêts que nous avons à discuter avec vous ; mais la médiation dont vous parlez n'est pas de cette nature. Vous ne voulez pas nous tromper, et vous sentez bien qu'il n'y a pas d'égalité entre Vous et Nous, dans la garantie d'une Puissance qui a trois cent mille hommes sur pied et qui n'a pas d'armée de mer.

Du reste, Monsieur, votre communication a un caractère de franchise et de précision que nous n'avons pas encore vu dans les rapports de Votre Cour avec Nous. Je me ferai un devoir de mettre la même franchise et la même clarté dans mes réponses : Nous sommes prêts à faire la paix avec tout le monde. Nous ne voulons en imposer à personne ; mais nous ne voulons pas qu'on nous en impose ; et personne n'a la puissance, ni les moyens

moyens de le faire. Il n'est au pouvoir de personne de nous faire revenir sur des Traités qui sont exécutés. L'intégrité, L'indépendance entière, absolue de l'Empire Ottoman sont, non seulement le désir le plus vrai de l'Empereur, mais le point le plus constant de Sa politique.

Deux Nations éclairées et voisines l'une de l'autre manqueraient à l'opinion qu'Elles doivent avoir de leur Puissance et de leur Sagesse, si Elles appelloient dans la discussion des grands intérêts qui les divisent, des interventions étrangères et éloignées. Ainsi, Monsieur, la paix peut être traitée et conclue immédiatement si Votre Cour a véritablement le désir d'y arriver.

Nos intérêts sont conciliables par cela même qu'ils sont distincts. Vous êtes les Souverains des Mers. Vos forces maritimes égalent celles de tous les Souverains du Monde réunis. Nous sommes une grande Puissance Continentale ; mais il en est plusieurs qui ont autant de forces que Nous sur terre ; et votre prépondérance sur les mers mettra toujours notre Commerce à la disposition de vos Escadres, dès la première Déclaration de guerre que Vous voudrez faire. Pensez vous qu'il soit raisonnable d'attendre que l'Empereur consente jamais à Se mettre aussi pour les affaires du Continent à votre discrétion ? Si, maitres de la Mer par votre puissance propre, vous voulez l'être aussi de la Terre par une Puissance combinée, la paix n'est

n'est pas possible, car alors vous voulez arriver à des résultats que vous ne pourrez jamais atteindre.

L'Empereur, tout accoutumé qu'il est à courir toutes les chances qui présentent des perspectives de grandeur et de gloire, désire la Paix avec l'Angleterre. Il est Homme. Après tant de fatigues, il voudroit aussi du repos. Père de Ses Sujets, il souhaite, autant que cela peut être compatible avec leur honneur et avec les garanties de l'avenir, leur procurer les douceurs de la Paix et les avantages d'un commerce heureux et tranquille.

Si donc, Monsieur, Sa Majesté le Roi d'Angleterre veut réellement la Paix avec la France, Elle nommera un Plénipotentiaire pour se rendre à Lille. J'ai l'honneur de Vous adresser des passe-ports pour cet objet. Aussitôt que l'Empereur aura appris l'arrivée du Ministre de Votre Cour, Il en nommera et en enverra un sans délai. L'Empereur est prêt à faire toutes les concessions que, par l'étendue de Vos Forces Navales et Votre prépondérance, vous pouvez désirer d'obtenir.

Je ne crois pas que Vous puissiez refuser d'adopter aussi le principe de Lui faire des propositions conformes à l'honneur de Sa Couronne et aux droits du Commerce de Ses Etats. Si vous êtes justes, Si vous ne voulez que ce qu'il Vous est possible de faire, la Paix sera bientôt conclue.

Je termine en vous déclarant que Sa Majesté adopte entièrement le principe exposé dans votre dépêche et présenté comme base de la Négociation,

tion, que la Paix proposée doit être honorable pour les deux Cours et pour leurs Alliés respectifs.

J'ai l'honneur d'être avec la plus haute Considération,

Monfieur,

de Votre Excellence le très humble

et très obéissant serviteur,

(Signé) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

(Translation.)

Sir,

Paris, 1st April 1806.

THE very Instant I received your Letter of the 26th March, I waited upon his Majesty; and I am happy to inform you, that he has authorized me to send you, without Delay, the following Answer:

The Emperor covets nothing that England possesses. Peace with France is possible, and may be perpetual, provided there is no Interference in her internal Affairs, and that no Attempt is made to restrain her in the Regulation of her Custom Duties; to cramp her Commercial Rights; or to offer any Insult to her Flag.

It is not you, Sir, who have displayed in many public Discussions an exact Knowledge of the general Affairs of Europe and of France, who require to be convinced that France has nothing to desire except Repose, and a Situation such as may enable her, without Obstruction, to give herself up entirely to the Labours of her Industry.

c

The

The Emperor does not imagine that any particular Article of the Treaty of Amiens produced the War. He is convinced, that the true Cause was, the Refusal to make a Treaty of Commerce, which would necessarily have been prejudicial to the Manufactures and the Industry of his Subjects. Your Predecessors accused us of wishing universal Conquest. In France, England has likewise her Accusers. Very well! We only ask Equality. We shall never require an Account of what you do at Home, provided that, on your Side, you never require an Account of what we do at Home. This Principle is reciprocally just, reasonable, and mutually advantageous.

You express a Desire that the Negotiation may not terminate in a shortlived Peace. France is more interested than any other Power that it should be permanent. It is not her Interest to make a Truce; since a Truce would only pave the Way for fresh Losses. You know very well that Nations, similar in this Respect to Individuals, accustom themselves to a State of War, as well as to a State of Peace. All the Losses that France could sustain, she has sustained. This will ever be the Case, in the first Six Months of War. At present, our Commerce and our Industry have taken the Channel dictated by the Circumstances of our Country, and are adapted to our State of War. Consequently a Truce of Two or

* se sont répliés sur eux mêmes.

Three

Three Years would be the Thing of all others the most opposite to our Commercial Interests, and to the Emperor's Policy.

As to the Intervention of a Foreign Power, the Emperor might accept the Mediation of a Power possessing a great Naval Force, because, in that Case, the Participation of such Power in the Peace would be regulated by the same Interests that we have to discuss with you ; but the Mediation you speak of is not of this Nature. You do not wish to deceive us ; and you are well aware there is no Equality betwixt us in the Guaranty of a Power which has Three hundred thousand Men on Foot, and which has no Naval Force. For the Rest, Sir, your Communication has a Character of Openness and Precision, which we have hitherto never seen in the Communications between your Court and us. I will make it my Duty to employ the same Openness, and the same Precision, in my Reply. We are ready to make Peace with the whole World. We wish to dictate to no One. But we will not be dictated to ; and no One possesses either the Power or the Means of doing it. It is in the Power of none to make us relinquish Treaties which are already carried into Effect. The Integrity, and the complete and absolute Independence of the Ottoman Empire form not only the sincerest Desire of the Emperor, but constitute also the undeviating Object of his Policy.

Two enlightened and neighbouring Nations would be wanting in the Opinion they ought to

entertain of their Power and Wisdom, should they call for the Intervention of foreign and distant Powers, in the Discussions of the great Interests which divide them : Thus Sir, Peace may be treated upon and concluded immediately, if your Court really entertains the Desire of attaining it.

Our Interests are reconcilable, inasmuch as they are distinct. You are the Rulers of the Ocean, your Naval Forces are equal to those of all the Sovereigns of the World united. We are a great Continental Power ; but there are many who equal our Power by Land, and your Maritime Preponderance will always place our Commerce at the Mercy of your Squadrons, immediately after your declaring War. Do you think it reasonable to expect that the Emperor should ever consent to submit himself to your Discretion, in Continental Affairs also? If, Masters of the Sea through your own Power, you propose being Masters of the Land likewise by a combined Force, Peace is impossible ; for in that Case you will be striving for an Object which you can never attain.

The Emperor, accustomed as he is to encounter every Risk, which holds out the Prospect of Greatness and of Glory, wishes for Peace with England—He is a Man—after so many Fatigues he is desirous of Repose—the Father of his Subjects, he wishes, as far as it is compatible with their Honour and with Security for the future, to procure for them the Blessings of Peace, and the Advantages of a successful and uninterrupted Commerce.

IF

If then, Sir, His Majesty the King of England really wishes for Peace with France, he will appoint a Plenipotentiary to repair to Lisle. I have the Honour of sending you Passports for this Purpose. As soon as the Emperor shall be informed of the Arrival of the Minister from your Court he will appoint one and will send him without Delay. The Emperor is ready to make every Concession, which, from the Extent of your Naval Forces and of your Preponderance, you may desire to obtain. I do not think that you can refuse to adopt the same Principle of making him Proposals conformable to the Honour of his Crown and the Commercial Rights of his Dominions. If you are just; if you desire only what is possible for you to obtain, Peace will be soon made.

I conclude, by declaring that his Majesty fully adopts the Principle laid down in your Dispatch, and offered as the Basis of the Negotiation, " that
 " the Peace proposed should be honourable for the
 " Two Courts, and for their respective Allies."

I have the Honour to be, with the highest Consideration,

Sir,

Your Excellency's most obedient,
 humble Servant,

(Signed) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

No. 7.

LETTER from Mr. Secretary Fox to
M. Talleyrand, dated Downing Street,
April 8th, 1806.

Monfieur, Downing Street, ce 8 Avril 1806.

JE n'ai reçu qu'hier au foir votre dépêche du premier courant. Avant d'y répondre, permettez moi d'affurer Votre Excellence que la franchise et le ton obligeant qu'on y remarque ont fait ici le plus grand plaisir. Un esprit conciliatoire manifesté de part et d'autre est déjà un grand pas vers la paix.

Si ce que Votre Excellence dit par rapport aux affaires intérieures regarde les affaires politiques, une réponse n'est guères nécessaire : nous ne nous y immifçons pas en tems de Guerre ; à plus forte raison nous ne le ferons pas en tems de Paix, et rien n'est plus éloigné des idées qui prevaleant chez Nous que de vouloir ou nous mêler des loix intérieures, que vous jugerez propres à régler Vos douanes et soutenir les droits de Votre commerce, ou d'insulter à Votre Pavillon. Quant à un traité de commerce, l'Angleterre croit n'avoir aucun intérêt à le désirer plus que les autres nations ; Il y a beaucoup de gens qui pensent qu'un pareil traité entre la France et la Grande Bretagne seroit également utile aux deux parties contractantes, mais c'est une question sur laquelle chaque Gouvernement doit juger d'après ses propres apperçus, et celui qui le refuse n'offense pas, ni a aucun compte à rendre à celui qui le propose.

Ce

Ce n'est Monsieur pas moi seulement, mais tout homme raisonnable doit reconnaître que le véritable intérêt de la France c'est la Paix, et que par conséquent c'est sur sa conservation que doit être fondée la vraie gloire de ceux qui la gouvernent.

Il est vrai que Nous nous sommes mutuellement accusés, mais il ne sert à rien dans ce moment-ci de disputer les argumens sur lesquels ces accusations ont été fondées. Nous désirons comme vous l'égalité; nous ne sommes pas assurément comptables l'un à l'autre de ce que nous faisons chez Nous, et le principe de réciprocité à cet égard, que Votre Excellence a proposé paroît juste et raisonnable.

On ne peut pas disconvenir de ce que Vos raisonnemens sur l'inconvénient qu'auroit pour la France une paix sans durée ne soient bien fondés, mais de l'autre côté celui que nous éprouverions seroit aussi très considérable. Il est peut-être naturel que dans de pareils cas chaque Nation exagère ses propres dangers, ou qu'au moins elle les regarde de plus près et avec un œil plus clairvoyant que ceux d'autrui.

Quant à l'intervention d'une puissance étrangère, il faut d'abord remarquer, que pour ce qui regarde la paix et la guerre entre la France et l'Angleterre, la Russie ne peut être censée Puissance étrangère, vû qu'elle est actuellement en alliance avec l'Angleterre et en guerre avec la France. C'est pourquoy dans ma Lettre, c'étoit comme Partie non

comme Médiateur qu'on a proposé de faire intervenir l'Empereur Alexandre. Votre Excellence dans la dernière clause de Sa dépêche reconnoit que la paix " doit être honorable tant pour la " France et l'Angleterre que pour leurs Alliés respectifs." Si cela est, il nous paroît impossible vû l'étroite Alliance qui subsistait entre les deux Gouvernemens, que celui d'Angleterre puisse commencer une négociation, si non provisoire, sans la concurrence ou tout au moins le consentement préalable de Son Allié.

Pour ce qui est de l'intégrité et de l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman, aucune difficulté ne peut s'offrir, ces objets étant également chers à toutes les parties intéressées à la discussion dont il est question.

Il est peut être vrai que la puissance de la France sur terre comparée à celle du reste de l'Europe, n'est pas égale à la supériorité que nous possédons sur mer, envisagée sous le même point de vue, mais il ne faut plus se dissimuler que le projet de combiner toute l'Europe contre la France est chimérique au dernier point. Au reste c'est en vérité pousser un peu trop loin les appréhensions pour l'avenir, que d'envisager l'Alliance entre la Russie et l'Angleterre (les deux puissances de l'Europe les moins faites pour attaquer la France par terre) comme tendante à produire un résultat pareil.

L'intervention de la Russie à la Négociation ne peut non plus être regardée comme la formation d'un Congrès, ni pour la forme ni pour la chose, d'autant qu'il n'y aura que deux Parties, La
Russie

Russie et l'Angleterre d'un coté et la France de l'autre. Un congrès pourroit être bon à beaucoup d'égards après la Signature des Préliminaires, en cas que toutes les Parties Contractantes soient de cet Avis, mais c'est un projet à discuter librement et amicalement après que l'affaire principale aura été arrangée.

Voilà Monsieur, que je vous ai exposé avec toute la clarté que j'ai pu les sentimens du Ministère Britannique sur les notions que Votre Excellence a suggérées, Je me plais à croire qu'il n'y a qu'un seul point essentiel sur lequel nous ne sommes pas d'accord.

Dès que Vous consentirez que nous traitions provisoirement jusqu'à ce que la Russie puisse intervenir, et dès lors conjointement avec Elle, nous sommes prêts à commencer, sans différer d'un seul jour, la négociation en tel lieu et en telle forme que les deux Parties jugeront les plus propres à conduire à bon escient l'objet de nos travaux, le plus promptement possible.

Je suis, &c.

(Signé)

C. J. FOX.

(Translation.)

Sir, Downing-Street, 8th April 1806.
I DID not receive until Yesterday Evening your Dispatch of the First Instant. Before I reply to it, allow me to assure your Excellency that the
Frankness

Frankness and obliging Tone which prevail in it have produced the greatest Satisfaction here. A Spirit of Conciliation manifested on both Sides is already a great Advance towards Peace.

If what your Excellency says respecting domestick Affairs relates to political Affairs, an Answer is scarcely requisite. We do not interfere in such Concerns in Time of War, much less shall we do so in Time of Peace; and nothing can be further from the Ideas which prevail here than any Wish either to interfere with respect to the internal Regulations which you may judge proper for the Management of your Custom Duties and for the Support of your Commercial Rights, or to offer insult to your Flag. As to a Treaty of Commerce, England supposes that she has no greater Interest in desiring it than other Nations. There are many who think that such a Treaty between Great Britain and France would be equally beneficial to the Two Contracting Parties; but this is a Question upon which each Government must decide according to its own Ideas, and the Party rejecting it gives no Offence, and is no way responsible to the Party proposing it.

It is not my individual Opinion alone, Sir, but it must be acknowledged by every reasonable Man, that the true Interest of France is Peace, and consequently that the true Glory of her Rulers ought to be placed in the Preservation of it.

It is true that we have mutually accused each other, but it can answer no Purpose at the present Moment

Moment to discuss the Arguments upon which those Accusations were founded. Like you, we desire to treat upon equal Terms. Assuredly we are not accountable to each other for what we do at Home; and the Principle of Reciprocity that your Excellency has proposed on this Point appears just and reasonable.

It cannot be denied that your Arguments respecting the Inconveniencies to which France would be subject by a short-lived Peace, are well founded: But on the other Hand, those which we should suffer would likewise be very considerable. It is perhaps natural, that in such Cases each Nation exaggerates its own Dangers, or at least that she examines them more minutely, and with a more penetrating Eye than those of others.

With respect to the Interposition of a Foreign Power, one cannot refrain from observing, that in whatever relates to Peace and War between England and France, Russia can never be considered a *Foreign Power*, in as much as she is in actual Alliance with England, and at War with France. For which Reason the Interposition of the Emperor Alexander was proposed in my Letter, not as a Mediator but as a Party. Your Excellency, in the last Paragraph of your Dispatch, acknowledges, that the Peace "ought to be honourable, not only "for England and France, but also for their respective Allies." This being the Case, it appears to us impossible, considering the close Alliance subsisting between the Two Governments, that that of
England

England can commence any other than a provisional Negotiation, without the Concurrence, or, at the very least, the previous Consent of her Ally.

As to what relates to the Integrity and Independence of the Ottoman Empire, no Difficulty can present itself, those Objects being equally dear to all the Parties interested in the present Discussion.

It is perhaps true, that the Power of France on Land compared with that of the rest of Europe, is not equal to the Superiority that We possess at Sea, considered in the same Point of View: But it can no longer be concealed, that the Project of combining the Whole of Europe against France, is to the last Degree chimerical; besides, it is in Truth carrying the Apprehension of what may happen hereafter rather too far, to consider the Alliance between England and Russia (the Two Powers of Europe the least calculated to attack France by Land) as tending to produce such a Consequence.

Nor can the Intervention of Russia in the Negotiation, be considered as the Formation of a Congress, either in Appearance or in Reality, in as much as there will be only Two Parties, England and Russia on one Side, and France on the other. A Congress might be desirable in many Respects, after the Signature of Preliminaries, in case all the Contracting Parties should be of that Opinion; but this is a Proposition that may be freely and amicably discussed, after the principal Points shall have been arranged.

Thus,

Thus, Sir, I have laid before you, with all the Clearness in my Power, the Sentiments of the British Ministry upon the Ideas which you have suggested. I entertain the gratifying Persuasion that there remains only one essential Point upon which we are not agreed.

As soon as you consent that we shall treat provisionally until Russia can take a Part in the Negotiation, and from that Moment, conjointly with her, we are ready to begin without the Delay of a single Day, at whatever Place, and in whatever Form, the Two Parties may judge best adapted to bring to a happy Issue the Object of our Labours, as expeditiously as possible.

I am, &c.

(Signed) C. J. FOX.

No. 8.

LETTER from M. Talleyrand to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated Paris, April 16th, 1806.—Received April 19th.

Monfieur, Paris le 16 Avril 1806.

J'E viens de prendre les Ordres de Sa Majesté l'Empereur et Roi, sous les Yeux de Qui je m'étois empressé de mettre la dépêche que Votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire en date du 8 Avril.

Il a paru a Sa Majesté qu'en admettant, comme vous le faites, le principe de l'Egalité, vous persistiez

sistiez cependant à demander une forme de Négociation qui ne peut s'accorder avec ce principe. Lorsqu'entre deux Puissances égales, Une d'Elles réclame l'intervention d'un Tiers, il est évident qu'Elle tend à rompre cet Equilibre si favorable à la juste et libre discussion de Leurs Intérêts. Il est manifeste qu'Elle ne veut pas se contenter des Avantages et des Droits de l'Egalité. J'ose croire, Monsieur, qu'en revenant une dernière fois sur cette discussion, je parviendrai à persuader à Votre Excellence, qu'à aucun titre et pour aucun motif, la Russie ne doit être appelée dans la Négociation proposée entre La France et L'Angleterre.

Lorsque la Guerre a éclaté entre les deux Etats, La Russie étoit en Paix avec La France. Cette Guerre n'a rien changé dans les Rapports qui existoient entr'Elle et Nous. Elle a d'abord proposé Sa Médiation, et ensuite, par des Circonstances étrangères à la Guerre qui Nous divise, des Froideurs étant survenues entre les deux Cabinets de St. Petersburg et des Thuilleries, l'Empereur Alexandre a jugé à propos de suspendre Ses Relations politiques avec la France mais en même tems Il a déclaré de la manière la plus positive qu'Il étoit dans l'Intention de rester étranger aux débats existans entre Nous et L'Angleterre.

Nous ne pensons pas que la Conduite que La Russie a tenue depuis cette époque ait rien changé à cette détermination : Elle a, il est vrai, conclu un Traité d'Alliance avec Vous ; mais ce Traité, il est aisé d'en juger par ce qui en a été rendu public,

par

par l'objet qu'il avoit en vue, et plus encore par les Résultats, n'avoit aucun Rapport avec la Guerre qui existoit depuis près de deux ans entre Nous et l'Angleterre.

Ce Traité étoit un Pacte de Participation à une Guerre d'une Nature différente, plus étendue et plus générale que la première. C'est de cette Guerre qu' est née la Troisième Coalition dans laquelle L'Autriche étoit Puissance principale, et La Russie, Puissance auxiliaire. L'Angleterre n'a participé qu'en Projet à cette Guerre. Jamais Nous n'avons eu à combattre Ses Forces réunies à celles de Ses Alliés. La Russie ne S'y est montrée que secondairement. Aucune Déclaration adressée à La France n'est venue Nous apprendre qu' Elle étoit en Guerre avec Nous, et ce n'est que sur les Champs de Bataille où la Troisième Coalition a été détruite, que Nous avons été officiellement informés que La Russie en avoit fait partie.

Lorsque Sa Majesté Britannique a déclaré La Guerre à La France, Elle avoit un But qu' Elle a fait connoître par Ses Manifestes. Ce But constitue la Nature de la Guerre. Lorsque 18 Mois après, Sa Majesté Britannique S'est alliée avec L'Autriche, La Russie et La Suède, Elle eut d'autres Objets en vue. Ce fut une nouvelle Guerre dont il faut chercher les Motifs dans les Pièces Officielles qui ont été publiées par les diverses Puissances. Dans ces Motifs il n'est jamais question des intérêts directs de L'Angleterre. Ces deux Guerres n'ont donc aucun Rapport ensemble.

L'Angleterre

L'Angleterre n'a point participé réellement à celle qui est terminée, La Russie, n'a jamais pris de part directe ni indirecte à celle qui dure encore. Il n'y a donc aucune Raïson pour que l'Angleterre ne termine pas Seule la Guerre que Seule Elle a faite avec Nous. Si Sa Majesté L'Empereur adoptoit le principe de négocier maintenant avec L'Angleterre unie à Ses Nouveaux Alliés, Elle admettroit implicitement que La Troisième Coalition existe encore, que la Guerre d'Allemagne n'est pas finie, que cette Guerre est la même que celle que La France soutient contre L'Angleterre. Elle accepteroit implicitement pour Base de La Négociation les Conditions de Monsieur Novosiltzoff qui ont excité l'étonnement de L'Europe et soulevé le Caractère François; et de Vainqueur de la Coalition L'Empereur Se placeroit volontairement dans la position du vaincu.

Aujourd'hui, L'Empereur n'a plus rien à débattre avec La Coalition. Il est en droit de méconnoître les Rapports que Vous avez eu avec Elle, et en traitant avec Vous, il ne peut être question que du But et des Intérêts de la Guerre entreprise antérieurement à Vos Alliances et qui leur ont survécu.

Quoiqu'il n'y ait que six Mois que le Voile qui couvroit les Combinaïsons secretes de la dernière Guerre a été déchiré, il est cependant vrai que le Continent est en Paix. Le Principal de Vos Alliés, L'Autriche a fait Sa Paix séparée. La Prusse dont les Armées ont été pendant quelque
 teins

tems sur le pied de Guerre, a fait avec Nous un Traité d'Alliance offensive et défensive. La Suède ne mérite aucune mention. Quant à La Russie, il existe entr' Elle et Nous des Propositions directes de Négociation. Par Sa Puissance, Elle n'a besoin de la Protection de Personne, et Elle ne peut réclamer l'Intervention d'aucune Cour pour terminer les differends qui Nous divisent. Par Sa Distance, Elle est tellement hors de Notre Portée, comme de tout moyen de nuire, que l'Etat de Guerre ou l'Etat de Paix ne produit dans Nos Rapports respectifs que des Changemens purement diplomatiques. Si dans une telle Situation L'Empereur acceptoit de négocier conjointement avec L'Angleterre et La Russie, n'en méconnoitroit-il pas tous les Avantages? Ne supposeroit il pas l'existence d'une Guerre qu' Il a glorieusement terminée? N'abandonneroit-il pas enfin de Lui à L'Angleterre le principe d'une Egalité déjà convenue entre Nous? Pour peu, Monsieur, que vous vouliez examiner avec le discernement qui vous appartient, les Considérations que j'ai l'honneur de vous exposer, vous conviendrez qu'une telle Négociation Nous seroit beaucoup plus préjudiciable que la Guerre et même qu'un Congrès.

En effet, dans un Congrès, si l'Angleterre, La Suède et La Russie débattoient pour faire prévaloir les principes qu'ont servi de fondement à la Troisième Coalition, La Prusse, Le Dannemarc, La Porte, La Perse, et L'Amerique réclameraient contre ces principes, et demanderoient des lois

égales de Navigation et un juste partage dans le Domaine de la Mer. Sans doute, dans cette discussion on voterait souvent la Diminution du Pouvoir de La France, mais souvent aussi on voterait pour la Diminution du Pouvoir de L'Angleterre. Des Puissances réclameraient l'Equilibre du Midi de L'Europe; mais d'autres aussi réclameraient l'Equilibre du Nord. Un grand Nombre s'occuperait de l'Equilibre de l'Asie; Toutes s'intéresseraient à l'Equilibre des Mers; Et si du Sein de tant de discussions orageuses et compliquées, il étoit possible d'espérer qu'il en sortit un Resultat, ce Resultat seroit juste, parcequ'il seroit complet; et certes Sa Majesté l'a déclaré dans toutes les Circonstances, Elle n'aura point de Répugnance à faire des Sacrifices pour la Tranquillité publique, lorsque L'Angleterre, La Russie et Toutes les Grandes Puissances seront chacune disposées à reconnoître les droits établis, à protéger les Etats foibles et à adopter des Principes de Justice, de Modération et d'Egalité; mais L'Empereur connoit trop les Hommes, pour se laisser séduire par des Chimères, et Il reconnoit que ce seroit s'égarer que de chercher la Paix dans un Dédale de dix Ans de Débats, qui pendant ce tems perpétueroient la Guerre et ne feroient que rendre Son terme plus incertain et plus difficile à atteindre. Il faudroit alors changer de Route et faire comme on fit à Utrecht, laisser les Alliés se morfondre dans des Débats interminables et inutiles, traiter Seul à Seul, discuter, comme on fit
alors,

alors, les intérêts des deux Puissances et ceux de Leurs Alliés respectifs, faire enfin la Paix pour Soi, et la faire assez équitable, assez honorable, pour qu'elle ne pût manquer d'être agréée par Toutes les Puissances intéressées. Voilà comme il convient, non pas dans dix ans, mais aujourd'hui, que deux Puissances, telles que L'Angleterre et La France terminent les différends qui Les divisent et établissent en même tems la Règle de Leurs Droits et celle des intérêts de Leurs Amis.

Pour me résumer, Monsieur, Je ne vois dans la Négociation proposée que trois formes possibles de discussion ; Négociation avec l'Angleterre et les Alliés qu'elle a acquis lors de la Formation de la Troisième Coalition ; Négociation avec toutes Les Puissances de l'Europe, en y joignant Les Américains ; Négociation avec l'Angleterre Seule. La première de ces Formes est inadmissible, parce qu'elle soumettroit l'Empereur à l'Influence de la Troisième Coalition qui n'existe plus : l'Empereur eut négocié ainsi, s'il eut été battu. La seconde Forme de Négociation éterniserait la Guerre, si les Incidents inévitables qu'elle multiplieroit à tous les Instants et les Passions qu'elle déchaineroit sans mesure, ne faisoient pas rompre avec éclat la discussion, peu d'années après qu'elle auroit été établie. La Troisième est donc la Seule que doivent désirer ceux qui veulent véritablement la Paix. Sa Majesté est persuadée que les dispositions justes et modérées qu'Elle aime à reconnoître dans le Ton et le Langage du Ministère de

Sa Majesté Britannique, secondant, au gré de Ses désirs, les Sentiments pacifiques dont Elle est plus que jamais déterminée à donner des Preuves à Ses Amis et même à Ses Ennemis, les Peuples épuisés des Efforts d'une Guerre dont l'intérêt est aussi difficile à sentir, que le véritable objet en est difficile à connoître, verront enfin sortir de la Négociation proposée une Paix qui est réclamée par tous Leurs besoins et par tous Leurs Voeux. Agréez, Monsieur, je vous prie, l'assurance de ma plus haute Considération.

(Signé) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

(Translation.)

Sir, Paris, 16th April 1806.

I HAVE taken the Pleasure of His Majesty the Emperor and King, before whom I lost no Time in laying the Dispatch which your Excellency did me the Honour of writing to me, under Date of the 8th Instant.

It appeared to His Majesty, that, admitting as you do the Principle of Equality, you nevertheless still persist in requiring a Form of Negotiation which cannot accord with that Principle. When in a Discussion between Two equal Powers One of them calls for the Interference of a Third, it is evident that she seeks to destroy that Equilibrium so favourable to a fair and free Discussion of their Interests. It is manifest that she is not willing

willing to content herself with the Advantages and the Rights of Equality. I am ready to believe, Sir, that in entering for the last Time upon this Discussion, I shall succeed in persuading your Excellency, that, under no Plea and on no Account, should Russia be called upon to take Part in the proposed Negotiation between England and France.

When the War broke out between the Two Countries, Russia was at Peace with France. This War has produced no Alteration in the Relations which existed between her and us. She first proposed her Mediation; and afterwards, in consequence of Circumstances foreign to the War which divides us, a Coolness arose between the Cabinets of St. Petersburg and the Thuilleries; the Emperor Alexander thought proper to suspend his political Relations with France; but at the same Time declared in the most positive Manner, that it was his Intention to take no Part in the existing Disputes between us and England.

We do not think that the Conduct which Russia has since held has in the smallest Degree altered this Determination. She has, it is true, concluded a Treaty of Alliance with you; but it is easy to see from what has been made publick of this Treaty, from the Object it had in View, and still more from the Consequences of it, that it had no Connection with the War which has been carrying on nearly Two Years between us and England.

This Treaty was an Agreement to take a Part in a War of a different Nature, more extensive and

more general than the first. From this War the Third Coalition sprung, in which Austria was a Principal and Russia an Auxiliary Power. It was only in Intention that England participated in this War. We have never had to oppose her Forces in Conjunction with those of her Allies. Russia acted only a secondary Part in it. No Declaration addressed to France informed us that she was at War with us; and it is only upon the Field of Battle where the Third Coalition was destroyed, that we have been officially informed that Russia was a Party to it.

When His Britannick Majesty declared War against France, He had an End in View which He made known by his Manifestos. This Object directed the Nature of the War; when, Eighteen Months afterwards, His Britannick Majesty formed an Alliance with Austria, Russia, and Sweden, He had other Objects in View.—This was a new War, the Motives of which must be sought for in the Official Papers which have been published by the different Powers; amongst these Motives the direct Interests of England are never mentioned. These Two Wars therefore have no common Connection; England in reality never participated in that which is terminated. Russia never took any Part directly or indirectly in that which still exists. There is, therefore, no Reason why England should not singly terminate a War, which she singly has waged against us. If His Majesty the Emperor were now to adopt the Principle of negotiating

negotiating with England jointly with her new Allies, he would implicitly admit the actual Existence of the Third Coalition, the Continuance of the German War, and the Identity of this War with that which France sustains against England. He would implicitly accept for the Basis of the Negotiation the Conditions of Monsieur Novofiltzoff, which excited the Astonishment of Europe, and were revolting to the Character of the French People;—and the Conqueror of the Coalition the Emperor would voluntarily place himself in the Situation of the Conquered.

At present, the Emperor has nothing to discuss with the Coalition. He is entitled to refuse his Recognition of the Relations which you have had with it; and in treating with you there can be no other Question, than the Object and the Interests of the War which was entered into previous to your Alliances, and which has survived them.

Notwithstanding only Six Months have elapsed since the Veil which concealed the secret Combinations of the last War has been removed, it is nevertheless true that the Continent is at Peace. Your principal Ally, Austria, has made a separate Peace. Prussia whose Armies were for some Time on the War Establishment, has concluded a Treaty of Offensive and Defensive Alliance with us, Sweden is not worthy a Remark. As to Russia there exist between her and us direct Proposals of Negotiation. Powerful as she is, she requires the Protection of no one, and she cannot call for

the Intervention of any Court to terminate the Disputes between us. Her remote Position places her so entirely out of our Reach, and deprives her so completely of all Means of annoying us, that the Alteration in our respective Connections, occasioned by a State of War or a State of Peace, is purely of a Diplomatick Nature. If in such a Situation, the Emperor were to accept the Condition of negotiating jointly with England and Russia, would he not resign all his Advantages? Would he not admit the Existence of a War which he has gloriously terminated? Would he not, in fine, abandon, in favour of England the Principle of Equality already agreed upon between us? If Sir, you will only examine with the Discernment which belongs to you the Considerations which I have the Honour to lay before you, you will agree that such a Negotiation would be far more prejudicial to us than War, and even than a Congress.

In fact, in a Congress, if England, Sweden, and Russia contended in support of the Principles which formed the Basis of the Third Coalition, Prussia, Denmark, the Porte, Persia, and America would protest against those Principles, and would require equal Laws for Navigation and a just Division of the Empire of the Seas. Doubtless in this Discussion, the Diminution of the Power of France would be frequently voted; but as frequently would the Diminution of the Power of England also be voted. The Balance of Power in the South of Europe would be demanded by some,
but

but others would demand the Balance of Power in the North. Many would bring forward the Balance of Power for Asia; all would feel an Interest in the Balance of Power on the Seas; and if it were possible to hope that any Result could be formed in the Midst of such complicated and turbulent Discussions, that Result would be just, because it would be complete; and certainly His Majesty has declared, under every Circumstance, that he would have no Repugnance to make Sacrifices for the publick Tranquillity, whenever England, Russia, and all the great Powers shall be disposed to recognize established Rights, to protect the weaker States, and to adopt the Principles of Justice, Moderation, and Equality; but the Emperor knows Mankind too well to allow himself to be led away by chimerical Ideas, and he feels that it would be in vain to seek for Peace in a Labyrinth of Ten Years of Discussions, which during that Period would perpetuate War, and would only have the Effect of rendering its Termination still more difficult and uncertain. It would then become necessary to change the System, and, as was done at Utrecht, leaving the Allies to perplex themselves in vain and endless Disputes, to enter into a separate Negotiation; to discuss, as was then done, the Interests of the Two Powers and of their respective Allies; at last to make Peace for ourselves, and to make it so equitable and so honourable as to be immediately agreed to by all the Powers concerned. This is the Mode in which it becomes

comes Two such Nations as England and France to terminate, not at the Distance of Ten Years, but immediately, the Differences which divide them, and at the same Time to establish the Regulation of their Rights and of the Interests of their Allies.

To resume, Sir ; I see in the proposed Negotiation, only Three possible Forms of Discussion :

Negotiation with England and the Allies which she acquired at the Time of the Formation of the Third Coalition :

Negotiation with all the Powers of Europe, with the Addition of America :

Negotiation with England alone.

The First of these Forms is inadmissible, because it would subject the Emperor to the Influence of the Third Coalition, which no longer exists. The Emperor would have negotiated in this Manner if he had been vanquished. The Second Form of Negotiation would eternalize the War, if the unavoidable Occurrences to which it would at every Instant give rise, and the Passions which it would let loose without Controul, did not cause the Discussions to be broken off with Violence a few Years after they should have been entered into. The Third therefore is the only One which can be desired by those who really wish for Peace. His Majesty is confident, that the just and moderate Dispositions which he has the Satisfaction of observing in the Tone and the Language of the Ministers of His Britannic Majesty, seconding, in conformity to his Desires, the Pacifick Sentiments of which he is
more

more than ever determined to afford Proofs to his Allies, and even to his Enemies, the Nations exhausted by the Efforts of a War, the Interest of which it is as difficult to perceive as its real Object is difficult to discover, will thus see a Peace, which is called for by all their Wants and all their Wishes, result from the proposed Negotiation.

I request, Sir, you will accept the Assurance of my high Consideration.

(Signed) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND,

No. 9.

LETTER from Mr. Secretary Fox to
M. Talleyrand, dated Downing Street,
April 20th, 1806.

Monfieur, Downing-Street, ce 20 Avril 1806.

J'AI reçu avant hier la dépêche de Votre Excellence du 16 de ce mois.

Après l'avoir lue et relue avec toute l'attention possible, je n'y trouve aucun argument suffisant pour induire notre Gouvernement à changer l'opinion qu'il a déjà énoncée, savoir, que toute Négociation où la Russie ne seroit pas comprise comme partie, est absolument inadmissible.

Nous voulons la Paix; mais nous ne pouvons rien vouloir qui puisse porter atteinte ou à la dignité de notre Souverain, ou à l'honneur, et aux intérêts de la nation. Or, si nous trahissions sans la Russie, vû les liens étroits qui nous unissent à
cette

cette Puissance, nous nous croirions exposés au reproche d'avoir manqué à cette fidélité scrupuleuse dans nos engagements dont nous nous faisons gloire ; tandis que de l'autre côté en persistant dans notre demande que la Russie soit admise, nous ne croyons rien faire qui soit contraire au principe d'égalité que nous réclamons tous les deux. Lorsque les trois Plénipotentiaires se trouveroient ensemble, comment croire qu'on pût rien emporter par la pluralité [de voix ? ou même qu'une assemblée pareille eut rien de commun avec un congrès général ? Il n'y existeroit effectivement que deux parties ; d'un côté la France, de l'autre les deux Puissances alliées. Au surplus, si l'on voit tant d'avantage dans une affaire de cette nature à se trouver deux contre un, il n'y auroit aucune objection à ce que vous fissiez intervenir celui de vos Alliés que vous jugeriez à propos.

Désirant sincèrement d'éviter des disputes inutiles, je ne me permets pas d'entrer dans la discussion des conséquences que Votre Excellence tire des événemens de la dernière campagne.

Je remarquerai seulement en passant que je ne vois pas par quelle raison une Alliance doit être envisagée comme nulle, par rapport aux Puissances qui y tiennent, par ce qu'une de celles qui la composoient en a été détachée par les malheurs de la guerre. Quant à l'ouverture que la Russie vous a faite nous ne savons ce qui en est ; mais quelle qu'en soit la nature, nous sommes persuadés que cette Cour ne se conduira jamais de manière à compromettre

mettre la loyauté reconnue de son caractère, ou d'affaiblir les liens d'amitié et de confiance qui subsistent entre Elle et l'Angleterre. Pour revenir au point. Votre Excellence dit que dans la négociation proposée Elle ne voit que trois formes possibles de discussion.

La première vous paroît inadmissible:

D'après ce que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous écrire; vous devez juger, Monsieur, que la troisième est incompatible tant avec nos idées fondamentales de la justice, et de l'honneur, qu'avec notre aperçu des intérêts de notre Pays. La seconde n'est pas peut-être mauvaise dans son principe, mais outre les délais qu'elle causeroit, elle ne seroit guères praticable dans la conjoncture actuelle.

C'est donc avec bien du regret que je dois déclarer nettement à Votre Excellence, que je ne vois nul espoir de paix dans ce moment-ci, à moins que chez vous on ne se dispose à traiter dans la forme que nous avons proposée.

Je crois devoir ajouter que cette forme nous est essentielle, non seulement pour les raisons que j'ai eu l'honneur de développer à Votre Excellence, mais en tant que toute autre pourrait faire naître des soupçons que de fait vous entretenez le projet chimérique qu'on vous reproche (à tort comme j'aime à croire) de nous exclure de toute relation avec les puissances du Continent de l'Europe; et même qu'une telle idée est moins revoltante pour nous qu'elle ne devrait l'être, et qu'elle ne l'est en effet. Ce n'est pas à un Ministre aussi éclairé que

que Votre Excellence qu'il puisse être nécessaire de déclarer que l'Angleterre ne peut jamais consentir à une exclusion qui la dégraderoit du rang qu'Elle a tenu jusqu'ici, et Elle croit pouvoir toujours tenir parmi les Nations du Monde.

La chose enfin se trouve réduite a un seul point. Veut-on traiter conjointement avec la Russie? Oui. Veut-on que nous traitions séparément? Non.

Bien que nous n'ayons pas réussi dans le grand objet que nous nous sommes proposé, les deux Gouvernements n'ont qu'à se louer de l'honnêteté et de la franchise qui ont caractérisé la discussion de leurs différends; et je vous dois sur mon compte particulier, Monsieur, des remerciemens de la manière obligeante dont Votre Excellence s'exprime à mon égard.

Je suis, &c.

(Signé) C. J. FOX.

(Translation.)

Sir, Downing-Street, April 20th, 1806.

I Received the Day before Yesterday, your Excellency's Dispatch of the 16th Instant.

After having repeatedly read it with all possible Attention, I do not find in it any Argument sufficient to induce our Government to change the Opinion which it has already declared, namely,

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that

that any Negotiation in which Russia is not included as a Party, is absolutely inadmissible.

We wish for Peace; but we cannot wish for any Thing which may be injurious either to the Dignity of our Sovereign, or to the Honour and the Interests of the Nation. But if we negotiate without Russia, considering the intimate Ties by which we are united with that Power, we should conceive ourselves open to the Reproach of having failed in that scrupulous Fidelity to our Engagements, on which we pride ourselves; whilst, on the other Hand, by persisting in our Demand that Russia be admitted, we do not conceive that we do any Thing contrary to that Principle of Equality to which both of us lay Claim. When the Three Plenipotentiaries are assembled, how can it be thought that any Question could be carried by the Majority of Voices? or even that such an Assembly could have any Thing in common with a General Congress? There would be in Fact but two Parties in it; on one Side, France, on the other the Two allied Powers. Moreover, if it is thought so advantageous in an Affair of this Nature, to have two against one, no Objection would be made to your introducing which ever of your Allies you may judge most expedient.

Sincerely desirous of avoiding useless Disputes, I do not allow myself to enter into a Discussion of the Consequences which your Excellency draws from the Events of the last Campaign.

I will

I will only remark, that I do not see any Reason why an Alliance should be considered as null with regard to the Powers who adhere to it, because a Power who formerly belonged to it has been detached from it by the Misfortunes of War.

With regard to the Overture which Russia has made you, we have no Knowledge of it; but, whatever may be the Nature of it, we are persuaded that that Court will never conduct itself so as to commit the acknowledged Honour of its Character, or to weaken the Ties of Friendship and of Confidence which subsist between England and Russia.

To return to the Point; your Excellency mentions that, in the proposed Negotiation, you know but of three possible Forms of Discussion.

The first appears to you inadmissible.

According to what I have had the Honour to write to you, you must be convinced, Sir, that the third is incompatible, both with our fundamental Ideas of Justice and Honour, and with our Conception of the Interests of our Country. The second is not perhaps bad, so far as regards its Principle; but besides the Delays which it would occasion, it would scarcely be practicable in the present Conjuncture.

It is therefore with much Regret, that I am obliged to declare frankly to your Excellency, that I see no Hope of Peace at this Moment, if you should not be disposed to negotiate in the Manner which we have proposed.

I think

I think myself obliged to add, that this Form is essential to us, not only for the Reasons which I have had the Honour to explain to your Excellency, but in so much as any other Form might create Suspicions that you really entertain the chimerical Project with which you are charged (wrongfully as I willingly believe) of excluding us from any Connection with the Continental Powers of Europe; and even, that such an Idea is less revolting to us than it ought to be, and than it in Reality is. It is not necessary to declare to a Minister, so enlightened as your Excellency, that England can never consent to an Exclusion which would degrade her from the Rank which she has hitherto held, and which she believes that she may ever hold, among the Nations of the World.

The Affair, in fine, is reduced to one single Point. Will you negotiate conjointly with Russia? We answer, Yes: But if you require us to negotiate separately, we answer, No.

Although we have not succeeded in the great Object which we proposed to ourselves, the two Governments may well pride themselves on the Candour and Frankness, which have characterized the Discussion of their Differences; and I owe to you, on my own Account, Sir, Thanks for the obliging Manner in which your Excellency expresses yourself with regard to me.

I am, &c.

C. J. FOX.

No. 10.

No. 10.

LETTER from M. Talleyrand to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated Paris, 2d June 1806.—
Received June, 4th.

Monfieur, A Paris le 2 Juin 1806.

J'AI mis sous les yeux de l'Empereur la dernière lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire. Je ne puis que vous répéter, d'après vos ordres, qu'exiger de la France qu'elle traite avec vous sur le principe de votre alliance avec la Russie, c'est vouloir nous réduire à une forme de discussion forcée, et nous supposer dans un état d'abaissement où nous ne nous sommes jamais trouvés. On ne doit jamais se flatter d'imposer à la France ni des conditions de paix, ni un mode de négociations contraire aux usages. L'exigence sur l'un ou l'autre de ces points, affecte également le caractère François, et je ne crains pas de dire que pour triompher à cet égard de toutes les répugnances, ce ne seroit pas trop qu'une armée Angloise eût envahi la Belgique et fut à la veille de pénétrer en Picardie par les débouchés de la Somme.

Je dois encore vous répéter, Monsieur, que dans la vérité, Sa Majesté desire la paix, et pourquoi n'ajouterai-je pas ce que nous avons pu dire, ce que nous avons réellement dit à toutes les époques où les négociations ont été rompus, que la prolongation de la guerre n'a jamais été préjudiciable à la grandeur François, et qu'en tems de paix, un
Grand

Grand Etat ne peut faire usage de ses forces, que pour se maintenir et pour conserver, telles qu'elles sont, ses relations avec ses voisins.

La France ne vous conteste pas, Monsieur, le droit de choisir et de conserver vos amis. Dans la guerre, elle n'a pas le choix de ses ennemis, et il faut bien qu'elle les combatte unis ou séparés, selon qu'il leur convient de se concerter pour accomplir leurs vues d'aggression, et de résistance, et de former des alliances si peu conformes à la véritable politique de leurs Pays, que la première clause de ces alliances a toujours été de les tenir secrettes.

Parceque nous voulons suivre, dans cette circonstance, la forme de négociation qui a été en usage dans tous les tems et dans tous les pays, vous en concluez que nous ne voulons pas que vous ayez des liaisons sur le continent. Je ne pense pas que nous ayons jamais donné lieu à une telle induction. Il ne dépend de nous d'empêcher aucun Gouvernement de se lier avec vous, et nous ne pouvons vouloir ni ce qui est injuste, ni ce qui est absurde : Mais autre chose est, que vous formiez des liaisons à votre choix ; et autre chose que nous y concourions et que nous vous aidions à les contracter. Or, consentir à traiter sur le principe de vos alliances et les admettre dans la discussion des intérêts directs et immédiats qui nous divisent, c'est plus que les scuffrir et les reconnoître ; c'est en quelque sorte les consacrer, les cimenter et les garantir. Je vous l'ai déjà observé, Monsieur, nous ne pouvons céder sur ce point, parceque le principe est pour nous.

Toutes fois, pour ne laisser lieu désormais à aucun mal entendu, je crois de mon devoir de vous proposer. 1°, De négocier dans les mêmes formes préliminaires qui furent adoptées sous le ministère de M. le Marquis de Rockingham en 1782 ; formes qui ne furent pas si heureusement renouvelées pour les Négociations de Lille ; mais qui eurent un plein Succès dans la Négociation qui précéda le traité d'Amiens. 2°, D'établir pour bases deux principes fondamentaux : le premier que je tire de votre lettre du 26 Mars ; Savoir : “ *Que les deux Etats auront pour objet que la paix soit honorable pour eux et leurs Alliés respectifs ; en même tems que cette paix sera de Nature à assurer, autant qu'ils le pourront, le repos futur de l'Europe.* ” Le second principe sera une reconnaissance en faveur de l'une et de l'autre Puissance de tout droit d'intervention et de garantie pour les Affaires Continentales et pour les Affaires Maritimes. Non seulement Sa Majesté ne répugne pas à faire un tel aveu ; Elle aime à l'ériger en principe ; et en vous exposant ainsi ses véritables intentions, je crois vous avoir donné une preuve décisive de ses dispositions pacifiques. Sa Majesté se persuade en même tems, qu'en prévenant pour toujours à cet égard tout sujet de plaintes, d'inquiétudes et de déclamations, Elle a fait, sur un point qui interesse essentiellement le bien de l'humanité, son devoir d'Homme, et de Souverain.

Ce seroit, Monsieur, avec regret que je verrois finir une discussion qui a commencé sous de si bons présages.

présages. J'aurois toutesfois en perdant une espérance qui m'est bien chère la Consolation de penser que le tort de l'avoir fait évanouir, ne sauroit être imputé à la France, puis qu'elle ne demande et ne veut que ce qui est raisonnable et juste.

Agréez, Monsieur, l'affurance de ma plus haute Considération.

(Signé)

CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

(Translation.)

Sir,

Paris, June 2d 1806.

I HAVE laid before the Emperor the last Letter, which your Excellency did me the Honour to write to me. I can only, by his Orders, repeat to you, that to require of France that she should treat with you upon the Principle of your Alliance with Russia, is wishing to reduce us to a constrained Form of Discussion, and supposing us in a State of Humiliation, into which we have never fallen. The Enemies of France must not hope to dictate to her either the Conditions of Peace, or a Mode of Negotiation contrary to the established Usages. Such an Attempt with respect to either of these Points, would equally affect the French Character; and I do not hesitate to say, that to overcome all our Repugnance on this Point, it would at least require that an English Army should have invaded Belgium, and should be at the Point of entering Picardy, by the Mouth of the Somme.

■ 3

I must

I must, Sir, again repeat to you, that His Majesty is truly desirous of Peace; and why should not I add, what we might have said, what we really have said at the Rupture of every Negotiation for Peace, that the Continuance of the War has never been prejudicial to the Grandeur of France, and that, in Time of Peace, a great Nation can use its Power only to maintain itself, and preserve in their present State its Relations with the neighbouring Countries.

France, Sir, does not object to your Right of chusing and preserving your Allies. In War she has not the Choice of her Enemies, and she must fight them separate or united, as it may suit their Convenience to concert among themselves, for the Accomplishment of their Views of Aggression and Resistance, and for the Formation of Alliances so little conformable to the real Interests of their respective Countries, that the first Clause of them has always been a Condition of Secrecy.

Because we wish, in this Case, to follow the Form of Negotiation which has been customary at all Times and in all Countries, you conclude that we desire that you should have no Connection with the Continent. I do not conceive that we ever gave you any Reason for drawing such an Inference. We cannot hinder any Government from forming an Alliance with you, and we cannot wish either what is unjust, or what is absurd. It is one Thing, that you should form Alliances according to your own Choice, but it is another, that

that we should concur in them, and aid you in contracting them. But to consent to treat upon the Principle of your Alliances, and to introduce them into the Discussion of the direct and immediate Interests that divide us, is doing much more than suffering and acknowledging them; it is in a Manner consecrating, cementing, and guarantying them. I have already, Sir, observed to you, that we cannot yield upon this Point, because the Principle is in our Favour.

To leave, however, from henceforward, no Room for any Misunderstanding, I think it my Duty to propose to you, 1st, To negotiate in the same Preliminary Forms which were adopted during the Administration of the Marquis of Rockingham, in 1782; Forms, which were not renewed with so much Advantage in the Negotiations of Lisle, but which were perfectly successful in the Negotiations which preceded the Treaty of Amiens: 2dly, To establish as a Basis, Two fundamental Principles; the First, which I take from your Letter of the 26th March, namely, "*That the Two States should have for their Object that the Peace be honourable for them and their respective Allies, and at the same Time of a Nature to secure, as far as is in their Power, the future Tranquillity of Europe.*" The Second Principle shall be, an Acknowledgement on the Part of the Two Powers of their mutual Right of Intervention and Guaranty in Continental and in Maritime Affairs. His Majesty, far from being

unwilling to make this Avowal, delights in raising it to a Principle ; and, in thus explaining his real Intentions, I think I have given you a decisive Proof of his pacific Dispositions. His Majesty is at the same Time persuaded, that, in preventing for ever all Subject of Complaint, Uneasiness, and Remonstrance on this Point, he has, in a Case which is of essential Interest to the Good of Human Nature, done his Duty as a Man, and as a Sovereign.

I should sincerely regret, Sir, that a Discussion, began under such favourable Auspices, should terminate without the Attainment of its Object. Should the Hopes which I cherish vanish, I shall, at all Events, have the Consolation of thinking, that the Fault cannot be imputed to France, who demands and wishes nothing but what is just and reasonable.

Accept, Sir, the Assurance of my distingüished Consideration.

(Signed) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

NO. II.

LETTER from Mr. Secretary Fox to
M. Talleyrand, dated Downing Street,
June 14, 1806.

Monsieur, Downing Street, ce 14 Juin 1806.
J'AI reçu il y a quelques Jours la Dépêche de
Votre Excellence en date du 2 du mois courant.
Je ne conçois pas comment en traitant avec la
Russie et Nous conjointement, Vous ayez à recon-
noître

noître le *principe* de l'Alliance entr' Elle et Nous ; tout au plus Vous ne reconnoissez que le "*fait* ;" encore moins puis je deviner comment cette manière de traiter Vous suppose dans un état d'abaissement quelconque. Nous ne prétendons nullement imposer à la France, ni les Conditions de la Paix, ni une mode de Négociation contraire aux Usages.

En 1782, Epoque que votre Excellence cite elle-même dans Sa Dépêche Nous ne Nous croyions pas dans un état d'avilissement ; cependant, lorsque Monsieur de Vergennes Nous dit qu'il falloit pour l'honneur de Sa Cour que Nous traitassions conjointement avec Elle, La Hollande et l'Espagne, Nous adoptâmes, sans croire en aucun sens Nous dégrader, la mode auquel ce Ministre paroissoit attacher tant de prix. Votre Gouvernement veut sincèrement la Paix : Ici on la desire également ; et je pourrois cependant dire de l'Angleterre ce que Votre Excellence dit de la France, que la prolongation de la Guerre n'a jamais été préjudiciable ni à Sa Gloire ni à Sa Grandeur ; à Ses vrais intérêts permanens peutêtre bien ; mais également à ceux de la France.

Quant à ce qu' il y a eu de secret dans Notre Traité d'Alliance avec la Russie, Votre Excellence est trop éclairée pour ne pas reconnoître que pour ce qui regardoit la Guerre et les propositions qu'on auroit à faire à la Prusse et à l'Autriche, le secret étoit nécessaire. Tout cela est passé. Agir de concert pour procurer en premier lieu le Repos à l'Europe

l'Europe et pour le lui conserver après, c'est le principal, je pourrois même dire l'unique, objet de Nos liaisons.

Après la manière franche dont Vous défavouez l'intention, qu'on Vous a imputé à tort par rapport à ce qui regarde nos liaisons continentales, il ne peut plus exister le moindre doute sur ce point essentiel, et il n'en seroit que plus fâcheux que les difficultés qui regardent la *Forme* plutôt que la *Chose* fissent continuer une Guerre que les deux Gouvernemens souhaitent également de terminer.

Venons à ce que Votre Excellence propose.

La *Forme* qui eut lieu dans le Ministère du Marquis de Rockingham m'est d'autant plus présente à la mémoire, que j'occupois alors le même Poste dont Sa Majesté a bien voulu récemment m'honorer. Que la France et l'Angleterre changent de position, et c'est précisément celle que j'ai proposée.

Nous traitons alors avec la France et Ses Alliés. Que la France traite à cette heure avec Nous et les Nôtres. Les Bases offertes dans votre seconde Proposition sont parfaitement conformes aux vues de Notre Gouvernement, bien entendu toujours que lorsque Nous reconnoissons mutuellement Nos Droits respectifs d'intervention et de garantie pour les Affaires de l'Europe, Nous convenons aussi mutuellement d'abstenir de tout Empiètement de part et d'autre sur les Etats plus ou moins puissans qui la composent.

Je

Je ne regretterois pas moins que Votre Excellence que cette discussion finît. Pour peu que Nous puissions agir de façon qu'on ne puisse pas Nous reprocher d'avoir manqué à la bonne foi vis à vis d'un Allié qui mérite à tous égards une Confiance entière de notre Part, Nous serons contents, d'autant plus que Nous savons qu'une Paix honorable ne seroit pas moins conforme aux voeux de la Russie qu' à ceux de la France et de l'Angleterre.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.

(Signé) C. J. FOX.

(Translation.)

Sir, Downing Street, June 14th, 1806.

I Received a few Days ago your Excellency's Dispatch of the 2d Instant.

I cannot understand how, in treating conjointly with England and Russia, you will acknowledge the *Principle* of the Alliance subsisting between the Two Courts; at most you will only acknowledge the *Fact*; much less can I conceive how you can consider yourselves in any Degree lowered by this Mode of Treating. We do not by any Means pretend to dictate to France, either the Conditions of Peace, or a Mode of Negotiation contrary to the established Usages.

In 1782, the Epoch which your Excellency alludes to in your Dispatch, we did not think ourselves

felves in a State of Degradation, yet when M. de Vergennes informed us that it was necessary for the Honour of his Court, that we should treat conjointly with France, Holland, and Spain, we did not think ourselves in any Degree lowered by adopting the Mode of Negotiation to which that Minister appeared to attach so much Consequence. Your Government is sincerely desirous of Peace. In this Country the same Sentiment prevails; and yet I could very well say of England what your Excellency says of France; namely, That the Continuance of the War has never been prejudicial either to its Glory or to its Grandeur; perhaps indeed, it has been so to its real and permanent Interests, but it has been equally so to those of France.

With respect to the secret Conditions of our Alliance with Russia, your Excellency is too enlightened not to allow, that in what concerned the War and the Propositions to be made to Prussia and Austria, Secrecy was absolutely necessary. All that is now at an End; to act in concert for the Establishment of the Repose of Europe, and for its subsequent Preservation, is the principal, and I may even say the only Object of our present Communications.

After the open Disavowal which you have made of the Intention falsely imputed to you with respect to our Continental Connections, no Doubt can exist upon that essential Point, and it would be the more distressing that Difficulties in *Form* rather than
in

in *Substance*, should prolong a War which the Two Governments equally desire to terminate.

Let us now come to what your Excellency proposes.

The Form of Negotiation which took place during Lord Rockingham's Administration is more particularly present to my Memory, as I then held the same Office with which His Majesty has lately been pleased to honour me. Let France and England change Situations, and the Form you mention is exactly similar to that which I have proposed.

We then treated with France and her Allies; let France now treat with us and our Allies. The Basis offered in your second Proposition is exactly conformable to the Views of our Government, provided it be well understood that, whilst we mutually acknowledge our respective Rights of Intervention and Guaranty with regard to the Affairs of Europe, we also mutually agree to abstain from all Encroachment upon the greater or lesser States which compose it.

I should regret equally with your Excellency that this Discussion should break off. If we can only act so as not to incur the Reproach of a Breach of Faith towards an Ally, who for so many Reasons deserves our entire Confidence, we shall be content, and the more so as we know that an honourable Peace would be no less conformable to the Wishes of Russia, than to those of France and England.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

(Signed) C. J. FOX.

No. 12.

No. 12.

COMMUNICATION made by the Earl of
Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated
June 13th, 1806.

A FEW Days after my Arrival at Paris from the Depôt at Verdun, Monf. Talleyrand desired me to call upon him; having done so, he told me that the French Government had been looking out for some Means by which a secret and confidential Communication might be made, explanatory of the Sentiments and Views of France, as well as the Outlines of the Terms on which Peace might be restored between the Two Countries.

Having mentioned the extreme Desire of making this Communication in such a Manner that no Publicity might in any Case ensue, should the Object of it not be obtained, Monsieur Talleyrand proceeded to state, in a long Argument, which it is useless to repeat, as it forms the Substance of several of the French Government's Dispatches; the Reasons which prevent their treating for a general Peace jointly with Russia.

He said, that in a Dispatch sent some Weeks before to Mr. Fox he had been ordered to name Lisle rather than Amiens for the Negotiation of a definitive Treaty, in order to remove all former Discussions, and to facilitate to England the Possession of Malta.

I then took the Liberty of interrupting M. Talleyrand, to say that however flattering the Confidence
he

he was ordered to place in me might be, yet that, feeling as I did, the Interests, and above all the Honour of my Country, it was impossible for me to be the Bearer of a Communication having Peace for its Object, against which I should feel obliged to vote in Parliament; and viewing the Restoration of Hanover in this Light, I could not receive any further Communication till I had explicit Declaration with regard to His Majesty's German Dominions.

M. Talleyrand then broke off the Conversation, desiring me to return the Third Day after. At the Expiration of this Time I waited upon him again, when he informed me that, considering the extreme Strefs which appeared to be laid upon this Point, Hanover should make no Difficulty.

Authorized by the Concession of that in which the Honour of the King and that of the Nation appeared most interested, I inquired whether the Possession of Sicily would be demanded, it having been so said, “(a) *Vous l'avez, nous ne vous la demandons pas; si nous la possédions elle pourroit augmenter de beaucoup les difficultés.*” Considering this to be very positive both from the Words and the Manner of delivering them, I conceived it improper to make further Questions. “(b) *Nous ne vous demandons rien*” amounting to an Ad-

(a) You are in Possession of it, we do not ask it of you; if we possessed it, it might very much augment our Difficulties.

(b) We ask nothing from you.

million

mission of *uti possidetis* as applicable to His Majesty's Conquests.

M. Talleyrand mentioned strongly the Recognition of the Emperor and the different Branches of his Family as absolutely expected. On this I took Occasion to state the Solidity which the Recognition of Great Britain would give to their Establishment, and inquired whether the French Government would guarantee the Integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The Answer was Yes, but it must be soon. “ (c) Beaucoup se prepare mais rien “ n’est fait.” Reverting to the first Conversation, I desired to know whether a middle Term might not be found at the same Time to obtain the Object desired by the French Government, and that desired by Great Britain, of not treating in a Manner unconnected with Russia. To this he answered that they were entirely ready to give every Facility to the Arrangement of the respective Interests of the Two Powers, or that a British Minister should, being authorized by the Emperor Alexander, stipulate for both.

The last Words of M. Talleyrand were, “ (d) Les “ Sentiments de la France sont entierelement changés ; “ l’aigreur qui caracterisoit le Commencement de

(c) A great deal is in Preparation, but nothing is yet done.

(d) The Sentiments entertained in France are entirely different from what they were. The Asperity which characterized the Commencement of this War, no longer exists; and what we most desire is, to live in Harmony with so great a Power as Great Britain.

“ cette

“ cette guerre n'existe plus, et ce que nous désirons
“ le plus, c'est de pouvoir vivre en bonne intelli-
“ gence avec une aussi grande puissance que la
“ Grande Bretagne.”

(Signed) YARMOUTH.

No. 13.

NOTE from Mr. Secretary Fox to
M. Talleyrand, dated June 14, 1806.

Monfieur,

JE ne Vous écris que deux Mots pour Vous
dire combien je fuis fatisfait du defir que Vous
avez témoigné pour la Paix. Au furplus Lord
Yarmouth a toute ma Confiance, et tout ce qu'il
Vous dira, Vous pouvez croire que c'est moi même
qui Vous le dis. Le tems preffe—Agréez tous
mes hommages.

(Signé) C. J. FOX.

Londres, ce 14 Juin 1806.

(Translation.)

Sir,

I JUST write you a few Words to express to
you the Pleasure which I feel at the Desire you
have manifested for Peace. I have only to add
that Lord Yarmouth possesses all my Confidence,
and

and that whatever he shall say to you, you may consider as said by myself. In great haste,

I am, &c.

(Signed) C. J. FOX:

London, 14th June 1806.

No. 14.

EXTRACT from a Dispatch from the Earl of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated Paris, June 19, 1806.—Received June 21st.

Sir, Paris, June, 19th 1806.

I HAVE the Honour to inform you that, in Obedience to your Orders, I made, all the Haste in my Power, to arrive at Paris as soon as possible; Calm at Sea however prevented my getting here till the Afternoon of the 16th.

I immediately waited upon M. Talleyrand to deliver to him the Dispatches you entrusted to my Care, and requested to put off any Conversation on the Subject of my Journey till next Day. I intended employing this Interval to endeavour to see M. d'Oubril if at Paris, and communicate with him previously to seeing again M. Talleyrand, or at any rate to obtain some Knowledge of his Motions.

Previous, however, to my leaving M. Talleyrand, he expressed to me that although the Desire of Peace was equally sincere now as it was when

when I quitted Paris, yet that some Changes had taken place which he had hinted at the Possibility of, when I last saw him, alluding to the Readiness of Russia to treat separately; and further mentioned that the Emperor had received Reports from his Brother and the General Officers under his Orders, stating that Naples could not be held without Sicily, and the Probability they saw of gaining Possession of that Island. I answered him, that, being ordered to require the Restoration of Naples to the King of Sicily as a necessary Article of Peace, there would be no Question of their Separation.

I conceive Sicily to be the great Difficulty, though perhaps, were there no other, it might be got over. M. Talleyrand often and seriously stated the absolute Determination of the Emperor not to consent to our Demands of Naples, Venice, Istria, and Dalmatia, or to alienate any Part of his Italian States to form a Provision for the King of Sardinia.

Against Cessions in the West Indies or elsewhere I solemnly protested; nor do I think they care sufficiently about these Objects to give any sufficient Continental Equivalent for them.

M. Talleyrand often repeated that the Emperor had enquired whether I had any Powers; adding, (a) " *qu' en politique on ne peut parler la même langue si on n'y est également autorisé;*" and as frequently said that they considered that

(a) " That in Politics it is impossible to hold the same Language, unless both Parties are equally authorized."

Hanover for the Honour of the Crown, Malta for the Honour of the Navy, and the Cape of Good Hope for the Honour of British Commerce, to be sufficient Inducements to induce His Majesty's Ministers to make Peace.

P. S. On Tuesday 17th June I waited upon M. Talleyrand, and began the Conversation by alluding to the Changes he had hinted at the Night before, and desired Leave, to repeat the Substance of what had passed at my former Interviews with him, and which I had by his Desire communicated. He agreed, that the Statement was accurate.

No. 15.

EXTRACT from a Dispatch from Mr. Secretary Fox to the Earl of Yarmouth, dated Downing Street, June 26, 1806.

My Lord, Downing Street, June 26, 1806.

I HAD the Honour on Saturday Evening to receive your Lordship's Letters of the 19th, and should sooner have answered them, if I had not been for these Three Days past totally incapable of attending to Business.

I am very happy to learn that M. Talleyrand acknowledges your Accounts of former Conversations to be accurately correct, but when he does acknowledge this, I have no Conception on what Ground

he can recollect from what he said so distinctly to your Lordship before, upon the Subject of Sicily: "(a) *Vous " l'avez, nous nevous demandons rien,*" are Words that made the more Impression on me, because, those contained in the latter Clause of the Sentence had been used by his Excellency in one of his Letters to me. It was on the Faith of the *uti possidetis* being to be strictly observed as the Basis, and particularly Sicily, on which Satisfaction had been given to your Lordship, that His Majesty was induced to authorize your Lordship to hold further Conferences with M. Talleyrand. Any Tergiversation or Cavil therefore on that Article, would be a Breach of the Principle of the proposed Basis in its most essential Part. To say that Hanover is an Exception to the Principle is in vain, in as much as Hanover is to be yielded expressly in Honour of the Crown; while, on the other Hand, the Recognitions proposed with regard to the French Empire and its Dependants, are not only in Honour of the Crown of France, but tend substantially to establish the Solidity of her Power. With regard to the Complaint of the Want of full Powers; to avoid all Pretence of Cavil on that Account, I am commanded by His Majesty to transmit to you the Instrument accompanying this Letter. But your Lordship should fairly state to M. Talleyrand, that you are not authorized to make any Use of them formally until M. Talleyrand returns to his

(a) You are in Possession of it; we ask nothing from you.

former Ground with respect to Sicily. Your Lordship is directed further, to ascertain that Minister, that, if Russia offers to treat separately, it is only in the Way in which we do; that is to say, separately in Form, but in Substance, in Concert with each other. And here you will recollect that this very Circumstance was canvassed in your former Conversations with M. Talleyrand, when that Minister expressed himself clearly that there would be no Objection on the Part of France to such Preconcert.

The Result of what I have stated to your Lordship is this: 1st, That Sicily is a *sine qua non*; on which Subject, if the French Minister recedes from his former Answer, it is in vain that any further Discussion should take place. It is clearly within his first Opinion delivered to your Lordship; it is clearly within his last Description of Places which are reciprocally possessed by the Two Countries, and cannot in all Probability be recovered by War.

If, according to the Hope conceived by your Lordship, this Matter should be arranged, you may open your full Powers; stating at the same Time, the Determination of this Court not to come to any final Agreement without the Consent of Russia. You will of course again mention the Questions of Naples and Istria. If we could attain either of them, it would be well; but if we cannot, your Lordship will not state these Points as conclusive Reasons against agreeing on Preliminary Articles, provided

provided such Articles be considered as provisional and subject to the Approbation of Russia.

With regard to the Mode of provisional Agreement, two suggest themselves to my Mind: The one, to send the Agreement we shall have entered into, either to Peterburgh, or to some authorized Agent of the Emperor Alexander, at Vienna, Paris, or elsewhere, for his Approbation; the other, to copy the Precedent adopted by Lord Sandwich and Doctor Franklin in the Year 1782. At that Time a provisional Treaty was signed by the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain and the United States of America, with the Reservation, that the said Treaty should not have Effect till a Peace should be agreed upon between France and England. Of these Two Modes I should prefer the latter.

It does not appear that there has been any Conversation between your Lordship and M. Talleyrand on a Point which was mentioned to you, and which appears to be of considerable Importance; I mean, the future Admission of Russia and Sweden to become Parties in a Definitive Treaty. I do not say that this is a Point that must be determined upon previous to your settling the Basis proposed; but it is one which should not be left Sight of, but, on the contrary, urged as far as possible.

and finally, and perhaps, the most important, to the
 terms of the Treaty, and to the manner of its execution,
 they, in fact, are the only points which are to be
 settled, and which should be settled, as far as possible,
 before the Treaty is signed, and before the
 plenipotentiaries are named.

No. 16.

EXTRACT from a Dispatch from the Earl
of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated
Paris, July 1st, 1806.—Received July 2th.

Sir, Paris, July 1st 1806.

I HAD the Honour to receive, on Saturday Night,
the full Powers with which it has graciously
pleas'd His Majesty to entrust me, and your Dis-
patch of the 26th of June.

I waited upon M. Talleyrand next Morning,
and stated to him in the strongest Manner the Im-
possibility of my conversing any further upon the
general Outlines of Peace, until he should return
to the former Ground, and consider Sicily in its
true and real Situation, namely, a State not con-
quered by France, or likely to be so, and coming
most strictly within the Meaning of his own Words;
that it had been clearly expressed by him, and
repeated to you in the first Instance, that France
did not intend to make Sicily an Obstacle to Peace.
M. Talleyrand answer'd, that whilst the War con-
tinued, and till Terms were actually agreed upon,
Change of Circumstances were always to be con-
sidered as Reasons for a partial Change of Terms;
that Bonaparte had been but lately convinc'd of
the Facility of taking Sicily at some future Period
of the War; but that, above all, he felt more and
more its absolute Necessity to make Naples and
the neighbouring Territories tenable: That had
any Confidential Overture been made Three Months
ago, they would have been ready to settle the
Question

Question of Naples in the Manner most satisfactory to Great Britain; the same a Month later with regard to Holland. Those Subjects were now arranged, and the Emperor would consider any retrograde Measure as equivalent to Abdication. I observed to that Minister, that however much good Faith may be necessary in every Transaction of the World, yet that being more peculiarly so, when a Communication is made secretly and verbally, I had a Right to be doubly surprized at any Change of Ground. He defended himself by his former Argument about altered Circumstances, and said, that when no Change of Disposition was manifested towards Great Britain herself, as to the Restoration of Hanover, or the Possession of Malta and the Cape, he thought we might suffer them to possess themselves of a Part of the States of their Enemy, necessary to the Tenure of the rest, which no Consideration would now induce France to restore.

M. Talleyrand then asked, whether I had any Powers. I told him that I must decline answering that Question, until he should inform me that there would be no further Discussion about Sicily; but that he might easily draw a Conclusion that I had, from the honourable Manner in which Great Britain endeavoured to remove every Obstacle not in its own Nature insurmountable.

The Minister then mentioned his being obliged to go to St. Cloud, and asked, what I said, I answered "That I was ordered to continue no Conversation

Conversation till I should be informed that this new Demand, changing entirely the proposed Basis, should be urged no more." He appointed next Morning for me to receive an Answer.

I accordingly returned to the Office Yesterday Morning, when M. Talleyrand repeated the same Demand, offering to desist from the Recognition by Great Britain of any or all the New States, waving this Concession to the Honour of the Powers created by France, and setting Hanover against Sicily, and pleading that no such Recognition being demanded, Hanover would then appear a fair Equivalent for that Island. He read the Draft of an Article to this Effect: That Great Britain and France should not oppose each others Arms against such of the Powers now at War, as should not be named in the Preliminary Articles.

To this I declined making any Answer, repeating my Orders not to converse further till he should abandon this Proposition, and return to the former Basis. I added that, unless he did so, I could expect nothing but your Order to return to England.

M. Talleyrand wished to revert to the old Topic, on which I repeated to him that it was impossible for me to converse on any Part of the Subject, till he should entirely relinquish every Mode of seeking for the Possession of Sicily.

M. Talleyrand desired me to inform you, that on the 29th of June the French Troops were to take Possession of Cattaro,

No. 17.

EXTRACT from a Dispatch from the Earl of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated Paris, July 1st, 1806.—Received July 4th.

Sir, Paris, July 1, 1806—*Midnight.*

AFTER closing the Dispatch I had the Honour to address to you this Morning, I went for the Passport M. Talleyrand had promised to have prepared for the Messenger's Return.

Instead of giving me the Passport, he made many Excuses for its having escaped his Memory, requesting me to wait till he should come back from St. Cloud.

When I returned, M. Talleyrand proposed to me to offer the Hans Towns as an Establishment for the King of Naples, and that the British Troops should occupy them the same Day they retake Possession of Hanover. On a little further Conversation, I had little Doubt that were England to provide in any other Manner for His Sicilian Majesty, the King might add the Hans Towns and their Territories in full Sovereignty to his German Dominions.

The Proposition about the Hans Towns being entirely new, I promised to refer it without any Comment to you for His Majesty's Consideration.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

(Signed) **YARMOUTH.**

No. 18.

No. 18.

EXTRACT from a Dispatch from Mr. Secretary Fox to the Earl of Yarmouth, dated Downing-Street, July 5th, 1806.

My Lord, Downing-Street, 5th July 1806.

YOUR Lordship's Dispatches of the 1st Instant were received here early Yesterday Morning, and I lose no Time in apprizing you of His Majesty's Commands upon the present State of the Discussion with the French Government.

The Abandonment of Sicily is a Point on which it is impossible for His Majesty to concede. Your Lordship has already stated unanswerably to M. Talleyrand, that this Demand is inconsistent with his express Declarations, and with the whole Principle on which the Negotiation rests. It is, besides, a Proposal in itself quite inadmissible. The King's Troops occupy Sicily for its Defence, but with no Right to cede it to France. It is not easy to contend, that the Possession of Sicily can be necessary to that of Naples; nor, if it were so, could that be assigned as a Reason for His Majesty's consenting to abandon that Island, which He may justly hope His Naval and Military Forces will be able to defend against all Attacks. The Hans Towns could not, in the present Circumstances, answer the Purpose of an Equivalent for Sicily, even if there were not other obvious Objections to such a Proposal. Nor would it be possible that any solid Basis for the Public Tranquillity of Europe could be established on the Idea thrown
out

out to you by M. Talleyrand, of leaving Great Britain and France at Liberty to prosecute the War against the Allies of each other; a State of Things in which their respective Fleets and Armies would in Fact be as much opposed to each other, as they are now, and the Peace between them would be merely nominal.

It is, therefore, to be hoped, that the French Government will revert to its original Proposals with which your Lordship was charged by M. Talleyrand. To that Basis of Negotiation it must be your Lordship's Endeavour to recall him; and if, unfortunately, you should find this to be impracticable, nothing can remain but that you should state, in perfectly civil, but decided Terms, that you are not at Liberty to treat on any other Ground, and must therefore desire your Passports to return to England.

I have stated in my last Letters the different Ideas that had occurred here for combining our Negotiation with that of Russia; providing, at the same time, for the Safety of Sweden and Portugal.

Until we are informed what other Proposal is made in this Respect by M. Talleyrand, I can only desire, that your Lordship will keep this Subject in View, so as not to admit of any Thing inconsistent with the Principle of good Faith, to which His Majesty must in Substance adhere, but in such Form as may best facilitate the great Work of Peace.

I am, &c.

No. 19.

EXTRACT from a Dispatch from the Earl of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated Paris, July 9th, 1806.—Received July 12th.

Sir,

Paris, July 9th 1806.

I HAD the Honour to receive your Dispatch of the 5th Instant early Yesterday Morning, and as soon as possible after waited upon M. Talleyrand to communicate to him that the Offer made by Francis was by no means admissible, and that I had no Authority to listen to any Proposals whatsoever for the Restoration of Peace till he should desist from all Pretension to the Island of Sicily.

M. Talleyrand not being willing to make any such Declaration, I asked him to give me a Passport to return to London; he desired me to wait one Day till he should again have taken the Emperor's Orders.

I accordingly returned this Morning, when he desired me to propose Dalmatia, Albania, and Ragusa, as an Indemnity for the Loss of Sicily to His Sicilian Majesty; to this I answered that as the Messenger was returning I should communicate this Proposition, but that it by no means authorized me to expect an Answer, and therefore I must beg leave to return to England.

Had M. d'Oubril not been here I should immediately have insisted on Passports.

I must

I must now inform you that on Monday M. Talleyrand took me aside and told me that the Telegraph announced the landing of Basilico, expressing at the same Time a Wish that the Dispatches he would bring might lead to Peace. I answered that I could expect no such Result whilst France demanded Sicily; and added, that if I might believe public Report, the Emperor so far from shewing any pacifick Disposition, every Day threw new Obstacles in the Way.

I then mentioned the Changes in Germany. M. Talleyrand said that they were determined upon, but *should not* be published if Peace took place. He has since repeated this to M. d'Oubril and myself, saying if Peace was made, Germany should remain in its present State.

M. d'Oubril writes both to you and to the Comte de Strogonoff; his Letters will probably contain more than mine, as I conversed very little with M. Talleyrand. I felt on very delicate Ground. Had I entered sufficiently into the Question of Indemnities for the King of Sicily, to obtain a precise Idea to what Extent they could be carried, Monsieur de Talleyrand might have formed an Opinion that I had some Instructions, and was prepared to abandon Sicily whenever I was assured of sufficient Compensation.

EXTRACT from a Dispatch from Mr. Secretary Fox to the Earl of Yarmouth, dated Downing-Street, July 18th, 1806.

My Lord, Downing-Street, 18th July 1806.

YOUR Lordship's last Dispatches have been received, and considered with all the Attention which their Importance naturally demanded.

It is unnecessary for me to recall to your Lordship's Recollection that, the Demand of Sicily, in whatever Shape it may be brought forward by France, is in express Contradiction to the Offers originally made to your Lordship by M. Talleyrand. But it is material that this Topick should never be lost sight of in the Course of these Discussions; and that your Lordship should observe to M. Talleyrand, that whatever Difficulty now obstructs the Conclusion of the Negotiation, arises solely from this unexpected Departure from the Basis originally established.

An Exchange is now offered for Sicily, and it is in that View, and not in that of an absolute and uncompensated Cession, that the Question is to be considered. In this Shape of the Business it is obvious that the Value of that Exchange must be to be judged of, not only by this Country and by Russia, but also by his Sicilian Majesty. As the King, whose Troops were admitted into Sicily for its Defence and Protection, naturally feels insuperable Objections to any Proposal for abandoning

abandoning that Island, unless with the free and full Consent of its Sovereign, and in consequence of such an Arrangement as should provide for his Interests by a Compensation really satisfactory both in point of Value and of Security.

The Plan of creating for him a new Kingdom, to consist of Dalmatia, Ragusa, and Albania, does not appear likely to answer this Description. Albania, which forms so large a Part of this proposed Sovereignty, is now a Province of the Turkish Empire; the Dismemberment of which it is a principal Object of the Policy both of Great Britain, and Russia to prevent: That Province has indeed, been frequently involved in [the same Sort of Confusion which prevails in many other Parts of that Empire. But this Circumstance only increases the Difficulty of giving any Consistence to a State to be formed out of such Materials. It does not lessen the other Objections to such a Plan.

There are in like Manner many and strong Objections to that Part of the Proposal which respects Ragusa; an independent State whose Territory has never been ceded to France by any Treaty, and of which she can consequently have no Right to dispose, her Occupation of it being indeed of very recent Date.

But even with Albania and Ragusa and much more without them, His Majesty sees no Hope that such a Power could be formed in that Quarter as would, either in Extent of Territory or in Amount of Revenue, afford the Means of opposing any

Barrier for Austria or Turkey, or even of maintaining its own Independence.

What Advantage then could be gained to the Allies by creating a nominal Kingdom, without any sufficient Power either to reduce the Countries of which it would be composed under any uniform System of Government, or to defend itself against the first Attack which may be made upon it from without?

If there could, with the Consent of his Sicilian Majesty, be any Question of an Exchange for Sicily, by the Creation of a new State in that Quarter, it is obvious that this could no otherwise be done than by annexing to Dalmatia not only the Whole of Istria, but also a very large Proportion if not the Whole of the Venetian States, including, if possible, the City of Venice itself. In some such Shape as this it is possible that the Proposition might be rendered not wholly unacceptable to his Sicilian Majesty. And although the Interests of this Country separately would be far less consulted by such a Plan than by the continued Occupation of Sicily, yet the Sense which the Russian Minister at Paris appears to entertain of the Advantage which might result from it to Austria and to Russia from the Recovery of Dalmatia, if it were well combined with future Arrangements of Defence, might induce His Majesty to accede to Proposals of this Description; on the Supposition above mentioned of a *bonâ fide* Consent on the Part of his Sicilian Majesty.

There

There appears, however, so little Probability of inducing France so to extend her Offer, that any further Discussion of it might scarcely have been worth pursuing, had not M. d'Oubril so strongly expressed his Wish, that this Court might rather seek to temporize than abruptly to break off a Negotiation now brought to a State which affords so little Promise of Success. It is only in compliance with that Desire that His Majesty has been pleased to direct your Lordship to continue the Conferences with M. Talleyrand, so as to ascertain whether any more practicable Shape can be given to the Proposal of an Exchange for Sicily. If this cannot be done, your Lordship's Attention will then, of Course, be directed to the Object of recalling the French Government to the Basis on which the Negotiation was originally placed by themselves, and on which His Majesty is still ready to conclude it.

M. d'Oubril has stated to Count Strogonoff the Proposals which have been made to him for the Conclusion of a separate Peace, and the Inducements which, he thinks, might lead His Majesty to judge such an Arrangement useful to the general Interests of Europe. His Majesty has undoubtedly been at all Times ready to make great Sacrifices for those Interests: But very little Expectation is entertained here, that Russia could, in such Course, obtain any effectual Security for them, at a Time when so much new Danger is to be apprehended, and in so many Quarters, from the Projects

of France with respect to Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, the Porte, Spain, and Portugal.

In the present Circumstances of Europe, the last Hope of averting these Dangers is to be found in the Union of the only Two Powers on whom France has as yet made no Impression, Great Britain and Russia.

And although the mutual good Dispositions and Confidence of those two Powers should in fact remain (as His Majesty trusts they would) unimpaired by the Difference of the Situation in which a separate Peace would place them, yet it is obvious, that the Enemy would build the most extensive Hopes on that Foundation, and would be more encouraged by that, than by any other Circumstance that could be stated, to proceed in the Execution of the Plans already announced to your Lordship and to M. d'Oubril.

His Majesty, therefore, directs that you should express to that Minister how material it is in every Case, that the Two Courts should continue to combine their Measures both of Peace and War, and that no Expectation should be held out to the Enemy of Success in any Endeavour to conclude a separate Peace with either of the Allies; a Line to which, as your Lordship will have informed M. d'Oubril, His Majesty has, on his Part, strictly adhered.

No. 2 f.

EXTRACT from a Dispatch from the Earl of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated Paris, July 19. — Received July 22d.

Paris, July 19, 1806. —
Sir, 12 o'Clock at Night.

ON the 10th General Clarke was named Plenipotentiary to treat with Monsieur d'Oubril: they have since had daily Conferences of many Hours, Yesterday of Fourteen. I hear every where that Peace will be signed To-morrow, between Russia and France. On the 17th M. d'Oubril admitted to me, that he had produced his Powers, and that if Conditions, such as he should judge necessary to ensure the Reposé of the Continent, could be obtained, he should sign a Truce of Ten Months; and this Night, on pressing him, and remonstrating both upon his Conduct and the Impropriety of disguising his Intention, I drew from him these Words, which I wrote down in his Presence.

“(a) Que voyant le danger immédiat de l’Autriche, s’il pouvoit la sauver il croiroit de son devoir de le faire, même par une paix particulière.” All he now appears to claim is the Return of the Troops from Germany; and if he is willing to make Peace on receiving an Assurance that Orders to that Effect shall be sent, nobody can doubt, but that it will be signed, and probably not

(a) “ That being aware of the immediate Danger of Austria, if it was in his Power to save it, he should think it his Duty to do so, even by a separate Peace.”

a Battalion make a retrograde Movement of Fifty Miles.

M. Talleyrand says, that M. d'Oubril is willing to abandon Sicily and Dalmatia, and even to engage to solicit the Junction of the former to Naples, &c.

I have used every Argument to dissuade M. d'Oubril from so unadvised and unwise a Measure, I hope more than I believe, with Success. Indeed, I feared from the first Hour I met him, that he was come determined to make a Peace, good or bad, with or without Great Britain. I may perhaps gain a Day, which may be a great deal, if that Day should produce Dispatches from M. de Strogonoff.

On the 17th, at Night, the new Arrangements for Germany were finally determined upon. The Princes and the Ministers who signed were scarce allowed Time to read the Deed.

There is a considerable Army forming at Bayonne; Thirty thousand Men are there already. This Army is ostensibly destined against Portugal, but will take Spain likewise. M. Herman, One of the Secretaries of the Foreign Office, set off for Lisbon with a Mission on the 13th.

All the Officers of the Army now in Germany received Yesterday Orders to join their Regiments instantly. The Court say, this is to have Troops to occupy the States seized by the New Confederacy. The Public ascribe this Measure to a Desire to frighten the

the Emperor of Germany; and myself, to a Wish to hurry M. d'Oubril, who has shewn so much Anxiety for the Evacuation of Germany.

M. d'Oubril and M. Talleyrand have, as I have learnt, fixed upon Majorca, Ivica, and Minorca, for his Sicilian Majesty, if they can prevail upon us to evacuate Sicily.

I have the Honour to be,

Sir, &c.

YARMOUTH.

No. 22.

COPY of a Dispatch from the Earl of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated Paris, July 20th, 1806.—Received July 24th.

Sir, Paris, July 20th 1806.—11 at Night.

AT Nine this Morning, having had the Honour to receive your Letters by Mr. Longuinoff, and written a few Lines to you in Addition to my Dispatches of last Night, I went to M. d'Oubril; and as I am happy since to find, anticipated the Contents of your Dispatch of the 18th Instant.

I used every Argument and Means to obtain Delay; engaged to break off, if he did; and, finally, authorized him to hold out Hopes, that I would listen to Propositions of Indemnity in lieu of Sicily for his Sicilian Majesty, if proposed by him, and accompanied by a joint Negotiation.

I begged he would do nothing till after Basilico should have arrived, as I had learned by the Télégraph that he had landed last Night.

I did not find him disposed to listen to me; and, not being willing to be too communicative towards him at that Moment, I went away.

At Twelve I waited upon M. Talleyrand: he was not to be seen.

At Four, I heard from good Authority, that Peace was signed. At Six, Basilico arrived. I then went to M. d'Oubril. He was said not to be at Home; but, seeing his Carriage, I forced my Way. He admitted the Fact, *Peace is signed*; the Conditions, the Evacuation *instantly* of Germany by the French Troops; the Integrity, &c. of the Ottoman Empire; no Attempt to be made upon Swedish Pomerania; and, by a secret Article, Russia promises to obtain his Sicilian Majesty's Consent, to an Exchange of Sicily for Majorca, Minorca, and Ivica. Russia to use her good Offices to restore Peace between France and England.

I have not seen the Treaty; but I believe it contains nothing else material.

M. d'Oubril sends a Copy to Count Strogonoff, and goes himself to St. Petersburg. I had no Patience to listen to M. d'Oubril's Defence of his Conduct, so I did not claim his good Offices. I
must

must have asked him officially to stay, which I did not choose to do.

I have the Honour to be,

Sir, &c.

YARMOUTH.

No. 23.

EXTRACT from a Dispatch from the Earl of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated Paris, July 21, 1806.—Received July 24.

Sir, Paris, 21st July 1806.

I SAW M. Talleyrand To-day. I can perceive that the Terms of France are increased, but still not as much as the sudden Defection of Russia had led me to apprehend. Hanover, Malta, the Cape, and India, remain pure and unfulfilled; and I took an Opportunity in Conversation to protest, that come what might, these were Points I never would suffer to be mentioned, but as Points agreed upon.

M. Talleyrand demanded my Powers. I did not think myself authorised, in the present Circumstances, to withhold them.

General Clarke is named to treat with me.

No. 24.

No. 24.

FULL POWERS given to the Earl of Yarmouth, which were communicated to M. Talleyrand on the 21st of July 1806, and exchanged with General Clarke, the French Plenipotentiary, on the 23d.

Georgius R.

GEORGIUS Tertius, Dei Gratiâ Britanniarum Rex, Fidei Defensor, Dux Brunsvicensis ac Luneburgensis, Sacri Romani Imperii Archi Thesaurarius et Princeps Elector, &c. Omnibus & Singulis ad quos præsentēs hæc literæ pervenerint, Salutem!

Cum Belli Incendio jam nimis diu diversis Orbis terrarum partibus, flagrante, in id quàm maxime incumbamus ut tranquillitas publica, tot Litibus Controversiisque ritè compositis, reduci et stabiliri possit; Cumque eâ de Causâ Virum quendam, tanto negotio parem, nostrâ ex parte plenâ auctoritate ad hoc tam magnum opus conficiendum munire decreverimus.

Sciatis igitur quod nos Fide, Industriâ, Ingenio, Perspicaciâ, et rerum usu Fidelis et Dilecti Francisci Seymour, Armigeri (vulgò dicti Comitis de Yarmouth) plurimum, confisi, eundem nominavimus, fecimus & constituimus Nostrum verum certum et insubitatum Procuratorem Commissarium et Plenipotentiarium; Dantes et concedentes eidem omnem et omnimodam Potestatem, Facultatem, Auctoritatemque,

tatēque, nec non Mandatum generale pariter ac speciale (ita tamen ut generale speciali non deroget neque contra) pro Nobis et Nostro Nomine cum Ministro vel Ministris Commissariis vel Plenipotentariis aliorum Principum aut Statuum quorumcunque tam Hostium quam Fæderatorum Nostrorum quorum interesse poterit, sufficienti iidem auctoritate instructis, tam singulatim ac divisim, quam aggregatim ac conjunctim, congregiendi et colloquendi, atque cum ipsis de pace firmâ et stabili, sincerâque Amicitia et Concordiâ quantocivis restituendis conveniendi et concludendi: eaque omnia quæ ita conventa et conclusa fuerint, pro Nobis et Nostro Nomine subsignandi, superiōre, conclusis Tractatum Tractatusve vel alia Instrumenta quotquot et qualia necessaria fuerint, consiciendi, mutuoque tradendi, recipiendique, omniaque alia, quæ ad opus supradictum feliciter exequendum pertinent, transigendi, tam amplis Modo et Formâ, ac vi Effectuque pari, ac Nos si interessemus facere et præstare possemus; Spondentes, et in Verbo Regio nostro Promittentes Nos omnia et singula quæcunque à dicto Nostro Plenipotentario transigi et concludi contigerint, grata, rata et accepta omni meliori modo habituros, neque passuros unquam ut in Toto vel in Parte a quopiam violentur aut in contrarium eatur.

In quorum omnium Majorem Fidem et Rebur
 nise Presentibus, Manu Nostrâ Regiâ signatis,
 Magnum Nostram Britanniarum Signum appendi
 fecimus.

fecimus. Quae Dabantur in Palatio Nostro Diei
Jacobi Die Vicesimo Sexto Mensis Junii, Anno
Domini Millesimo Octingentesimo Sexto, Regnique
Nostri Quadragesimo Sexto.

(Translation.)

GEORGE R.

GEORGE the Third by the Grace of God of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ire-
land King, Defender of the Faith, Duke of Brun-
swick and Lunenburg, Arch Treasurer and Prince
Elect of the Holy Roman Empire, &c. To all and
singular to whom these Presents shall come, Greet-
ing!

The Flames of War having already raged too
long in the different Quarters of the World, it is
the more incumbent upon Us, to re-establish the
publick Tranquillity by putting an End to so many
Quarrels and Controversies. We have therefore
judged it expedient to invest a fit Person with full
Powers on Our Part, for the better carrying on this
great Undertaking.

Know therefore, that We reposing especial Trust
in the Fidelity, Diligence, Judgment, Perseverance,
and Experience of Our trusty and well-beloved
Francis Seymour, Esquire, (commonly called Earl
of Yarmouth), have nominated, constituted, and
appointed him, as by these Presents We do nomi-
nate, constitute, and appoint him Our true certain
and

and undoubted Procurator, Commissioner, and Plenipotentiary; Giving to him all and all Manner of Powers, Faculty, and Authority, together with general as well as special Orders, (so that the general do not derogate from the special, nor on the contrary), for Us and in Our Name to meet and confer with the Ministers, Commissioners, or Plenipotentiaries of any other Princes or States whatsoever, who may be interested therein, whether Our Enemies or Our Allies, furnished with sufficient Powers for that Purpose, as well singly and separately, as aggregately and conjointly; and to consult and agree with them for the speedy Restoration of sincere Friendship and Amity, and of a firm and lasting Peace; and for Us and in Our Name to sign all such Matters and Things as shall be agreed upon and concluded, and on the Premises to form such Treaty or Treaties or other Instruments as shall be necessary; and mutually to deliver and receive the same in Exchange, and to do and perform all such Acts, Matters, and Things as may be in any way proper and conducive to the Purposes above mentioned, in as full and ample a Manner and Form, and with the like Validity and Effect, as We Ourself if We were present could do and perform; engaging and promising on Our Royal Word, that We will accept, ratify, and confirm in the most effectual Manner, all such Acts, Matters, and Things as shall be so transacted and concluded by Our said Plenipotentiary, and that We will never suffer

Enc

suffer any Person to violate the same in Whole or in Part, or to act contrary thereto.

In Testimony and Confirmation of all which, We have caused Our Great Seal of Our United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland to be affixed to these Presents signed with Our Royal Hands.

Given at Our Court at St. James's this Twenty-sixth Day of June, in the Year of Our Lord One thousand eight hundred and six, and of Our Reign the Forty-sixth.

No. 25.

EXTRACT from a Dispatch from the Earl of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated Paris, July 24, 1806.—Received July 28.

Sir, Paris, July 24th 1806.
I HAD the Honour to send by M. de Longuinoff, Dispatches acquainting you, for His Majesty's Information, of the Peace signed between the Russian and French Plenipotentiaries, and with as accurate a Statement of the Terms as I was able to obtain. M. d'Oubril himself set out for Peterburgh early on the Morning of the 22d.

On the 22d I received the Official Notification of the Appointment of General Clarke to treat on the Part of France, (a Copy of which I have the Honour to inclose, marked A.) preceded by a private Communication from M. Talleyrand, saying that

that the Russian Peace being signed, and the Season of the Year favourable to the Accomplishment of the ulterior Views of France, no Arrangement, which might remove for some Weeks or even Months, a Definitive Treaty could now take place.

I answered the Official Note (marked A.) with One, a Copy of which I inclose, (marked B.)

In the Evening, General Clarke proposed a Conference for the following Morning, at which we should mutually exchange our full Powers. We accordingly did so; and I have the Honour to inclose (marked C.) a Copy of those of General Clarke.

This Conference began by an historical Recapitulation of what had previously passed, General Clarke saying, he had not yet received his final Instructions on all the different Points in Discussion; it was therefore agreed to adjourn the Conference to this Day, when each should come prepared with a Memorandum of the Intentions of his Government, founded on what had already passed; General Clarke at the same Time declaring that a separate Peace with Russia was to be considered equal or superior, in the present Circumstances of the World, to any great Success in War, and consequently as entitling France to Terms much more advantageous than those to which she would have subscribed some Days ago. This was accompanied by some Animadversions upon the Conduct of Russia, to which I could only answer, that I felt it my Duty to abstain from any Remark, and
 should,

should, therefore, be entirely silent upon that Subject; but that I could assure him that if an Intention existed of making any Change in the great Points upon which we had had such positive, though certainly not official, Assurances, namely, His Majesty's German Dominions, Malta, and the Cape, I must consider the Negotiation as stopped *in limine*, and that there would remain only for me to return to England, and acquaint the King that no Peace, consistent with His Majesty's Honour or that of the Country, could be made. General Clarke reverted to his Want of full Instructions, and promised to meet me properly prepared, the next Day.

At Three o'Clock this Day, I again met General Clarke, when I read a Paper, a Copy of which I have the Honour to inclose (marked D.), containing the Abstract of what I had always stated to be the Basis and Terms on which His Majesty could alone consent to treat. I did not, however, deliver it to him, considering it merely as the Heads of past Conversations.

General Clarke then said, That as it was impossible I could be prepared with the Assent of His Majesty to the Arrangement proposed by Russia for His Sicilian Majesty, on which the Terms might much depend, I must consider the Communication he made as not strictly official in Point of Form, but as depending only on that Circumstance to make it so.

General

General Clarke proceeded to state, that, in the Situation France was in at this Moment, the Emperor would feel authorized to withhold some of the great Points; but that having repeatedly said the contrary, though not in an official Manner, he would abide by it.

General Clarke first conversed about His Majesty's German Dominions. On this Subject, by secret Articles, any Thing His Majesty thinks right may be stipulated: by the publick Article, the Promise not to object to some Acquisition of Territory to be made by Prussia. I stopped General Clarke here to say, that His Majesty never could consent to the King of Prussia's obtaining the Hanse Towns. General Clarke said, that it was Fulda, Hoya, and some other trifling Principalities, over which it was proposed to extend the Sovereignty of His Prussian Majesty, but that the Independence and present State of the Hanse Towns should not be meddled with.

On the Subject of Malta—Malta, Gozo, and Conino in full Sovereignty to His Majesty, with a Clause in the Article, declaratory of the Dissolution of the Order, and that the Two Powers, “(a) n'en reconnoissent plus l'existence.” Some Pensions for the Chevaliers and others, having “(b) des Droits réels dans l'Isle.”—This not to extend to

(a) no longer recognize the Existence of it.

(b) real Rights in the Island.

Foreign Commanderies of the Order, or to any Claim not local.

The Cape in equal full Sovereignty; as a Condition it is desired, “(c) qu’il y soit établi un port franc” to all Nations: either the Port itself declared so, or a Part appropriated to that Purpose.

On the Subject of the Maintenance of the Integrity of the Territories and Possessions of the Sublime Porte, General Clarke proposed an Article, a Copy of which I have the Honour to send (marked E.), I told him the usual full Clause would be sufficient; he persisted that I should send it for His Majesty’s Consideration.

To the usual full Clause of the Integrity of the Territories and Possessions of His most Faithful Majesty, General Clarke weighed upon a proposed Addition of the Word “(d) partout;” and when asked for explanation, said, He thought His Britannick Majesty might occupy some of His most Faithful Majesty’s Foreign Possessions.

The Integrity of His Swedish Majesty’s Dominions in the usual Manner.

Having dismissed these Points, General Clarke stated the Demands of France:

Pondicherry,

St. Lucie,

Tobago,

Surinam,

Goree,

Demarara, Berbice, Essequibo,

(c) that there should be established there a free Port.

(d) in every Part of the World.

The

The Recognition in the usual Words, “(e) est reconnu,” of the different Branches of the reigning Family; of the Electors of Bavaria and Wirtemberg as Kings; of the new Dukes of Cleves, Baden, and Darmstadt.

In discussing for many Hours these Demands, I never for an Instant admitted the Possibility of His Majesty consenting to the Cessions required. I sought, however, to ascertain to what Extent, and in what Manner they could be modified.

(e) is recognized.

First Inclosure (A.)

COPY of a Note from M. Talleyrand to the Earl of Yarmouth, dated July 22d, 1806.

My Lord,

Paris ce 22 Juillet 1806.

J'AI l'honneur d'informer Votre Excellence qu'ayant mis sous les yeux de S. M. l'Empereur la copie des Pleins-Pouvoirs de Sa Majesté Britanique dont vous m'avez fait l'honneur de me donner communication officielle, j'ai reçu d'Elle l'ordre de vous informer qu'elle avoit fait choix de Son Excellence le Général Clarke Son Prémier Secrétaire des Commandemens pour negocier et conclure le traité qui doit mettre un terme à la guerre actuelle, et rendre enfin à l'Europe et au Commerce du monde la Paix et la Tranquillité depuis

depuis si long temps interrompues. Je viens de transmettre à M^r le Général Clarke les ordres de Sa Majesté, et je ne doute pas qu' aujourd'hui même il ne s'entende avec votre Excellence pour ouvrir une négociation, au résultat de la quelle sont attachés de si importans intérêts et dont il m'a paru que les deux Gouvernemens et les deux Peuples desirent également la prompte issue.

Je prie Votre Excellence d'agréer les Assurances de ma plus haute Considération:

(Signé) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND,
Prince de Benevent.

(Translation.)

My Lord, Paris, 22d July, 1806.

I HAVE the Honor to inform your Excellency, that, having laid before his Majesty the Emperor, the Copy of the full Powers from his Britannick Majesty, which you have done me the Honour to communicate to me officially, I have received his Majesty's Orders to inform you, that he has made Choice of his Excellency General Clarke, his Principal Private Secretary, to negotiate and conclude the Treaty which is to put an End to the present War, and restore at length to Europe, and to the Commerce of the World, that Peace and Tranquillity which have been so long interrupted. I have just transmitted to General Clarke his Majesty's Orders, and I have no Doubt that he will immediately

immediately arrange with your Excellency the Opening of a Negotiation, to the Result of which are attached such important Interests, and the prompt Issue of which appears to me to be equally desired by both Governments and both Nations.

I request your Excellency to accept the Assurances of my distinguished Consideration.

(Signed) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND,
Prince of Benevento.

Second Inclosure (B.)

COPY of a Note from the Earl of Yarmouth to M. Talleyrand, dated July 22d, 1806.

Monfieur, Paris Juillet 22, 1806.

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser la reception de la lettre de Votre Excellence m'informant du choix qu'a fait l'Empereur de Son Excellence M^r le Général Clarke son Premier Secrétaire des Commandemens pour négocier et conclure le traité qui doit mettre un terme à la guerre actuelle.

Je prie Votre Excellence de croire à l'empressement que je mettrai à m'entendre avec M. le Général Clarke à ce Sujet dès le moment que Son Excellence m'en manifesterà le désir.

Je prie Votre Excellence d'agréer les Assurances de ma plus haute Considération.

(Signé) YARMOUTH,

(Translation.)

Sir, Paris, July 22d, 1806.

I HAVE the Honour to acknowledge the Receipt of your Excellency's Letter, acquainting me with the Choice made by the Emperor of his Excellency General Clarke, his Principal Private Secretary, for the Purpose of negotiating and concluding the Treaty which is to put an End to the present War.

I request that your Excellency will be persuaded of the Earnestness with which I shall enter into Arrangements on this Subject with General Clarke, as soon as his Excellency shall inform me of his Wishes in this Respect.

I request your Excellency to accept the Assurances of my distinguished Consideration.

(Signed) YARMOUTH.

Third Inclosure (C.)

COPY of General Clarke's Full Powers.

Saint Cloud le 21 Juillet 1806,

NAPOLEON par la grace de Dieu, et les Constitutions, Empereur des Français, Roi d'Italie, prenant entière confiance dans la fidélité pour notre Personne, et le zèle pour notre Service de M. le Général de Division Clarke, notre Conseiller intime du Cabinet, et Grand Officier de la Legion d'honneur, Nous lui avons donné, et lui donnons par les présentes, plein et absolu pouvoir, commission,

comission, et mandement spécial, pour en notre nom; et avec tel Ministre de Sa Majesté Britanique dûment autorisé à cet effet convenir, arrêter, conclure, et signer, tels traités, articles, conventions, declarations; et autres actes qu' il avisera bien être; promettons d'avoir pour agréable et tenir ferme et stable, accomplir et executer ponctuellement tout ce que le dit Plenipotentiaire aura promis et signé en vertu des présens Pleins-Pouvoir comme aussi d'en faire expédier les lettres de ratification en bonne forme, et de les faire délivrer pour être échangées dans le tems dont il sera convent.

En foi de quoi nous avons donné les présentes signées de Notre main, contresignées et munies de Notre Sceau Impérial.

A St. Cloud, le vingt un Juillet An Mil huit cent six, de Notre Regne le second.

(Signé) NAPOLEON,

Par l'Empereur, le Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat,

(Signé) HUGUES MARET.

Le Ministre des Relations Extérieures,

(Signé) CH. MAURICE TALLEYRAND,

Prince de Benevent.

(Translation.)

NAPOLEON, by the Grace of God, and by the Constitution, Emperor of the French, King of Italy, reposing entire Confidence in the Fidelity to our Person, and Zeal for our Service,

of the General of Division Clarke, our Privy Counsellor of the Cabinet, and Great Officer of the Legion of Honour, we have given to him, and do give to him by these Presents, full and absolute Power, Commission, and special Orders to agree upon, decide, conclude, and sign, in our Name, and with the Minister of His Britannick Majesty, duly authorized thereunto, such Treaties, Articles, Conventions, Declarations, and other Acts, as he shall judge to be expedient ; promising to agree to, to maintain, to accomplish, and punctually to execute, all that the said Plenipotentiary shall have promised and signed, by virtue of the present full Powers, as also to have the Letters of Ratification prepared in due Form, and to deliver them, in order that they may be exchanged within the Time agreed upon.

In Witness whereof, we have given these Presents, signed with our Hand, countersigned, and sealed with our Imperial Seal.

At St. Cloud, the 21st July 1806, in the Second Year of our Reign.

(Signed) NAPOLEON.

By the Emperor,

The Minister Secretary of State,

(Signed) HUGUES MARET.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs,

(Signed) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND,

Prince of Benevento.

Fourth

Fourth Inclosure (D.)

EXTRACT from a Paper read to General Clarke by the Earl of Yarmouth.

L'ETAT où se trouvent actuellement les deux Puissances Belligerantes, par la suite des événemens de la guerre laissant peu de points de contact immédiat entre Elles, ou sur lesquels Elles ne puissent selon toute apparence parvenir maintenant à s'entendre, Sa Majesté Britannique, animée non moins que l'Empereur des Français du desir de mettre un terme aux calamités de la guerre a autorisé le Souffigné (muni des Pleins-Pouvoirs de Sa Majesté) a discuter les bases, et à donner un plein effet à ce desir reciproque.

Les acquisitions immenses faites par la France depuis le commencement des hostilités, et l'influence directe et immédiate qu'Elle a obtenue ayant totalement changé le systéme politique de l'Europe, Sa Majeste Britannique se voit forcée à chercher dans les conquêtes qu'Elle a faites, et dans la possession de Malte, un contrepoids juste et raisonnable. Sa Majesté traiteroit en consequence généralement sur la base de *uti possidetis*.

Il est entendu en même tems que les possessions Allemandes de Sa Majesté Britannique, dont Elle s'est vue privée par des motifs étrangers à la guerre entre les deux Puissances, Lui soyent rendues en entier.

Entendu

Entendu de même que la Paix assurera l'intégrité des territoires et possessions de la Sublime Porte, de Sa Majesté très fidèle, de Sa Majesté le Roi de Suède, et l'Etat actuel de la Suisse.

(Translation.)

THE Situation in which the two belligerent Powers are now placed by the Course of the Events of the War, leaving few Points of immediate Contact between them, or on which they may not, according to all Appearance, come now to an Understanding, His Britannick Majesty, animated no less than the Emperor of the French, with a Desire to put an End to the Calamities of War, has authorized the Undersigned (furnished with the full Powers of His Majesty) to discuss the Basis, and to give full Effect to this reciprocal Desire.

The immense Acquisitions made by France since the Commencement of Hostilities, and the direct and immediate Influence which she has obtained, having entirely changed the political System of Europe, His Britannick Majesty finds himself obliged to seek, in the Conquests he has made, and in the Possession of Malta, a just and reasonable Counterpoise. His Majesty would consequently treat generally on the Basis of the *uti possidetis*.

It is at the same Time understood, that the German Possessions of His Britannick Majesty, of which

which he was deprived from Motives foreign to the War between the Two Powers, shall be restored to him entire.

It is likewise understood, that the Peace shall secure the Integrity of the Territories and Possessions of the Sublime Porte, of his most Faithful Majesty, of his Majesty the King of Sweden, and the present State of Switzerland.

Fifth Inclosure (E.)

COPY of an Article proposed by General Clarke to the Earl of Yarmouth for the Maintenance of the Integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

LES deux Puissances contractantes se garantissent réciproquement l'intégrité et l'indépendance entière et absolue de l'Empire Ottoman. Elles s'opposeront mutuellement à ce qu'aucune Puissance pretende rien de contraire aux usages, droits de souveraineté, et propriétés de la Sublime Porte.

(Translation.)

THE Two Contracting Powers reciprocally guarantee the entire and absolute Integrity and Independence of the Ottoman Empire. They will mutually oppose the Pretensions of any Power to

to any Thing contrary to the Usages, the Rights of Sovereignty, and the Possessions of the Sublime Porte.

No. 26.

EXTRACT from a Dispatch from Mr. Secretary Fox to the Earl of Yarmouth, dated Downing-Street, July 26, 1806.

My Lord, Downing-Street, July 26th 1806.

YOUR Lordship's Dispatches conveying the mortifying Intelligence of the Signature of a separate Treaty between Russia and France, were received here Yesterday; and His Majesty's Ministers have since had the Opportunity of being acquainted with the precise Terms of that Treaty, which it appears had not in all respects been accurately represented to Your Lordship.

The King was most particularly struck with the great Difference which was perceived between the actual Arrangement made respecting Sicily, and that which had been described to Your Lordship.

In writing to your Lordship, it is not necessary to dwell on the humiliating Conditions to which M. d'Oubril has thought proper to bind his Sovereign. Of that Minister's Misconduct your Lordship appears fully sensible; and I doubt not you exerted yourself to the utmost to prevent it. When this was found impracticable, your Lordship was naturally

naturally placed in Circumstances of considerable Difficulty, and for which every Allowance is to be made. But it is necessary for me to say, frankly, that it would on the Whole have been more satisfactory to the King's Servants if your Lordship had waited to know the Impression which this new Event might create here before you had produced your full Powers.

It was originally declared by your Lordship to M. Talleyrand, that your full Powers were not to be produced till the French Government should have reverted to the Basis of Negotiation originally proposed by themselves; that of the *uti possidetis* univervally, with the single Exception of Hanover. By subsequent Instructions, your Lordship had indeed been acquainted that, in compliance with the Wish so strongly expressed by the Russian Negotiator at Paris, His Majesty would not refuse to enter into the Consideration of such Proposals as might be made to Him for a fair Equivalent to be given to his Sicilian Majesty in lieu of Sicily, with the full and free Consent of that Monarch. The Proposal of such an Equivalent, and its Acceptance by His Majesty's Government, would have replaced the Negotiation on its original Footing, that of a *uti possidetis*, to be departed from only by inutual Consent, in those Cases where any Exchange for a reasonable Equivalent might meet the Ideas of both Parties; and the Case for the Production of your Lordships full Powers would thus have arisen clearly and unequivocally. Even as the
 Matter

Matter now stands, it does not certainly preclude Discussion. But this might have been continued unofficially. And it is apprehended that, by producing your Powers on the very Day after the Signature of the Russian Treaty, an Impression may have been created very unfavourable to the further Progress of the Negotiation.

In the Situation to which the Business is now brought, His Majesty thinks it necessary to lose no Time in taking every proper Step for replacing the Discussions between the Two Countries on their original Footing.

The first Proposals made by France were, that a Plenipotentiary should be sent from hence with full Powers to treat, and to conclude a separate Peace with France and her Allies. This was declined here, not from any Unwillingness to enter into Discussions for Peace on just and honourable Terms, an Object which His Majesty has uniformly expressed Himself desirous of accomplishing, but because the King was bound by Engagements to Russia, which precluded Him from treating otherwise than in Concert with that Power. Subsequently to this, a Proposal was conveyed through your Lordship for the Conclusion of Peace on the Basis so often referred to; and the intermediate Communications received from Russia enabled His Majesty, consistently with good Faith, to entertain those Proposals, and to express His Disposition to accede to them, provided that, in the Mode of treating

treating and concluding, the most intimate Concert should still be maintained with Russia.

The extraordinary Step taken by M. d'Oubril has now removed all Necessity of further Reserve on this Point.

His Majesty, in this State of Things, thinks it proper to combine together the Two Proposals which He has at different Periods received from France; and, as the Difficulty which before prevented the sending from this Country a public Minister, openly accredited, to treat for Peace, now no longer subsists, and as an acceptable Basis of Negotiation has been proposed to Him by the Enemy, His Majesty directs, that your Lordship should apply to M. Talleyrand for Passports for a public Minister so authorised and accredited, to whom, it is His Majesty's gracious Intention to join your Lordship, in the full Powers to be granted by His Majesty.

The great Advantages which the King's Service will derive from the Employment of a Person fully instructed as to the Sentiments of His Majesty's Government on all the various Points of Discussion that may arise, cannot fail to strike your Lordship in the same Light in which they are seen here; and the King's Servants entertain no Doubt of your Lordship's zealous and hearty Co-operation in the Execution of the joint Instructions which such a Person will bring with him. I have only, therefore, to add, that your Lordship may assure M. Talleyrand, that as soon as the necessary

Passports

Passports are received, there shall not be an Hour's Delay in his setting out; and that His Majesty's Government continues ardently to wish for the Conclusion of Peace, provided it can be accomplished on the same Grounds of national Honour, which have never been lost Sight of here.

No. 27.

EXTRACT from a Dispatch from Mr. Secretary Fox to the Earl of Yarmouth, dated Downing-Street, July 28th, 1806.

My Lord, Downing-Street, July 28th 1806.
YOUR Lordship's Dispatch of the 24th Instant was received here this Morning, and, as it is probable that, in the Course of this Day, or Tomorrow at farthest, your Lordship will receive mine of the 26th Instant, I do not think it necessary to do more at present, than to request that your Lordship will assure M. Talleyrand, that, immediately on the Receipt of the Passports which you have been instructed to demand, the Earl of Lauderdale, who has been humbly recommended to His Majesty for this important Trust, will be prepared to set out; and that he will, therefore, of course, be with your Lordship in a very few Days from this Date. I need hardly observe to your Lordship, that it is of the utmost Importance, that, in the Interim, your Lordship should avoid
taking

taking any Step, or even holding any Language, which may tend in the smallest Degree to commit the Opinion of His Majesty's Government on any Part of the Matters now depending.

No. 28.

COPY of a Dispatch from the Earl of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated Paris, July 30th, 1806.—Received August 1st.

Sir, Paris, July 30th, 1806.

I HAD the Honour to receive your Dispatch of the 26th Instant late at Night on the 28th, and next Morning lost no Time in asking for Blank Passports for a Person fully instructed with the Sentiments of His Majesty's Government, whom it was their Intention to join with me in the important Commission of treating for Peace. M. Talleyrand told me he must take the Emperor's Orders. I accordingly returned this Day, when that Minister informed me, that the Emperor could consider this Demand in no other Light but that of unnecessary Delay, because His Majesty's Secretary of State was actually in Possession of a Blank Passport, which would enable any Person or Persons to come to Paris without the Loss of Time occasioned

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sioned by this Demand, but that “ (a) pour “ *surcroit de facilités,*” there could be no Difficulty about giving more. I answered that I had no Knowledge of this Circumstance. M. Talleyrand said it was certain, because he had sent two entirely in blank, and that one only had been used, namely, that with which I returned.

It is unnecessary for me to add any Thing to what I have already said in my former Dispatches, relative to the Signature of the Russian Treaty; any Inaccuracy in the Statement of its Contents, such as I was enabled to transmit them, may easily be accounted for by the Circumstance of my not having seen the Treaty itself, and by the Unwillingness M. d’Oubril naturally felt to open himself to me on that Subject; he informed me at the Time that he should send a Copy to M. de Strogonoff, who would communicate it to His Majesty’s Ministers.

It is with Pain, Sir, proportioned to my Zeal for His Majesty’s Service, and to the fair and honest Conviction of my having done nothing which the peculiar and trying Circumstances of the Moment did not require from me, that I have learnt by the same Dispatch the Expression of a Wish that I had delayed the Production of my Full Powers till I could know the Impression which this Event of the Russian Treaty might produce in His Majesty’s Councils, and the Apprehension that by the pro-

(a) for still greater facility.

ducing

ducing them, so soon after the Signature of the Russian Treaty, an Impression might be created unfavourable to the further Progress of the Negotiation.

If the Question regarded only my own personal Feelings, I should not think myself at Liberty to allot to it so large a Portion of a Publick Dispatch; but it may not, I conceive, be unuseful, with a View to the Conduct of the Negotiation, that you should be apprized of some Details which I have hitherto omitted dwelling upon, partly from the Urgency of more important Subjects, and partly from my Desire not to trespass upon your Attention to so great an Extent. I trust, Sir, that His Majesty will see in these Details wherewithal to justify my Conduct in the difficult Situation in which I was placed.

The Fate of Holland and Naples were settled before I was honoured with His Majesty's Confidence. My Conversation here with M. Talleyrand soon convinced me that these were only Preludes to still greater Changes in the System of Europe. I saw at the same Time a great Desire of Negotiation, before the final Execution of some of the Emperor's Schemes should have removed any Hope of its being attended with Success.

This Opinion, not preconceived or lightly taken up, but gradually formed from a Variety of Circumstances, was confirmed by the Nature of
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the Offers held out, unofficially indeed, but in such clear and unequivocal Terms, that it was impossible to entertain any Doubt of the Intention of this Government to adhere to them.

The Point which of all others was the most essential, and that on which Satisfaction was due to the National Honour and to that of His Majesty, Hanover, would, I was assured, be given up without Restriction; for I did not then know we should be asked to allow the King of Prussia to obtain the Sovereignty of some of the lesser Principalities.

I received similar Assurances about Malta, and the Cape of Good Hope; nor have I any Reason to doubt but that before Russia had made her Peace separately, these Terms might have been obtained, and the Treaty have had solely for its Basis the *uti possidetis*, with the sole Exception in our Favour of Hanover restored, and latterly indeed of some Arrangements tolerable to all Parties in Exchange for Sicily.

M. Talleyrand held the same Language to me, with respect to Russia, which he had before held with regard to the Affairs of Germany. “ You
 “ have now been here a Month; we have been
 “ willing to converse with you, to give you an In-
 “ sight into our Views, and to communicate them
 “ to the British Government. We told you, that
 “ if you had the Powers, and would enter into Ne-
 “ gotiation, we would not sign the Arrangement
 “ of Germany. A reasonable Time was left for
 “ you to consult your Government; we had no
 “ Answer.

“ Answer. The Arrangement was signed, (a) et
 “ *Nous n'en reviendrons jamais.* We now ask you
 “ whether you will treat before Russia has signed,
 “ which will not pass two Days.”

It cannot be necessary to state my Answer to such a Proposition. I will only add, that the Treaty with Russia was signed within the Time mentioned, and then commenced the Difficulty of my Situation.

“ Switzerland,” I was told by the same Authority, “ is on the Eve of undergoing a great
 “ Change. This cannot be averted but by a Peace
 “ with England; but still less can we alter, for
 “ any other Consideration, our Intention of In-
 “ vading Portugal. The Army destined for that
 “ Purpose is already assembling at Bayonne. This
 “ is for the Determination of Great Britain.”

But I confess the Point of all others the most decisive in inducing me to produce my Full Powers, was the Language held respecting Prussia.

“ Prussia demands from us a Declaration respect-
 “ ing Hanover; we cannot consent wantonly to
 “ lose the only Ally France has had since the
 “ Revolution; the Declaration once made (b) *Nous*
 “ *n'en pouvons nous retracter.*” Would you have
 “ us break entirely with Prussia, when we cannot
 “ even say that Great Britain will negotiate with
 “ us? Are you here only with Orders to delay

(a) and we will never receive from it:

(b) we cannot retract.

“ our Measures till the Season of the Year makes
 “ Exertion impossible, or can you treat? If so, is
 “ not the Assurance we give you that Hanover,
 “ Malta, and the Cape, shall not be contested,
 “ sufficient to induce you to do so? Must we lay
 “ before the British Government our exact Terms,
 “ before they will even avow Negotiation with so
 “ great a Power as that of France? or shall we
 “ execute our other Projects, as we did those in
 “ Holland and Naples?”

Undoubtedly, Sir, Conversations of this Sort,
 confirmed even as they were by the Events passing
 under my Eyes, could never have induced me
 to commit His Majesty's confidential Servants upon
 any Point upon which I had not received their
 Instructions, and which left no Time to receive
 them; but I did not think myself at liberty to shift
 from myself the Responsibility thus thrown upon
 me, at the Risk of seeing Portugal and Switzerland
 share the same Fate which Germany has just ex-
 perienced, and Hanover confirmed to Prussia, until
 such Time as His Majesty's Arms should recover
 the Possession of it.

The Mode of Proceeding of this Government
 left me no Alternative. Either to avow Negotia-
 tion, or shut up every Opening to it, was my only
 Option.

I felt that I pledged His Majesty to nothing ex-
 cept the Fact of Negotiation, already privately
 known to every Court in Europe.

I carefully

I carefully forbore giving any written Paper, or admitting even the Possibility of any other Basis than that of *uti possidetis*.

I have ascertained the real Extent of the Pretensions of France; and I did consider myself to have prevented a great Evil at small Expence by having given Time to yourself and His Majesty's other confidential Servants, to provide by the further Instructions you might judge proper, for the Interest of the Powers, thus, for the Moment at least, saved from the Grasp of France,

I persuade myself that the Motives here detailed upon which I acted at the Moment, will place in a stronger Light the Difficulties of my Position, and will on further Consideration obtain His Majesty's gracious Approbation of the Conduct which I thought myself obliged to hold in consequence.

His Majesty's Ministers would have relieved me from much painful Responsibility if they had commanded me to proceed no further, and wait the Arrival of the Person alluded to, and for whom I have the Honour to enclose the necessary Passport which I have this Moment received.

Mr. Goddard, whom a long Residence in France, independent of his Abilities and correct Information on what has passed here, renders entirely able to give His Majesty's Ministers every Explanation they may wish for, is so good to take this Dispatch with him to England, where he is

returning at the End of his long Captivity in this Country.

I have the Honour to be,
Sir, &c.

YARMOUTH.

No. 29,

COPY of a Dispatch from Mr. Secretary
Fox to the Earl of Yarmouth, dated
Downing-Street, August 2d, 1806.

My Lord, Downing-Street, August 2d, 1806.

MR. GODDARD arrived here Yesterday
Evening with your Lordship's Dispatch of
the 30th July.

His Majesty's Servants always did Justice to the
Motives which induced your Lordship to produce
your Full Powers, though the Step is one of
which it is not possible for them to express Ap-
probation, thinking it, as they do, likely to have
given so much more Countenance than was
desirable to the new and increasing Demands of
France.

The Full Powers which Lord Lauderdale carries
with him, are drawn jointly in his Name and
your Lordship's. In the present Disposition of
the French Government, there is, I fear, little
Probability, that Peace can be concluded on such
Terms as are alone admissible. The Trial should,
however,

however, be made with Frankness and good Faith; and it is with this View, that His Majesty has been pleased to direct that the Earl of Lauderdale should proceed to Paris, notwithstanding the present unfavourable Aspect of the Negotiation. His Instructions your Lordship will consider as equally addressed to yourself, and as the Rule of your Conduct in any Conferences which, in Conjunction with him, you may have with Monsieur Talleyrand or General Clarke; and, in any Point of Doubt that may occur, it is His Majesty's Pleasure, that your Lordship should be guided by Lord Lauderdale's Opinion, formed, as it will be, on the fullest Knowledge of the Sentiments and Views of His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) C. J. FOX.

No. 30.

COPY of a Dispatch from Mr. Secretary Fox to the Earl of Yarmouth, dated Downing-Street, August 3d, 1806.

My Lord, Downing-Street, August 3d 1806.
I WAS unwilling to detain Lord Lauderdale for the Purpose of replying particularly to the unfounded Allegations of M. Talleyrand, which you have recapitulated in your Dispatch of the 30th Ult. But some Points are there mentioned which cannot

cannot be left without an Answer, such, indeed, as I trust your Lordship has already given to them.

It is true, as stated by that Minister, that when the Demand was made for Lord Lauderdale's Passport, there still remained here a Blank Passport, One of the Two sent here some Time before your Lordship's Arrival, when it had been proposed to us to treat separately from Russia. That Proposal having fallen to the Ground, the Circumstance of our being still in Possession of the Passport was overlooked; but, even if it had occurred, some Doubt would probably have arisen, how far it might be proper, in so different a State of Things, to make use of it for Lord Lauderdale, without some previous Communication of such an Intention. This whole Matter is, however, very immaterial. The principal Point to which I feel it necessary to advert, is that Part of M. Talleyrand's Language which imputes to this Country needless Delays in the Negotiation, and attributes to that Cause the unjustifiable Measures pursued by France in Germany, and elsewhere.

In the Instructions given to Lord Lauderdale, the repeated tergiversations of France, during the Negotiation, are detailed. It is from thence, alone, that Delay has arisen.

Your Lordship truly states, that the Offers made through yourself were so clearly and unequivocally expressed, that the Intention of the French Government could not be doubted. But they were

were no sooner made than departed from. In the first Conference after your Lordship's Return to France, Sicily was demanded. In the former Offers, it had been distinctly disclaimed, “ (a) Vous “ l’avez—nous ne vous la demandons pas. Si “ nous la possédions elle pourroit augmenter de “ beaucoup les difficultés.” This Demand, therefore, could not have been foreseen, being in Contradiction to their own Assurances; and your Lordship could only take it *ad referendum*. This produced a Delay attributable solely to France. Our Answer was immediate and distinct. The new Demand was declared, to be a Breach of the Principle of the proposed Basis in its most essential Part. To obviate a Cavil on the Subject of Full Powers, they were sent to you; but with an express Injunction not to use them, nor even to produce them formally, till the French Government should return to its former Ground respecting Sicily. Your Lordship stated this to M. Talleyrand, and you received, in Return, a Proposal, of giving to His Majesty, or to the King of Naples, the Hans Towns in lieu of Sicily. This being again a Proposition entirely new, could only be referred for His Majesty's Consideration. On the very next Day after it arrived, it was decidedly rejected here; and, so little were we disposed to delay, that the same Dispatch conveyed to

(a) You are in Possession of it. We do not demand it of you. If we possessed it the Difficulties might be much increased.

you

you His Majesty's Orders, if the Demand of Sicily should still be persisted in, to desire your Passports, and return to England.

Of this Order your Lordship informed M. Talleyrand, and its Execution was delayed only by a fresh Proposal of Exchanges brought forward by France, and supported by the Russian Minister, as affording the Means by which His Majesty might prevent, amongst other Things, the Changes meditated in Germany. M. Talleyrand, it appears, now represents this Communication in the following Terms: " We told you, that *if you had Powers, and would enter into Negotiation, we would not sign the Arrangement in Germany.*" M. Talleyrand's real Communication is to be found in your Lordship's Dispatch of the 9th July, in which he says, that those Changes "*were determined upon, but should not be published if Peace took place.*"

That Dispatch was received here on the 12th; and on the 17th, in direct Violation of these Assurances, in whichever Form they were conveyed, the German Treaties were both signed and published.

They must of course have been prepared at least One Day before. What M. Talleyrand therefore calls a reasonable Time allowed to your Lordship to consult your Government, was at the most Twenty-four Hours, even supposing the utmost possible Expedition to be made by the Messengers to and from England, and no Accident
or

or Delay to occur by Land or Sea. These Dates will undoubtedly not have escaped your Lordship's Attention, and will have enabled you to refute, in the most decisive Manner, the unfounded Pretences by which the French Government seeks to attribute to Delays on our Part, the Results of its own Injustice, and repeated Breach of Promise.

The Whole of our Intercourse with France bears indeed so different a Character from that of Delay, and the Whole of the King's Conduct in this, as in every other Instance, is marked by so many striking Proofs of His Desire to avert, even by the greatest Sacrifices, such Calamities as he is now accused of producing, that your Lordship may perhaps have felt it less necessary to enter into a particular Refutation of such a Charge.

But after the Experience which in this Negotiation we have had of the Conduct of the French Government, it is of the highest Consequence not to suffer such Imputations to pass unnoticed, and, by Disregard, to acquire Strength and Currency.

Of the subsequent Proceedings, no Explanation can be necessary.

It had not been decided here, that in the Event of the Signature of the Russian Treaty, the Negotiation on the Part of this Country should be pursued on any other Basis but that of the strict *uti possidetis*, with the Exception of Hanover. The Resolution of admitting even the Possibility of Equivalent for Sicily, had been adopted only in consequence of M. d'Oubril's Desire, and in order
to

to maintain, if it had been possible, the Union of Council and Measures between Great Britain and Russia.

But by the Production of your Lordship's Full Powers. His Majesty was in some Sort pledged to continue the Negotiation. It was then judged proper that a fresh Negotiator should be added to your Lordship, and not an Instant has been lost in giving Effect to that Determination; nor has any considerable Delay occurred on this Side the Water, except in the single Point respecting the Passport, which I have explained in the Outset of this Dispatch.

I am, &c.

(Signed) C. J. FOX.

No. 31.

COPY of a Dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated Paris, August 6, 1806.—Received August 13.

Sir, Paris, 6th August 1806, 9 o'Clock A.M.
THE Desire expressed by Commodore Owen in the uncertain State of the Weather, to get off the Coast of France as soon as possible, prevented me from detaining the Boat for the Purpose of announcing to you my Arrival at Calais.

After a very quick Passage in His Majesty's Frigate the Clyde, I was put on Shore on Sunday Morning

Morning the 3d about 11 o'Clock. At Calais I received every Mark of Attention and Civility from the Magistrates and the Commanders of the Army, and of the Marine, as well as from the Inhabitants of the Place, who were in Crowds on the Shore, expressing their Wishes for Peace.

I have now to inform you, that on Tuesday I got to Paris about 12 o'Clock, where I immediately sent the enclosed Note, (marked A.) to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, from whom I soon afterwards received the Answer, (marked B), which I also enclose. At the Hour appointed, I waited upon his Excellency with whom I had a short Conversation, in which his Anxiety for your speedy Recovery formed the principal Topic. He informed me that General Clarke was the Person named by the Emperor to negotiate with Lord Yarmouth and myself, and appointed this Day at 11 o'Clock for the formal Exhibition of our Powers.

As the Frequency of Communication gives rise to false Speculations in England, it is not my Intention to send a Messenger until I shall have something more important to communicate.

I am, &c.

LAUDERDALE.

First Inclosure (A.)

COPY of a Note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand, dated August 5, 1806.

Paris ce 5 Aôut 1806.

LE Comte de Lauderdale nommé par Sa Majesté Britannique comme Plénipotentiaire auprès de la Cour de France, a l'honneur d'annoncer à Son Excellence le Ministre des Relations Extérieures son arrivée à Paris, et de le prier en même tems, de vouloir bien lui indiquer l'heure à laquelle il pourroit se rendre chez Elle.

(Translation.)

Paris 5 August 1806.

THE Earl of Lauderdale, appointed by His Britannick Majesty, Plenipotentiary at the Court of France, has the Honour to inform his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of his Arrival at Paris, and at the same Time to request that he will have the Goodness to inform him at what Hour he may call upon him.

Second

Second Inclosure (B.)

COPY of a Note from M. Talleyrand to the
Earl of Lauderdale, dated August 5,
1806.

Paris le 5 Août 1806.

LE Ministre des Relations Extérieures a appris
avec plaisir l'arrivée de Monsieur Le Comte
de Lauderdale. Il fera à ses ordres aujourd'hui à
cinq heures. Il a l'honneur d'offrir à Monsieur Le
Comte de Lauderdale l'assurance de sa haute con-
sidération.

(Translation.)

Paris, 5 August 1806.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has learnt with
Pleasure the Arrival of the Earl of Lauderdale.
He will be happy to see him to-day at Five
o'Clock.

He has the Honour to present to the Earl of
Lauderdale the Assurances of his high Considera-
tion.

No. 32.

COPY of a Dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated Paris, August 7, 1806.—Received August 13.

Sir,

IN consequence of the Appointment mentioned in my Dispatch of Yesterday's Date, I called on his Excellency, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, at 11 o'Clock, and exhibited the Powers with which His Majesty had been graciously pleased to invest me.

According to Custom I left with his Excellency a Copy of the Powers, and he delivered to me a Letter which I have the Honour to inclose, informing me that General Clarke had been appointed to negotiate with Lord Yarmouth and myself.

To General Clarke I was introduced before Dinner, at the House of his Excellency the Minister, and in the Course of a short Conversation with him, fixed our First Meeting for Twelve o'Clock this Day. I have Reason to think that he did not wish it to take place so soon, though he certainly made no explicit Objection when I proposed it.

I am, &c.

(Signed) LAUDERDALE.

Inclosure

Inclufure referred to in the preceding Difpatch.

COPY of a Note from M. Talleyrand to
the Earl of Lauderdale, dated Auguft
6th, 1806.

Paris le 6 Août 1806.

LE Souffigné Miniftre des Relations Extérieures
s'eft empressé de mettre fous les yeux de
Sa Majesté l'Empereur et Roi les Pleins-Pouvoirs
dont Son Excellence Mylord Lauderdale Miniftre
Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté Britannique lui a fait
l'honneur de lui donner communication.

Il a l'honneur d'informer Lord Lauderdale que
M. le Général Clarke a été nommé et accrédité par
Sa Majesté pour traiter de la Paix, et que c'est
avec ce Miniftre que leurs Excellences Mylord
Lauderdale et Mylord Yarmouth auront à fuivre
les négociations relatives aux Diffuffions existantes,
et que les deux Gouvernemens ont également à
coeur de terminer.

Le Miniftre des Relations Extérieures prie Son
Excellence Mylord Lauderdale d'agréer l'affurance
de fa haute Confideration.

(Signé) **CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND,**
Prince de Benevent.

(Translation.)

Paris, August 6, 1806.

THE Underfigned Minister for Foreign Affairs has loft no Time in laying before His Majesty, the Emperor and King, the Full Powers which his Excellency Lord Lauderdale, Minister Plenipotentiary on the Part of His Britannick Majesty, has done him the Honour to communicate to him. He has the Honour to inform Lord Lauderdale, that General Clarke has been appointed by his Majesty, and has received his Credentials to treat for Peace, and that it is with that Minister that their Excellencies, my Lords Lauderdale and Yarmouth, will have to enter into Negotiation on the Subject of the present Discussions, which the Two Governments equally desire to see happily concluded.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs requests his Excellency Lord Lauderdale to accept the Assurance of his high Consideration.

(Signed) **CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND,**
Prince of Benevento.

No. 33.

COPY of a Dispatch from the Earl of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated Paris, August 7, 1806.—Received August 13.

Sir, Paris, August 7, 1806.

I RECEIVED in due Time, and in their Order, your several Dispatches of the 28th Ult. and the 2d and 3d Inst. As no Messenger has been dispatched from hence since the Receipt of them, I have been obliged to defer till now replying to their Contents.

It was with great Satisfaction that I learnt by your Dispatch of the 2d Inst. the Intelligence of Lord Lauderdale's Departure from England; as, independently of the Advantages I must derive from communicating with a Person charged with the latest and fullest Instructions from His Majesty, his Arrival here afforded me the Opportunity of evincing, in the clearest Manner, that I had in no Instance thought myself at Liberty to depart from the Basis, originally laid down as the only one on which His Majesty's Ministers could consent to treat with the French Government.

It must be evident that whatever Delays have occurred in the Negotiation are imputable to France, and to the perpetual Variation of the Terms proposed by her; and I had not failed before the Receipt of your Dispatch of the 3d Inst. repeatedly

to do Justice to the Conduct of His Majesty's Government in that Respect.

As in the Line of Conduct which I thought it my Duty to observe previous to the Earl of Lauderdale's Arrival, I had no other Object in View than the fulfilling to the best of my Abilities the Mission with which His Majesty had been graciously pleased to charge me, I can, under the present Circumstances, have no other Ambition than that of co-operating with my best Endeavours in the Negotiation entrusted to us jointly, upon the same Basis on which I had originally placed it.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

(Signed) YARMOUTH.

No. 34.

FULL Powers given to the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth, which were communicated to M. Talleyrand on the 6th of August 1806.

GEORGIUS Tertius, Dei Gratiâ Britanniarum Rex, Fidei Defensor Dux Brunsvicensis ac Luneburgensis Sacri Romani Imperii Archi Thesaurarius et Princeps Elector &c. Omnibus et Singulis ad Quos præsentēs hæ literæ pervenerint, Salutem!

Cum belli incendio jam nimis diu diversis Orbis Terrarum partibus, flagrante, in id quàm maxime incumbamus ut Tranquillitas publica, tot Litibus Controversiisque rite compositis, reduci et stabiliri possit,

possit, Cumque eâ de Causâ Viros quosdam, tanto Negotio pares, Nostrâ ex Parte plenâ Auctoritate ad hoc tam magnum Opus conficiendum munire decrevimus.

Sciatis igitur, quod Nos, Fide, Industriâ, Ingenio, Perspicaciâ et Rerum Usu, perquam fidelis et dilecti Nostri, Jacobi, Comitis de Lauderdale, et fidelis et dilecti Nostri Francisci Seymour, Armigeri (valgò dicti Comitis de Yarmouth) plurimum confisi, eosdem nominavimus, fecimus, et constituimus sicut per præsentés Nominamus, facimus et constituimus, Nostros veros certos, et indubitatos Procuratores Commissarios et Plenipotentarios; Dantes et concedentes iisdem, conjunctim vel separatim, omnem et omni modam Potestatem, Facultatem, Auctoritatemque, nec non Mandatum generale pariter ac speciale (ita tamen ut generale specialî non deroget, neque contrâ), pro Nobis et Nostro Nomine cum Ministris, Commissariis vel Plenipotentariis aliorum Principum aut Statuum quorumcunque, tam Hostium quam Fæderatorum Nostrorum, quorum interesse poterit, sufficienti itidem Potestati instructis, tam singulatim ac divisim, quam aggregatim ac conjunctim, congregandi et colloquendi, atque cum Iphis de Pace firmâ et stabili, sincerâque Amicitîâ et Concordiâ quantocius restituendis, conveniendi et concludendi, eaque omnia quæ ita conventa et conclusa fuerint, pro Nobis et Nostro Nomine subscribendi, superque conclusis, Tractatum Tractatusve vel alia Instrumenta quotquot et qualia necessaria fuerint, conficiendi

mutuóque tradendi, recipiendique, omniaque alia, quæ ad opus supradictum feliciter exequendum pertinent, transigendi, tam amplis Modo et Formâ, ac Vi Effectuque pari, ac Nos, si interessemus facere et præstare possemus; Spondentes et in Verbo Regio Nostro promittentes, Nos omnia et Singula quæcunque à dictis Nostris Plenipotentiaris, conjunctim vel separatim, transigi et concludi contigerint, grata, rata, et accepta omni meliori modo habituros, neque passuros unquam, ut in toto vel in parte a quopiam violenter aut ut iis in contrarium eatur.

In quorum omnium majorem Fidem et Robur hîcæ præsentibus manû Nostrâ Regiâ Signatis Magnum Nostrum Britanniarum Sigillum appendi Fecimus.

Quæ dabantur in Palatio Nostro Divi Jacobi Die primo Mensis Augusti, Anno Domino Millesimo Octingentesimo Sexto Regnique Nostro Quadragésimo Sexto.

(Translation.)

GEORGE the Third, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland King, Defender of the Faith, Duke of Brunswick and Lunenburg, Arch-Treasurer and Prince Elector of the Holy Roman Empire, &c. To all and singular to whom these Presents shall come, Greeting!

The

The Flames of War having already raged too long in the different Quarters of the World, it is the more incumbent upon Us to re-establish the publick Tranquillity by putting an End to so many Quarrels and Controversies, We have therefore judged it expedient to invest certain fit Persons with full Powers on Our Part for the better carrying on this great Undertaking.

Know therefore, that We, reposing especial Trust in the Fidelity, Diligence, Judgment, Perspicuity, and Experience of Our right trusty and well-beloved James, Earl of Lauderdale, and of Our trusty and well-beloved Francis Seymour Esquire, commonly called Earl of Yarmouth, have nominated, constituted, and appointed them, as by these Presents We do nominate, constitute, and appoint them Our true, certain, and undoubted Procurators, Commissioners, and Plenipotentiaries: Giving to them conjointly or separately, all and all Manner of Power, Faculty, and Authority, together with general as well as special Orders, (so that the general do not derogate from the special, nor on the contrary), for Us and in Our Name to meet and confer with the Ministers, Commissioners, or Plenipotentiaries of any other Princes or States whatsoever, who may be interested therein, whether Our Enemies or Our Allies, furnished with sufficient Powers for that Purpose, as well singly and separately, as aggregately and conjointly, and to consult and agree with them for the speedy Restoration of a sincere Friendship

ship and Amity, and of a firm and lasting Peace; and for Us and in Our Name to sign all such Matters and Things as shall be agreed upon and concluded on the Premises, and to form such Treaty or Treaties or any other Instruments as shall be necessary, and mutually to deliver and receive the same in Exchange, and to do and perform all such Acts, Matters, and Things, as may be in any way proper and conducive to the Purposes above mentioned, in as full and ample a Manner and Form, and with the like Validity and Effect, as We Ourself if We were present could do and perform; engaging and promising, on Our Royal Word, that We will accept, ratify, and confirm, in the most effectual Manner, all such Acts Matters, and Things as shall be so transacted and concluded by Our said Plenipotentiaries, conjointly or separately, and that we will never suffer any Person to violate the same in Whole or in Part, or to act contrary thereto.

In Testimony and Confirmation of all which We have caused Our Great Seal of Our United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland to be affixed to these Presents signed with Our Royal Hand.

Given at Our Court at St. James's this First Day of August in the Year of Our Lord One thousand eight hundred and six, and of Our Reign the Forty-sixth,

No. 35.

COPY of a Dispatch from the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated Paris, August 9, 1806.—
Received August 13.

Sir, Paris, August 9th, 1806.

THINKING it unnecessary to send a Courier to England with the Details of the mere Matters of Form which necessarily took place after Lord Lauderdale's Arrival, we have delayed Writing till there appeared something of Importance to communicate to you.

We have now to inform you, that Lord Lauderdale, having exhibited his Powers, and delivered a Copy in the customary Form, our first Meeting with General Clarke, the Plenipotentiary of the French Government, took place at his House, on Thursday 7th August at Noon.

Our Conversation commenced by General Clarke's observing that as Lord Lauderdale had just arrived from London, with full Instructions from His Majesty, he had probably something new to communicate.

Lord Lauderdale in substance replied, that it was his Wish before intermeddling with the Negotiation now pending, distinctly to recall to the Recollection of General Clarke what had already passed between His Majesty and the Government of France, and at once precisely to state the only

Footing

Footing on which His Majesty could consent to treat. To effect this Object, he informed General Clarke, that he had prepared a Note (marked A.) which he begged to deliver to him as Official.

General Clarke read the Note twice with great Attention, and afterwards placed it in his Portfolio, saying that he must take it *ad referendum*.

Very little passed at this Meeting sufficiently interesting to merit being detailed; the General objected to the Practice he apprehended Lord Lauderdale meant to introduce of conducting the Negotiation by Writing; and said he was afraid the Emperor would regard it as a Means of endless Delay, if a Note was to be delivered upon every insignificant Question which it might be necessary to discuss. The Reply consisted merely in stating the Distinction betwixt delivering a written Note for the Purpose of at once bringing to a Point the Basis on which the Negotiation was to be conducted, and resorting on every trivial Occasion to that Practice. The first, it was contended must accelerate; the latter, it was admitted, would delay the Negotiation; and it would be therefore carefully avoided, as it was His Majesty's Wish that no Delay should take place.

General Clarke, with something like an Insinuation that an unfair Advantage was taken by the Government of Great Britain, announced that as there had been Two Plenipotentiaries appointed by His Majesty, it was the Emperor's Intention to
do

do the same, and that the Name of the Person selected would be communicated to us.

It is proper to state, that in the Course of this Conversation Lord Yarmouth recalled to General Clarke's Recollection, that in all the Interviews he had had with him, he uniformly stated the *uti possidetis* as the only Basis upon which he could possibly treat. General Clarke in Reply said, that he could make no Answer to what Lord Yarmouth stated, without alluding to Conversations which he affected to consider as loose, calling them “(a) des romans politiques;” at the same Time by his Silence he clearly admitted what Lord Yarmouth most distinctly stated.

Our first Interview terminated with an Appointment to meet at Lord Lauderdale's Apartments on Friday the 8th at Twelve o'Clock, the General observing that it might be perhaps necessary to put off the Appointment, as he wished to have full Time to consider the Note which had been delivered, and as the new Plenipotentiary might wish to have an Opportunity carefully to read the Correspondence that hitherto had taken place. He promised at the same Time if this was the Case, to give us Notice by Writing in the Morning.

On Friday the 8th at Eleven o'Clock the Inclosures (marked B. and C.) were left at Lord Lauderdale's Apartments; and an Answer was sent to General Clarke, stating that an Appointment had

(a) Political Romances.

been

been made by Lords Lauderdale and Yarmouth to receive the Turkish Ambassador at Four o'Clock, and requesting that the Meeting should take place on Saturday the 9th at Noon.

General Clarke and Monsieur Champagne, Minister of the Interior, the newly appointed Plenipotentiary, afterwards put off this Meeting till Four o'Clock To-day, as the latter was obliged to attend the Emperor's Privy Council at St. Cloud.

Late on Friday Night Lord Yarmouth received the Answer to the Note delivered by Lord Lauderdale, a Copy of which (marked D.) is inclosed, to which Lord Lauderdale and Lord Yarmouth immediately returned the Answer, also inclosed, (marked E.).

General Clarke and M. Champagne came to the Meeting appointed at Four o'Clock, and a Conversation took place which lasted for upwards of Two Hours. Into the Details of this it is impossible now to enter. The general Object of it was to engage Lord Lauderdale to depart from the Basis which he had insisted should be recognized, to prevail upon him to consult his Government, or to take Ten or Fifteen Days for Consideration; but it terminated by Lord Lauderdale's declaring that the last Note was to be considered as a Prelude to his demanding Passports, for which he should apply to M. Talleyrand in the Course of the Evening.

The Letter, a Copy of which (marked F.) is inclosed, was dispatched to M. Talleyrand Half an Hour after

after the Departure of the Plenipotentiaries, and it appears highly improbable that any Proposition should be made which can alter our Resolution of leaving France, the Moment the Passports arrive.

We have the Honour to be, &c.

(Signed) LAUDERDALE.
YARMOUTH.

First Inclosure (A.)

COPY of a Note delivered by the Earl of Lauderdale to General Clarke on the 7th of August 1806.

Paris, le 7 Août 1806.

LE Souffigné Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté Britannique, avant d'entrer sur la négociation présentement pendante, entre Son Souverain et la Cour de France, le juge nécessaire de retracer brièvement les circonstances qui l'ont amené. En même tems il croit qu'il convient au Caractère de Franchise et de Sincérité, lequel, comme Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté Britannique, il s'est résolu de soutenir constamment, de déclarer, comme la seule base sur laquelle il peut consentir à négocier, le Principe que la France elle-même a énoncé originairement, aussi bien que de définir la nature de la discussion dans laquelle il est prêt à entrer.

Le Langage fort et énergique dans lequel le Gouvernement de France exprimoit, il y a quelques mois, son desir de la Paix, pendant qu'il inspiroit

roit à Sa Majesté une confiance dans la véritable sincérité du désir de la Cour de France, ne lui laissoit que le regret que la proposition de traiter avec elle, séparément de ses Alliés, paroissoit empêcher et la France et l'Angleterre de profiter de cette heureuse disposition de leurs Gouvernement respectifs; comme alors il étoit impossible à Sa Majesté, conformément à la bonne foi qu'elle a toujours manifesté, de traiter autrement que conjointement avec Son Allié L'Empereur de Russie.

Depuis ce tems-là, quand Sa Majesté a trouvé que des circonstances, qu'il n'est pas nécessaire de détailler ici, lui permettoient de traiter séparément, c'étoit avec bien du plaisir qu'elle recevoit la proposition de traiter généralement sur la Base de *uti possidetis*, qu'on devoit observer scrupuleusement, excepté dans le cas d'Hanovre, qu'on se proposoit de céder à Sa Majesté en entier.

Il est vrai que cette proposition n'étoit faite, ni directement, ni par le canal d'un Ministre accrédité : de son authenticité pourtant on ne pouvoit avoir le moindre doute.

Indépendamment de l'Autorité qu'elle recevoit du caractère de la personne employé pour la communiquer, il sembloit qu'elle s'accordoit parfaitement, avec ce qui avoit été annoncé précédemment : “ L'Empereur n'a rien à désiré de ce que possède “ l'Angleterre,” (un aveu fait au commencement de la correspondance entre les deux Cours) étoit un prélude naturel d'une telle proposition.

Sa

Sa Majesté regardoit la cession d'Hanovre comme un témoignage de l'esprit de Justice dans lequel la proposition avoit été conçue, parceque cet Electorat, quoique occupé sur une identité supposéé d'intérêts et de mesures, n'entroit en effet pour rien dans les differends qui occasionnoient la guerre presente, et Elle a vu, dans le principe jusqu'alors reconnu comme la Base générale de Négociation, une base particulierement adaptée aux situations relatives des deux Parties, ce qu'elle jugeoit être preuve que la France étoit tout aussi sincèrement disposéé que la Grandé Bretagne, de mettre fin à un ordre de choses également préjudiciable aux intérêts des deux pays.

En effet il paroissoit à Sa Majesté, être le seul principe, sur lequel une Négociation pouvoit probablement être mené à une heureuse conclusion. De la nature des intérêts des Parties qui y participoient, il y avoit peu d'espérance qu'aucun arrangement satisfaisant pourroit être fait, en manière de restitution réciproque, en rendant leurs acquisitions respectives, tandis que, de l'autre Coté, le Principe de *uti possidetis* se présentoit naturellement, comme le mode de mettre fin aux hostilités malheureuses entre les deux Nations, dont toutes les deux sont en possession de conquêtes étendues et importantes en territoire et influence, la France sur le Continent de l'Europe, et la Grande Bretagne dans d'autres parties du Monde.

A Sa Majesté cette verité paroissoit encore plus frappante, en se représentant, que toutes les

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deux

deux Nations jouissoient dans leurs acquisitions respectives, d'un état de possession, lequel ne pourra guères souffrir de changemens importants par la continuation de la guerre; la supériorité des Forces Navales de la Grande Brétagne, n'étant, selon toutes les apparences, pas moins fermement établie sur mer, que celle des armées de France sur le continent l'Europe.

C'étoit sous l'impression que ces idées produisoient naturellement, que Sa Majesté, sans hésiter, accepta la proposition de traiter sur le Principe de *uti possidetis*, avec la réserve due à la Connexion et au Concert, qui subsistoient avec L'Empereur de Russie; et comme une preuve de Sa sincérité, Elle choisit la personne par laquelle cette communication a été faite, pour annoncer l'alacrité avec laquelle elle a accédé à la Base proposée pour conclure un traité.

Le Souffigné n'a nulle disposition de cacher la satisfaction que Sa Majesté avoit sentie dans ces perspectives heureuses de rendre promptement les Bénédiction de la Paix à ses Sujets sur des Principes justes et équitables et qui sont conformes à l'honneur de Sa Couronne; ni le regret qu'Elle a éprouvé, quand, presque au moment même où l'accession de Sa Majesté au Principe offert à Son Acceptation fut annoncé, ce principe étoit abandonné subitement par la demande de l'Evacuation et de la Reddition de Sicile; une demande, laquelle jusqu'ici n'a été modifiée que par des projets d'indemnité

dennite pour Sa Majesté Sicilienne, qui paroissent insuffisants et inadmissibles.

Cette demande si incompatible avec les Principes avoués sur lesquels les deux Parties traiteront, étoit de soi même suffisante pour mettre fin à la Négociation, mais l'anxiété de Sa Majesté Le Roi de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande de concourir avec Son Allié l'Empereur de Russie, et d'assurer à ses sujets les Bénédiction de la Paix, l'a persuadé de recevoir toute proposition nouvelle pour procurer à Sa Majesté Sicilienne, en échange de la Sicile, un équivalent réel et satisfaisant, lequel devoit obtenir le consentement de ce Souverain.

Aucune proposition satisfaisante de cette nature n'ayant encore été faite, le Souffigné doit déclarer, qu'il ne peut pas consentir à traiter autrement que sur le Principe de *uti possidetis*, comme originairement proposé à Son Souverain par la Cour de France : En même tems il souhaite qu'il soit bien entendu, que l'adoption de ce Principe ne l'empêchera pas, ni d'écouter à une indemnification juste et suffisante à Sa Majesté Sicilienne pour la Cession de Sicile, ni d'accepter quelque proposition pour l'échange de territoire entre les deux Parties contractantes sur des Principes justes et égaux, et tels qu'ils puissent tendre à l'avantage reciproque des deux Pays.

Le Souffigné conçoit bien que depuis que l'*uti possidetis* a été proposé par la Cour de France, la Paix a été conclue entre la France et l'Empereur de Russie, et que par conséquent la Situation relative

entre les deux pays n'est plus la même ; mais au contraire il doit aussi observer, que depuis ce temps là la France a acquis de nouveaux Avantages par les Changemens étendus qu'elle a faits dans la Constitution de l'Empire Germanique, un Arrangement, dont la prévention a été fournie par elle à la Cour de la Grande Bretagne comme un motif puissant pour la conclusion immédiate de la Paix, sur la Base d' *uti possidetis*. Si donc ce principe paroïssoit juste auparavant, il ne peut pas manquer à présent, selon ses propres vues de l'objet, d'être encore plus favorable à ses intérêts qu'à ceux de l'Empire Britannique.

Le Souffigné le juge en même temps nécessaire d'observer, que quoique la France puisse avoir d'autres vues importantes sur le Continent de l'Europe, Sa Majesté le Roi de la Grande Bretagne et de l'Irlande peut bien justement avoir la perspective, dans d'autres parties du monde, d'une importance infinie au Commerce et à la Puissance de son Empire, et conséquemment qu'il ne peut pas, conformément ni aux intérêts de Son Peuple, ni à l'honneur de Sa Couronne, négocier sur aucun Principe d'infériorité, ni déclaré ni supposé. Il ne peut traiter sur aucun autre pied que sur l'hypothèse, que la continuation des hostilités est également désavantageuse à toutes les deux Parties. Il ne peut y avoir aucune raison de supposer que les conquêtes que Sa Majesté se propose de garder par la Paix, pourroient lui être remportées par la Guerre ; et le Souffigné doit supposer, que la meilleure preuve de

de l'Equité des Bases sur lesquelles il se propose de traiter, se trouve dans le fait, qu'elles ont été proposées par la France, à la première ouverture de ces Communications entre les deux Gouvernemens, qui ont amené la Mission dont son Souverain l'a chargé conjointement avec le Comte de Yarmouth.

(Signé) LAUDERDALE;

(Translation)

Paris, 7th Aug. 1806.

THE Undersigned Plenipotentiary of His Britannick Majesty, previous to entering upon the Negotiation actually pending between his Sovereign and the Court of France, thinks it necessary briefly to retrace the Circumstances in which it originated. At the same Time, he conceives it consistent with that Character of Openness and Sincerity, which, as His Britannick Majesty's Plenipotentiary, he is determined invariably to support, to declare the only Basis upon which he can consent to treat, to be the Principle which France herself originally laid down; and to define the Nature of the Discussion into which he is about to enter.

The strong and energetick Language in which the French Government, a few Months since, expressed its Desire for Peace, whilst it inspired His Majesty with Confidence in the real Sincerity of the Wishes of the Court of France, left him only to

regret that the Proposal of treating with His Majesty separately from his Allies, appeared to prevent both France and England from profiting by that happy Disposition of their respective Governments ; it being at that Time impossible for His Majesty, conformably with the good Faith which He has ever evinced, to treat otherwise than conjointly with His Ally the Emperor of Russia.

Since that Time, His Majesty having found that Circumstances which it is unnecessary to detail here, permitted His Majesty to negotiate separately : He received with great Pleasure, the Proposal of treating generally, upon the Basis of *uti possidetis*, which was to be scrupulously observed except in the Case of Hanover, which was proposed to be ceded to His Majesty with all its Dependencies.

It is true, that this Proposal was not made either directly, or through the Channel of an accredited Minister: of its Authenticity, however, no one could entertain the smallest Doubt.

Independently of the Authority which it derived from the Character of the Person employed to communicate it, it seemed to agree completely with what had been previously announced. For “ The Emperor desires nothing that England possesses,” (an Avowal made at the Commencement of the Correspondence between the two Courts) was a natural Prelude to such a Proposal.

His Majesty regarded the Cession of Hanover as a Proof of the Spirit of Justice in which the Proposal was conceived ; because this Electorate, although

although occupied on account of a supposed Identity of Interests and of Measures, in Fact had no Relation whatever with the Disputes which produced the present War ; and His Majesty saw in the Principle hitherto acknowledged as the general Basis of Negotiation, a Basis peculiarly adapted to the relative Situations of the two Parties, which he considered a Proof that France was as sincerely disposed as Great Britain to put an End to an Order of Things, equally prejudicial to the Interests of both Countries.

In fact it appeared to His Majesty to be the only Principle upon which it was probable that a Negotiation could be brought to a successful Issue. From the Nature of the Interests of the Parties engaged in it, there was but little Hope that any satisfactory Arrangement could be made on the Ground of reciprocal Restitution, by giving up their respective Acquisitions ; whilst, on the other Hand, the Principle of *uti possidetis* naturally presented itself, as the Mode of terminating the unfortunate Hostilities between the two Nations, both of whom were in Possession of Conquests extensive and important in point both of Territory and of Influence ; France on the Continent of Europe, and Great Britain in other Parts of the World.

This Truth appeared still more striking to His Majesty, upon reflecting that the State of Possession in which the two Nations held their respective Acquisitions could scarcely suffer any important Change by the Continuance of the War ; the Superiority of the Naval Force of Great Britain being,

according to all Appearance, not less firmly established on the Seas, than that of the Armies of France on the Continent of Europe.

It was under the Impression which these Ideas naturally produced, that His Majesty accepted, without Hesitation, the Proposal of treating upon the Principle of *uti possidetis*, with the Reservation due to the Connection and the Concert that subsisted with the Emperor of Russia; and, as a Proof of his Sincerity, His Majesty fixed upon the Person by whom the Communication had been made, to announce the Readiness with which He had acceded to the Basis proposed for the Conclusion of a Treaty.

The Undersigned is by no Means disposed to conceal the Satisfaction His Majesty derived from these happy Prospects of speedily restoring to his Subjects the Blessings of Peace, upon just and equitable Principles, such as were conformable to the Honour of his Crown; nor the Regret which His Majesty felt, when, almost at the very Moment of His declaring His Acceptance of the Proposal that had been made to Him, it was signified that this Principle was suddenly abandoned by the Demand of the Evacuation and Cession of Sicily; a Demand which has hitherto been modified merely by Projects of Indemnity for his Sicilian Majesty, which appear to be totally inadequate and inadmissible.

This Demand, so incompatible with the avowed Principles upon which the Two Powers were treating,

ing, was in itself sufficient to put an End to the Negotiation; but the Anxiety of His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland to concur with His Ally the Emperor of Russia, and to secure to His Subjects the Blessings of Peace, induced Him to receive any new Proposal for obtaining for his Sicilian Majesty, in Exchange for Sicily, a real and satisfactory Equivalent, such as that Sovereign should consent to accept.

No satisfactory Proposal of this Nature having yet been made, the Underfigned must declare that he cannot consent to treat upon any other Principle than that of the *uti possidetis*, as originally proposed to His Sovereign by the Court of France: At the same Time He is desirous it should be well understood, that the Adoption of this Principle will not prevent Him either from listening to any just and adequate Indemnification to his Sicilian Majesty for the Cession of Sicily, or from accepting any Proposition for the Exchange of Territory between the Two Contracting Parties, upon just and equal Principles, such as may tend to the reciprocal Advantage of the two Countries.

The Underfigned is well aware that since the *uti possidetis* was proposed by the Court of France, Peace has been concluded between France and the Emperor of Russia, and that, in consequence, the relative Situation of the Two Countries is no longer the same; but, on the other Hand, he must also observe, that since that Time France has acquired fresh Advantages in consequence of the extensive Changes

Changes which she has made in the Constitution of the German Empire; an Arrangement, the preventing of which was represented by France to the Court of Great Britain as a powerful Motive for the immediate Conclusion of Peace on the Basis of *uti possidetis*. If then this Principle formerly appeared just to France, it cannot fail at present, according to her own Views of the Subject, to be more favourable to her Interest than to those of the British Empire.

The Undersigned thinks it at the same Time necessary to observe, that although France may have other important Views upon the Continent of Europe, His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland may very fairly form Views in other Parts of the World of infinite Importance to the Commerce and to the Power of His Empire, and consequently that he cannot conformably with either the Interests of His People or the Honour of His Crown, negotiate upon any Principle of Inferiority either avowed or supposed. He can treat upon no other Footing than the Supposition, that the Continuance of Hostilities is equally disadvantageous to both Parties. There can be no Reason to suppose that the Conquests which His Majesty proposes to retain by the Peace can be wrested from Him by War; and the Undersigned is persuaded that the best Proof of the Equity of the Conditions upon which he proposes to treat, is to be found in the Fact, that they were proposed by France herself at the first Opening of the Communications between

Two

Two Governments, which have led to the Mission with which His Sovereign has been pleased to entrust him conjointly with the Earl of Yarmouth.

(Signed) LAUDERDALE.

Second Inclosure (B.)

COPY of a Note from General Clarke to the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth, dated August 8, 1806.

Paris le 8 Août 1806.

LE Général Clarke prie Leurs Excellences Messieurs les Comtes de Lauderdale et d'Yarmouth, de vouloir bien remettre à 4 heures après midi, la conférence qui devrait avoir lieu aujourd'hui à midi. Si l'heure de 4 heures est incommode pour leurs Excellences, le General Clarke les prie d'indiquer celle qui leur serra qui leur sera agréable. Il se rendra chez my Lord Lauderdale avec son Excellence Monsieur de Champagny, Ministre de l'Intérieur, nommé par sa Majesté l'Empereur et Roi, son Plénipotentiaire conjointement avec le Général Clarke, pour traiter de la paix avec la Grande Bretagne.

Le Général Clarke a l'honneur d'affurer Leurs Excellences Messieurs les Comtes de Lauderdale et d'Yarmouth de sa haute Considération.

(Translation.)

(Translation.)

Paris, August 8, 1806.

GENERAL Clarke requests their Excellencies the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth will be pleased to postpone to Four o'Clock in the Afternoon the Conference which was fixed for 12 o'Clock. Should the Hour of Four be inconvenient to their Excellencies, General Clarke begs they will name one that will suit them. The General will wait upon Lord Lauderdale with His Excellency Monsieur de Champagny, Minister of the Interior, who has been appointed by His Majesty the Emperor and King to be His Plenipotentiary conjointly with General Clarke, to negotiate a Peace with Great Britain.

General Clarke has the Honour of assuring their Excellencies the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth of his high Consideration.

Third Inclosure (C.)

COPY of a Note from M. Talleyrand to the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth, dated August 8, 1806.

My Lords,

Paris le 8 Août 1806.

J'AI l'honneur d'informer Vos Excellences, que Sa Majesté l'Empereur et Roi a jugé convenable d'adjoindre, en qualité de Ministre Plénipotentiaire, Monsieur de Champagny, son Ministre
de

de l'intérieur, à la mission, qui jusqu' à ce jour, avoit été confiée seulement à Monsieur le Général Clarke, et que ces deux Ministres sont également autorisés à conférer avec Vos Excellences sur le grand objet de concilier la politique et les intérêts des deux États. Je me suis empressé de leur faire connaître les intentions de Sa Majesté, et je ne doute pas qu'ils ne s'entendent pour donner Cours dès aujourd'hui à la Négociation que Monsieur le Général Clarke a eu l'Avantage d'ouvrir avec Vos Excellences, et que Sa Majesté espère autant qu'Elle desire voir arriver à un resultat également utile et honorable pour les deux peuples.

Je prie Vos Excellences d'agrèer l'assurance de ma haute Considération.

(Signé) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND,
Prince de Benevent.

(Translation.)

My Lords, Paris, August 8, 1806.

I HAVE the Honour to inform your Excellencies, that His Majesty the Emperor and King has judged it expedient to join Monsieur de Champagne, His Minister of the Interior, as additional Minister Plenipotentiary, to the Mission which hitherto had been entrusted solely to General Clarke, and that these two Ministers are equally authorized to confer with Your Excellencies on the great Object of conciliating the Politics and
the

the Interests of the two States. I lost no Time in acquainting them with the Intentions of His Majesty, and I doubt not they will concert Measures for the immediate Prosecution of the Negotiation which General Clarke has had the Honour to enter upon with your Excellencies, and which His Majesty hopes as well as desires to see terminate in a Result equally advantageous and honourable to both Nations.

I request your Excellency to accept the Assurance of my high Consideration.

(Signed) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND,
Prince of Benevento.

Fourth Enclosure (D.)

COPY of a Note from General Clarke to the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth, dated August 8, 1806.

Paris, August 8th, 1806.

LE Souffigné Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté L'Empereur des François Roi d'Italie, a mis sous les yeux de Son Gouvernement la Note remise hier par Son Excellence le Lord Lauderdale Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté Britannique.

Sa Majesté L'Empereur des François Roi d'Italie, n'a pu qu'être péniblement affectée de voir qu'une Négociation qui a déjà été l'objet de tant de pourparlers, qui a donné lieu à l'envoi de tant de Couriers de part et d'autre, qui étoit enfin déjà

déjà conduite à Sa Maturité, ait soudainement retrogradé de maniere à presenter des obstacles, non dans la nature des Stipulations, mais quant aux bases mêmes d'après lesquelles cette Négociation fut ouverte.

La Cour de France s'est constamment refusée à admettre dans une même Negociation les Cours d'Angleterre & de Russie, et quelque désir qu'ait Sa Majesté l'Empereur des François Roi d'Italie de voir la Paix générale bientôt retablie, il n'est aucune consideration qui eût pû le porter à violer ce principe de Sa politique. D'ailleurs les Négociations que la France avoit entamées à Peterfbourg avoit convaincu Sa Majesté L'Empereur des François, Roi d'Italie, que le Cabinet Anglois se faisoit illusion sur la Nature de Ses Rélations avec la Russie.

Après plusieurs mois de discussions le Cabinet de Londres céda sur ce point et Son Excellence Le Comte de Yarmouth arriva publiquement à Calais, puis à Paris, pour traiter de la Paix. Il eut dès son arrivée dans cette Capitale des conférences avec Son Excellence Le Ministre des Rélations Extérieures, après lui avoir fait connoître préalablement qu'il étoit duëment autorisé par Son Gouvernement.

Depuis cette époque, la Russie a conclu sa Paix avec La France, Le Souffigné a été nommé Ministre Plenipotentiaire pour traiter avec le Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté Britannique, & sa première démarche a été un échange de Ses pouvoirs avec

avec ceux de Son Excellence Le Comte de Yarmouth, qu'il a dû croire, ainsi que le portent les Pleins Pouvoirs de Son Excellence, autorisé à traiter, à conclure et à signer un Traité. Définitif entre la France et Le Royaume Uni de La Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande.

De très fréquentes conférences, la plupart de plusieurs heures, ont eu lieu depuis entre les deux Plénipotentiaires, qui de bonne foi de part & d'autre, s'appliquèrent à applanir les difficultés, et mirent de côté tout ce qui peut aigrir les esprits ou embarasser et retarder inutilement la marche de la Négociation.

Au lieu de se remettre de part & d'autre, des notes plus ou moins adroites, mais qui éloignent plus qu'elles ne rapprochent du but qu'on veut atteindre, au lieu d'entâmer de ces controverses écrites, non moins préjudiciables à l'humanité que les hostilités à main armée, et qui prolongent les malheurs des peuples; au lieu surtout de négocier la paix comme on fait la guerre, les Plénipotentiaires eurent des conférences franches, dans lesquelles Sa Majesté L'Empereur & Roi accorda tout ce qu' il peut accorder sans perdre de vue la Dignité de Sa Couronne, Son Amour pour Ses peuples, et l'intérêt de Ses Alliés.

Jamais on ne réduira Sa Majesté à d'autres sacrifices.

La Marche que prend Son Excellence Le Comte de Lauderdale, nouveau Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté Britannique, ne semble-t-elle pas annoncer

cer qu'une Multitude de Notes ne suffira même pas pour que les deux Gouvernemens s'entendent ? Et ne court-on pas évidemment le risque, en adoptant une telle marche dont l'abus a été si manifeste de nos jours, de s'entendre encore moins qu'on n'a fait jusqu'ici ? Si l'on ne veut au contraire que créer des pièces qu'on puisse ensuite présenter au Parlement de la Grande Bretagne, Sa Majesté l'Empereur et Roi n'éprouve pas le même besoin. C'est la Paix qu'il desire : Cette paix également honorable pour La France, pour la Grande Bretagne et pour leurs Alliés, que le travail assidu et mutuel des Plenipotentiaires respectifs avoit rendue acceptable pour les deux Gouvernemens.

Cependant pour faire paroître aux yeux de tous Son Amour pour la Justice et la Sincérité de Ses Sentimens pacifiques, et pour qu'on connoisse véritablement à qui l'on doit attribuer tout empêchement à la marche de la Négociation, Sa Majesté L'Empereur des François a daigné permettre au Souffigné de discuter ici la vaine question relative à la base de cette Négociation déjà avancée et sur le point d'être terminée.

Dans la lettre écrite à Son Excellence Monsieur Fox le 1^{er} Avril par Son Excellence le Ministre François des Relations Extérieures, ce Ministre annonça que Sa Majesté l'Empereur des François adoptoit entièrement le principe exposé dans la Dépêche de Son Excellence Monsieur Fox du 26 Mars, et présenté comme base de la Négociation :

M.

“ que

“ que la Paix proposée doit être honorable pour
 “ les deux Cours et pour leurs Alliés respectifs.”

Dans la lettre du 2 Juin à Son Excellence Monsieur Fox, Son Excellence le Ministre des Relations Extérieures alla plus loin : Il proposa au Nom de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des François Roi d'Italie d'établir pour bases deux principes fondamentaux, le premier tiré de la lettre de Monsieur Fox du 26 Mars, savoir : “ que les deux Etats auront pour
 “ objet que la Paix soit honorable pour eux et leurs
 “ Alliés respectifs, en même tems que cette Paix
 “ sera de nature à assurer autant qu'ils le pourront le repos futur l'Europe.”

Le second principe étoit “ une reconnaissance en
 “ faveur de l'une et de l'autre Puissance de tout
 “ droit d'intervention et de garantie pour les Affaires
 “ Continentales et pour les Affaires Maritimes.”

Telles sont les bases adoptées par le Gouvernement Britannique et convenues avec lui. Jamais il n'a pu venir dans la pensée de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des François Roi d'Italie de prendre pour base de la Négociation *l'uti possidetis*.

Si telle eut été la pensée il eut gardé la Moravie, une partie de la Hongrie, la Styrie, la Carniole, la Croatie, toute l'Autriche ainsi que sa Capitale. Trieste et Fiume et le Littoral environnant seroient encore en sa Puissance comme Gènes et Venise. Le Hanovre, Osnabruck, et toutes les embouchures des grandes rivières du Nord de l'Allemagne seroient soumis à Son Empire, et
 certe

certes alors Sa Majesté l'Empereur des François Roi d'Italie auroit pu sans difficultés, laisser le Cap, Surinam, Tabago, Saint Lucie, Pondicherry, &c. au pouvoir de Sa Majesté Britannique.

Quant à la Sicile, dans cette hypothèse même, Sa Majesté l'Empereur et Roi ne l'auroit pas laissée à Ses Ennemis : mais Sa Majesté auroit pensé seulement que la conquête de cette Ile auroit dû précéder l'ouverture des Négociations, et lorsque La Prusse et La Russie ont, ou garanti ou reconnu les changemens arrivés dans le Royaume des Deux Siciles, doit on présumer que l'Angleterre eût pu empêcher la conquête de la Sicile, qui n'est séparée du Continent que par un Canal de moins de deux mille Toises.

Et en supposant même que le Cap, Surinam et autres possessions Hollandoises eussent pu être définitivement detachées du Royaume de Hollande, n'est il pas certain que son existence comme Nation devenoit impossible par cela seul, et que Son incorporation avec l'Empire François eut été la suite nécessaire du refus qu' auroit fait l'Angleterre de lui restituer Ses Colonies ? Quel seroit en effet le moyen de maintenir une Nation qui n'auroit que des dettes, et à laquelle l'absence absolue de tout commerce étoit tout moyen de les payer ? Quelque chose que puissent alléguer Leurs Excellences les Plénipotentiaires de Sa Majesté Britannique, il est impossible qu'ils ne soient pas convaincus qu'il est extrêmement différent pour la Grande Bretagne

de voir le Texel et l'embouchure du Rhin et de la Meuse soumis aux Douanes Françaises, ou de les voir soumis à celles des Hollandois. Ainsi donc sans la restitution de Ses Colonies la Holland deviendrait forcément une Province de l'Empire François, car en acceptant la Couronne de Hollande, le Prince Louis a déclaré formellement son intention d'y renoncer, si les Colonies Hollandoises n'étoient restituées à la Paix générale.

Que le Hanovre devienne en outre une Province de la France, que Trieste, Fiume et leur territoire deviennent également des Provinces du Royaume d'Italie, et que la Grande Bretagne garde en compensation le Cap, Surinam, Malta, et Pondicherry, &c. La France y consentira et le grand principe d'*uti possidetis* sera appliqué dans toute son étendue pour le présent et à l'avenir.

Que le Nouveau Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté Britannique trouve dans l'histoire du Monde une Négociation terminée d'après l'*uti possidetis* entre deux grands Peuples ?

Qu'il examine si l'*uti possidetis* n'appartient pas plutôt à une Armistice qu'à une Paix ?

Il est impossible de ne pas dire qu'en proposant à la France l'*uti possidetis*, surtout dans les circonstances actuelles, on a dû s'être formé une étrange idée du Caractère de l'Empereur Napoleon, et qu'il faut qu'on l'ait cru réduit à un singulier état d'abaissement et de détresse.

Mais

Mais en demandant *Uti possidetis*, Son Excellence le Comte de Lauderdale, Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté Britannique, sans avoir égard au principe qu'il avance, veut cependant changer le destin d'un Etat Continental tout entier, lequel fournissoit vingt cinq mille hommes à l'Angleterre, et lui a fourni une partie des moyens qu'elle montra, dans la guerre de Sept Ans et même dans la guerre de la Revolution Françoisé, aux Armées du Nord. Ainsi donc on veut *Uti possidetis* pour ôter à la France tout son Commerce, tous ses Etablissmens, et ruiner ses Alliés ; mais on veut violer le principe de *Uti possidetis* pour obliger la France à renoncer à ses engagements, à rompre ses Traités, à dissoudre enfin tout son Système Continental ! N'est ce pas proposer une paix mille fois plus désastreuse que la plus longue guerre et des conditions capables d'exciter l'indignation de tous les François ! Quoi ! La France auroit vaincu toutes les Puissances soldées par l'Angleterre pendant la durée de Trois Coalitions, pour se voir imposer des conditions aussi injustes que deshonorantes, malgré la moderation et la générosité qu'elle a montrées.

Son Excellence Monsieur Fox a proposé lui même que " la Paix fût honorable pour les deux Cours " et pour leurs Alliés respectifs."

Sa Majesté l'Empereur des François Roi d'Italie, ne pourroit regarder la Paix comme honorable, si par un de ses conditions il devoit perdre un seul de Ses Sujets, et quelque peu importante que

puisse être la Colonie de Tabago, il suffit qu'elle ait fait partie de l'Empire François au moment où Sa Majesté a pris les rênes de Gouvernement, pour qu'Elle ne signe jamais un Traité où l'alienation de cette Colonie ou de toute autre qui Lui appartient de la même manière, seroit comprise, Aucun Anglois raisonnable n'a pu se flatter du contraire, et dans sa position, Sa Majesté perdrait, si Elle y consentoit, l'estime de tout ce qu'il y a de brave et de généreux même chez ses Ennemis.

Le Souffigné est chargé de déclarer que Sa Majesté l'Empereur et Roi estime à deshonneur la seule idée d'une Négociation basée sur l'*uti possidetis* Elle est d'autant plus contraire à ses principes que Sa Majesté a restitué ses conquêtes, et qu' Elle regneroit aujourd'hui sur une population double de celle qui lui est soumise, si lors des Paix qu'Elle a faites à l'expiration des diverses Coalitions elle avoit pris pour unique principe l'*uti possidetis*.

Le Souffigné est également chargé de déclarer, que les seules bases de Négociation que Sa Majesté l'Empereur et Roi veuille adopter, sont celles proposées en partie par Son Excellence Monsieur Fox, contenues dans la lettre qui lui a été adressée le 2 Juin, par le Ministre des Relations Extérieures, et rappelée dans le douzième Paragraphe de la présente Note.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur des François Roi d'Italie, n'exige de la Grande Bretagne rien qui soit contraire aux intérêts de Ses Alliés. Elle doit s'attendre

s'attendre qu'on n'exigera d'Elle-même rien de contraire aux interets de Ses propres Alliés.

Le Souffigné est chargé d'ajouter qu'il se réfère à tout ce qui avoit été préparé par les efforts mutuels de Son Excellence le Comte de Yarmouth et du Souffigné.

Si la Paix ne se retablit pas, ce n'est pas la France qui pourra être accusée d'avoir changé, mais l'Angleterre; quoique la Paix entre la France et la Russie, et d'autres événemens défavorables à la Grande Bretagne ayent eu lieu depuis que la Négociation a été entamée et presque amenée à la Conclusion, de concert avec Son Excellence le Comte de Yarmouth.

Le Souffigné fait cette occasion d'affurer Leurs Excellences les Comtes de Lauderdale et Yarmouth de sa haute Considération,

(Signé) CLARKE.

(Translation.)

Paris, August 8th, 1806.

THE Underfigned Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, has laid before his Government the Note transmitted Yesterday by his Excellency Lord Lauderdale, Plenipotentiary from His Britannic Majesty.

His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, could not see without Pain, that a Negotiation which has already been the Subject of so

much Discussion, which has occasioned the dispatching of so many Messengers by both Parties, which was in a Word already brought to Maturity, should have suddenly taken a retrograde Direction, so as to present Obstacles founded, not in the Nature of the Stipulations, but on the very Ground on which that Negotiation was commenced.

The Court of France has constantly refused to admit in the same Negotiation, the Courts of England and Russia, and whatever Desire His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, may have, to see a general Peace shortly re-established, no Consideration could induce him to violate that Principle of his Policy. The Negotiations which France had commenced at Petersburgh, had moreover convinced His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, that the English Cabinet deceived itself with respect to the Nature of its Relations with Russia.

After several Months of Discussion, the Cabinet of London yielded this Point, and his Excellency the Earl of Yarmouth arrived publicly at Calais, and afterwards at Paris, for the Purpose of treating for Peace. He had Conferences with his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs immediately after his Arrival in this Capital, having previously made known to him that he was duly authorized by his Government.

Since that Period, Russia has concluded her Peace with France. The Undersigned has been appointed

pointed Minister Plenipotentiary to negotiate with the Plenipotentiary of His Britannick Majesty, and the first Step was an Exchange of his Powers with those of his Excellency the Earl of Yarmouth, whom he was bound to believe, as is expressed in his Excellency's Full Powers, authorized to negotiate, conclude, and sign a Definitive Treaty between France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

Very frequent Conferences, most of them of several Hours, have since taken place between the Two Plenipotentiaries, who, with good Faith on both Sides, endeavoured to do away the Difficulties, and put aside every Thing that could have tended to irritate their Minds, or to embarrass and unnecessarily retard the Progress of the Negotiation.

Instead of transmitting to each other Notes, more or less ingenuous, but which rather remove than approximate the Object which it is wished to attain; instead of beginning those written Controversies, which are not less injurious to Humanity than open Hostilities, and which prolong the Miseries of Nations; instead, above all Things, of negotiating Peace in the same Manner in which War is carried on, the Plenipotentiaries had free Conferences, in which His Majesty the Emperor and King granted all which he could grant, without losing Sight of the Dignity of his Crown, his Love for his People, and the Interest of his Allies.

His Majesty will never be reduced to make further Sacrifices.

Does

Does not the Method taken by his Excellency the Earl of Lauderdale, the new Plenipotentiary on the Part of His Britannick Majesty, appear to announce that a Multitude of Notes will not be sufficient even to bring the Governments to an Understanding? And is not a Risk evidently incurred, by adopting such a Method, the Abuse of which has been so manifest in our Recollection, of being still further from a good Understanding than we have hitherto been? If, on the contrary, it is only wished to form Documents which may hereafter be presented to the Parliament of Great Britain, His Majesty the Emperor and King has no similar Inducement, it is Peace that he desires; a Peace equally honourable for France, for Great Britain, and for their Allies, which the mutual and assiduous Labour of the respective Plenipotentiaries shall have rendered acceptable to both Governments.

Nevertheless, that his Love of Justice, and the Sincerity of his pacifick Sentiments may be manifest to every one, and that it may be truly known, to whom all Hindrance to the Progress of the Negotiation ought to be attributed, His Majesty the Emperor of the French has deigned to permit the Undersigned to discuss here the vain Question relative to the Basis of this Negotiation, which was already advanced and on the Point of being terminated.

In the Letter written to his Excellency Mr. Fox, on the 1st of April, by his Excellency the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, that Minister declared that

that His Majesty the Emperor of the French entirely adopted the Principle set forth in the Dispatch of his Excellency Mr. Fox, of the 26th March, and offered as the Basis of the Negotiation: "That the proposed Peace ought to be
 "honourable for the Two Courts, and for their
 "respective Allies."

In his Letter of the 2d June to his Excellency Mr. Fox, his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs went still further; he proposed in the Name of His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, to establish as a Basis two fundamental Principles, the First of them taken from Mr. Fox's Letter of the 26th March, namely:
 "That the Object of the two Powers should be
 "a Peace Honourable to themselves, and to their
 "respective Allies, at the same Time that this
 "Peace should be of a Nature to insure as far as
 "should lie in their Power, the future Tranquillity
 "of Europe."

The Second Principle was, "An Acknowledgement in favour of both Powers of the Right of
 "Interference and of Guarantee with regard to
 "Continental Affairs, and with regard to Maritime
 "Affairs."

Such was the Basis adopted by the British Government, and agreed upon with it. It could never have entered into the Mind of His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, to take the "*uti possidetis*" as the Basis of the Negotiation, If such had been his Intention, he would
 have

have kept Moravia, a Part of Hungary, Styria, Carniola, Croatia, the whole of Austria, as well as its Capital—Trieste, and Fiume, and the surrounding Coast would still be in his Power, as well as Genoa and Venice. Hanover, Osnaburgh, and all the Mouths of the Great Rivers of the North of Germany would be subject to his Dominion; and, doubtless, His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, might then, without Difficulty, have left his Britannick Majesty in Possession of the Cape, Surinam, Tobago, St. Lucia, Pondicherry, &c.

As to Sicily, in this very Supposition His Majesty the Emperor and King would not have left it to his Enemies; but His Majesty would only have thought that the Conquest of this Island should have preceded the Opening of the Negotiations; and while Prussia and Russia have either guaranteed or recognized the Changes which have taken place in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, is it to be supposed that England could have prevented the Conquest of Sicily, which is separated from the Continent only by a Channel of less than Two Thousand Toises?

And even supposing that the Cape, Surinam, and other Dutch Possessions could have been finally detached from the Kingdom of Holland, is it not certain that its Existence as a Nation would become from that very Cause impossible; and that its Incorporation with the French Empire would have been

been the necessary Consequence of a Refusal given by England to restore to it its Colonies? What, in fact, could be the Means of maintaining a Nation which would have nothing but Debts, and from which the total Deprivation of all Commerce would take away the Possibility of paying them? Whatever their Excellencies the Plenipotentiaries of His Britannick Majesty may alledge, it is impossible that they should not be convinced, that it is a very different Thing for Great Britain, to see the Texel and the Mouths of the Rhine and of the Meuse in the Power of the French Revenue Officers, or to see them in the Power of the Dutch. Thus, therefore, Holland, without the Restitution of its Colonies, would necessarily become a Province of the French Empire; for, on accepting the Crown of Holland, Prince Lewis formally declared his Intention of renouncing it, if the Dutch Colonies were not restored at the general Peace.

Let Hanover become a Province of France; let Trieste, Fiume, and their Territory likewise become Provinces of the Kingdom of Italy, and let Great Britain keep as a Compensation, the Cape, Surinam, Malta, and Pondicherry, &c. France will consent to it, and the great Principle *uti possidetis* will be applied in its full Extent, both as to the present and as to the future.

Let the new Minister Plenipotentiary of His Britannick Majesty, point out in the History of the World, a Negotiation terminated upon the Principle of the *uti possidetis* between two great Nations:

Let

Let him examine whether this Principle does not belong rather to an Armistice than to a Treaty of Peace? It is impossible not to say, that, in proposing to France the *uti possidetis*, particularly under the present Circumstances, a strange Idea must have been formed of the Character of the Emperor Napoleon, and it must have been believed that he was reduced to a singular State of Humiliation and Distress.

But, in demanding the *uti possidetis*, his Excellency, the Earl of Lauderdale, Plenipotentiary from His Britannick Majesty, without regard to the Principle which he advances, wishes to change entirely the Destiny of a continental State, which gave 25,000 Men to England, and furnished her with a Part of the Means which she afforded in the Seven Years War, and even in the War of the French Revolution, to the Armies of the North. Thus, therefore, it is wished to maintain the Principle of the *uti possidetis*, in order to deprive France of all her Commerce, and of all her Establishments; and to ruin her Allies; but it is wished to violate the Principle of the *uti possidetis*, in order to oblige France to renounce her Engagements, to break her Treaties; in a Word, to dissolve her whole continental System! Is not this to propose a Peace a thousand Times more disastrous than the longest War, and Conditions calculated to excite the Indignation of every Frenchman? What! shall France have conquered all the Powers subsidized by England during three Coalitions, to see imposed upon her

her Conditions as unjust as they are dishonourable, notwithstanding the Moderation and Generosity which she has shewn ?

His Excellency Mr. Fox himself proposed, that
 “ the Peace should be honourable to both Courts,
 “ and to their respective Allies.”

His Majesty, the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, could not consider the Peace as honourable, if, by One of its Conditions, he was to lose a single Subject, and of however little Importance the Colony of Tobago may be, it suffices, that it made Part of the French Empire at the Time His Majesty took the Reins of the Government, to prevent his ever signing a Treaty in which the Alienation of that Colony, or of any other which belongs to him in the same Manner, shall be comprized. No reasonable Englishman can have flattered himself with the contrary ; and His Majesty, in the Position in which he stands, would, by consenting to it, lose the Esteem of every brave and generous Person, even among his Enemies.

The Undersigned is directed to declare, that His Majesty the Emperor and King considers as a Disgrace the very Idea of a Negotiation, founded on the *uti possidetis*. It is the more contrary to his Principles, inasmuch as his Majesty has restored his Conquests, and that he should be now reigning over a Population the Double of that which he in fact governs, if, at the Conclusion of the Treaties of Peace which he made at the Expiration of the
 3 several

several Coalitions, he had taken the *uti possidetis* for his only Principle.

The Undersigned is also directed to declare, that the only Conditions of Negotiation which His Majesty the Emperor and King is willing to adopt, are those proposed in Part by His Excellency Mr. Fox, contained in the Letter which was addressed to him on the 2d of June by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and repeated in the Twelfth Paragraph of the present Note.

His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, requires nothing of Great Britain which can be contrary to the Interests of her Allies. He is entitled to expect that nothing will be exacted of him, which can be contrary to the Interests of his own Allies.

The Undersigned is directed to add, that he refers to what had been prepared by the mutual Efforts of his Excellency the Earl of Yarmouth, and the Undersigned.

If Peace shall not be re-established, it is not France who can be accused of having changed, but England: although Peace between France and Russia, and other Events unfavourable to Great Britain have taken place since the Negotiation was entered upon and nearly brought to a Conclusion, in Concert with his Excellency the Earl of Yarmouth.

The

The Underigned avails himself of this Opportunity to assure their Excellencies the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth of his high Consideration.

(Signed) CLARKE.

Fifth Inclosure (E.)

COPY of a Note from the Earl of Lauderdale and Yarmouth to General Clarke, dated August 9, 1806.

Paris, le 9 Août 1806.

LES Souffignés Plénipotentiaires de Sa Majesté Britannique ne croient pas devoir se permettre d'entrer dans une Considération détaillée de la Note officielle qui vient de leur être remise de la part de Son Excellence le General Clarke en date du 8 Août. D'après la Manière dont les différens Points qui font le Sujet de cette Note y sont traités, il leur seroit impossible de les discuter avec ce Calme, et avec cet égard aux convenances qu'exige le Caractère dont ils sont revêtus de la part de leur Souverain; mais le Sujet de cette Note est d'une Nature si générale, et si étrangère à l'Objet immédiatement en question, qu'il seroit parfaitement inuile de le prendre en Considération dans le Moment actuel.

Le Souffigné Comte de Lauderdale, loin de penser que la manière de discuter par écrit les Points fondamentaux d'une Négociation puisse aug-

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menter

menter en aucune Façon la Difficulté de s'entendre, troit, au contraire, appercevoir déjà des Preuves manifestes de son Utilité, en ce que la Note officielle, présentée par lui depuis son Arrivée, a amené la Négociation à un issu non equivoque, et a mis fin aux mal-entendus, sans doute réels, qui ont eu lieu, et qui n'auroient jamais pu exister, si la même Methode avoit été adoptée dès le Commencement de la Négociation.

Le Souffigné Comte de Yarmouth, se voit obligé de revenir sur la manière dont il a été donné à entendre, qu'il ait débarqué à Calais revêtu d'un Caractère public pour traiter de la Paix. Il n'est venu que pour rendre en Personne, et de *vive voix*, la Réponse à une communication qu'il avoit été prié de faire au Gouvernement Anglois, fondée sur la Base de l'*uti possidetis*, d'après les Paroles suivantes de Son Excellence Monsieur de Talleyrand " Nous " ne vous demandons rien ;" accompagnées d'Assurances positives que la Réstitution des Possessions Allemandes de Sa Majesté n'éprouveroit aucun Résistance. Le même Sentiment se trouve également exprimé dans la Lettre de Monsieur de Talleyrand à Monsieur Fox, en date du 1 Avril : " l'Empereur n'a rien à désirer de ce que possède " l'Angleterre."

Le Comte de Yarmouth se croit également obligé de ne pas passer sous Silence les Remarques faites par Son Excellence le Général Clarke au sujet des délais dans la Négociation, et de la fréquente Communication par Couriers. Les Réponses de Sa
Majesté

Majesté Britannique ont toujours été franches et promptes, et si le Nombre des Couriers a été considérable, il ne peut être attribué qu' à des Motifs étrangers à Sa Majesté.

Les Souffignés Comtes de Lauderdale et de Yarmouth, ne peuvent aucunement souscrire à l'Opinion énoncée par Son Excellence le Général Clarke dans la dite Note, que la Négociation " ait été entamée, et presque amenée à sa Conclusion" dans l'Intervalle qui s'est écoulé entre l'Époque de la Connoissance officielle donnée par le Comte de Yarmouth de ses Pleins-Pouvoirs, et l'Arrivée du Comte de Lauderdale : au contraire ils regardent cette Négociation comme ayant à peine commencé. Les Conversations auxquelles on a fait Allusion ont consisté de la part les Plénipotentiaires François à faire des Demandes, que le Souffigné Comte de Yarmouth a uniformément déclaré être inadmissibles ; et de la part de Lord Yarmouth à se retrancher dans les Bornes de l'*uti possidetis*, comme n'ayant aucune Instruction de la Part de son Gouvernement pour admettre d'autres Bases de la Négociation ; Bases suggérées par la France, dans la Communication faite par le Comte de Yarmouth et précédemment annoncées dans la Lettre de Monsieur de Talleyrand du 1 Avril.

Les Souffignés Comtes de Lauderdale et de Yarmouth, croient inutile de répéter ici les Motifs énoncés dans la Note officielle, présentée par le Comte de Lauderdale, et qui ont fait regarder par

Sa Majesté la Base de l'*uti possidetis*, proposée par la France, comme susceptible d'une Application particulière à l'Etat respectif des deux Pays. C'est pour eux un profond Sujet de regret, que par l'Abandon absolu, et d'une manière aussi prononcée, de cette Base, de la part du Gouvernement François, l'Attente et les Espérances des deux Peuples se voyent entièrement frustrées.

Il ne reste aux Comtes de Lauderdale et de Yarmouth qu' à déclarer, que Sa Majesté toujours prête à écouter des Conditions de Paix justes et honorables, se repose avec Confiance sur les Moyens que lui fournissent la Loyauté et l'Affection de ses Sujets : Elle ne se prêtera jamais à des Propositions quelconques de négocier sur des Bases incompatibles avec l'Honneur de Sa Couronne, et les véritables Intérêts de ses Sujets.

(Signé) LAUDERDALE.
YARMOUTH.

(Translation.)

Paris, 9th August 1806.

THE Undersigned Plenipotentiaries of His Britannick Majesty cannot allow themselves to enter into a detailed Consideration of the Official Note, dated the 8th August, which has just been delivered to them on the Part of His Excellency General Clarke. From the Manner in which the
different

different Points which form the Subject of this Note are treated, it would be impossible for them to discuss them with that Calmness and that Regard to Propriety, which the Character with which their Sovereign has invested them, demands. But the Subject of this Note is of a Nature, so general and so foreign to the Object under Discussion, that it would be perfectly useless to take it into Consideration at the present Moment.

The Underfigned the Earl of Lauderdale, far from thinking that the Manner of discussing in Writing the fundamental Points of a Negotiation can in any Shape increase the Difficulty of coming to an Understanding, is on the contrary of Opinion that he already perceives evident Proofs of its Utility, in as much as the official Note presented by him since his Arrival has brought the Negotiation to an unequivocal Issue, and has put an End to those Misunderstandings, without doubt real, which have taken place, and which never could have occurred if the same Method had been adopted at the Commencement of the Negotiation.

The Underfigned the Earl of Yarmouth finds himself compelled to recur to the Manner in which it has been stated to him, that he landed at Calais invested with a publick Character to treat for Peace. He only came to give in Person and *viva voce*, the Answer to a Communication that he had been requested to make to the English Government, founded upon the Basis of the *uti possidetis*, in

Conformity with the following Words of His Excellency M. Talleyrand : “ We ask nothing from “ you ;” accompanied with positive Assurances that the Restitution of the Possessions of His Majesty in Germany would meet with no Opposition. The same Sentiment also recurs in the Letter from M. Talleyrand to Mr. Fox of the First of April in these Terms : “ The Emperor covets nothing that “ England possesses.”

The Earl of Yarmouth feels himself under an equal Necessity of not passing over in Silence the Remarks made by his Excellency General Clarke, on the Subject of the Delays of the Negotiation and of the frequent Communication by Messengers, The Answers of His Britannick Majesty have ever been frank and prompt ; and if the Number of Messengers has been considerable, it can only be attributed to Motives foreign to the Wishes of His Majesty,

The Underigned the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth, can by no Means subscribe to the Opinion held out by his Excellency General Clarke in the said Note, that the Negotiation “ had “ been begun and nearly brought to a Conclusion” in the Interval which elapsed between the Time when Lord Yarmouth officially communicated his Full Powers, and the Arrival of Lord Lauderdale ; on the contrary, they consider the Negotiation as having scarcely commenced. The Conversations to which Allusion has been made, consisted, on the

Part

Part of the French Plenipotentiaries, in making Demands which the Underfigned the Earl of Yarmouth has uniformly declared to be inadmissible ; and on the Part of Lord Yarmouth in keeping strictly within the bounds of the *uti possidetis*, not having any Instructions on the Part of his Government to admit any other Conditions of Negotiation ; Conditions suggested by France in the Communication made by the Earl of Yarmouth, and previously announced in M. Talleyrand's Letter of the 1st of April.

The Underfigned Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth think it unnecessary in this place to repeat the Motives set forth in the official Note presented by Lord Lauderdale, and which induced His Majesty to consider the Basis of the *uti possidetis* proposed by France peculiarly applicable to the respective Situation of the Two Countries. It is to them a Subject of deep regret that, by so absolute and decided a Departure from that Basis on the Part of the French Government, the Hopes and Expectations of the Two Nations must be entirely frustrated.

It only remains for the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth to declare, that His Majesty, ever ready to listen to just and honourable Conditions of Peace, relies with Confidence upon the Means which He derives from the Loyalty and Affection of His Subjects. He will never listen to any Proposals of Negotiation whatsoever upon Terms incompatible

compatible with the Honour of His Crown and the
real Interests of His Subjects.

(Signed) LAUDERDALE,
YARMOUTH.

Sixth Inclosure (F.)

COPY of a Note from the Earls of Lauder-
dale and Yarmouth to M. Talleyrand,
dated August 9th, 1806.

Paris le 9 Aout, 1806,
6 heures et demi P. M.

LES Prétentions mises en avant par le Gouverne-
ment François dans la Note officielle de Son
Excellence Le General Clarke, si incompatibles
avec la Base proposée d'abord par le même Gou-
vernement, ne nous laissant d'autre alternative que
celle de retourner auprès de notre Gouvernement,
Nous avons l'honneur de prier Votre Excellence de
vouloir bien nous faire expédier les Passeports né-
cessaires pour Nous et notre Suite.

Nous profitons de cette occasion pour rénou-
veller à Votre Excellence les Assurances de la haute
Considération avec laquelle, &c.

(Signé) LAUDERDALE,
YARMOUTH.

(Translation.)

(Translation.)

Paris, 9th August, 1806.—
Half past Six P. M.

THE Pretensions brought forward by the French Government in the official Note of his Excellency General Clarke, so incompatible with the Basis formerly proposed by that Government, not leaving us any other Alternative than that of returning to England, we have the Honour to request your Excellency to have the Goodness to send the necessary Passports for ourselves and our Suite.

We avail ourselves of this Opportunity of renewing to your Excellency the Assurances of our high Consideration, &c.

(Signed) LAUDERDALE.
YARMOUTH.

No. 36.

EXTRACT from a Dispatch from the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated Paris, August 11th, 1806.—Received August 13th.

Sir, Paris, 11th August, 1806.

IN our last Dispatch of the 9th Instant, we had the Honour of informing you, that on that Evening we had applied for Passports to return to England, and also for a Passport for a Courier we intended to have dispatched immediately.

We

We have only now to mention that, on Sunday at Eleven o'Clock, we sent the Inclosure (marked A), renewing our Demand; and that this Morning, having received no Answer to either Application, the Inclosure, (marked B) was sent to M. Talleyrand's House, Ruë d'Anjou. The Courier Basilico, who carried the Note, returned soon after to inform us, that he was directed at M. Talleyrand's House to go to the Foreign Office where he accordingly went, but was told that no Communication would be received there till between Twelve and One.

We then begged of Mr. Goddard to go himself to the Foreign Office, and deliver the Letter; He found that the Clerks had only just arrived, and that M. Talleyrand was gone to St. Cloud, not to return till Four o'Clock.

At Half after Five we received from Messrs. Clarke and Champagny an official Note (marked C). Immediately upon the Receipt of this Note, we wrote the Inclosure (marked D) to M. Talleyrand, and received from him at Nine o'Clock an Answer (marked E), which is also inclosed.

The Inclosure (marked F) is the Reply to the official Note which we intend to send the Moment it can be copied.

Addition by the Earl of Yarmouth.

As the French Government has in every Instance admitted the Exactness of the Communications made by me, I beg Leave, in Addition to this
Dispatch,

Dispatch, to remark that the Intention expressed to me by the French Government, as that which made them prefer communicating through my Channel rather than on Paper, was the expressing to His Majesty's Government their Readiness to restore His Majesty's German Dominions *in toto*, but that for obvious Reasons this could not be expressed on Paper till every other Condition of the Treaty should be settled.

First Inclosure (A.)

COPY of a Note from the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth to M. Talleyrand, dated August 10th, 1806.

Paris, 10 Aout 1806,
11 heures A. M.

LES Comtes de Lauderdale et de Yarmouth ont l'honneur de réitérer à Son Excellence le Ministre des Relations Extérieures, la demande qu'ils ont eu l'honneur de lui faire hier à six heures et demi après midi, des passeports nécessaires pour eux et pour leur suite, ainsi que d'un passeport pour un Courier qui l'attend pour partir.

(Translation.)

(Translation.)

Paris, August 10th, 1806.—

11 o'Clock, A. M.

THE Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth have the Honour to repeat to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Demand which they had the Honour to make to his Excellency Yesterday, at Half past Six o'Clock in the Evening, of Passports necessary for them and their Suite, as well as of a Passport for a Messenger who is now waiting for it to proceed on his Journey.

Second Inclosure (B.)

COPY of a Note from the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth to M. Talleyrand, dated August 11th, 1806.

Paris, le 11 Aout 1806,

10 heures A. M.

Monfieur,

IL est de notre devoir de réitérer la demande déjà deux fois faite d'un passeport de Courier, et en même tems celle des passeports nécessaires pour notre retour en Angleterre.

Nous croyons devoir aussi remarquer à Votre Excellence que ces demandes furent faites avant-hier (Samedi) à six heures et demi du Soir ; qu'elles furent renouvelées auprès de Votre Excellence hier (Dimanche) à onze heures, et que jusqu' à present nous n'avons reçu aucune réponse à ces demandes.

Lorsque Votre Excellence se rappelle qu'il s'est
passé

passé près de 24 heures depuis que nous nous sommes adressés pour la seconde fois à Votre Excellence ; et que sans parler de nos propres passeports nous nous sommes vus privés dans l'intervalle des Moyens d'envoyer un Courier en Angleterre. Elle ne peut qu'être entièrement persuadée, que si nous nous abstenons de toute remarque sur un procédé aussi extraordinaire et aussi contraire aux usages reçus, c'est par le desir d'éviter, autant et aussi longtems qu'il sera possible, tout ce qui pouvoit occasioner de l'aigreur, et changer la nature et le ton des communications qui ont eu lieu jusqu'à present entre les deux Gouvernemens.

Nous prions Votre Excellence de vouloir bien agréer les assurances de la haute Consideration avec laquelle nous sommes.

(Signé) LAUDERDALE.
YARMOUTH.

(Translation.)

Sir,

Paris, 11th August, 1806—
10 o'Clock A. M.

IT is our Duty to repeat the Demand which we have already Twice made of a Passport for a Messenger, and of Passports for our Return to England.

We think it right also to remark to your Excellency, that these Demands were made the Day before Yesterday (Saturday) at Half past Six
in

in the Evening ; that they were renewed to your Excellency Yesterday (Sunday) at 11 o'Clock, and that to the present Moment we have not received any Answer to them.

When your Excellency recollects that near Twenty-four Hours have passed since we addressed ourselves for the Second Time to your Excellency, and that, to say nothing of our own Passports, we have been deprived in the Interval of the Means of sending a Messenger to England, you must be persuaded, that if we abstain from all Remark upon a Proceeding so extraordinary and so contrary to the established Usages, it is from a Desire to avoid as much and as long as possible, any Thing that may occasion Animosity, and change the Nature and Tone which have hitherto characterised the Communications between the Two Governments.

We request your Excellency to accept the Assurances of the high Consideration with which we remain, &c.

(Signed) LAUDERDALE.
YARMOUTH.

Third

Third Inclosure (C.)

COPY of a Note from Messrs. Champagny and Clarke to the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth, dated August 11th, 1806.

Paris, 11 Août 1806.

LES Souffignés Ministres Plénipotentiaires de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des François Roi d'Italie ont lû avec Attention la note en date du 9 Août que leur ont adressée Leurs Excellences les Plénipotentiaires de Sa Majesté le Roi du Royaume Uni de la Grande Brétagne et de l'Irlande, et dans laquelle ils proposent encore l'*uti possidetis* comme base de la negociation.

Les Plénipotentiaires François ne savent s'ils doivent penser que, de l'adoption de ce principe, il résulât pour l'Angleterre le droit d'exiger du Gouvernement François, pour elle et ses Alliés, toutes les réstitutions à sa bienfiance sans qu'elle fut tenuë à aucune réstitution envers la France et ses alliés des Conquêtes qu'elle a faites. Cette prétention seroit tellement extraordinaire qu'autant voudroit dire que la France signera toutes les conditions qu'il plaira aux Plénipotentiaires Anglois de rediger. Certes on ne peut penser que telle soit réellement l'intention du Ministère Anglois. Il n'a pas envoyé des Plénipotentiaires uniquement pour exiger l'admission d'une Base indéterminée qui les rendroit maitres de toutes les Conditions du Traité. Dans un etat de choses aussi obscur, les Plénipotentiaires François demandent

ent des explications propres à les éclairer, et à faire marcher la négociation. Elles consistent à faire connoître quelles sont les conquêtes que l'Angleterre veut garder ; quelles sont celles qu'elle veut rendre à la France et à ses Alliés, et quelles sont les Conquêtes de la France dont elle desire la restitution. Alors se développera un système de compensation, qui donnera une idée claire des principes et des intentions du Cabinet Britannique. Les Plénipotentiaires François sauront quels engagements ils contractent par l'adoption de la Bale qui leur est proposée. Et certes ils ne peuvent consentir à cette adoption sans comprendre ce qui leur est demandé.

En posant le principe de *l'uti possidetis* les Plénipotentiaires Anglois auroient ils en vûe de proposer un moyen d'échange et de compensation ? dans ce cas l'Empereur l'adopte parcequ'il le trouve conforme aux deux principes déjà consentis de part et de autre dans les Lettres du Ministre François des Relations Extérieures et du Secrétaire d'Etat du Département Anglois des Affaires Etrangères.

1. Au principe posé par M. Fox dans sa lettre du 26 Mars dernier ; “ que les deux parties
“ auront pour objet que la paix soit honorable pour
“ toutes les deux et leurs alliés respectifs, et en
“ même tems de nature à assurer autant qu'elles
“ le pourront le repos futur de l'Europe.”

2. Au principe joint au précédent par le Ministre des Relations Extérieures, dans sa lettre
du

du 2 Juin suivant, le quel consiste en une reconnaissance, en faveur de l'une et de l'autre Puissance, de tout droit d'intervention et de garantie pour les Affaires Continentales et pour les Affaires Maritimes.

Les Souffignés saisissent cette occasion de renouveler à Leurs Excellences les Plénipotentiaires de Sa Majesté le Roi du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et de l'Irlande l'Assurance de leur haute Consideration.

(Signé)

CHAMPAGNY.
CLARKE.

(Translation.)

Paris, 11th August 1806.

THE Undersigned, Ministers Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of the French King of Italy, have read with Attention the Note dated the 9th of August, addressed to them by their Excellencies the Plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the King of the United Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland, in which they again propose the *uti passidatis* as the Basis of the Negotiation.

The French Plenipotentiaries know not, whether, by the Adoption of this Principle, England would obtain the Right of exacting from the French Government for herself and her Allies, every Restitution which may suit her Convenience, without

without being bound to make any Restitution to France and her Allies of the Conquests which she has made. This Demand would be extraordinary, that it would be equivalent to saying that France should sign all the Conditions which it may please the English Plenipotentiaries to commit to Writing. One cannot suppose that such is really the Intention of the English Ministry. They have not sent over Plenipotentiaries for the sole Purpose of requiring the Admission of an indefinite Basis which would render them Masters of all the Conditions of the Treaty. In a State of Things so obscure the French Plenipotentiaries demand such Explanations as may enable them to understand, and to proceed in the Negotiation. They consist in making known what are the Conquests which England wishes to keep, what are those which she will restore to France and her Allies, and what Conquests of France she requires to be restored. This will unfold a System of Compensation, which may give a clear Idea of the Principles and Intentions of the British Cabinet. The French Plenipotentiaries will then know what Engagements they contract in adopting the Basis which is proposed to them; for they can certainly never consent to this Adoption without knowing what is demanded of them.

In laying down the Principle of *uti possidetis*, have the English Plenipotentiaries had it in View to propose a Means of Exchange and of Compensation?

tion? If, this is their Meaning the Emperor adopts it, because it appears to him conformable to the two Principles already agreed upon by both Parties, in the Letters of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs; and of the English Secretary of State for the Department of Foreign Affairs, viz.

1st, To the Principle laid down by Mr. Fox in his Letter of the 26th March last, " that the Object of both Parties ought to be that the Peace should be honourable for both, and their respective Allies; and at the same Time of a Nature to insure, as far as should be in their Power, the future Tranquillity of Europe."

2^d, To the Principle subjoined to the preceding by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his Letter of the 2d June following, which consists of *an Acknowledgement, in favour of the Two Parties, of the full Right of Intervention and of Guaranty in Continental and in Maritime Affairs.*

The Undersigned take this Opportunity of renewing to their Excellencies the Plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Assurance of their high Consideration.

(Signed) CHAMPAGNY. CLARKE.

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Fourth Enclosure (B.)

COPY of a Note from the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth to M. Talleyrand, dated August 11th, 1806.

Monfieur,

Paris le 11 Août 1806.—
6 heures et demi P.M.

NOUS recevons à l'instant une Note signée par LL. E. E. M. de Champagne et Monsieur le General Clarke, à laquelle dans toute autre Circonstance nous aurions répondu sur le champ.

Mais il est de notre devoir de remarquer en premier lieu à Votre Excellence, que depuis six heures et demi du soir, d'avant-hier nous sommes restés sans réponse à la demande d'un Passeport de Cour, ainsi qu'à celle de nos propres passeports, quoique cette demande ait été réitérée successivement, et jusqu'à trois fois, pendant cet espace de temps.

Il est de la plus haute importance, dans la position où nous sommes, d'assurer une Communication parfaitement libre et non interrompue, et aussi fréquente que nous pourrions le désirer, avec Notre Gouvernement. Nous prions donc Votre Excellence de nous satisfaire à ce Sujet, afin que nous fussions si dans tous les Cas possibles où nous jugerions à propos de demander des passeports, soit pour nous mêmes soit pour des Couriers, nous serions sûrs de les obtenir sans aucun délai.

Il nous est également nécessaire de remarquer que nous n'avons aucune réponse aux instances que

nous

nous avons faites auprès de Votre Excellence au
sujet de M. Goddard.

Nous profitons de cette occasion pour re-
nouveler à Votre Excellence les Assurances de la haute
Considération avec la quelle nous sommes.

(Signé) LAUDERDALE.
YARMOUTH.

(Translation.)

Paris, 11th August, 1836.—
Half past Six, P. M.

Sir,

WE have this Moment received a Note signed
by their Excellencies M. de Champagny and
General Clarke, to which under any other Cir-
cumstances we should have immediately replied.

But it is our Duty previously to remark to your
Excellency, that we have remained since Half past
Six o'Clock of the Evening of the Day before
Yesterday, without any Answer to our Demand of a
Passport for a Messenger or to that of our own Pas-
ports, although this Demand has been repeated
Three Times in this Interval.

It is of the highest Importance, in our present
Situation, to be certain of a Communication per-
fectly free and uninterrupted, and as constant as
we can desire, with our Government. We there-
fore entreat your Excellency to satisfy us on this
Point, in order that we may know whether, in all
the possible Cases in which we may think proper to
demand

demand Passports either for ourselves or for Messengers, we shall be sure to obtain them without Delay.

We are also under the Necessity of remarking that we have received no Answer to the Request we made to your Excellency on the Subject of Mr. Goddard.

We take this Opportunity of renewing to your Excellency the Assurances of the high Consideration with which we are, &c.

(Signed) LAUDERDALE,
YARMOUTH.

Fifth Inclosure (E.)

COPY of a Note from M. Talleyrand to the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth, dated August 11th, 1806.

Paris le 11 Août 1806.

Le Souffigné Ministre des Relations Extérieures à l'honneur d'adresser à Leurs Excellences Mylord Lauderdale et Mylord Yarmouth Ministres Plénipotentiaires de Sa Majesté le Roi d'Angleterre, le Passeport de Courier qu'elles ont demandé. Il regrette que l'interruption de travail accordée aux bureaux le jour de dimanche ne lui ait pas permis de l'envoyer plutôt. Quant à celui que leurs Excellences ont demandé pour euxmêmes, le Souffigné se flatte qu'ils donneront au retard de cette

cette expedition l'interprétation la plus naturelle et la plus propre à prévenir de leur part toute espèce de plainte. Le Souffigné ne craindra jamais la responsabilité des lenteurs qui auront pour Objet de prolonger de quelques jours, l'espoir de pacifier deux Grands États; et de faire cesser le fleau de la guerre sur les quatre parties du Monde.

Le Souffigné Ministre des Relations Extérieures, prie Leurs Excellences Messieurs les Plénipotentiaires de Sa Majesté Britannique d'agréer l'assurance de sa haute Consideration;

(Si, né)

CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND,
Prince de Benevent.

(Translation.)

Paris, 11th August, 1806.

THE Undersigned, Minister for Foreign Affairs, has the Honour to transmit to their Excellencies Lords Lauderdale and Yarmouth, Ministers Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of England, the Passport for a Messenger which they demanded. He regrets that the Relaxation from Business granted in the Offices on Sundays, should have prevented him from sending it sooner. With regard to the Passports their Excellencies have demanded for themselves, the Undersigned flatters himself that they will give to the Delay in sending them, the Interpretation the most natural and the most proper to prevent all Complaint on their Part.

The Underfigned can Over- feat the Responsibility of Delays; which have for Object to prolong, for some Days, the Hope of restoring Peace between all Two great Powers, and of putting an End to the Source of War in the Four Quarters of the World.

The Underfigned Minister for Foreign Affairs, begs their Excellencies the Plenipotentiaries of His Britannick Majesty to accept the Assurance of his high Consideration.

(Signed) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND,
Prince of Benevento.

Sixth Inclosure (F.)

COPY of a Note from the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth to Messrs. Champagny and Clarke, dated August 11th, 1806.

Paris, ce 11 Aout 11 heure
P. M. — 1806.

Les Souffignés Plenipotentiaries de Sa Majesté Britannique n'auroient pas differé la réponse à la Note du 11 Aout qui leur a été remise de la part de leurs Excellences les Plenipotentiaries du Gouvernement François; mais les demandes faites qu'ils avoient faites à Son Excellence le Ministre de l'Extérieur des Passports, même pour leurs Couriers, étant restées sans réponse, ils ont dû préalablement devoir consulter, s'ils continueroient

de la nation de leur seigneurie. Ces négociations ont été
non interrompues avec leur Gouvernement, telle
qu'elle est toujours subsistée en pareil cas chez tous
les Gouvernemens de l'Europe.

L'Explication que les Souffignés ont reçue de la
part de Son Excellence le Ministre des Relations
Extérieures, leur fait espérer que dans quelques
Circonstance que ce puisse être, un pareil retardé-
ment n'aura plus lieu.

Après avoir même pesé la note de leurs Ex-
cellences les Plénipotentiaires du Gouvernement
François, les Souffignés observent, que le Gouverne-
ment Britannique, bien loin de prétendre à "exiger
" du Gouvernement François toutes les restitutions
" à Sa bienfaisance, sans qu'il soit tenu à aucune
" restitution envers la France," n'a témoigné
d'autre désir que celui de traiter avec le Gouverne-
ment François, sur la Base qui lui a été proposée par
la France elle-même, telle qu'elle se trouve expri-
mée dans la Note de Lord Lauderdale ; savoir " de
" traiter généralement sur la base de *uti possidetis*
" qu'on devoit observer scrupuleusement, excepté
" dans le Cas du Hanovre, qu'on se propoisoit de
" céder à Sa Majesté Britannique en entier."

Quand même il seroit possible de se méprendre
sur les résultats à tirer nécessairement de ce prin-
cipe, les discussions de vive voix qui eurent lieu
le 9 du Courant entre les Plénipotentiaires Fran-
çois et les Souffignés, ne permettoient pas de douter
que la proposition ainsi énoncée n'eut été par-
faitement

faitement entenduë par ces Plénipotentiaires. En conséquence les Souffignés n'ont qu'à répéter, que d'après les instructions de leur Gouvernement, ils ne peuvent faire autrement qu'insister sur ce que ce principe soit préalablement reconnu. Ce n'est qu'à cette Condition qu'il leur est permis de continuer la Négociation.

Dès qu'on fera d'accord sur ce principe, les Souffignés seront prêts à entâmer la discussion des autres points indiqués dans la Note de Lord Lauderdale.

Il ne reste aux Souffignés qu'à ajouter, que si le Gouvernement François témoigne la disposition d'adhérer à la proposition, telle que Sa Majesté Britannique la suppose avoir été faite par le Gouvernement François, ils s'en féliciteront, comme d'un évènement des plus fortunés; évènement qui promet (d'après le Sentiment de M, Fox cité par leurs Excellences) "une paix honorable pour les deux Nations, et en même tems de Nature à affurer le repos futur de l'Europe."

(Signé) LAUDERDALE,
YARMOUTH.

(Translation)

(Translation.)
 Paris, 11th August 1866.
 11 o'Clock P.M. 1866

THE Underfigned Plenipotentiaries of His Britannick Majesty would not have delayed their Answer to the Note of this Day's Date, addressed to them by their Excellencies the Plenipotentiaries of the French Government; but as their reiterated Demands to His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs for Passports, even for their Messenger, remained unanswered, they thought it right first to ascertain, whether they were still to enjoy an open and uninterrupted Communication with their Government, such, as in similar Cases, has always been permitted by every Government in Europe.

The Explanations which the Underfigned have received from his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, induce them to hope that a like Delay will, on no Occasion whatever, again take place.

After having maturely considered the Note of their Excellencies the Plenipotentiaries of the French Government, the Underfigned have to remark, that the British Government, far from pretending to "exact from the French Government every Re-
 "stitution which may suit their Convenience, with-
 "out being bound to make any Restitution to
 "France," never expressed any other Wish than
 that of treating with the French Government on
 the

the Basis which was proposed to them by France herself; as it is expressed in the Note of Lord Lauderdale, viz. "to treat generally upon the Basis of *uti possidetis*, which was to be scrupulously observed, except in the Case of Hanover, which was proposed to be ceded to His Britannick Majesty with all its Dependencies."

They must also observe, that if it were possible to mistake the Result which would necessarily follow from this Principle, the verbal Discussions which took place on the 9th Instant, between the French Plenipotentiaries and the Underigned, leave no Room for Doubt, whether the Proposition thus laid down was perfectly understood by those Plenipotentiaries.

The Underigned have therefore only to repeat, that they cannot, consistently with the Instructions of their Government, do otherwise than insist upon the previous Recognition of this Principle. It is on this Condition alone that they are authorized to continue the Negotiation.

As soon as this Principle shall be agreed to, the Underigned will be ready to proceed to the Discussion of the other Points mentioned in the Note of Lord Lauderdale.

It only remains for the Underigned to add, that if the French Government expresses a Disposition to adhere to the Proposal, such as His Britannick Majesty understands it to have been made by them, they shall congratulate themselves as on a most fortunate Event; an Event which promises (ac-
cording

according to the Expression of Mr. Fox, quoted by
their Excellencies,) "a Peace honourable for the
two Nations; and at the same Time of a Nature
to insure the future Tranquillity of Europe."
(Signed) LAUDERDALE,
YARMOUTH.

No. 37.

EXTRACT from a Dispatch from Mr. Secretary Fox to the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth, dated Downing-Street, August 14th, 1806.

My Lords, Downing-Street, August 14th 1806.

THE Messenger, Basilico, arrived here early this Morning, with the Dispatches with which your Lordships had charged him; and, although it appears most probable, that, before he can again reach Paris, your Lordships will be no longer there, yet, as there is still a Possibility, from the last Note from the French Plenipotentiaries, that the Negotiation may proceed on the Basis pointed out for it by your Instructions, it has been judged proper that no Time should be lost in redischarging him, in order that you may be apprized of His Majesty's full Approbation of the Tenour of the different Notes which have been delivered on your Part since the Earl of Lauderdale's Arrival at Paris. As no other Point but that

that of the general Basis of Negotiation has yet been brought into Discussion, nothing need be added to the former Instructions, by which the Course of any further Discussions that may take place is still to be entirely guided.

No. 38.

COPY of a Dispatch from Mr. Secretary Fox to the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth, dated Downing Street, August 14th, 1806.

My Lords, Downing-Street, August 14th, 1806.

HIS Majesty's Servants have observed, from the Dispatches received this Day, that some Insinuation has been thrown out by the French Government, of a Disposition on the Part of this Country to gain some unfair Advantage by the Employment of Two Plenipotentiaries in the present Discussions. That Government has since taken the obvious Mode of counteracting this Advantage (if any such there was) by naming, on their Part also, a Second Plenipotentiary. But, the King's Government is desirous, while it adheres steadily to the Substance of those Points which are thought fit to be insisted on for the Honour and Interest of His Majesty's Crown, to leave no Pretence for Cavils as to the Form in which these Discussions are carried on. The Advantage

vantage which was to be looked to from the personal Share which the Earl of Yarmouth originally had in these Transactions, as the Bearer of the Overtures made by France, has now ceased; and, while his Lordship has, on the one Hand, properly recorded his decisive Testimony as to the Reality of these Overtures, and as to the exact Terms of Peace so offered, the French Government has, on the other Hand, not only refused to adhere to those Offers, but has expressly declared, that they never can even have entered into their thoughts. “(a) Jamais il n’a pu venir dans la pensée de Sa Majesté l’Empereur des François Roi d’Italie de prendre pour Base de la Négociation l’*uti possidetis*.”

In this State of Things, the King’s Servants are not aware of any Benefits that would be likely to result to His Majesty’s Service from imposing on Lord Yarmouth any further Duty in this Respect; nor do they wish that any such Ground for Cavil as I have before alluded to, however unfounded it would be, should be left to the Enemy.

They have, therefore, submitted it as their humble Advice to His Majesty, that, in case of the Continuance of the Negotiations, the French Minister should be informed, that they will henceforth be conducted by the Earl of Lauderdale alone,

(s) It never could have entered into the Thoughts of his Majesty the Emperor, of the French, King of Italy, to take for Basis of the Negotiation, the *uti possidetis*.

the Earl of Yarmouth having obtained His Majesty's gracious Permission to return to England; but that, His Majesty does not, on His Part, make any Objection to Lord Lauderdale's treating with both the Persons who have been named by the French Government for that Trust:—A Proof perfectly decisive, in all its Parts, that no unfair Advantage, such as the French Government appears to apprehend, can have been in the King's Contemplation.

I am, &c.

C. J. FOX.

No. 39.

COPY of a Dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated Paris, August 16th, 1806.—Received August 19th.

Sir,

Paris, 16th August 1806.

THE Note to the Plenipotentiaries of the French Government, dated the 11th, of which a Copy (marked F) was sent in my Dispatch of the 11th Instant, was delivered early in the Morning of the 12th, as you will see from the inclosed Receipt (marked A).

No Answer having been received, it was thought proper on the 14th to send to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, a Letter, of which a Copy is also inclosed (marked B).

No.

No Answer to the official Note transmitted to the Plenipotentiaries of the French Government on the Morning of the 12th, has yet been given; and General Clarke, upon whom Lord Yarmouth and I waited this Morning merely for the Purpose of shewing him a Mark of Attention, informed us, that it was in the Possession of the Emperor, who had not as yet signified his Pleasure on the Subject.

At One o'Clock we received a Note from M. Talleyrand (marked C), and nearly at the same Time another (marked D), from General Clarke. Copies of both of these are herewith transmitted.

I think it evident from what General Clarke says, that no Communication will be made for two Days.

There is perhaps nothing sufficiently important to authorize my sending a Courier. Indeed my principal Motive for doing so is to quiet the Anxiety which you naturally feel from receiving no Information for so many Days, concerning the State of a Transaction so important in its Consequences.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

(Signed) LAUDERDALE.

First Inclosure (A.)

COPY of a *Receipt*, dated August 12th,
1806.

J'AI reçu un paquet cacheté à mon adresse
et à celle de M. de Champagny Ministre de
l'Intérieur, à 7 h¹/₂, le 12 Août, 1806.

A Paris même date. (Signé) CLARKE.

(Translation.)

I HAVE received a sealed Packet, addressed to
me and to M. de Champagny Minister of the
Interior, at Half-past Seven, August 12th 1806.

Paris, 12 August. (Signed) CLARKE.

Second Inclosure (B.)

COPY of a Note from the Earls of Lauderdale
and Yarmouth to M. Talleyrand,
dated August 14th, 1806.

Monsieur,

Paris, le 14 Août, 1806,
2 heures P. M.

NOUS croyons devoir prévenir Votre Excellence
que de très bonne heure dans la matinée
du 12 du courant, nous avons transmis à Leurs
Excellences les Plénipotentiaires François une
Note en réponse à celle de Leurs Excellences
reçue le 11 du Mois. Dans cette réponse nous
nous sommes appliqués à indiquer, de nouveau,
les

les points qui nous paroissent exiger, sous une forme quelconque, une explication préalable, pour nous autoriser, en conformité avec Nos Instructions, à poursuivre la Négociation actuelle.

Le Silence de Leurs Excellences les Plénipotentiaires à cet égard nous donne lieu à présumer que dans le moment actuel nous ne devons pas nous attendre à une pareille explication de leur part.

C'est d'après cette idée que nous désirons mettre un terme à l'attente générale des deux Nations, vû le peu d'apparence, qu' il y a de la voir réalisée.

Nous sentons que la demande que nous faisons, dans de pareilles circonstances, des Passeports pour notre retour, pourroit être susceptible d'interprétations d'une nature à retarder l'heureux moment où les vues du Gouvernement François se rapprocheront d'avantage de celles qu'on Lui avoit supposées. C'est pour ôter jusqu'à la possibilité d'un pareil inconvénient, que nous croyons devoir assurer Votre Excellence, qu' une démarche quelconque, qui auroit l'effet de mettre des obstacles au renouvellement de la Négociation, seroit par là même contraire à nos intentions ; malgré que par les raisons que nous avons détaillées, nous nous voyions obligés de mettre un terme à notre Mission.

Il ne nous reste plus que d'affurer Votre Excellence, que si pour le bonheur des deux Nations il arrivoit que nous nous fussions trompés dans
 P. 2 l'induction

l'induction que nous avons tiré du silence des Plénipotentiaires François, nous attendrons pendant un temps raisonnable les explications que leurs Excellences pourroient avoir à nous communiquer.

Pour prévenir cependant la répétition d'une demande aussi pénible pour nous de faire, qu'il le seroit à Votre Excellence de la recevoir, dans le cas où les négociations n'auroient point une issue favorable, nous la prions de nous munir des Passeports nécessaires pour nous et notre suite, pour être mis en usage selon les circonstances.

Nous avons l'honneur de renouveler à Votre Excellence les Assurances de notre haute Considération.

(Signé) LAUDERDALE.
YARMOUTH.

(Translation.)

Sir,

Paris, 14th August, 1806.—
2 o'Clock, P. M.

WE think it our Duty to acquaint your Excellency, that early in the Morning of the 12th Instant, we transmitted to their Excellencies the French Plenipotentiaries, a Note in Answer to that of their Excellencies received on the 11th Instant. In this Answer, we endeavoured again to set forth the Points which appeared to us to require in some Form or other, a previous Explanation, to authorize us, in Conformity to our Instructions, to pursue the present Negotiation.

The

The Silence of their Excellencies the Plenipotentiaries in this Respect, gives us Reason to presume that we must not, at the present Moment, expect such an Explanation on their Part.

Impressed with this Idea, we desire to put an End to the general Expectation of both Nations, considering the slight Appearance there is of seeing it realized. We feel that the Demand which we make, under such Circumstances, of Passports for our Return, may be susceptible of Interpretations of a Nature to retard the happy Moment when the Views of the French Government shall approach nearer to those which it had been supposed to entertain. It is in order to prevent the Possibility of such a Misinterpretation, that we think it incumbent on us to assure your Excellency, that a Step which would have the Effect of causing any Obstacle to the Renewal of the Negotiation, would be very far from our Intention, though, from the Reasons which we have detailed, we find ourselves obliged to put an End to our Mission.

It only remains for us to assure your Excellency, that if, fortunately for both Nations, it should happen that we have been mistaken in the Inference which we have drawn from the Silence of the French Plenipotentiaries, we will wait during a reasonable Time for the Explanations which their Excellencies may have to communicate to us. In order, however, to prevent the Repetition of a Demand, as painful for us to make, as it would

be for your Excellency to receive, in case the Negotiations should not have a favourable Issue, we request you to furnish us with the necessary Passports for us and our Suit, to be made use of according to Circumstances.

We have the Honour to renew to your Excellency the Assurances of our high Consideration,

(Signed) LAUDERDALE,
YARMOUTH,

Third Inclosure (C.)

COPY of a Note from M. Talleyrand to the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth, dated August 16th, 1806.

Paris, 16 Août 1806,

LE Souffigné Ministre des Relations Extérieures s'est empressé de mettre sous les yeux de Sa Majesté la Note que Leurs Excellences Messieurs les Comtes Lauderdale et Yarmouth lui ont fait l'honneur de lui adresser le 14 courant. Aussitôt qu'il aura reçu ses ordres relativement aux objets de cette Note, il se fera un devoir d'en donner connaissance à Messieurs les Ministres Plénipotentiaires de Sa Majesté Britannique.

Le Souffigné les prie en attendant d'agréer l'assurance de sa haute Considération,

(Signé) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND,
Prince de Bénévent.

(Translation.)

(Translation.)

Paris, August 16, 1806.

THE Underfigned Minister for Foreign Affairs, hastened to lay before His Majesty, the Note which their Excellencies the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth did him the Honour to address to him on the 14th Instant. As soon as he shall have received Orders relative to the Objects of this Note, he will not fail to inform the Plenipotentiaries of his Britannick Majesty.

The Underfigned requests them, in the meanwhile, to accept the Assurance of his high Consideration.

(Signed) **CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND,**
Prince of Benevento.

Fourth Enclosure (D.)

COPY of a Note from General Clarke to the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth, dated August 16th, 1806.

Paris, le 16 Aôut 1806.

EN entrant chez M. le Prince de Bénévent, J'ai appris que Basilico étoit arrivé hier à Boulogne, Je m'empresse d'en prévenir Mylord Lauderdale. J'apprens également que Sa Majesté L'Empereur est allé chasser à Rambouillet, où il paroît que Sa

Majesté

Majesté doit passer la journée de demain. Je prie Mylord Lauderdale de faire part de ceci à Mylord Yarmouth, et d'agréer l'assurance de ma haute Consideration,

(Signé) CLARKE.

(Translation.)

Paris, 16th August, 1806.

ON going to the Prince of Benevento's I learnt that Basílico arrived Yesterday at Boulogne. I lose no Time in communicating this Circumstance to Lord Lauderdale. I learnt also, that his Majesty the Emperor is gone to hunt at Rambouillet, where his Majesty intends remaining Tomorrow.

I request Lord Lauderdale to inform Lord Yarmouth of this, and to accept the Assurance of my high Consideration.

(Signed) CLARKE,

No. 40.

COPY of a Dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated Paris, August 17th, 1806.—Received August 22d,

Sir, Paris, August 17, 1806.

I TAKE the Opportunity of Lord Yarmouth's Return to England, to inform you that in consequence of His Majesty's Pleasure signified in your Dispatch of the 14th Instant, I this Morning wrote to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, stating to him, that Lord Yarmouth had His Majesty's Permission to return to England; and that His Majesty had been graciously pleased, in the Event of the Negotiation proceeding, to confine the future Management of it solely to me.

About Eleven o'Clock, M. de Champagny and General Clarke paid me a Visit of Ceremony; Lord Yarmouth happened to be with me at the Time; and we mentioned to them the Change that had taken place, and shewed them the Note which I was just about to dispatch, and a Copy of which is enclosed.

The Object of the Visit was merely to ask the Plenipotentiaries and the Gentlemen attached to the Mission to dine with M. de Champagny To-morrow.

Nothing whatever was said that related to the Negotiation, and I believe no Answer will be given either to the Note of the 11th, or to the Note sent to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 14th, till the Emperor's Return from Rambouillet, which, they

they informed me To-day, was uncertain. The Mode in which I have mentioned to the Minister for Foreign Affairs His Majesty's Permission to Lord Yarmouth to return to England seemed to me calculated to afford as little Opportunity as possible to the French Government to cavil about a Change of Form in the Mission.

I think it proper to add, that in doing this, every Facility was afforded by Lord Yarmouth, who in the handsomest Manner desired me on this, as on other Occasions, to consider only what I thought most advantageous for the Publick Service.

I have Honour to be,

Sir, &c.

LAUDERDALE.

Inclosure in No. 40.

COPY of Note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand, dated 17th August 1806,

Paris, le 17 Août 1806.

LE Souffigné a l'honneur de prévenir Son Excellence le Ministre des Relations Extérieures, que Sa Majesté Britannique a daigné accueillir la demande du Comte de Yarmouth et lui permettre de retourner en Angleterre. D'après la teneur des Pleins-Pouvoirs du Souffigné déjà communiqués à Leurs Excellences Les Plénipotentiaires François, il

il est autorisé à traiter conjointement ou séparément avec le Gouvernement François, Et il vient de recevoir de Sa Cour des nouvelles instructions précises à cet effet, dans le cas où la réponse à la Note du 11 de ce mois seroit de nature à permettre au Souffigné de poursuivre la Négociation.

Le Souffigné à l'honneur de renouveler à Son Excellence les assurances de sa haute Considération.

(Signé) LAUDERDALE.

(Translation.)

Paris, 17th August 1806.

THE Underigned has the Honour to inform his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that His Britannick Majesty has been pleased to grant the Request of the Earl of Yarmouth, and to allow him to return to England. According to the Tenour of his Full Powers, which have been already communicated to their Excellencies the French Plenipotentiaries, the Underigned is authorized to treat jointly or separately with the French Government; and he has just received from his Court precise Instructions to that Effect, in case the Answer to the Note of the 11th Instant should be of a Nature to permit the Underigned to pursue the Negotiation.

The Underigned has the Honour of renewing to his Excellency the Assurances of his high Consideration.

(Signed) LAUDERDALE.

No. 41.

No. 41.

EXTRACT from a Dispatch from Mr. Secretary Fox to the Earl of Lauderdale, dated Downing-Street, August 23d, 1806.

My Lord, Downing-Street, August 23, 1806.

THE Contents of your last Dispatches do not appear to require any particular Answer, and this Messenger is sent back only that you may be enabled to keep us regularly informed (so long as you shall still continue at Paris) of the State of the Negotiation there.

If, on the Arrival of any Intelligence of the Decision of Russia not to ratify without the Consent of this Court, the French Government should increase their Offers in order to separate His Majesty from the Emperor of Russia, your Lordship is on all such Occasions to observe, that it is M. d'Oubril's Treaty alone that has released His Majesty from the Obligation not to separate in substance his Treaty from that of Russia; an Obligation to which His Majesty had determined scrupulously to adhere, and from which, even in Point of Form, he had departed no farther than he had learnt to be the Wish of Russia herself. Should, therefore, M. d'Oubril's Treaty not be ratified, the Two Courts would revert to their former Situation, with the additional Bond of Union which would result from the mutual Proofs they would thus have afforded to each other of their Resolution to adhere invariably to the Spirit and Principles of their Alliance.

No. 42.

No. 42.

COPY of a Dispatch from Lord Lauderdale to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated Paris, August 25th, 1806.—Received September 3d.

Sir, Paris, August 25th, 1806.

IN my Dispatch of the 16th Instant, I had the Honour of transmitting to you a Copy of a Letter sent by Lord Yarmouth and myself, on the 14th Instant, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

I have now to inform you that my Desire to combine with Firmness the utmost Degree of Forbearance that appeared to me consistent with the Character with which His Majesty has been pleased to invest me, induced me patiently to suffer the Silence of the French Government, without Remark, from the 14th till the 22d, when I transmitted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a Note, of which I have the Honour to inclose you a Copy, marked (A.)

No Notice having been taken of this Note by his Excellency, I have this Morning sent a Second Note, of which I have also the Honour to inclose a Copy, marked (B.)

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) LAUDERDALE.

The Right Honourable C. J. Fox.

First

First-Inclosure (A).

COPY of a Note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand, dated August 22d, 1806.

LE Souffigné Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté Britannique, se voit dans la nécessité de rappeler à Son Excellence le Ministre des Relations Extérieures.

1° Que dans la matinée du 12 de ce mois, une Note signée par le Souffigné et le Comte de Yarmouth, en date du 11, fut remise à Son Excellence le Général Clarke, dans la quelle les Souffignés observèrent.

“ Que le Gouvernement Britannique bien loin
 “ de prétendre à exiger, du Gouvernement Fran-
 “ cois toutes les restitutions à Sa bienfiance sans
 “ qu’il soit tenu à aucune restitution envers la
 “ France, n’a temoigné d’autre désir, que celui de
 “ traiter avec le Gouvernement Francois sur la
 “ base qui lui a été proposée par la France elle-
 “ même, telle qu’elle se trouve exprimée dans la
 “ Note de Lord Lauderdale savoir: de traiter
 “ généralement sur la base de *uti possidetis* qu’on
 “ devoit observer scrupuleusement, excepté dans
 “ le Cas du Hanovre, qu’on se proposoit de céder
 “ à Sa Majesté Britannique en entier. Que quand
 “ même il seroit possible de se méprendre sur les
 “ résultats à tirer nécessairement de ce principe,
 “ les discussions de vive voix qui eurent lieu le
 “ 9 du

“ 9 du Courant entre les Plénipotentiaires Fran-
 “ çois et les Souffignés ne permettoient pas de
 “ douter que la proposition ainsi enoncée n'eut
 “ été parfaitement entendu par ces Plenipoten-
 “ tiaires.

“ En conséquence les Souffignés n'ont qu'à
 “ répéter, que d'après les instructions de leur
 “ Gouvernement, ils ne peuvent faire autre-
 “ ment qu'insister sur ce que ce principe soit
 “ préalablement reconnu. Ce n'est qu'à cette
 “ Condition qu'il leur est permis de continuer la
 “ Négociation.”

2° Que le 14 de ce mois, le Souffigné conjointe-
 ment avec le Comte de Yarmouth, eut encore
 l'honneur de marquer par écrit à Son Excellence
 le Ministre des Relations Extérieures : “ Que le
 “ Silence de leurs Excellences les Plénipotentiaires
 “ à cet égard nous donne lieu à présumer que dans
 “ le moment actuel nous ne devons pas nous at-
 “ tendre à une pareille explication de leur part.

“ C'est d'après cette idée que nous désirons
 “ mettre un terme à l'attente générale des deux
 “ Nations, vu le peu d'apparence, qu' il y a de la
 “ voir réalisée. Nous sentons que la demande que
 “ nous faisons, dans de pareilles circonstances des
 “ Passeports pour notre retour, pourroit être sus-
 “ ceptible d'interprétations d'une nature à retarder
 “ l'heureux moment où les vues du Gouverne-
 “ ment François se rapprocheront d'avantage
 “ de celles qu'on Lui avoit supposées. C'est
 “ pour ôter jusqu' à la possibilité d'un pareil in-
 “ convenient

“ convenient que nous croyons devoir affurer
 “ Votre Excellence, qu’une démarche quelconque
 “ que, qui auroit l’effet de mettre des obstacles
 “ au renouvellement de la Négociation, seroit par
 “ là même contraire à nos intentions; malgré que
 “ par les raisons que nous avons détaillées nous
 “ nous voyions obligés de mettre un terme à notre
 “ Mission.”

Le Souffigné, en voyant tarder la réponse à ces
 communications, s’est persuadé, que ce délai pou-
 voit prévenir des dispositions favorables au progrès
 de la Négociation, et qu’il seroit enfin compensé
 par une réponse conforme à cette interprétation.
 Lors même qu’il n’en a vu arriver aucune, il a
 persévéré également dans une conduite, qui a du
 prouver incontestablement la sincérité du desir
 qu’il avoit manifesté de recevoir des explications
 qui le missent en état de poursuivre les Objets
 de Sa Mission. Mais si, des le 14 de ce mois, le
 Souffigné, conjointement avec le Comte de Yar-
 mouth, s’est vu obligé d’observer à Son Excel-
 lence le Ministre des Relations Extérieures, qu’il
 appréhendoit (d’après le Silence de Leurs Excel-
 lences les Plénipotentiaires François) qu’il ne
 seroit fait aucune réponse à ce sujet; et si à cette
 Epoque ils ont cru devoir déclarer la nécessité où
 ils étoient, en conformité avec les ordres de leur
 Souverain, de demander des Passeports pour leur
 départ, le Souffigné n’a pas besoin de remarquer
 à Son Excellence le Ministre des Relations Ex-
 térieures,

térieures, combien les nouveaux délais survenus depuis cette date, prescrivent impérieusement au Souffigné de renouveler instamment cette demande.

En même temps le Souffigné doit ajouter, que ne pouvant se persuader que dans le cas où la réponse ne dut pas être favorable, Son Excellence le Ministre des Relations Extérieures eut différé, pendant un aussi long intervalle, l'adoption de la seule alternative de l'envoi des Passeports, il ne se refuse pas entièrement même aujourd'hui à l'Espoir de voir établie de nouveau la proposition telle que les Ministres de Sa Majesté Britannique l'ont comprise avoir été faite de la part du Gouvernement François, puisque c'est ainsi seulement que l'attente des deux Nations pourra enfin être réalisée. Quand même ces espérances ne seroient point fondées, le Souffigné ne regrettera jamais un délai qui lui a fourni l'occasion de prouver, d'une manière non équivoque, le désir sincère d'une paix solide et honorable dont Sa Majesté Britannique n'a cessé d'être animée, et dont Sa Majesté a donné la meilleure preuve, en autorisant le Souffigné à traiter sur la base proposée en premier lieu par la France. C'est dans cette même vue que le Souffigné a supporté une aussi longue incertitude, sans faire à cet égard la moindre réclamation.

Aujourd'hui, en priant Son Excellence le Ministre des Relations Extérieures, de lui faire passer provisoirement, et pour être mis en usage dans les cas déjà indiqués, les Passeports nécessaires

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pour lui et pour sa Suite, le Souffigné croit avoir adopté le seul moyen de prévenir la nécessité où il pourroit autrement se trouver, s'il se voyoit forcé de renouveler cette demande, de l'accompagner de réclamations telles que l'autoriseroit le Droit des Gens et la Dignité de Son Souverain.

(Signé) LAUDERDALE.

(Translation.)

Sir, Paris, 22d August 1806.

THE Underfigned, Minister Plenipotentiary of His Britannick Majesty finds himself under the Necessity of recalling to the Attention of his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs;

First, That in the Morning of the 12th Instant, a Note, signed by the Underfigned and the Earl of Yarmouth, and dated the 11th, was transmitted to His Excellency General Clarke, in which the Underfigned observed, " The British Govern-
 " ment, far from pretending to exact from
 " the French Government every Restitution which
 " they may fait their Convenience, without being
 " bound to make any Restitution to France, never
 " expressed any other Wish than that of treating
 " with the French Government on the Basis which
 " was proposed to her by France herself; as it
 " is expressed in the Note of Lord Lauderdale,
 " viz. to treat generally upon the Basis of *uti possi-
 " detur*, which was to be scrupulously observed,
 " except

"except in the Case of Hanover, which was pro-
 "posed to be ceded to His Britannick Majesty, with
 "all its Dependencies. They must also observe,
 "that if it were possible to mistake the Result
 "which would necessarily follow from this Prin-
 "ciple, the verbal Discussions which took place on
 "the 9th Instant, between the French Plenipoten-
 "tiaries and the Underfigned, leave no Room
 "for Doubt, whether the Proposition thus laid
 "down was perfectly understood by those Plenipo-
 "tentiaries.

"The Underfigned have therefore only to
 "repeat, that they cannot, consistently with the
 "Instructions of their Government, do otherwise
 "than insist upon the previous Recognition of
 "this Principle. It is on this Condition alone
 "that they are authorized to continue the Nego-
 "tiation."

2dly, That on the 14th Instant, the Underfigned,
 together with the Earl of Yarmouth, had again the
 Honour to state in Writing to His Excellency the
 Minister for Foreign Affairs, "The Silence of
 "their Excellencies the Plenipotentiaries in this
 "Respect, gives us Reason to presume that we
 "must not, at the present Moment, expect such
 "an Explanation on their Part.

"Impressed with this Idea, we desire to put an
 "End to the general Expectation of both Nations,
 "considering the slight Appearance there is of
 "seeing it realized. We feel that the Demand

which we make, under such Circumstances, of
 Passports for our Return, may be susceptible of
 Interpretations of a Nature to retard the happy
 Moment when the Views of the French Govern-
 ment shall approach nearer to those which it had
 been supposed to entertain. It is in order to
 prevent the Possibility of such a Misinterpreta-
 tion, that we think it incumbent on us to
 assure your Excellency, that a Step which would
 have the Effect of causing any Obstacle to the
 Renewal of the Negotiation, would be very far
 from our Intention, though, from the Reasons
 which we have detailed, we find ourselves ob-
 liged to put an End to our Mission."

The Underigned, on finding that no Answer
 was made to these Communications, persuaded
 himself that this Delay might proceed from Dispo-
 sitions favourable to the Progress of the Negotia-
 tion, and that he should be at length rewarded by
 an Answer conformable to this Expectation; even
 when he found that no Answer arrived, he still
 persevered in a Conduct which must have incon-
 testably proved the Sincerity of the Desire he had
 evinced, to receive Explanations which might
 enable him to follow up the Objects of his Mission.
 But if, so early as the 14th Instant, the Under-
 signed, together with the Earl of Yarmouth, found
 himself obliged to observe to his Excellency the
 Minister for Foreign Affairs, that he feared (from
 the Silence of their Excellencies the French Pleni-
 potentiaries)

potentiaries) that no Answer would be given on the Subject; and if, at that Period, they thought it incumbent on them to declare the Necessity they were under, in pursuance of their Sovereign's Orders, of demanding Passports for their Departure, the Undersigned has no Occasion to remark to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs how imperiously the fresh Delays that have taken place since that Date, prescribe to the Undersigned the pressing Renewal of this Demand.

The Undersigned must at the same Time add, that, not being able to persuade himself, that in case an unfavourable Answer had been intended, his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs would have so long deferred the Adoption of the only Alternative, namely, the sending Passports, he does not even now give up the Hope of a Renewal of the Proposal, such as the Ministers of His Britannick Majesty understood it to have been made on the Part of the French Government, since it is thus alone that the Expectation of both Nations can at last be realized. Even if these Hopes should not be well founded, the Undersigned will never regret a Delay which has afforded him the Opportunity of manifesting in an unequivocal Manner, the sincere Desire of a solid and honourable Peace which His Majesty has never ceased to entertain, and of which His Majesty has given the most convincing Proof, in authorizing the Undersigned to negotiate on the Basis proposed in the first Instance by France. It

is with this View that the Underigned has borne so long a State of Uncertainty, without making the least Observation on the unaccountable Delay.

The Underigned, in now requesting his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs to transmit to him provisionally, and for the Purpose of being made use of in the Cases already pointed out, Passports for himself and his Suite, conceives that he has adopted the only Means for preventing the Necessity he might otherwise find himself under (if he was forced to repeat this Demand) of accompanying it by Representations, such as would be authorized by the Law of Nations, and by the Dignity of His Sovereign.

(Signed) LAUDERDALE.

Second Inclosure (B.)

COPY of a Note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand, dated August 25th, 1806.

Paris, 25 Août 1806,

LE Silence constamment maintenu par Leurs Excellences les Plénipotentiaires François, ainsi que par Son Excellence le Ministre des Relations Extérieures, après la Note officielle du Soussigné et du Comte de Yarmouth en date du 11 de ce mois; après la Lettre adressée à Son Excellence le Ministre des Relations Extérieures, en date du 14, et après la note officielle du Soussigné en date

date du 22 du courant, semble annoncer clairement que le Gouvernement François a abandonné tout desir de la Paix, sur la base que lui-même voit d'abord proposée, et que le Souffigné a uniformement déclaré être la seule et unique base sur laquelle il étoit autorisé à traiter avec ce Gouvernement.

Dans cet état des choses le Souffigné ne sauroit se flatter qu'il puisse resulter aucun avantage de son séjour prolongé à Paris; et d'un autre côté des delais ultérieurs doivent nécessairement donner lieu à croire, aux deux nations ainsi qu'à l'Europe entière, que la Paix, l'objet de leurs vœux, est sur le point d'être conclue, au moment même où tout espoir raisonnable à cet égard paroît s'être entièrement évanoui. Fortement pénétré de ce sentiment, le Souffigné se voit obligé à terminer sa Mission, en faisant à Son Excellence le Ministre des Relations Extérieures la demande formelle des Passeports nécessaires pour son retour auprès de Son Souverain.

En même tems, et d'après l'esprit de Conciliation qui a constamment caractérisé toutes ses démarches depuis son arrivée à Paris, le Souffigné, aujourd'hui même qu'il se voit obligé par les Instructions à faire la demande de ses Passeports, ne peut se résoudre à rendre impossible une communication de la part du Gouvernement François, de nature à mettre le Souffigné à même de poursuivre la Négociation, quoique d'après le silence prolongé

de ce Gouvernement, il ne puisse guères s'attendre à une issue aussi favorable.

Ce ne sera donc que dans la matinée de Mercredi prochain 27 de ce mois, que le Souffigné aura l'honneur de se rendre en personne chez Son Excellence le Ministre des Relations Extérieures, pour faire la demande formelle et définitive des Passeports nécessaires pour lui et pour sa Suite. Il ajoute seulement que les Passeports dont il fera la demande, feront pour son retour immédiat, et non des Passeports pour être mis en usage selon les circonstances, comme il les a en dernier lieu demandés.

(Signé) LAUDERDALE,

(Translation.)

Paris, 25th August, 1806,

THE Silence still maintained by their Excellencies the French Plenipotentiaries, as well as by his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, after the Official Note delivered by the Undersigned and the Earl of Yarmouth on the 11th Instant, after the Letter addressed to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 14th Instant; and after the official Note of the Undersigned dated the 22d Instant, appears clearly to announce, that the French Government has abandoned every Wish for Peace, on the Conditions which they themselves had in the first Instance proposed

proposed, and which the Undersigned has uniformly declared to be the sole Basis on which he was authorized to negotiate with that Government.

In this State of Affairs, the Undersigned cannot flatter himself with the Possibility of any Advantage resulting from the Prolongation of his Stay at Paris; he feels too that farther Delay would necessarily give to both Nations and to all Europe Reason to believe, that Peace, the Object of their Desires, is on the Point of being concluded, at the very Moment when all reasonable Hope of attaining it appears to be completely at an End.

The Undersigned, strongly impressed with this Idea, finds himself obliged to terminate his Mission, by making to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs the formal Demand of Passports for his Return into the Presence of his Sovereign.

At the same Time, and in Conformity with the Spirit of Conciliation which has constantly characterised his whole Conduct since his Arrival at Paris, the Undersigned, at the Moment when he feels himself obliged by his Instructions to demand his Passports, cannot resolve to prevent the Possibility of a Communication on the Part of the French Government, of a Nature to enable him to carry on the Negotiation, although from the continued Silence of that Government he can scarcely retain Hopes of so favourable an Issue.

It will not therefore be until the Morning of Wednesday the 27th Instant, that the Undersigned

signed will have the Honour of calling on his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, for the Purpose of making a formal and definitive Demand of the necessary Passports for himself and Suite. He has only to add, that the Passports which he proposes to demand will be for his immediate Return, and not to be made use of according to Circumstances, as he lately demanded them.

(Signed) LAUDERDALE.

No. 43.

COPY of a Dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated August 29th, 1806.—Received September 3d.

Sir, Paris, August 29, 1806.

IN my last Dispatch, dated August 25th, I had the Honour of stating to you the Detail of the Negotiation till the Afternoon of that Day. At Eleven o'Clock at Night, I received from the Plenipotentiaries of France a Note, intimating their Desire of having a Conference on the Subject of the Note written by Lord Yarmouth and myself, on the 11th of the Month. Of this, as well as of the Answer agreeing to the Proposal, I have the Honour to inclose Copies (marked A. and B.)

On the 26th, at the Hour appointed, I went to the Office of the Minister of the Interior, where I found

M, de

M. de Champagny and General Clarke, the Two Plenipotentiaries of the French Government.

The general Result of what passed, impressed me with a Conviction that the French Plenipotentiaries no longer thought of making Peace upon the Grounds on which France was understood to desire it at the Time of Lord Yarmouth's Communication; and I am confident that the Part I bore in the Discussion thoroughly satisfied them, that I was resolved firmly to adhere to the Ground which I had taken in the Note of the 11th, on which I was invited to hear their Remarks.

The Hour of Dinner terminated our Conference, a Renewal of which, on any Day I should name, was after Dinner anxiously solicited by M. de Champagny. I objected to it, as apparently unnecessary, and only calculated to protract my stay in this Country to no Purpose; but, before I left him, expressed my willingness to comply once more with the Wishes of the French Plenipotentiaries, as a farther Mark of my Anxiety to do any Thing which even they could think had a Tendency to produce that Peace, which His Majesty was so anxious to accomplish on equitable Terms; and another Meeting was fixed, to take place on Friday the 29th at Three o'Clock.

Late on the Evening of the 26th, I waited on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, for the Purpose of informing him, that, at the Request of the Plenipotentiaries of France, I had agreed to a Renewal of the Conference. He had gone to St. Cloud,

Cloud, and, as by the Minister's Absence, I had no Opportunity of explaining my Reasons for not waiting on him, for the Purpose of asking Passports, as announced in my Note of the 25th, I thought it right, early next Morning, to send a Letter, of which a Copy is inclosed (marked C.)

On the 27th, after Dinner, I had a very long Conference with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Substance of which confirmed me in the Opinion I had antecedently formed, in consequence of what passed at the Meeting with the Plenipotentiaries of France, that there is at present no Disposition to make Peace on the Terms tendered for His Majesty's Acceptance; and I am convinced you will have the same Impression, when I state to you that Mr. Talleyrând, in the Course of our Conversation, repeatedly made use of the following marked Expression: "Jamais l'Empereur ne cedera un grain de Poussière du Territoire François."

In the Course of this Conference, the Minister frequently alluded to the Situation of Hanover, and stated, that, within Eight-and-Forty Hours, its Fate must be determined for ever. He seemed much surpris'd that nothing appeared to make any Impression on me, frequently repeating, that, in getting the Cape, Malta, and His Majesty's Hanoverian Dominions, I should make a glorious Peace, and assuring me, that if this Opportunity should be lost, he did not foresee any Means by which Peace could be ever attained, as the Emperor was

was determined to make War all his Life, rather than yield any Part of the Territory of France, the Integrity of which he had sworn to maintain.

Our Conversation ended, by my assuring him, at the Time I was about to retire, that while these Sentiments continued to prevail in this Country, it was impossible Peace should be made, and that, with the Knowledge I now possessed of the Opinions entertained by the French Government, I could not acquit myself of trifling, if I should remain any longer to carry on what I must consider as a Farce.

After a full Consideration of all that has taken place, I have, therefore, this Morning, resolved to bring Things to a Point, by delivering to the Plenipotentiaries of France, the detailed Note of which I inclose a Copy, (marked D.)

I am, &c.

(Signed LAUDERDALE.

First Inclosure (A.)

COPY of a Note from Messrs. Champagny and Clarke to the Earl of Lauderdale, dated August 25th, 1806.

Paris, 25 Aout 1806.

LES Plénipotentiaires de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des François Roi d'Italie, désirent d'entretenir Son Excellence Monsieur le Comte de Lauderdale Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté Britannique sur l'Objet

L'Objet de la dernière Note* que Son Excellence leur a adressée, l'engagent à se rendre demain vers trois heures après-midi au Ministère de l'Intérieur où ils seront réunis, si toutes fois cette heure peut convenir à Son Excellence.

M. de Champagny a l'Honneur de proposer à Monsieur le Comte de Lauderdale de diner chez lui à la suite de la Conférence. Il espère que Son Excellence voudra bien amener à diner Messieurs Goddard, Stewart, et Maddison.

Les Plénipotentiaires François ont l'Honneur de renouveler à Son Excellence Monsieur le Comte de Lauderdale l'Assurance de leur haute considération.

(Signed) CHAMPAGNY.
CLARKE.

(Translation.)

Paris, 25th August 1806.

THE Plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, wishing to confer with his Excellency the Earl of Lauderdale, His Britannick Majesty's Plenipotentiary, upon the Subject of the last Note* his Excellency addressed to them, request his Lordship will call at the Office of the Minister of the Interior To-morrow about Three o'Clock in the Afternoon, where they

* Lord Lauderdale's Note of the 14th Instant. Vide page 200.

will

will meet, provided the Hour is convenient to his Excellency.

M. de Champagny has the Honour of inviting the Earl of Lauderdale to dine with him after the Conference, and hopes that his Excellency will bring with him to Dinner Messrs. Goddard, Stewart, and Maddison.

The French Plenipotentiaries have the Honour of repeating to his Excellency Lord Lauderdale the Assurances of their high Consideration.

(Signed) CHAMPAGNY.
CLARKE.

Second Incloîure (B.)

COPY of a Note from the Earl of Lauderdale to Messrs. Champagny and Clarke, dated August 25th, 1806.

Paris, 25 Août 1806.

LE Comte de Lauderdale, Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté Britannique, a l'honneur d'accuser la Reception de la Note qui vient de lui être remise de la part de leurs Excellences les Plénipotentiaires François.

Il aura l'Honneur de se rendre vers trois Heures demain au Ministère de l'Intérieur, et de diner ensuite chez Son Excellence Monsieur de Champagny. Messieurs Goddard, Stewart et Maddison auront également l'Honneur de s'y rendre pour l'Heure du diner.

(Signé) LAUDERDALE.

(Translation.)

(Translation.)

Paris, 27th August.

THE Earl of Lauderdale, Plenipotentiary from His Britannick Majesty, has the Honour to acknowledge the Receipt of the Note which their Excellencies the French Plenipotentiaries have just transmitted to him.

He will do himself the Honour of calling at the Office of the Minister of the Interior, about Three o'Clock To-morrow, and of dining afterwards with his Excellency M. de Champagny.

Messieurs Goddard, Stewart, and Maddison, will also have the Honour of dining with his Excellency.

Third Inclosure (C.)

COPY of a Note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand, dated Paris 27th August.

Paris, 27 Août.

JE me suis présenté hier au soir chez Votre Excellence pour avoir l'honneur de la voir, et pour la prévenir, que sur la demande qui m'a été faite hier, par leurs Excellences les Plénipotentiaires François, d'une nouvelle Conférence pour Vendredi prochain, 29 du mois, j'ai différé la demande des Passeports que je devois faire aujourd'hui à Votre Excellence. Leurs Excellences les Plénipotentiaires François ont paru attacher tant d'importance à mon

à mon Consentement à cet égard, que j'ai donné avec Plaisir ce nouveau Gage de l'Esprit pacifique et conciliateur qui m'a toujours dirigé, et si je n'ose me flatter à l'occasion de cette Demande de la perspective d'une heureuse Issue de la Négociation, j'aurai au moins la Satisfaction de démontrer encore de la manière la plus sensible et la moins équivoque combien mes Sentimens personnels sont d'accord à ce sujet avec ceux de mon Gouvernement, et avec quel Empressement je saisis toutes les occasions de donner, aux Personnes que cette Négociation m'a procuré l'avantage de connoître, de nouvelles marques des Sentimens distingués que je ne cesserai dans aucune Circonstance d'entretenir pour elles.

Je suis, &c.

(Signé) LAUDERDALE.

(Translation.)

Sir, Paris, August 27th 1806.

I CALLED Yesterday Evening at your Excellency's House, that I might have the Honour of seeing you, and informing you, that, in consequence of the Request which was Yesterday made to me by their Excellencies the French Plenipotentiaries, of another Conference on Friday next, the 29th Instant, I have postponed my Demand for Passports, which I intended to make this Day to your Excellency. Their Excellencies the French Plenipotentiaries

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tiaries appeared to attach so much Importance to my consenting to another Interview, that I gave with Pleasure this new Pledge of the pacifick and conciliatory Spirit by which I have ever been guided; and if I cannot flatter myself that there will result from this Demand the Prospect of a happy Issue to the Negotiation, I shall at least have the Satisfaction of having again manifested in the most unequivocal Manner, how much my personal Sentiments agree in this Respect with those of my Government, and with what Eagerness I avail myself of every Opportunity of giving to the Persons, with whom this Negotiation has procured me the Advantage of being acquainted, fresh Marks of the distinguished Sentiments which I shall never cease, under any Circumstances, to entertain towards them.

I am, &c.

(Signed) LAUDERDALE.

Fourth Inclosure (D.)

COPY of a Note from the Earl of Lauderdale to Messrs. Champagny and Clarke, dated 29th August 1806.

Paris le 29 Août 1806.

AU moment de renouer avec leurs Excellences les Plénipotentiaires François, la Conférence du 26 de ce mois, le Souffigné Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté Britannique se croit obligé de remettre
 sous

sous les yeux de leurs Excellences l'Etat de la Négocia-
 tion, tel qu'il se trouve à la Suite de la Note remise
 de la part du Souffigné et du Comte de Yarmouth le
 11^{me} du Courant ; leurs Excellences les Plénipoten-
 tiaires François verront, d'après cet Exposé, qu'au
 point où en est actuellement la Discussion, il n'est
 plus permis au Souffigné de la continuer, à moins
 que par l'Admission de l'unique bafé sur laquelle il
 est autorisé à négocier, leurs Excellences ne lui
 fournissent de nouveaux Motifs pour justifier
 une pareille détermination.

Dans la Note officielle, remise à Leurs Excel-
 lences les Plénipotentiaires François, le 12 Août, il
 leur fut observé : “ Que le Gouvernement Bri-
 tannique bien loin de pretendre à ‘ exiger du
 “ Gouvernement François toutes les restitutions à
 “ Sa bienfiance fans qu’il foit tenu à aucune resti-
 “ tution envers la France, ’ n’a temoigné d’autre
 “ defir que celui de traiter avec le Gouvernement
 “ François sur la bafé qui lui a été proposée par la
 “ France elle-même, telle qu’elle se trouve expri-
 “ mée dans la Note de Lord Lauderdale, favoir : de
 “ traiter généralement sur la bafé de *uti possidetis*
 “ qu’on devoit observer scrupuleufement, excepté
 “ dans le Cas du Hanovre, qu’on se propofoit de
 “ céder à Sa Majesté Britannique en entier.

Quand même il feroit possible de fe meprendre
 sur les resultats à tirer necessairement de ce prin-
 cipe, les discussions de vive voix qui eurent lieu
 le 9 du Courant entre les Plénipotentiaires Fran-

“ çois et les Souffignés, ne permettoient pas de
“ douter que la proposition ainsi énoncée s’est
“ été parfaitement entendue par ces Plénipoten-
“ tiaires. En conséquence les Souffignés n’ont qu’à
“ répéter, que d’après les instructions de leur
“ Gouvernement, ils ne peuvent faire autrement
“ qu’insister sur ce que ce principe soit préalable-
“ ment reconnu. Ce n’est qu’à cette Condition
“ qu’il leur est permis de continuer la Negocia-
“ tion.”

Cette Note resta sans réponse jusqu’au 13 Idu
mois que leurs Excellences les Plénipotentiaires
François marquèrent, par écrit, au Souffigné
“ Que les Plénipotentiaires de Sa Majesté l’Em-
“ pereur des François Roi d’Italie, desirant d’en-
“ tretienir Son Excellence Monsieur le Comte de
“ Lauderda Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté Rus-
“ sannique sur l’Objet de la dernière Note, que
“ Son Excellence leur a adressée, l’engagent à se
“ rendre demain vers trois heures après midi au
“ Ministère de l’Intérieur où ils seront réunis, si
“ toutes fois cette heure peut convenir à Son Ex-
“ cellence.”

Le Souffigné se dispense de faire aucune Objec-
tion sur l’Intervalle qui s’est écoulé entre l’envoi
de la Note du 11 et l’époque où on y a répondu,
ainsi que sur la Manière dont on a évité d’entrer
en matière, par écrit, sur le contenu de cette
Note, suivant l’Usage de tous les temps, et de tous

les Pays, toutes les Fois qu'il s'agit des Affaires de cette importance. Il se borne à remarquer, que lorsqu'après un aussi long délai, et à la suite d'une invitation par écrit, le Souffigné n'y est rendu, dans l'espoir de recevoir en fin la décision du Gouvernement François sur le contenu de la Note officielle du 11, la Conférence n'a pas entendu de la part de leurs Excellences les Plénipotentiaires François, qu'à engager le Souffigné à présenter le Projet détaillé d'un Traité.

Déjà dans la Note du 11 Août, le Souffigné, conjointement avec le Comte de Yarmouth, avait déclaré formellement, que, jusqu'à ce que la France eût adopté la Base, telle que le Gouvernement Britannique la croyoit avoir été proposée en premier lieu par elle, il ne lui étoit point permis d'entrer dans les détails de la Négociation. Aussi, quand même le Souffigné auroit pu s'oublier au point d'accéder à la Proposition faite dans la dernière Conférence par leurs Excellences les Plénipotentiaires François, non seulement il auroit fallu, pour cela, qu'il abandonnât les seules Conditions que ses Instructions l'autorisent à admettre, comme base de la Négociation, mais qu'il s'exposât encore à une Contradiction manifeste, en présentant d'abord l'ensemble d'un Projet de Traité, dont les détails devroient ensuite s'élucider par la Négociation même. Négociation que le Souffigné avait déclaré ne pouvoir entamer que d'après une Reconnaissance préalable de la Base en question.

Dans cet Etat des Choses le Souffigné après avoir assisté selon le désir de Leurs Excellences les Plénipotentiaires François, aux Conférences qu'elles lui ont proposées; après avoir mûrement réfléchi sur toutes les Communications qu'il a reçues de leurs Excellences, et s'être ainsi pleinement convaincu que les Vuës actuelles du Gouvernement François sont fort éloignées de celles que Sa Majesté Britannique a dû lui supposer; enfin que la Continuation de la Négociation actuelle ne pourra désormais avoir d'autre Effet que celui d'entretenir chez les deux Peuples un Espoir qui ne saura être réalisé, le Souffigné croit de son devoir de déclarer formellement à leurs Excellences les Plénipotentiaires François, la Résolution où il est, conformément aux Instructions de son Souverain, de mettre un terme à sa Mission. L'Admission par écrit de la Base si souvent mise en avant par le Souffigné pourra seule apporter du Changement à cette Détermination.

(Signé) LAUDERDALE.

(Translation.)

Paris, 29th August 1806,

THE Undersigned Plenipotentiary of His Britannick Majesty, being on the Point of renewing with their Excellencies the French Plenipotentiaries the Conference of the 26th Instant, thinks himself obliged to lay before their Excellencies the State

State of the Negotiation, such as it stood after the Note transmitted on the Part of the Underfigned and of the Earl of Yarmouth on the 10th Instant. Their Excellencies, the French Plenipotentiaries will perceive from this Statement, that the Discussion is come to a Point which will no longer permit the Underfigned to continue it, unless by the Admission of the only Basis on which he is authorized to negotiate, their Excellencies should afford him fresh Motives to justify such a Determination.

In the official Note transmitted to their Excellencies the French Plenipotentiaries on the 12th of August; it was observed to them, " That the
 " British Government, far from pretending to exact
 " from the French Government every Restitution
 " which may suit their Convenience, without being
 " bound to make any Restitution to France, never
 " expressed any other Wish than that of treating
 " with the French Government on the Basis which
 " was proposed to her by France herself; as it is
 " expressed in the Note of Lord Lauderdale, viz.
 " ' to treat generally upon the Basis of *uti possidetis*,
 " which was to be scrupulously observed,
 " except in the Case of Hanover, which was pro-
 " posed to be ceded to His Britannick Majesty,
 " with all its Dependencies.'

" That even if it were possible to mistake the Result which would necessarily follow from this Principle, the verbal Discussions which took place on the 9th Instant, between the French Plenipotentiaries and the Underfigned, leave no Room for

" Doubt, whether the Proposition thus laid down
 " was perfectly understood by those Plenipotentiaries
 " taries.
 " The Undersigned have therefore only to repeat,
 " that they cannot, consistently with the Instructions
 " tions of their Government, do otherwise than
 " insist upon the previous Recognition of this Principle
 " ciple. It is on this Condition alone that they are
 " authorized to continue the Negotiation."

This Note remained without Answer till the 25th
 of that Month, when their Excellencies the French
 Plenipotentiaries informed the Undersigned by a
 Letter, that, " the Plenipotentiaries of his Majesty
 " the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, wish-
 " ing to confer with his Excellency the Earl of
 " Lauderdale, His Britannick Majesty's Plenipoten-
 " tiary, upon the Subject of the last Note his Ex-
 " cellency addressed to them, request his Lordship
 " will call at the Office of the Minister of the In-
 " terior To-morrow about Three o'Clock in the
 " Afternoon, where they will meet, provided the
 " Hour is convenient to his Excellency."

The Undersigned forbears making any Obser-
 vations on the Length of the Interval which elapsed
 between the sending the Note of the 11th and the
 Period when it was answered; as well as on the
 Manner in which their Excellencies avoided enter-
 ing into Discussion in Writing on the Contents of
 that Note, according to the Usage of all Times,
 and of all Countries, whenever Affairs of such
 Importance are in question. He confines himself to
 remark

remark that, when, after so long a Delay, and the Undersigned accepted an Invitation from their Excellencies to renew the Discussions, in the Hope of receiving at length the Decision of the French Government on the Contents of the official Note of the 11th; the Conference appeared to tend on the Part of their Excellencies the French Plenipotentiaries solely to engage the Undersigned to present the detailed Project of a Treaty.

The Undersigned, jointly with the Earl of Yarmouth, had already in the Note of the 11th Instant, formally declared, that, until France had adopted the Basis, such as the British Government understood it to have been originally proposed by her, he could not enter into a detailed Negotiation. If indeed the Undersigned could have forgot himself so far as to accede to the Proposition made at the last Conference by their Excellencies the French Plenipotentiaries, it would not only have been necessary for that Purpose, that he should have abandoned the only Conditions which his Instructions authorized him to admit, as the Basis of the Negotiation, but moreover that he should expose himself to a manifest Contradiction, in presenting at first an entire Project of a Treaty, the Details of which were to result from the Negotiation itself; a Negotiation which the Undersigned had declared that he could not enter upon till after a previous Acknowledgment of the Basis in question.

In

In this State of Things the Underigned, after having attended, conformably to the Desire of their Excellencies the French Plenipotentiaries, at the Conferences which they proposed to him; after having maturely reflected on all the Communications which he has received from their Excellencies, and thus fully convinced himself, that the present Views of the French Government are far different from those which his Britannick Majesty had a Right to expect from them; in a Word, that the Continuance of the present Negotiation can henceforth have no other Effect than that of keeping up, in both Nations, a Hope which cannot be realized, the Underigned thinks it his Duty formally to declare to their Excellencies the French Plenipotentiaries, the Resolution which he has taken, in Conformity to the Instructions of his Sovereign, to put an End to his Mission. The Admission, in Writing, of the Basis so often brought forward by the Underigned can alone occasion a Change in this Determination.

(Signed) LAUDERDALE.

EXTRACT from a Dispatch from the
 Earl of Lauderdale to Mr. Secretary
 Fox, dated Paris August 30th, 1806.
 Received September 3d.

Sir, Paris, August 30th, 1806.

WHEN I reflect on the Contents of the Dispatch
 I had the Honour of making up for you
 Yesterday, I cannot help anticipating the Surprise
 with which you must receive the Intelligence, that
 I am now under an Engagement to renew the Con-
 ference with the Plenipotentiaries of France, on
 Thursday the 4th of September.

On going Yesterday, at Three o'Clock, to the Of-
 fice of the Minister of the Interior, I confess I did
 not foresee the Possibility of any Thing occurring
 that could prevent my executing the Resolution I
 had formed, of demanding Passports this Morning,
 and of returning immediately to England. I trust
 I need scarcely assure you, that I have as strong an
 Impression as any Man can have, of the bad Con-
 sequences that may attend exhibiting any Thing
 which looks like Versatility of Conduct; and yet,
 under the Circumstances in which I found myself
 placed, I am satisfied I had no Choice, and that I
 could not refuse, with Propriety, the Solicitations
 of the French Plenipotentiaries to renew the Con-
 ference.

At the Commencement of our Interview, I per-
 ceived a Disposition to greater Cordiality than I
 had

had hitherto experienced. To M. de Champagny's Inquiry, whether they had been fortunate enough, by what they had said, to induce me to deliver the Project of a Treaty, I answered, by recalling to his Recollection, the Reasons I had formerly stated for declining such a Proceeding till the Basis that had originally been proposed was again formally recognized; and I informed him, that, in order to give them an accurate View of my Conception of the Subject, I had prepared a Note which I wished to submit to them, delivering to them the Note a Copy of which I had the Honour of inclosing in my Dispatch of August 29th.

After reading this Note, and observing in general that they did not know whether, if we should come to a particular Explanation, we might not arrive at a Conclusion coincident in its Effect with the Object I had in View, when I insisted on the general Principle, they entered into a Detail with respect to the Necessity of some immediate Determination on the Subject of Hanover, and afterwards stated their Views as to the French Possessions in the East Indies, the Dutch Colonies, St. Lucie, and Tobago; on all of which, they talked in a Style so perfectly different from any Thing I had before heard, that I should not be more surprized if, at our next Conference, they were to give them up, than I was at the Change of Tone manifested on this Occasion.

A great deal more passed in the Way of general Conversation; all of which tended to shew me, that

that, although they were still at a wide Distance from such Terms as I could accede to, they had wonderfully relaxed from the Tone they had antecedently assumed.

M. de Champagny then invited me to name a Day for returning our Conference. To this, I decidedly objected, admitting, at the same Time, that they had made Concessions in the Course of our Discussion; but adding, that they were still so far from agreeing to admit what the English Government uniformly conceived the original Proposition to have conveyed, that I could not yet indulge any Hopes of our coming to an Agreement, and should therefore feel it necessary to terminate my Mission.

M. de Champagny asked me with some Warmth, whether I wished for Peace on the Terms which I myself had stated? whether I thought myself authorized, after the Concessions they had just made, to refuse them Time to consider how much further they might go? and whether I might not reasonably entertain Hopes that, with a little Time, the Differences which appeared now to separate us might vanish?

On receiving such a Remonstrance, I thought it impossible not to agree to a Renewal of the Conference; and after some Conversation, Thursday was fixed for the Day of our Meeting.

A great deal more passed in the Way of general Conversation, all of which I have not room to relate. No. 45.

No. 45
EXTRACT from a Dispatch from Earl
 Spencer to the Earl of Lauderdale, dated
 Downing-Street, September 4th, 1806.

My Lord, Downing Street, September 4th, 1806.
I AM commanded by His Majesty to inform your
 Lordship that he is pleased to approve entirely
 the Conduct you have held in the Circumstances
 detailed in your last Dispatches, and to express His
 Majesty's Satisfaction in the good Effect which
 appears to have resulted from it.

It is proper, however, to remark, that, as the
 French Plenipotentiaries have not bound them-
 selves as yet by any written Note, nor have even
 in Conversation agreed to replace the Negotiation
 on its true Basis; the present Appearance of
 greater Facility on their Part, may probably arise
 only from their Desire of keeping your Lordship
 at Paris till the Answer from Petersburg shall
 be received; an Object which your Lordship's
 last Note had shewn them they could no longer ac-
 complish without some Departure from the Ground
 on which they have hitherto stood.

If the Russian Treaty shall not be ratified, His
 Majesty is then (as I have already observed to your
 Lordship) replaced with respect to the Emperor of
 Russia in the same Situation as before the Signa-
 ture of M. d'Oubril's Treaty; but with the addi-
 tional Tye, which the two Courts would in that
 Case

Case feel from the fresh Proofs each will have given to the other of a steady Adherence to the System of Alliance: and it will then be necessary that our Peace shall be so far made dependant on that of Russia as is pointed out in the Instructions originally given to Lord Yarmouth.

Since the above was written, we have received the important Intelligence contained in the indorsed Papers*, Copies of which I have thought it necessary to forward to you without a Moment's Delay for your Information; the Case is already provided for in this Dispatch, and in the present state of our Information on the Subject, I have nothing to add to what is above stated. A few Days will now probably put us in Possession of the further Views and Intentions of Russia, to which reference must of course be had in every succeeding Stage of the Negotiation; and as I shall lose no Time in transmitting to your Lordship such fresh Instructions as these may give rise to, so we shall be anxious to hear as soon as possible from you what Effect this Event may produce on the Disposition of the French Government.

* Intelligence of the Refusal of the Emperor of Russia to ratify M. d'Oubril's Treaty.

No. 46.

EXTRACT from a Dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated Paris, September 4th, 1806.—Received September 7th.

Sir, Paris, September 4th, 1806.

IN my last Dispatch I informed you that in consequence of the Solicitations of the Plenipotentiaries of France, urged in the Manner I there stated to you, I had consented to a Renewal of the Conference this Day at Three o'Clock.

About Half past Two I received from M. Talleyrand a Note, a Copy of which, marked A. as well as of my Answer, marked B., I now inclose.

On going to M. Talleyrand's Office, I found him just returned from St. Cloud. He began by informing me that till Yesterday they had received no certain Information from Petersburgh; but that the Courier who arrived last Night, had brought Intelligence that the Emperor had positively refused to ratify the Treaty. He stated that he had the Emperor's Orders to say that this Change of Circumstances would certainly induce him to make Peace with England on more favourable Terms than he would otherwise have at present consented to; and further to declare, that as he would find it necessary to give to his Plenipotentiaries new Instructions, so he thought it proper to communicate this to me, that

that I might write to my Court to receive also such further Instructions as they might think proper to

^{GIVE}
In answer to a Question which I asked, whether there was any Reason to expect the Arrival of any Minister to renew the Negotiation on the Part of Russia, he said that no Information on that Subject had been received. On taking Leave I assured M. Talleyrand that I should report to you the apparent Openness with which the Communication had been made, and that I should dispatch a Courier this Evening with the Information.

First Inclosure (A.)

COPY of a Note from M. Talleyrand to the Earl of Lauderdale, dated September 4th, 1806.

Paris, le 4 Septembre.

L'É-Ministre des Relations Extérieures a reçu l'Ordre de Sa Majesté L'Empereur et Roi de conférer aujourd'hui avec Son Excellence Lord Lauderdale. Il a en conséquence l'honneur de lui proposer de vouloir bien se rendre à l'Hôtel des Affaires Étrangères à deux Heures et demie. Il le prie d'agréer l'Assurance de sa haute considération.

(Translation)

(Translation.)

Paris, 4th September 1806.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has received the Orders of his Majesty the Emperor and King, to hold a Conference this Day with his Excellency Lord Lauderdale. He has therefore the Honour to propose to his Excellency to call at the Office for Foreign Affairs at Half past Two. He begs him to accept the Assurance of his high Consideration.

Second Inclosure (B.)

COPY of a Note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand, dated September 4th, 1806.

Paris, le 4 Sept, 1806.—à 2 heures P. M.

LORD Lauderdale reçoit à l'instant la Lettre en date du 4 Septembre, par laquelle Son Excellence le Ministre des Relations Extérieures propose à Lord Lauderdale une Conférence pour aujourd'hui à deux heures et demi chez Son Excellence. Cette Invitation n'a été rendue à l'Hotel de Lord Lauderdale qu'à deux heures et demi; heure proposée pour la Conférence: Mais Lord Lauderdale s'empresse de se rendre chez Son Excellence dans un quart d'heure au plus tard.

(Translation.)

(Translation.)

Paris, 4th Sept. 1806.—Half past Two, P.M.

LORD Lauderdale has this Instant received the Note dated the 4th September, by which his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes to Lord Lauderdale a Conference at his Excellency's Office this Day at Half past Two o'Clock.

This Invitation was not delivered at Lord Lauderdale's Hotel till Half past Two, the Time specified for the Conference: But Lord Lauderdale will have great Pleasure in waiting upon his Excellency in a Quarter of an Hour at farthest.

No. 47.

EXTRACT from a Dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated Paris, September 7th, 1806.—
Received September 11th.

Sir, Paris, September 7th 1806.

I Received last Night, by the Courier Parsons, the Dispatch dated the 4th September, signed by the Earl Spencer.

Though the latter Part of it is written in the Knowledge that the Emperor of Russia has refused to ratify the Treaty made by M. d'Oubril, and refers to the Instructions antecedently given me, on the Supposition that this Event should take place, I shall

delay pressing for any Renewal of the Conferences, till I shall receive further Advice from England.

I am led to this Resolution, because I wish to hear from you after you have received my Dispatch of September 4th, and, because I further think that it would be highly advantageous previously to be informed concerning the Nature of the Communication, which the Court of Petersburg intends to make to the French Government, with respect to the Basis on which His Imperial Majesty will renew the Negotiation. And it appears to me from the Note, a Copy of which you transmitted to me, that a Communication of this Sort may be daily expected.

No. 48.

EXTRACT from a Dispatch from Mr. Secretary Windham to the Earl of Lauderdale, dated Downing-Street, September 10th, 1806.

My Lord, Downing Street, 10 Sept. 1806.
YOUR Lordship's Dispatch of September 4th has not failed to engage His Majesty's most serious Attention. The Language held by M. Talleyrand appears directed to the Object of engaging His Majesty in a separate Negotiation, to the Exclusion of Russia; but the Intents both of this Country and of Europe have always been considered here as essentially connected with the Maintenance

Maintenance of the strictest Union of Councils and Measures between His Majesty and the Emperor of Russia. It was with deep Regret that His Majesty saw the apparent Violation of this Principle in the separate Treaty signed by M. d'Oubril; and He cannot but consider the steady and upright Conduct of the Emperor of Russia on that trying Occasion, as imposing on His Majesty a fresh Obligation not to separate His Interests from those of so honourable and faithful an Ally.

Your Lordship must therefore in the first Place represent to the French Government, that the Refusal to ratify M. d'Oubril's Treaty, has replaced the Two Courts in their former State of close and intimate Alliance; and that any Attempt on the Part of France to separate them, must henceforth be considered as hopeless. She can now form no Expectation that she can conclude Peace with either of them, until the Negotiation with the other shall be brought to the same Conclusion.

In reverting to this Resolution, His Majesty does not however desire to carry the Operation of this Principle at all farther than before. He has no Objection to its being understood as was expressed to Lord Yarmouth in Mr. Fox's Letter of the 26th of June, that the Two Courts shall treat separately in Form, but in Substance in Concert with each other. In this Mode of treating, the separate Interests of Great Britain and France may as before be separately discussed between them. But His Majesty

Majesty is determined, as is expressed in the same Dispatch, that He will not come to any final Agreement without the Consent of Russia; and that any Arrangement of the Points depending between Him and France, is to be considered as provisional, and subject to the case of a like Arrangement to be made by His Ally.

With respect to the separate Interests of Great Britain, His Majesty adheres to the Basis originally proposed to him by France, and on which your Lordship has so often had Occasion to insist, that of the *uti possidetis* for the Two Powers and their Allies in all Parts of the World, with the single Exception of the Restitution of Hanover, as having been originally attacked on Grounds which cannot be defended.

This is the Offer of France as originally made to His Majesty; it is the Demand on which His Majesty still thought fit to insist, when apparently abandoned by Russia; and His Majesty has no Desire of encreasing it under Circumstances, which, according to the Avowal of France herself, entitle His Majesty to expect more favourable Conditions than France has lately been inclined to accede to. The *uti possidetis* thus described, must however now of Necessity include the Kingdom of Sicily.

Every Endeavour was made in the Outset of the Negotiation to obtain the Restitution of Naples to His Sicilian Majesty; and the Grounds on which it was thought fit finally to desist from that Claim on the Part of His Majesty are detailed in the Correspondence

respondence of this Office with Lord Yarmouth and your Lordship.

But the Case of Sicily was always deemed to be widely different from that of Naples. Our actual Occupation of that Island brings it fully within the Benefit of the *uti possidetis*. And recent Events, have shewn how very distant are the Hopes of Conquest in that Quarter, which were so much relied upon in one of the Notes presented to your Lordship by the French Plenipotentiaries.

Lord Yarmouth had been uniformly instructed to insist on this Demand as a *sine qua non* Condition of all Arrangements for Peace. On the Refusal of France to accede to this Claim, his Lordship had actually, in pursuance of those Instructions, demanded his Passports, and it was not in the smallest Degree departed from or relaxed until a Desire was expressed to him by M. d'Oubril, that this Government would listen to Proposals for an Equivalent to be given for Sicily. In Compliance with the supposed Wishes of His Ally, and on that Ground alone, His Majesty consented to entertain the Consideration of such an Equivalent, but none has ever been suggested that appeared at all likely to meet the just Expectations which His Sicilian Majesty would have been entitled to form on that Head. And His Majesty has now the Satisfaction of learning, that the Sentiments of His Ally have in Fact never been different from His own on this Point; and that the Preservation of Sicily is con-

sidered

sidered in Russia, as well as in England, as a just Condition of any Peace with France. On both these Grounds, therefore, both on the Principle adopted for His own Negotiation, and on the Ground of His Determination not to separate Himself from Russia, His Majesty thinks it absolutely necessary to maintain this Point with the same Firmness which He had originally manifested respecting it.

This includes all that it is necessary to say on any Point, respecting the immediate Interests of this Country, or of any Possession hitherto known to be occupied by His Majesty's Arms.

No. 49.

COPY of a Dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Earl Spencer, dated Paris, September 18th, 1806.—Received September 22d.

My Lord, Paris, Sept. 18, 1806.

I HAD the Honour of receiving the Dispatch, signed by Mr. Secretary Windham, dated September to, late in the Evening of Friday last.

Unfortunately I had had a slight Degree of Fever for four Days preceding, and I never was more unfit than on Saturday Morning to attend to Business of such a Magnitude.

On considering the Instructions contained in the Dispatch with all the Attention I could, they appeared

peared to me to relate to two distinct Subjects: First, To the Form and Manner in which His Majesty thought proper that I should conduct the Negotiation: Secondly, To the Terms which, under the present Circumstances of the Two Countries, it is proper to ask.

To this Distinction I conceived it to be the more necessary for me to attend, because I thought it regular and proper to address what I had to say on the First Point to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, whereas the Plenipotentiaries of France, should the Government authorize them to proceed, seemed the proper Channel of Communication on the Second.

In pursuance of this Idea, I immediately wrote a Note, a Copy of which (marked A.) I inclose, addressed to M. Talleyrand, which I sent by Mr. Goddard in the Evening, as I was myself confined to bed.

On Monday, about Five o'Clock, M. Talleyrand called, and though I was very ill at the Time, I resolved to admit him. He sat upwards of Half an Hour. The Outline of his Conversation consisted in his expressing a Desire to have a full Communication with me, in his assuring me that if the Difficulties, in respect of Form, could be got over, he did not think the Objections to the Terms would be material, and that, where Peace was seriously in View, as it was with them, it figured as an Object of such Importance as to give a Disposition

position to accommodate about Conditions: In a Word, that he had little Doubt that he and I would arrange the Business.

On my Part, I stated, that I was afraid he proceeded on the Supposition that I might give Way in some of the Points in Question, which I thought it fair to assure him at once was impossible: I stated to him generally the Demands I was to make on the Part of England, which would no Way vary from the Terms we had originally understood to have been proposed; and that he must expect I would be as positive in relation to the Conditions for Russia, with which he was acquainted, as I should be with respect to any Point more peculiarly of British Interest. I then thought it right to introduce the Subject of my having no Powers from Russia, observing that, although there might be some Irregularity in this Mode of proceeding, yet that, under all the Circumstances of the present Case, it seemed unavoidable, because the Principle and Feelings of His Majesty would never permit him to think of treating, but in such a Manner as might insure to the Court of Petersburg an honourable Peace, at the Moment that Peace should be concluded between England and France; and that unless I could be allowed to state the Object of Russia, this could be hardly effected.

[He assured me that they would wave all Objections with regard to Form, and that they would be perfectly ready to hear me on the Subject of a Treaty of Peace with Russia; his Objection to my Proposal]

Proposal being founded, not on the Circumstance of my wanting Powers from Russia, but on the very unusual Proposal of concluding a Treaty, which, when signed, was only to take place in a certain Event. I mentioned to him that the same Thing had been done at Paris in 1782, when Mr. Oswald concluded a Treaty of Peace with Dr. Franklin and Mr. Adams.

During the Whole of this Conversation, I had gone even out of my Way to repeat to him the Necessity of his laying his Account with my adhering rigidly to the Terms I had detailed; and yet he left me with such Expressions as could not fail to create a Belief, that he intended to accede to my Propositions.

At the Moment he quitted me I was much better than I had been for some Days, and was in such Hopes that I was about to get well, that I undertook to write to him next Morning, Tuesday the 16th, to say whether I could appoint a Meeting in the Course of that Day. Unfortunately I had a miserably bad Night, and finding myself in the Morning totally disqualified for Exertion, I wrote to him a Note of which I now enclose a Copy (marked B.).

Your Lordship will perceive, that in this Note I pressed for an Answer in Writing, in a Manner as strong and as inoffensive as I could devise.

On the Morning of the 17th, I wrote to M. Talleyrand a short Note (marked C.) expressing my Desire that he would come to me any Time after
Three

Three o'Clock, which was hardly dispatched before I received a Letter from his Excellency, announcing the Arrival of a Courier at Boulogne, and the melancholy Account of Mr. Fox's Death. A Copy of this, together with my Answer, a Copy of which (marked D. and E.) I have the Honour of inclosing.

In the Evening I received the Inclosure (marked F.) from which your Lordship will perceive that I shall at last have a Meeting with M. Talleyrand Tomorrow at One o'Clock.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

(Signed) LAUDERDALE.

First Inclosure (A.)

COPY of a Note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand, dated September 13th, 1806.

Paris, le 13 Septembre 1806.

LE Souffigné Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté Britannique a transmis sans délai, à sa Cour, la communication qui lui fut faite par Son Excellence le ~~Ministre~~ des Relations Extérieures Jeudi 4 de ce mois; et il s'empresse maintenant de répondre à cette communication, en intimant à Son Excellence la marche que Sa Majesté a jugé à propos de lui prescrire pour sa conduite dans les circonstances actuelles.

Sa

Sa Majesté Britannique, toujours attentive au maintien des liaisons intimes, et de l'Alliance, qui subsistent entre Sa Majesté et l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, trouve naturellement, dans la conduite recente de son Illustre Allié, et dans les témoignages qu'il vient de donner de l'Intérêt qu'il prend au Bien-être de la Grande Bretagne, et au bonheur général de l'Europe, de nouveaux motifs pour ne séparer, en aucun cas, ses Intérêts de ceux de la Cour de Peterbourg.

Cependant Sa Majesté ne prétend pas porter ce principe plus loin que ne l'a déjà dû faire le Comte de Yarmouth, d'après les Instructions de Mr. Fox, dans les Communications de la Seigneurie avec le Gouvernement François. Rien n'empêche que les intérêts de la Grande Bretagne et de la France ne soient traités séparément ; seulement Sa Majesté n'autorise pas le Souffigné à signer un Traité autrement que provisoirement ; ce Traité ne devant avoir son plein effet que dans le cas où la paix se feroit entre ce fidèle Allié de la Grande Bretagne et la France : c'est à ces conditions seulement que le Souffigné est autorisé actuellement à négocier.

Le Souffigné a ordre d'ajouter, que Sa Majesté Britannique parfaitement instruite du desir de la Cour de St. Peterbourg pour la Paix sur des Bases reciproquement honorables et avantageuses, et compatibles, en même tems, avec les intérêts de l'Europe, l'a autorisé à faire part aux Plénipotentiaires François des conditions auxquelles la Russie

(d'après

(d'après la connoissance intime et entière que possède Sa Majesté Britannique des intentions de cette Cour) seroit prête à négocier avec le Gouvernement François ; de les rédiger en forme de Traité, dans le cas où elles seroient consenties de part et d'autre ; et d'inserer dans le Traité provisionnel entre la Grande Bretagne et la France un Article, d'après lequel Sa Majesté Britannique s'engageroit à employer sa Médiation pour obtenir l'accession de Sa Majesté L'Empereur de toutes les Russies à ce Traité.

Le Souffigné n'ignore pas que c'est aux Plénipotentiaires François qu'il doit faire la communication officielle des Conditions : En attendant, et pour la satisfaction de Son Excellence Le Ministre des Relations Extérieures, il n'a aucune difficulté de lui dire, qu'elles seront en substance les mêmes qui ont déjà été communiquées à Son Excellence, par Son Excellence le Baron de Budberg.

Le Souffigné attendra, avec une vive impatience, la réponse que Son Excellence le Ministre des Relations Extérieures voudra bien lui faire par écrit à cette Communication. Il lui est d'autant plus essentiel de l'obtenir sous cette forme, que Sa Cour a remarqué sur ce que les communications déjà faites par le Souffigné, sont plusieurs fois restées sans réponse écrite.

Le Souffigné a l'Honneur de renouveler à Son Excellence le Ministre des Relations Extérieures les Assurances de sa haute Considération.

(Signé) LAUDERDALE.

(Translation.)

(Translation.)

Paris, 13th Sept. 1806.

THE Underfigned, Plenipotentiary of His Britannick Majesty, loft no Time in transmitting to his Court the Communication which his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs made to him on Thursday the 4th Instant; and he now haftens to reply to that Communication, by informing his Excellency of the Line of Conduct His Majesty has thought proper to direct him to purfue under the prefent Circumftances.

His Britannick Majesty, ever anxious to maintain the intimate Connection and Alliance which fubfift between His Majesty and the Emperor of All the Ruflias, naturally finds in the recent Conduct of His illuftrious Ally, and in the Proofs which he has lately afforded of the Intereft which he takes in the Welfare of Great Britain and in the general Happinefs of Europe, additional Motives not to feparate, in any Cafe, His Interests from thofe of the Court of St. Peterfburgh.

It is not, however, the Intention of His Majesty to carry this Principle further than the Earl of Yarmouth was inftructed to carry it by Mr. Fox, in his Lordfhip's Communications with the French Government. There is nothing to prevent the Interests of Great Britain and of France from being treated feparately: only His Majesty does not authorife the Underfigned to fign any Treaty except provisionally: fuch Treaty not to have its full
Effect

Effect until Peace shall have been concluded between that faithful Ally of Great Britain and France. It is upon these Conditions alone that the Underfigned is at present authoris'd to negotiate.

The Underfigned has Orders to add, that His Britannick Majesty, fully acquainted with the Desire entertained by the Court of St. Petersburg for Peace upon Conditions reciprocally honourable and advantageous, and at the same Time compatible with the Interests of Europe, has authoris'd him to impart to the French Plenipotentiaries the Conditions upon which Russia (according to the full and perfect Knowledge His Britannick Majesty has of the Intentions of that Court) would be willing to negotiate with the French Government; to reduce them into the Form of a Treaty in the Event of their being agreed to on both Sides; and to insert an Article in the Provisional Treaty between Great Britain and France, by which His Britannick Majesty should engage to employ His Mediation, for the Purpose of obtaining the Accession of his Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias to the said Treaty.

The Underfigned is aware that he ought to make the official Communication of the Conditions to the French Plenipotentiaries: In the mean Time, and for the Satisfaction of his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, he has no Difficulty in telling him that they will be in Substance the same as those which have already been communicated to his

his Excellency by his Excellency Baron de Budberg.

The Underigned expects with great Impatience the Answer to this Communication, which his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs will have the Goodness to send in Writing. It is the more necessary for him to receive it in that Form, as his Court has remarked that the Communications the Underigned has already made, have frequently remained without a written Answer.

The Underigned has the Honour to renew to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs the Assurances of his high Consideration.

(Signed) LAUDERDALE.

Second Inclosure (B.)

COPY of a Note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand, dated September 16th, 1806.

Paris, ce 16 Septembre 1806.

LORD Lauderdale a l'Honneur de prévenir Son Excellence Monsieur de Talleyrand qu'il a passé une très mauvaise nuit, et qu'il se trouve aujourd'hui absolument hors d'état de discuter des Affaires.

Lord Lauderdale aura l'Honneur d'écrire à Son Excellence demain matin. Il espère qu'à cette époque l'indisposition dont il souffre aura pris une

T

tournoire

tournure qui le mette en état d'avoir avec Son Excellence l'entretien qu'il désire tant.

Il espère cependant que Son Excellence voudra bien à cette entrevue remettre à Lord Lauderdale une réponse par écrit à sa dernière Note. Il le prie de croire que ce n'est nullement par le désir d'insister sur une demande, par la seule raison qu'elle a été une fois faite, qu'il la renouvelle actuellement ; mais les Ordres de sa Cour sont précis sur ce point, et Lord Lauderdale peut encore moins se dispenser de rappeler cette circonstance au souvenir de Son Excellence aujourd'hui, qu'il se trouve appelé à traiter pour une Cour de laquelle il n'a pas eu des Pourvoirs directs.

Lord Lauderdale a l'Honneur de renouveler à Son Excellence l'assurance de sa haute Considération.

(Signé) LAUDERDALE.

(Translation.)

Paris, 16th September 1806.

LORD Lauderdale has the Honour of informing his Excellency Monsieur Talleyrand, that he has passed a very bad Night, and finds himself utterly incapable of entering upon Business To-day.

Lord Lauderdale will have the Honour of writing to his Excellency To-morrow Morning, when he hopes the Indisposition under which he now labours,

labours, will have taken such a Turn as may enable him to hold the Conversation with his Excellency which he so much desires.

Lord Lauderdale hopes, nevertheless, that his Excellency will be pleased, at this Interview, to put into his Hands a written Answer to his last Note:

He entreats his Excellency to believe, that it is by no Means from a Desire of insisting upon a Demand merely because it has been once made, that he now renews it, but the Orders of his Court are positive in this Respect, and Lord Lauderdale feels it the more indispensable for him to remind his Excellency of this Circumstance at the present Moment, since he finds himself called upon to treat for a Court from which he has received no direct Powers.

Lord Lauderdale has the Honour of renewing to his Excellency, the Assurance of his high Consideration.

(Signed) LAUDERDALE.

Third Inclosure (C.)

COPY of a Note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand, dated September 17th, 1806.

Paris, ce 17 Septembre 1806.

LORD Lauderdale, quoique toujours trop indisposé pour pouvoir sortir aujourd'hui, se croit cependant en état d'entrer en Conférence avec Son Excellence Monsieur de Talleyrand, si Son Excellence lui faisoit l'honneur de venir à l'Hotel de l'Empire aujourd'hui au moment qui seroit le plus agréable à Son Excellence après trois heures.

Si cette proposition ne s'accordoit pas avec les Engagemens de Son Excellence, ou qu'elle lui fut d'ailleurs incommode, Lord Lauderdale espèreroit être en état de sortir demain, et de se rendre chez Son Excellence Monsieur de Talleyrand à l'heure de sa Commodité.

Il a l'honneur de renouveler à Son Excellence les assurances de sa haute Considération.

(Signe) LAUDERDALE.

(Translation.)

Paris, 17th September 1806.

LORD Lauderdale, although still too unwell to leave the House, thinks himself able to hold a Conference with his Excellency M. Talleyrand Today, if his Excellency will do him the Honour of coming

coming to the Hotel de l'Empire, any Time after Three o'Clock that may best suit his Excellency.

Should this Proposal interfere with his Excellency's Engagements, or being in any other Respect inconvenient to him, Lord Lauderdale hopes to be able to go out To-morrow, and will wait upon his Excellency M. Talleyrand at whatever Hour may best suit him.

He has the Honour of renewing to his Excellency the Assurances of his high Consideration.

(Signed) LAUDERDALE.

Fourth Inclosure (D.)

COPY of a Note from M. Talleyrand to the Earl of Lauderdale, dated September 17th, 1806.

Paris le 17 Septembre 1806 au matin.

M. LE Prince de Benevent apprend dans le moment, que le Courier Johnson est arrivé, et sera aujourd'hui à Paris. M. le Prince de Benevent apprend en même tems, avec une véritable peine, la Mort de M. Fox, dont il a l'Honneur de faire part à Son Excellence Monsieur le Comte de Lauderdale. M. Fox est provisoirement remplacé par M. Spencer.

M. le Prince de Bénévent espère que la Santé de Mylord Lauderdale est meilleure aujourd'hui.

Il a l'Honneur de lui renouveler l'Assurance de sa
haute Considération.

(Signé) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND,
Prince de Benevento.

(Translation.)

Paris, September 17, 1806.

THE Prince of Benevento has this Moment learnt that the Messenger, Johnson, is arrived, and will be in Paris To-day. It is with sincere Regret that the Prince of Benevento, at the same Time, heard of the Death of Mr. Fox, of which Event, he has the Honour of informing his Excellency Lord Lauderdale. Mr. Spencer succeeds Mr. Fox provisionally.

The Prince of Benevento hopes that Lord Lauderdale finds himself better To-day. He has the Honour of renewing to him the Assurance of his high Consideration.

(Signed) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND,
Prince of Benevento.

Fifth Inclosure (E.)

COPY of a Note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand, dated September 17th, 1806.

Paris ce 17 Septembre 1806.

LORD Lauderdale reçoit le billet que Son Excellence le Prince de Bénévent lui a fait passer ce matin, au moment où il venoit d'expédier celui dans lequel il proposoit à Son Excellence une Conférence pour aujourd'hui. Lord Lauderdale présume que, vù l'état de sa santé, et la prochaine arrivée du Courier, Son Excellence, pensera comme lui, que la Conférence pourra être renvoyée jusqu'à demain.

Lord Lauderdale remercie Son Excellence le Prince de Bénévent de son attention à lui apprendre la nouvelle de l'Arrivée du Courier. La mort de Mr. Fox ne le surprend pas, et il paroît d'après ce que lui marque Son Excellence dans son Billet, que Lord Spencer, qui est Secrétaire d'Etat pour l'Intérieur, a la garde des sceaux du Département des Affaires Etrangères provisoirement, ainsi qu'il est d'usage, et en attendant que le Successeur soit nommé.

Lord Lauderdale a l'Honneur de renouveler à Son Excellence les assurances de sa haute Considération.

(Signé) LAUDERDALE.

(Translation.)

Paris, September 17, 1806.

LORD Lauderdale received the Note that his Excellency the Prince of Benevento sent him this Morning, at the Moment when he had just dispatched the Note in which he proposed to hold a Conference with his Excellency this Day. Lord Lauderdale presumes that, considering the State of his Health, and the approaching Arrival of the Messenger, his Excellency will agree with him in Opinion, that the Conference may be postponed till To-morrow.

Lord Lauderdale thanks his Excellency the Prince of Benevento for his Attention in acquainting him with the Arrival of the Courier. The Death of Mr Fox occasioned him no Surprise; and it appears from what his Excellency mentions in his Note, that the Seals of the Foreign Department (as is usually the Case) have been provisionally entrusted to Lord Spencer, Secretary of State for the Home Department, until a Successor is appointed.

Lord Lauderdale has the Honour of renewing to his Excellency the Assurances of his high Consideration.

(Signed) LAUDERDALE.

Sixth

Sixth Inclosure (F.)

COPY of a Note from M. Talleyrand to the Earl of Lauderdale, dated September 17th, 1806.

Paris le 17 Septembre 1806.

LE Ministre des Relations Extérieures a trouvé, à son retour de St Cloud, le billet que Son Excellence Lord Lauderdale lui a fait l'Honneur de lui adresser.

Il regrette extrêmement que la Santé de Son Excellence ne soit pas meilleure. Demain étant le Jour de son travail à Saint Cloud, il ne pourra pas avoir l'Honneur de voir Son Excellence ; mais il ne manquera pas de se rendre chez elle après-demain vers Une Heure.

Le Ministre des Relations Extérieures a l'Honneur de renouveler à Son Excellence Lord Lauderdale les Assurances de Sa haute Considération.

(Signé) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND,
Prince de Benevent.

(Translation.)

Paris, September 17, 1806.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs, on his Return from St. Cloud, found the Note which his Excellency Lord Lauderdale had done him the Honour of writing to him. He regrets extremely the

the continued Indisposition of his Excellency. To-morrow, being the Day of his official Attendance at St. Cloud, he cannot have the Honour of seeing his Excellency, but he will not fail to wait upon him the next Day about One o'Clock.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has the Honour of renewing to his Excellency Lord Lauderdale, the Assurances of his high Consideration.

(Signed) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND,
Prince of Benevento.

No. 50.

COPY of a Dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Earl Spencer, dated Paris, September 19th, 1806.—Received September 22d.

My Lord, Paris, 19th September 1806.

AT One o'Clock this Day, Monsieur Talleyrand called on me according to the Appointment which I announced to your Lordship in my last Dispatch. I immediately perceived, that his Plan was to exhibit extreme Civility; which no One knows better how to execute.

After some Time spent in Compliments, and in Condolence on the great Loss the World had sustained, he told me, that as I insisted on an Answer in Writing, One was prepared, which contained a Declaration consonant to what he supposed me to wish on the Two most material Points.

First,

First, That the Emperor was willing to admit of an Article being introduced to answer the Objects I had in View in relation to Russia, and to instruct his Plenipotentiaries to hear me with respect to the Interests of that Power. Secondly, That France would be ready to make great Concessions for the Purpose of obtaining Peace.

After some Conversation, all tending to impress me with the Idea that Peace was their main Object, and that they were even ready to make any Sacrifice to secure it, he produced the Paper to which he had alluded (marked A.); and which I had at first understood he meant to transmit to me when he should go Home.

Before he opened it, he looked at me, and said, that there was a Mixture in it of what perhaps I should not like, but that I must take the Evil with the Good. He begged that I would allow him to read it through without interrupting him. When he had finished, I said that I should of course send such an Answer as I thought becoming and proper. I told him, and, I trust, with perfect Temper and seeming Indifference, that the most important Thing for me to know was, whether these Concessions would be to the Extent of allowing us to retain what they had originally proposed? He answered, that the Emperor would leave every Thing open to the Plenipotentiaries.

On his going away I felt myself so extremely fatigued, in consequence of the weak State in which my late Illness has left me, that I was obliged to
lie

lie down and recruit my Strength before I could turn my Mind to the Formation of what I conceived to be a proper Answer to his Note. I trust your Lordship will approve of the Answer I have sent, a Copy of which I have the Honour of inclosing, (marked B.). My Object in framing it, was to facilitate as much as possible the immediate Progress of the Negotiation, and, at the same Time, to let the Government of France feel that I was alive to what, in point of Dignity, belonged to the Plenipotentiary of His Britannick Majesty.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LAUDERDALE.

First Inclosure (A.)

COPY of a Note delivered by M. Talleyrand to the Earl of Lauderdale, dated September 18th, 1806.

LE Souffigné Ministre des Relations Extérieures a mis sous les yeux de Sa Majesté l'Empereur Roi d'Italie la note que Son Excellence Mylord Comte de Lauderdale, Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté Britannique lui a fait l'honneur de lui adresser le 13 de ce mois.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur et Roi voit avec peine que la négociation semble prendre chaque jour une direction rétrograde, et Elle peut difficilement
s'expliquer

s'expliquer à quel but désire arriver le Gouvernement Anglois.

D'abord, on a mis en avant et l'on a voulu faire reconnoître des formules surannées, dont le texte et le fond n'avoient jamais été admis, ni même discutés par le Gouvernement François, et lorsque cette difficulté a paru écartée, et que Messieurs les Plénipotentiaires François ont fait pressentir des sacrifices qui constatent de plus en plus les dispositions de leur Gouvernement pour la Paix, on revient à des points antérieurs à la Négotiation, et l'on reproduit une question qui trois fois avoit été décidée, d'abord par les pouvoirs donnés à M. d'Oubril et dont Messieurs les Plénipotentiaires de Sa Majesté Britannique ont eu Connoissance, depuis par les pouvoirs que l'Angleterre avoit donnés à Mylord Comte de Yarmouth, et enfin pour la troisième fois par ceux de Mylord Comte de Lauderdale. Il étoit ce semble, permis de penser qu'une discussion terminée avant les premières conférences de Messieurs les Négociateurs et décidée même par le fait seul de leur négociation ne se représenteroit plus.

Toutesfois Sa Majesté l'Empereur voulant donner une nouvelle preuve de ses constantes dispositions pour le rétablissement de la Paix, adhère à la proposition suivante, " que les négociations entre la France et l'Angleterre continueront, et que le Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté le Roi de la Grande Bretagne pourra introduire dans le
Traité,

Traité, soit comme article patent, soit comme article secret, soit dans toute autre forme qui rempliroit le même but, tout ce qu'il croira utile pour concilier les differends qui existent entre la France et la Russie, et pour la faire participer aux bienfaits de la Paix ; bien entendu qu'on n'admettra que les propositions respectivement honorables et ne portant aucune atteinte à la puissance réelle, à la dignité des deux Empires, et qu'on ne verra plus reproduire les propositions étranges que M. de Novosiltzoff avoit eu à faire de la part de la Russie, et qui ayant signalé l'origine d'une Coalition vaincue et confondue dès sa naissance, doivent être oubliées avec elle. Il est des propositions qui n'étant que le résultat d'une aveugle confiance et d'une espèce d'enivrement, et qui n'étant fondées ni sur la force réelle des Etats, ni sur leur situation géographique, sont privées du Caractère pacifique, et portent avec elles leur réprobation.

La France ne doit abandonner ni les intérêts de l'Empire Ottoman, ni une position qui la mette à portée de soutenir cet Empire contre les agressions dont la Russie le menace ouvertement ; mais tous ces objets destinés à entrer dans les dispositions du Traité, devant être réservés pour la Discussion, le Souffigné ne cherchera pas à participer sur les résultats qu'elle doit avoir.

Si depuis les changemens survenus dans le Cabinet de Sa Majesté Britannique on continuë en Angleterre à vouloir la Paix, la Paix peut se faire et se faire

faire promptement ; L'Empereur ne s'arrêtera point à quelques sacrifices pour l'accélérer et la rendre durable : mais si les dispositions pour la Paix avoient changé à Londres, si les vuës sages et libérales développées dans les premières communications qui ont eu lieu avec l'illustre Ministre que regrettent les deux nations, ne prévalaient plus, une discussion vague, des prétentions immodérées, et des propositions ambiguës, s'écartant du ton de franchise et de noblesse nécessaire pour conduire à un rapprochement véritable, ne feroient qu'aigrir d'avantage, et feroient indignes des deux peuples.

La France ne prétend donner la loi ni à la Russie, ni à l'Angleterre, mais Elle ne veut la recevoir ni de l'Angleterre, ni de la Russie. Que les conditions soient égales, justes, modérées, la Paix est faite ; mais si l'on se montre impérieux, exagéré, si on affecte la suprématie, si enfin on veut dicter la Paix, l'Empereur et le Peuple François ne releveront pas même ces propositions. Confians en eux mêmes, ils diront ce qu'un ancien Peuple répondit à ses Ennemis, " Vous demandez nos armes, venez les prendre."

Le Souffigné à l'honneur, &c.

(Signé) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

(Traduction.)

(Translation)

Paris, 18 September, 1806.

THE Undersigned, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, has laid before his Majesty the Emperor, King of Italy, the Note which his Excellency the Earl of Lauderdale, Minister Plenipotentiary from His Britannick Majesty, did him the Honour to address to him on the 13th of this Month.

His Majesty the Emperor and King with Regret that the Negotiation seems to take every Day a retrograde Course, and he is at a loss to discover what Point the English Government will attain.

In the first Instance, obsolete Forms were brought forward and urged for our Acceptance, the Text and the Substance of which had never been admitted, nor even discussed, by the French Government; and when this Difficulty appeared to be removed, and the French Plenipotentiaries held out a Prospect of Sacrifices which proved more and more the Desire of their Government for Peace, Points antecedent to the Negotiation were recurred to, and a Question was started again which had been Three Times decided; First, by the Powers given to M. d'Oubril, with which His Britannick Majesty's Plenipotentiaries were acquainted; afterwards by the Powers given to the Earl of Yarmouth; and lastly, for the Third Time, by those of the Earl of Lauderdale. One might have supposed that a Discussion, terminated before the First Conference of the respective

spective Negotiators, and decided even by the very Fact of their Negotiation, would not again be brought forward.

His Majesty the Emperor wishing however to give a fresh Proof of his uniform Desire for the Re-establishment of Peace, adheres to the following Proposal; That the Negotiations between France and England shall continue; that the Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Great Britain shall be at Liberty to introduce into the Treaty, either as a publick or a secret Article, or in any other Form which would answer the same End, whatever he may conceive would tend to reconcile the existing Differences between France and Russia, and would procure for the latter a Participation in the Benefits of Peace, it being well understood, that no Proposals shall be admitted except such as are respectively honourable, and are not injurious to the real Power and the Dignity of the Two Empires; and that we shall not see again brought forward the extraordinary Proposals which M. de Novosiltzoff was charged to make on the Part of Russia, and which having marked the Origin of a Coalition conquered and destroyed in its Birth, ought equally to be forgotten with the Coalition itself. There are Proposals which, being only the Result of blind Confidence, and of a Species of Infatuation, and being founded neither on the real Force of the Parties, nor on their geographical Situation, are deprived of

of a pacific Character, and carry with them their own Condemnation.

France ought neither to abandon the Interests of the Ottoman Empire, nor a Position which enables her to sustain that Empire against the Aggressions with which she is openly medased by Russia; but as all the Objects destined to enter into the Arrangements of the Treaty, must be reserved for Discussion, the Undersigned will not seek to anticipate the Result which it may produce.

If, after the Changes which have taken place in the Cabinet of His Britannick Majesty, Peace is still wished for in England, Peace may be made, and that without Delay. The Emperor will not hesitate to make some Sacrifices in order to accelerate it, and to render it durable; but if the Dispositions for Peace should have changed in London, if the wise and liberal Views manifested in the first Communications which took place with the illustrious Minister, whom both Nations lament, should no longer prevail, a vague Discussion, immoderate Pretensions, and ambiguous Proposals, wide of that Tone of Frankness and Dignity necessary to conduce to a real Reconciliation, would only have the Effect of producing more Irritation, and would be unworthy of both Nations. France does not pretend to dictate either to Russia or to England, but she will be dictated to by neither of these Powers. Let the Conditions be equal, just, and moderate, and the Peace

Peace is concluded; but if an imperious and exaggerating Disposition is evinced, if Pre-eminence is affected, if in this World, it is meant to give Peace, the Emperor and the French People will not even notice these Proposals. Considering themselves, they will say to a Nation of Antiquity and its Enemies, "you demand our Arms, and will take them."

The Undersigned, Minister for Foreign Affairs, has the Honour to renew to his Excellency the Earl of Lauderdale the Assurance of his high Consideration.

(Signed) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND,
Prince of Benevento.

Second Inclosure (B.)

COPY of a Note from Lord Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand, dated September 19th, 1806.

Le Souffigné Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté le Roi de la Grande Bretagne, en repondant à la Note Officielle de Son Excellence le Ministre des Relations Extérieures, en date du 18me de ce Mois, qui lui a été remise aujourd'hui, commence par observer que c'est à dessein qu'il s'abstient autant qu'il est possible de toute remarque sur des points qui pourroient s'y trouver énoncés, mais qui sont étrangers à l'objet immédiatement en question. Il évitera par ce moyen des discussions qui seroient

de nature à lui faire oublier le ton et la mesure que lui prescrit son devoir dans tout le cours de sa Mission. Cette conduite est aussi la seule conforme à cet amour de la Paix qui caractérise toutes les démarches du Roi son Maître.

Lorsque le Souffigné se représente qu'il est venu à Paris autorisé à faire la Paix sur des conditions censées proposées par la France : que malgré le refus de Sa Majesté Impériale de toutes les Ruffies de ratifier le Traité signé par M. Pouchin, et les avantages éclatans obtenus par les armes de Sa Majesté dans l'Amérique-Espagnole, il s'est vu à même de donner (ainsi qu'il a eu l'honneur de le faire à Son Excellence le Ministre des Relations Exterieures) des assurances que les demandes de Sa Cour, en sa propre faveur n'en seroient pas essentiellement augmentées ; le Souffigné a dû être surpris de voir que l'on veuille supposer à Son Gouvernement l'intention de se montrer "impérieux, exagéré." Il ne l'est pas moins de ce qu'en repondant à une Note dans laquelle il avoit eu l'honneur d'expliquer distinctement à Son Excellence que c'étoit sur les conditions enoncées par Son Excellence le Baron de Budberg que l'on insistoit en faveur de la Ruffie, Son Excellence ait cru devoir marquer du sceau de reprobation des Conditions proposées dans des Circonstances totalement différentes par M. Novosiltzoff, et la nature desquelles Le Souffigné se trouve par le fait entièrement ignorer.

Toutesfois,

Toutefois, après s'être expliqué comme l'a fait le Souffigné vis à vis de Son Excellence le Ministre des Relations Extérieures, et lui avoir fait entendre qu'il n'est autorisé à traiter que de manière à s'assurer de ce que la Paix avec la Grande-Bretagne et avec la Russie se fasse au même moment, et après avoir reçu dans la note officielle d'hier, des assurances que le Gouvernement François ne se refuse point à l'admission d'un Article qui aura pour but de pourvoir à cet objet indispensable, le Souffigné n'a aucune difficulté à reprendre les conférences avec LL. EE. les Plénipotentiaires François de quel LL. EE. auront été autorisés à cet effet.

Le Souffigné à l'honneur, &c.

(Signé) LAUDERDALE

(Translation,)

Paris, 19th September 1806.

THE Undersigned Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Great Britain, in answering the Official Note of his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated the 18th instant, which has been received To-day, begins by remarking, that he purposely abstains as much as possible from all Observation upon those Points contained in it, which are foreign to the immediate Object in Question. By this Means, he will avoid Discussions

of a Nature so general, as to forget that Terms of Moderation which it is his Duty to observe in the whole Course of his Mission. He will thus maintain the Line of Conduct, which is conformable to that Love of Peace, which characterizes all the Proceedings of the King his Master.

When the Undersigned reflects, that he came to Paris, authorized to conclude Peace upon Terms understood to have been proposed by France; that notwithstanding the Refusal of His Imperial Majesty of All the Russias to ratify the Treaty signed by M. d'Oubri, and the splendid Successes obtained by His Majesty's Arms in Spanish America, he was authorized to give Assurances (as he had the Honour of doing to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs) that the Demands of his Court, in its own Favour, would not in consequence of these Successes be materially encreased; the Undersigned had reason to be surprized at finding his Government charged with manifesting an "imperious and exaggerating Disposition." He is not less astonished, that his Excellency, in replying to a Note in which Lord Lauderdale had the Honour of explaining distinctly to him, that the Conditions pointed out by his Excellency Baron de Budberg, were in Substance what would be insisted upon by Great Britain in Favour of Russia, should have thought it necessary to reprobate so strongly Conditions proposed by M. de Novossitzoff under totally different Circumstances; and of the Nature

Nature of which the Underigned is entirely ignorant. Nevertheless, after the Explanations given by the Underigned to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Declaration made by him to his Excellency, that the Underigned is not authorized to negotiate otherwise than so as to ensure the Conclusion of a Peace with Great Britain and with Russia at the same Moment; and, after having received, in the Official Note of Yesterday's Date, Assurances that the French Government does not refuse the Admission of an Article, the Design of which shall be to provide for this indispensable Object, the Underigned will make no Difficulty in resuming the Conferences with their Excellencies the French Plenipotentiaries, as soon as their Excellencies shall be duly authorized for this Purpose.

The Underigned has the Honour, &c.

(Signed) LAUDERDALE.

No. 51.

EXTRACT from a Dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Earl Spencer, dated Paris, September 26th, 1806.—
Received September 28th.

NOTHING material happened after the Conference with M. Talleyrand, which I detailed in my Dispatch of the 19th Instant, till the 22d,

when I received from him a Communication, informing me that the Emperor having thought General Clarke's Services at his Person necessary in a Journey he was about to undertake immediately M. de Champagny would be instructed to conduct singly on the Part of France the Business of the Negotiation in future.

This Communication was made in a Letter which I enclose (marked A.) together with a Copy of my Answer (marked B.)

On the 23d, being anxious that the Negotiation should proceed as soon as possible, I took the Opportunity of M. de Champagny's sending to enquire after my Health, to urge him, in Writing, to renew the Conferences without farther Loss of Time. Your Lordship will find a Copy of my Letter (marked C.); together with his Answer (marked D.) enclosed.

On the 24th I received from M. Talleyrand an Answer to the Demand I had made for an Explanation on the Subject of Passports, in my Letter of the 22d. This Communication (marked E.) I think it proper also to transmit to your Lordship.

On the 25th at One o'Clock, M. de Champagny called on me, as had been previously agreed, for the Purpose of renewing the Conferences.

After the usual Interchange of Civilities, he proceeded to say, that, to secure Peace, the Emperor had determined to make great Sacrifices.

That

1st, That Hanover with its Dependencies should be restored to His Majesty.

2d, That the Possession of Malta should be confirmed to Great Britain.

3d, That France would interfere with Holland to confirm to His Majesty the absolute Possession of the Cape.

4th, That the Emperor would confirm to His Majesty the Possession of Pondicherry, Chandernagore, Mahee, and the other dependent Comptoirs.

5th, That as Tobago was originally settled by the English, it was meant also to give that Island to the Crown of Great Britain.

To all this he added, that what he had now said proceeded on the Supposition, that Sicily was to be ceded, and that the French Government proposed that his Sicilian Majesty should have as Indemnity, not only the Balearic Islands, but should also receive an Annuity from the Court of Spain to enable him to support his Dignity.

I here interrupted him, expressing my Surprise after the full Explanation I had with M. Talleyrand on that very Point, that the Possibility of our giving up Sicily should be mentioned again; that the Guarantee of it to the King of the Two Sicilies was as much an Object with England as M. Talleyrand knew it to be with Russia; and that I was happy to take that Opportunity of stating to him fairly, that I felt myself bound to consider the obtaining for Russia the Arrangement which he desired, as an Object more interesting if possible

to

to England, than whose Points which might be considered as peculiarly connected, with his own Interests.

He informed me, that there was no Clause in his Instructions empowering him to hear me on the Part of Russia; but that he had ever seen M. Talleyrand's Note to me, and, being satisfied that this was an accidental Omission, which would be forthwith remedied, he had no Objection to protest, as if such a Clause had been inserted.

It was agreed that I should go to him To-day at Two o'Clock to renew the Conference.

First Inclosure (A.)

COPY of a Note from M. Talleyrand to the Earl of Lauderdale, dated September 22d, 1806.

My Lord, Paris, 22 Septembre 1806.

J'AI l'Honneur de vous informer, que Sa Majesté ayant jugé utile à son Service de retenir près de sa Personne M. le General Clarke, pendant le Cours d'un Voyage qu'Elle est sur le Point d'entreprendre, M. de Champagny sera désormais chargé de suivre seul la Négociation commencée avec Votre Excellence. J'ai fait connoître les Intentions de Sa Majesté à le Ministre, qui a l'ordre de s'entendre avec vous pour que le cours des Conférences et de la Correspondance des deux Légations n'éprouve aucune

aucune interruption. Je dois en même temps vous assurer, qu'étant moi-même destiné à suivre Sa Majesté, je n'en continuerai pas moins de correspondre avec Votre Excellence, l'ordre général du Service étant tel que toutes les Dépêches de mon Ministère me seront journellement et régulièrement adressées.

Je pris Votre Excellence d'agréer l'Assurance de ma haute Considération.

(Signé) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND,

Prince de Benevento, I

S. E. M. le Comte de Landenberg, &c. &c. &c.

&c. &c. &c.

(Translation):

My Lord, Paris, the 23^d September 1806,
I HAVE the Honour to inform you, that his Majesty having thought it for the Good of his Service to retain General Clarke near his Person, during the Course of a Journey, he is about to undertake; M. de Champagny will henceforth be charged with conducting singly the Negotiation entered into with your Excellency.

I have communicated his Majesty's Intentions to that Minister, who has received Orders to concert with you such Measures as may prevent any Interruption to the Continuance of the Conference, and of the Correspondence between the Two Missions. I should, at the same Time acquaint you, that

that being myself directed to follow his Majesty, I shall nevertheless continue to correspond with your Excellency as before; the general Order of the Service being such, as to secure the daily and regular Delivery of all Dispatches addressed to me on the Affairs of my Department.

I beg your Excellency will accept the Assurance of my high Consideration.

(Signed) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND,

Prince of Benevento.

His Excellency the Earl of Lauderdale,

&c. &c. &c.

Second Inclosure (B.)

COPY of a Note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand, dated September 22d, 1806.

Monfieur, Paris, 22 Septembre 1806.

J'AI l'Honneur d'accuser la Réception de la Lettre de Votre Excellence en date d'aujourd'hui, par laquelle elle me donne l'avis que Monsieur de Champagny fera désormais chargé de suivre seul la Negotiation avec moi; et que ce Ministre a ordonné de s'entendre avec moi, pour que le cours des Conférences et de la Correspondance n'éprouve aucune Interruption.

En attendant Votre Excellence je vous prie de m'observer, qu'il n'est

Il n'est pas moins essentiel de pouvoir, comme Votre Excellence le fera sans doute avant son départ, à 5998 les Communications par Couriers avec mon Gouvernement, me soit assurée, pendant votre Absence, sans délai ou Empêchement quelconque, ainsi qu'il s'est pratiqué depuis mon arrivée ici. Il ne peut échapper à Votre Excellence, combien il seroit impossible de vous faire parvenir à tems les Demandes que j'ai occasion de faire à ce Sujet, à mesure que Besoin en naît ; et je la prie en Conséquence de vouloir bien m'indiquer la Personne à laquelle je dois m'adresser pour cet Objet pendant son Absence.

Je prie Votre Excellence d'agréer l'Assurance de ma haute Considération.

(Signé) LAUDERDALE.

(Translation.)

Sir, Paris, 22d September 1805.
I HAVE the Honour to acknowledge the Receipt of your Excellency's Letter of this Date, in which you inform me that M. de Champagne will in future be directed to carry on singly the Negotiation with me, and that this Minister has received Orders to make such Arrangements with me as may prevent any Interruption to the Continuance of the Conferences and of the Correspondence. In returning my Thanks to your Excellency for this Communication, I have the Honour to remark

to you, that it is no less essential to take Measures, if your Excellency will do us the favour to direct your Departure, for ensuring a Communication by Messengers, such as my Government during your Absence, against any Delay or Obstacle whatever, in the same Manner as has been practised since my Arrival there. It cannot escape your Excellency's Observation, how impossible it would be for me to transmit to you in sufficient Time the Demands which I may be obliged to make on this Subject, as Occasion may require; and I have in consequence to request you would have the Goodness to inform me to what Person I am to address myself for this Purpose during your Absence.

I request your Excellency to accept the Assurances of my high Consideration.

(Signed) LAUDERDALE.

Third Inclosure (C.)

COPY of a Note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. de Champagny, dated September 23d, 1806.

Monsieur, Paris, le 23 Septembre 1806
 Je suis, on ne peut pas plus, sensible à l'intérêt que Votre Excellence prend à l'état de ma Santé. Depuis quelques Jours j'éprouve un malaise sensible, et je me crois aujourd'hui rétabli de peu s'en faut.

Soit

Son Excellence le Ministre des Relations Ex-
 térieures par une note en date d'hier m'a prevenu
 que Votre Excellence seroit désormais chargée de
 suivre seul avec moi la Négociation. L'Etat de ma
 Santé ne mettant plus d'Obstacle à cet égard, je
 prie Votre Excellence de vouloir bien me regarder
 comme à vos Ordres, soit pour la recevoir ici,
 soit pour me rendre chez Elle, à sa Commodité,
 afin de reprendre les Conférences dont diverses
 Circonstances ont depuis si longtems occasionné l'In-
 terruption.

Je prie Votre Excellence d'agréer l'Assurance de
 ma haute Considération.

(Signé) LAUDERDALE.

(Translation.)

Sir, Paris, 23d September 1806.

IT is impossible to be more sensible than I am of
 the Interest which your Excellency takes in the
 State of my Health. For some Days past I have
 been much better, and I now consider myself quite
 or nearly well.

His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs
 has informed me, in a Note of Yesterday's Date,
 that your Excellency is hence forward to carry on,
 singly, the Négociation with me. The State of my
 Health being no longer an Obstacle, I request your
 Excellency will be pleased to consider me at your
 Disposal, either to receive you here, or to call
 upon

upon you, as it may be most convenient, in order to resume the Conference, which, from various Circumstances, have been so long interrupted.

I request your Excellency to accept the Assurances of my high Consideration.

(Signed) LAUDERDALE.

Fourth Inclosure (D.)

COPY of a Note from M. de Champagny to the Earl of Lauderdale, dated September 23d, 1806.

Le Mardi 23 Sept^r 1806.

M. De Champagny apprend avec le plus grand Plaisir le rétablissement de la Santé de Mylord Comte de Lauderdale: il se félicite d'avoir à continuer avec Son Excellence des Relations auxquelles il met le plus grand Prix. Il est très empressé de recommencer les Conférences interrompues; mais l'ouvrage extraordinaire que lui donne le prochain Départ de l'Empereur ne lui permet pas de le faire aujourd'hui même, ou demain, comme il l'auroit désiré. Il a donc l'Honneur de proposer à Mylord, Jeudi prochain comme étant le premier Jour où il aura un moment de libre. La Conférence aura lieu dans l'Endroit et l'Heure qu'il plaira à Mylord de choisir; et M. de Champagny le prie de ne consulter dans ce Choix que l'Intérêt de sa Santé.

Il prie le Comte de Lauderdale d'agréer
l'Assurance de sa haute Considération;

(Signed) CHAMPAGNY.

I request your Lordship to accept the
Assurance of my high Consideration.

LAUDERDALE
(Translation.)

Tuesday, 23d September 1806.

M. De Champagny has learnt, with the utmost Satisfaction, the Reestablishment of the Health of his Excellency the Earl of Lauderdale, and he congratulates himself on the Prospect of continuing with his Excellency the Relations on which he sets the highest Value. He is extremely anxious to renew the Conferences which had been interrupted; but the extraordinary Business occasioned by the approaching Departure of the Emperor, does not allow him to do so, either To-day or To-morrow, as he could have wished. He has, therefore, the Honour to propose to his Lordship Thursday next, being the first Day in which he shall have a Moment's Leisure. The Conference shall be held at whatever Place and Hour his Lordship may name; and M. de Champagny requests him in making this Appointment only to consult the State of his Health.

He requests the Earl of Lauderdale to accept the Assurance of his high Consideration.

(Signed) CHAMPAGNY.

Fifth Inclosure (E.)
COPY of a Note from M. Talleyrand to the
Earl of Lauderdale, dated September
24th, 1806.

My Lord, Paris, 24 Sept. 1806.

J'AI l'honneur de vous informer que j'ai pris les
ordres de Sa Majesté sur l'Objet de la Lettre que
Votre Excellence m'a fait l'Honneur de m'écrire en
date du 22 Septembre, et qu'elle a immédiatement
autorisé M. de Champagny, Son Ministre Plénipo-
tentiare, de vous délivrer tous les Passeports qui
seront nécessaires à Votre Excellence, pour assurer
la Régularité et la Célérité de ses Communications
avec le Ministère de Sa Majesté Britannique.

J'ai l'Honneur de renouveler à Votre Excellence
l'Assurance de ma haute Considération.

(Signé) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND,
Prince de Benevent.

(Translation.)

My Lord, Paris, September 24th, 1806.

I HAVE the Honour to inform you, that I have
taken His Majesty's Pleasure on the Subject of
the Letter which your Excellency did me the
Honour to write to me on the 22d September,
and that his Majesty immediately authorized M. de
Champagny, his Minister Plenipotentiary, to deliver
to you all the Passports which may be necessary

to

to insure the Regularity and Expedition of your Excellency's Communications with the Ministers of His Britannick Majesty.

I have the Honour to renew to your Excellency the Assurance of my high Consideration.

(Signed) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND,
Prince of Benevento.

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rembs COPY of a Dispatch from the Earl of
Lauderdale to Earl Spencer, dated
Paris, September 26th, 1806.—Received
September 28th.

My Lord, Paris, September 26th 1806.

IN Conformity with my Engagement made Yesterday, which I had the Honour of mentioning to your Lordship in my former Dispatch of this Date, I waited on Mr. Champagny this Afternoon at Two o'Clock.

He informed me, that the accidental Omission in his Instructions had been remedied, and that he had now Powers to talk with me on the Interests of Russia, with a View to arrange the Conditions on which France would make Peace with that Country: but he, at the same Time, proposed, that we should, in the first Instance, talk over the Terms of Peace between France and England.

I observed, that as the greatest Difficulties in our

last Conference seemed to arise from the Conditions that I had proposed as necessary to be granted to Russia; and, as England was resolved not to make Peace without obtaining for Russia all the Objects on which she insisted, I thought the more natural Order would be, to resume our Conversation on these last Topics.

A long Discussion accordingly ensued, which ended in his informing me that, on the Subject of Concession to Russia, he was authorized to communicate to me, that the Government of France was willing, in Addition to the Treaty made by M. d'Oubril, to cede to that Power the full Sovereignty of the Island of Corfu; but that he had no Authority to go any farther.

I then informed him, that I was sorry to learn that the Negotiation was at an End, for that my Instructions were precise, and that I should feel it my Duty, the Moment I left him, to state to M. Talleyrand, that all Hopes having vanished of bringing the Negotiation to a favourable Issue, I had only now to request Passports for my Return to England.

After strong Expressions of mutual Regard, he attended me to the outer Room, where he again proposed a Renewal of our Conferences, in case his Government should give him new Instructions.

My Answer was, that I had no Choice in immediately applying for Passports; but that, as long as I remained in this Country, I never would refuse to see him; and that, if, before my Departure, he should

should come with Powers to grant all the Objects on which I had explained myself, I should feel the greatest Satisfaction, though, at that Moment, I thought any Appointment perfectly unnecessary.

On my Return home, I sent to M. Talleyrand a Letter demanding my Passports, a Copy of which, (marked A.), I enclose; and, I understand from the Courier Basilico, that he received it Ten Minutes before he got into his Carriage to go to Mentz.

About Six o'Clock, I received from M. de Champagny a Note, of which, as well as of my Answer, I enclose Copies to your Lordship, (marked B. and C.)

Whilst I am writing, I have received the Note, which I inclose, (marked D).

I have the Honour to be, &c,

(Signed) LAUDERDALE.

I open this Dispatch to inclose a Note, (marked E.), I have this Moment received from M. de Champagny.

First Inclosure (A.)

COPY of a Note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand, dated September 26th, 1806.

Monsieur, Paris, 26th Sept^r 1806.

J'E ne perds pas un moment à faire connaître à Votre Excellence que le Résultat de la Conférence que j'ai eue aujourd'hui avec Son Excellence Monsieur de Champagny, ne me laisse malheureusement aucun espoir de pouvoir amener les Négotiations de la Part de la Grande Bretagne et de la Russie, à une issue favorable.

Dans cet état des choses, et d'après mes instructions, il ne me reste d'autre parti à prendre que de m'adresser à Votre Excellence pour les Passeports nécessaires, afin que je puisse retourner auprès de Mon Souverain.

En faisant ainsi cette demande à Votre Excellence Je ne saurois me refuser au plaisir que je ressens à témoigner ma reconnaissance de toutes les attentions personnelles que Votre Excellence a bien voulu me marquer pendant mon séjour à Paris; et à exprimer en même temps les Sentimens d'Estime que j'ai toujours ressentis, et que je ressentirai dans tous les tems pour Votre Excellence.

Je la prie d'agréer l'Assurance de ma plus haute Considération.

(Signé) LAUDERDALE.

(Translation.)

(Translation)

Paris, September 26th, 1806.
I LOSE not a Moment in acquainting your Excellency that the Result of the Conference which I have had To-day with his Excellency M. de Champagny, unfortunately leaves me no Hope of being able to bring the Negotiations, on the Part of Great Britain and of Russia, to a favourable Issue.

In this State of Things, and according to my Instructions, no Part remains for me to take but to address myself to your Excellency for Passports, for my Return into the Presence of my Sovereign.

In thus making this Demand to your Excellency, I cannot deny myself the Pleasure which I feel in expressing my Thanks for all the personal Attentions which your Excellency has shewn to me during my Residence at Paris; and in assuring your Excellency at the same Time of the Sentiments of Esteem which I have always felt, and which I shall ever feel, for your Excellency.

I request you to accept the Assurances of my distinguished Consideration.

(Signed) LAUDERDAE

LACROIX

Second Inclosure (B.)

COPY of a Note from M. de Champagny
to the Earl of Lauderdale, dated Sep-
tember 26th, 1806.

Paris, le 26 Septembre 1806.

M. DE Champagny a rendu compte à Son
Gouvernement de la Conférence qu'il a eue
aujourd'hui avec My Lord Lauderdale: comme
plusieurs jours devoient nécessairement s'écouler,
avant qu'il ait pu en recevoir de nouveaux Ordres,
il croit utile pour l'Avancement de ce But si
desirable, la Paix, d'en causer encore avec son Ex-
cellence, et il a l'honneur de lui proposer de le
recevoir chez Lui Lundi prochain à l'heure qui con-
viendra d'avantage à Sa Santé.

M. de Champagny prie Son Excellence My Lord
Comte de Lauderdale, d'agréer l'Assurance de sa
haute Consideration.

(Translation.)

Paris, September 26, 1806.

M. De Champagny has made a Report to his
Government of the Conference which he
this Day held with Lord Lauderdale; as several
Days must necessarily elapse before he can receive
fresh Orders from his Government, he thinks it
may tend to advance that very desirable Object,
Peace, to converse again on the Subject with his
Excellency; and he has the Honour to propose to

His

His Excellency to receive him at his House on Monday next, at the Hour which may best suit his Health.

M. de Champagny requests his Excellency the Earl of Lauderdale to accept the Assurances of his high Consideration.

Third Inclosure (C.)

COPY of a Note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. de Champagny, dated September 26th, 1806.

Paris, 26 Septembre 1806.

LORD Lauderdale reçoit dans l'instant la Note de Son Excellence Monsieur de Champagny, dans laquelle, en lui marquant qu'il a rendu compte à Son Gouvernement de la Conférence d'aujourd'hui, Son Excellence exprime le desir de causer encore avec Lord Lauderdale.

Quoique le resultat de la conférence que Lord Lauderdale a euë aujourd'hui avec Son Excellence (et à la suite de laquelle il a crü devoir demander les Passeports, comme il vient de le faire à Son Excellence le Ministre des Relations Extérieures) ne laisse aucun espoir d'amener la négociation à une issue favorable, le desir d'entretenir encore Lord Lauderdale, exprimé par Son Excellence M. de Champagny, est une regle pour Lui; et il s'empresse de répondre à cette invitation, en prevenant Son Excellence qu'il se rendra au Ministère de l'Intérieur,

l'Intérieur, où bien qu'il aura l'honneur de la recevoir chez Lui Lundi prochain, à l'heure qui sera la plus commode à Son Excellence.

Lord Lauderdale a l'honneur de répéter à Son Excellence M. de Champagny l'Assurance de sa haute Considération.

(Translation.)

Paris, 26th September 1806.

LORD Lauderdale has this Instant received the Note of his Excellency M. de Champagny, in which, after informing him of his having made a Report to his Government of this Day's Conference, he expresses a Desire again to converse with Lord Lauderdale.

Although the Result of the Conference which Lord Lauderdale has this Day had with his Excellency (at the Conclusion of which his Lordship thought it his Duty to ask for Passports, for which he has just made Application to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs) leaves no Hope of bringing the Negotiation to a favourable Issue, the Wish expressed by his Excellency M. de Champagny to have another Conversation with Lord Lauderdale, is decisive; and Lord Lauderdale hastens to reply to this Invitation, by informing his Excellency that he will either meet him at his Office, or will have the Honour of receiving him at Home, on

Monday

Monday next, at whatever Hour may best suit his
Excellency. Lord Lauderdale has the Honour to repeat to
his Excellency M. de Champagny the Assurance of
his high Consideration.

Fourth Inclosure (D.)

COPY of a Note from M. d'Hauterive to
the Earl of Lauderdale, dated Septem-

ber 26th, 1806.

My Lord, Paris, 26 Septembre 1806

Je reçois dans l'instant une lettre qui est apportée
de Votre part pour Monsieur le Prince de Béné-
vent. Il vient de partir dans l'instant même, et je
m'empresse de profiter de l'occasion que m'offre le
départ immédiat de la première Voiture de la suite,
qui pourra la remettre à Monsieur le Prince de Be-
névent dans la route, ou tout au moins à son
arrivée à Mayence.

Je prie Votre Excellence, My Lord, d'agréer
l'assurance de ma plus haute considération,

(Signé) HAUTERIVE,
Conseiller d'Etat, et Chef de la
Division du Ministère de
l'Intérieur.

(Translation.)

(516)

(Translation.)

My Lords: Paris, 26th September 1806.
I Have this Moment received a letter from you for the Prince of Benevento. He is this Instant set out, and I embrace the Opportunity offered by the Departure of one of his Suite, whose Carriage will follow him immediately, to forward it to the Prince of Benevento; it will probably reach him on the Road, but at all Events on his Arrival at Mentz.

I beg your Excellency will accept the Assurance of my high Consideration.

(Signed) HAUTERIVE.

Fifth Inclosure (E.)

COPY of a Note from M. de Champagny to the Earl of Lauderdale, dated September 26th, 1806.

Paris, ce 26 Septembre 1806.

MONSIEUR de Champagny aura l'honneur de se rendre chez My Lord Lauderdale Lundi prochain à deux heures, qui est le moment qu'il suppose convenir le plus à Son Excellence.

Il lui envoie de Passeport qu'il a demandé pour le Courier Basilico. Il prie Son Excellence d'agréer l'assurance de sa haute considération.

(Translation.)

(Translation.)

Paris, 26th September 1806.
Monsieur de Champagne will have the Honour of
 installing calling upon Lord Lauderdale on Monday
 next, at Two o'Clock, which he supposes will be
 the most convenient Time.
 He sends the Passports Lord Lauderdale desired
 for the Messenger Basilico. He requests his Excellency
 to accept the Assurances of his high Consideration.

No. 53.

EXTRACT from a Dispatch from Viscount
 Howick to the Earl of Lauderdale, dated
 Downing-Street, October 1st, 1806.

My Lord, Downing Street, October 1st, 1806.
YOUR Dispatches of the 26th Ult. brought by
 the Messenger Johnson have been laid before
 the King.

His Majesty has seen with great Regret that, after
 more than Six Months spent in Negotiation, the
 French Government still hesitates upon the Ad-
 mission of Points constantly urged by His Majesty as
 the only Grounds on which he could consent to
 Peace, and that in so unsatisfactory a State of
 Things, the Chief of that Government, together
 with his Principal Minister, has suddenly left Paris*.

* The Chief of the French Government left Paris on the
 Night of the 24th September, and was followed by M. Talley-
 rand on the 26th.

creating

creating thereby new Obstacles to the Progress of the Negotiation.

Whatever Views the French Government may have in keeping up this State of Suspence and Uncertainty, His Majesty feels that it is equally prejudicial to the Interests of His Subjects and to those of Europe. If the Professions of France are sincere, there can be no Reason why she should not give a plain and decisive Answer to Demands which have been so long under Consideration ; and the Time is now come when such an Answer must be required as indispensable to your Continuance at Paris.

No. 54

EXTRACT from a Dispatch from the

Earl of Lauderdale to Viscount Howick,

dated Paris, October 4th, 1806. Received

October 6th.

My Lord, Paris, October 4, 1806.

YESTERDAY, at Four o'Clock, M. de Champagne sent me a Note to announce the Arrival of a Courier at Boulogne, who reached Paris this Morning at Three o'Clock.

On reading your Lordship's Dispatch, dated October 1st, it appeared to me that His Majesty had been pleased to approve of the Demand of Passports which I had made.

Your

Your Lordship may depend on my pressing for them with the utmost possible Earnestness and Affiduity; but how soon I may be able to succeed, it is impossible for me, under the peculiar Circumstances of the Case, to prophesy.

No. 55.

COPY of a Dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Viscount Howick, dated Paris, October 6th, 1806.—Received October 8th.

My Lord,

LA TE last Night M. de Champagny's Principal Secretary called upon me with a Letter from him, inclosing a Letter from M. Talleyrand, both of which I have the Honour of transmitting to your Lordship, (marked A. and B).

From these your Lordship will perceive, that the Negotiation is now at an End, and that M. de Champagny has been authorized to give me the Passports I required.

I have this Day accordingly renewed my Demand to him in a Letter, a Copy of which I inclose (marked C.)

On considering M. Talleyrand's Note, it seemed to me necessary, that I should not take the Step of asking my Passports from M. de Champagny, without accompanying my Demand with a Reply to some

of the Observations made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Your Lordship will accordingly find inclosed a Copy (marked D.) of an official Note addressed by me to that Minister.

I have sent the Courier, Lyell, for the Purpose of conveying this Information, and I have given him a Letter to Admiral Holloway, desiring him instantly to announce by the Telegraph, that I shall leave Paris on Thursday Morning.

I have taken this Step, because it occurred to me that Government being thus in Possession of the Intelligence, that the Negotiation is at an End, Ten Hours before it can reach London, they may have it in their Power to take the most prudent Means to make the Fact publick.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

(Signed) LAUDERDALE.

First Inclosure (A.)

COPY of a Note from M. de Champagny to the Earl of Lauderdale, dated October 5th, 1806.

Paris le 5 Octobre 1806.

M. De Champagny a l'honneur de faire passer à Son Excellence Mylord Comte de Lauderdale, la dépêche ci-jointe, qui lui a été adressée pour Son Excellence par le Ministre des Relations Extérieures. Il doit aussi lui faire connoître qu'il est autorisé à lui délivrer les Passeports qu'Elle a demandés.

demandés. C'est de toutes les Missions qu'il aura
 eu à remplir auprès d'Elle, la seule qui lui aura
 paru pénible, et elle le fera beaucoup : il attendra
 que Son Excellence lui ait fait connoître ses inten-
 tions.

M. de Champagne prie Mylord Comte de
 Lauderdale d'agréer l'Assurance de sa haute Con-
 sideration.

(Translation.)

Paris, 5th October, 1806.

M. De Champagne has the Honour to transmit to
 his Excellency the Earl of Lauderdale the
 accompanying Dispatch, addressed to his Excellency
 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He is also
 charged to inform him, that he is now authorized
 to deliver to him the Passports which he has de-
 manded. This, of all the Duties which he has had
 had to discharge towards his Excellency, is the
 only one which will have appeared painful to him ;
 and it will be greatly so. He waits to be informed
 of the further Dispositions of His Excellency.

M. de Champagne begs my Lord Lauderdale to
 accept the Assurances of his high Consideration.

CHAMPAGNY.

Second

Second Inclosure (B.)

COPY of a Note from M. Talleyrand to the
Earl of Lauderdale, dated Mentz, October
1st, 1806.

Mayence le 1^{er} Octobre 1806.

LE Souffigné, Ministre des Relations Extérieures,
a mis sous les yeux de Sa Majesté l'Empereur
Roi d'Italie, la note que Son Excellence Mylord
Comte de Lauderdale, Ministre Plénipotentiaire
de Sa Majesté Britannique, lui a fait l'honneur de
lui adresser le 26 de ce mois.

Sa Majesté, après s'être prêtée, dans le désir de
la paix, à toutes les propositions qui auroient pu la
rendre durable et respectivement utile aux deux
Puissances Contractantes et à leurs Alliés, verra
avec peine la rupture d'une Négociation dont les
dispositions personnelles lui avoient fait espérer
d'autres résultats. Si le Cabinet Anglois veut ré-
noncer à la perspective de la paix, si son Ministre
Plénipotentiaire doit quitter la France, Sa Majesté
se flatte cependant que le Cabinet Anglois et Lord
Lauderdale, lorsqu'ils mesureront l'étendue des
Sacrifices qu'Elle étoit disposée à faire pour avancer
le retour d'une sincère reconciliation, auront la
conviction intime que Sa Majesté vouloit, pour le
bonheur du Monde, ne mettre en balance aucun
avantage avec ceux de la Paix, et que l'intention
d'en assurer les Bienfaits à ses peuples, pouvoit
seule décider Son Coeur paternel à des Sacrifices
non

non seulement d'amour propre mais de Puissance, plus considérables que ne l'auroit indiqué l'opinion même du peuple Anglois, au milieu d'une guerre où il auroit obtenu, sans aucun mélange de revers, de constans Avantages.

Toutefois s'il étoit dans la destinée de l'Empereur et du peuple François, de vivre encore au milieu des guerres et des orages que la politique et l'influence de l'Angleterre auroient suscitées, Sa Majesté après avoir tout fait pour mettre un terme aux maux de la guerre, se voyant déçue dans ses plus chères Espérances, compte sur la Justice de Sa cause, sur le Courage, l'Amour, la Puissance de Ses Peuples. Mais se rappelant encore les dispositions qu'Elle avoit toujours exprimées, dans le cours de la Négociation, Sa Majesté ne peut voir qu'avec regret, que l'Angleterre qui pouvoit illustrer et affermir Sa vaste puissance par le bienfait de la Paix, dont le besoin se fait sentir à la génération actuelle et au peuple Anglois comme à tous les autres, en laisse volontairement échapper la plus belle occasion. L'avenir fera connoître si une coalition nouvelle sera plus contraire à la France que les trois premières. L'avenir dévoilera si ceux qui se plaignent de la Grandeur et de l'Ambition de la France, n'ont pas à imputer à leur haine, à leur injustice, la Grandeur et l'Ambition dont ils l'accusent. La France ne s'est agrandie que par les efforts, renouvelés tant de fois, pour l'opprimer.

Ne'anmoins quelques soient les inductions que l'on puisse tirer pour l'avenir des exemples du passé

Sa Majesté sera prête, si les Négociations avec l'Angleterre doivent être interrompues, à les reprendre au milieu de toutes les chances des Evénemens. Elle sera prête à les rétablir, sur les bases posées de concert avec l'illustre Ministre que l'Angleterre a perdu, et qui n'ayant plus rien à ajouter à Sa Gloire que le rapprochement des deux peuples, en avoit conçu l'espérance, et a été enlevé, au monde au Comte de milieu de son ouvrage.

Le Souffigné a l'honneur de prévenir Son Excellence, Mi-Lord Comte de Lauderdale, que Monsieur de Champagny a été autorisé à lui délivrer les Passeports qu'il a demandés.

Le Souffigné s'empresse de renouveler à Son Excellence Mi-Lord Comte de Lauderdale, l'Assurance de Sa haute Considération.

(Signé) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND,
Prince de Benevent.

(Translation.)

THE Underfigned, Minister for Foreign Affairs, has laid before his Majesty the Emperor King of Italy, the Note which his Excellency the Earl of Lauderdale Minister Plenipotentiary from His Britannic Majesty, did him the Honour to address to him on the 26th of this Month.

His Majesty, after having, from a Desire of Peace, listened to every Proposition which could have rendered it durable and of reciprocal Advantage

vantage to the Two contracting Powers, and to their Allies, will see with Pain the Rapture of a Negotiation, to which his own Disposition had led him to hope a more favourable Conclusion. If the English Cabinet is resolved to forego the Prospect of a Peace, and, if His Britannick Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary must depart from France, his Majesty still flatters himself that the English Cabinet and Lord Lauderdale will, when they shall measure the Extent of the Sacrifices which he was disposed to make, in order to facilitate the Return of a sincere Reconciliation, be convinced, that his Majesty, in order to promote the Happiness of the World, would not hesitate between any Advantages in Comparison with those to be expected from Peace, and that the Desire to insure its Benefit to his People, could alone have determined his paternal Heart to make Sacrifices not only of Self-love but of Power, more considerable than even the Opinion of the English Nation could have pointed out in the midst of a War, in which he had obtained constant Advantages without any Mixture of Reverse. If, however, it is the Destiny of the Emperor and of the French Nation still to live in the midst of the Wars and Tumults, which the Policy and Influence of England have raised, his Majesty having done every Thing to put a stop to the Calamities of War, finding himself deceived in his dearest Hopes, relies on the Justice of his Cause, on the Courage, the Affection, the Power of his People. At the same Time calling to Mind the Dis-

positions which he has ever expressed throughout the Negotiation, his Majesty cannot see but with Regret, that England, who might have strengthened and confirmed her vast Power by the Blessings of Peace, the Want of which is felt by the present Generation, and by the English People as well as all others, willingly suffers the most favourable Opportunity of concluding it to pass by: The Event will disclose whether a new Coalition will be more disadvantageous to France than those which have preceded it. The Event will also disclose, whether those who complain of the Grandeur and Ambition of France, should not impute to their own Hatred and Injustice this very Grandeur and Ambition of which they accuse her. The Power of France has only been increased by the reiterated Efforts to oppress her. Nevertheless whatever Inferences for the future may be drawn from the Examples of the past, his Majesty will be ready, should the Negotiations with England be broken off, to renew them in the Midst of any Events. He will be ready to replace them on the Basis laid in concert with the illustrious Minister whom England has lost, who, having nothing to add to his Glory except the Reconciliation of the Two Nations, had conceived the Hope of accomplishing it, but was snatched from the World in the Midst of his Work.

The Underigned has the Honour to inform his Excellency the Earl of Lauderdale, that M. de Champagny has been authorized to deliver to him the Passports which he has demanded.

The

The Underigned is desirous of renewing to his Excellency the Earl of Lauderdale, the Assurance of his high Consideration.

(Signed) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND,
PRIME of Benvenuto.

Third Inclosure (C.)

COPY of a Note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. de Champagny, dated October 6th, 1806.

Paris, le 6 Octobre 1806.

LORD Lauderdale a l'honneur d'accuser la reception de la Note de Son Excellence Monsieur de Champagny en date du 5 de ce mois, et de la Depêche qui y fut jointe de la part de Son Excellence le Ministre des Relations Extérieures.

Lord Lauderdale en apprenant que Son Excellence Monsieur de Champagny est autorisé à lui delivrer les Passeports qu'il a demandés, prie Son Excellence de vouloir bien les lui faire passer, tant pour lui même que pour sa suite; et en meme tems un Passeport séparé pour le Courier Scott, qui pourroit peut être ne pas l'accompagner.

Lord Lauderdale prie Monsieur de Champagny d'agréer les assurances de sa haute consideration.

(Signé) LAUDERDALE.

(Translation.)

Paris, October 6th, 1806.

LORD Lauderdale has the Honour to acknowledge the Receipt of the Note of his Excellency M. de Champagny, dated the 5th of this Month, and of the Dispatch which accompanied it, from his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Lord Lauderdale, learning that his Excellency M. de Champagny is authorized to deliver to him the Passports which he has demanded, requests his Excellency to have the Goodness to forward them to him, as well for himself as for his Suite, and at the same Time a separate Passport for the Messenger Scott, who, perhaps, may not accompany him.

Lord Lauderdale begs M. de Champagny to accept the Assurances of his high Consideration.

(Signed) LAUDERDALE.

Fourth Inclosure (D.)

COPY of a Note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand, dated October 6th, 1806.

Paris, le 6 Octobre, 1806.

LE Soussigné Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté Britannique, a reçu hier au soir fort tard la Note que Son Excellence le Ministre des Relations Extérieures lui a fait l'honneur de lui adresser le premier de ce mois.

Le

Le Souffigné, en apprenant que Son Excellence Monsieur de Champagny est autorisé à lui accorder les Passports qu'il a demandés, et qu'il est sur le point de recevoir, ne peut s'empêcher d'observer à Son Excellence le Ministre des Relations Extérieures, en réponse à Sa Note, qu'il a de la peine à s'imaginer, quelles sont les circonstances desquelles Son Excellence, a cru pouvoir tirer cette induction " que le Gouvernement Anglois veut " renoncer à la perspective de la paix."

Le Souffigné a été envoyé en France pour négocier la Paix dans le tems où cet illustre Ministre auquel Son Excellence a payé un si juste tribut d'Eloge, préfidoit encore le Département des Affaires Etrangères. Cet grand homme agissoit alors d'après la pleine conviction qu'il avoit reçu de la France une proposition de Paix sur la Base du *uti possidetis* avec la seule exception du Hanovre et de ses dépendances en faveur de Sa Majesté Britannique, et malgré les Succès des Armes de Sa Majesté Britannique tant en Italie que sur le continent de l'Amérique Meridionale, et malgré le refus de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies de ratifier ce traité qui, aux yeux du Gouvernement François passoit pour éгалer le plus beau fait de guerre, il n'a été mis en avant de la Part de Sa Majesté aucune nouvelle proposition, incompatible avec ce principe, qui avoit d'abord été proposé de la part du Gouvernement François par le canal du Comte de Yarmouth, comme devant faire la base de la Négociation. Ce n'est sûrement pas d'après
une

une pareille conduite que l'on puisse être fondé à croire, " que le Gouvernement Anglois veuille renoncer à la perspective de la paix."

Les conditions que le Souffigné a eu ordre de proposer comme bases de la Paix entre Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies et le Gouvernement François, seroient elles davantage de nature à faire naître ce soupçon? Bien au contraire. Pour peu que les deux parties eussent pour objet une paix solide et durable c'étoient là les Conditions que commandoient également la Justice et les convenances. *La Justice*, car assurément rien n'étoit plus équitable que d'accorder à Sa Majesté Sicilienne et au Roi de Sardaigne, une compensation pour les pertes immenses qu'ils ont essuyées sur le continent. *Les Convenances*, parceque pour assurer la durée de la Paix, un Arrangement de limites qui seroit de nature à empêcher les disputes, fera toujours préférable à celui qui fournit à l'une des Parties, des moyens et des avantages pour l'attaque. De ce principe se'nfuiroit naturellement l'Evacuation proposée de la Dalmatie et de l'Albanie par les Armes Françoises.

Si donc le Souffigné a eu ordre de demander ses Passeports et de quitter la France, ce n'est assurément pas parceque Son Souverain veut renoncer à la Paix, mais parcequ'il s'y voit forcé. Le Gouvernement François n'ayant pas consenti toutes les Conditions que comportoit la proposition faite dans l'origine à Sa Majesté Britannique, et ayant
en

en outre rejetté comme Base du Traité avec la Russie, les conditions justes et raisonnables que le Souffigné avoit été autorisé à proposer,

Le Souffigné a reçu avec une véritable Satisfaction les Assurances générales des dispositions du Gouvernement François pour le renouvellement de la Négociation dans un autre Moment, ainsi qu'elles se trouvent énoncées dans la Note officielle de Son Excellence le Ministre des Relations Extérieures. Il a vu avec non moins de plaisir que le ton et la mesure observés dans cette communication correspondent aux sentimens qui les accompagnent. A cet égard Son Excellence peut être bien persuadée, que le Gouvernement François ne sauroit témoigner sous aucune forme un plus vif désir de voir cesser les calamités de la guerre, que celui qu'éprouve invariablement Sa Majesté Britannique, toutes les fois que la paix peut se faire à des conditions compatibles avec l'honneur de Sa Couronne et les intérêts de Ses Sujets.

Le Souffigné devoit terminer ici la réponse officielle qu'il a cru devoir faire à la note de Son Excellence Le Ministre des Relations Extérieures, mais il ne peut passer sous silence une partie de cette note, où Son Excellence paroît vouloir faire entendre, que le Gouvernement Britannique semble n'être plus disposé à agir d'après les mêmes principes qui dirigoient le conduite du grand homme que l'Angleterre vient de perdre. Le Souffigné sans qu'il soit autorisé à traiter cette matière, ni même à l'introduire dans une pièce officielle, espère en la bonté

bonté et l'indulgence connues de Son Souverain, lorsqu'il se permet à cet égard l'observation suivante.

Pendant vingt six ans de commerce intime et suivi avec M. Fox, le Souffigné, autant que qu'il que ce soit, a été a même de se pénétrer des sentimens de cet homme célèbre. Il lui en reste la plus profonde impression, que jamais Ministre n'auroit pû donner aux instructions dont il pourroit être l'organe un assentiment plus parfait, ni concourir plus effiacement à leur exécution, que n'auroit fait M. Fox, en donnant au Souffigné, de la part de Sa Majesté Britannique, des ordres tels que le Souffigné les a en effet reçus, dans des circonstances où l'ouvrage de la paix (sur les bases justes et équitables, qui avoient été proposés à ce Ministre) lui paroitroit impraticable.

Combien ces Sentimens n'auroient ils pas été fortifiés dans l'esprit de ce Ministre, en voyant le Gouvernement François se refuser aux justes demandes de cet illustre Allié, qui, par sa fidélité envers Sa Majesté Britannique, a mérité de la part du Roi que ses intérêts lui fussent aussi chers que les siens propres.

Le Souffigné a l'honneur de prévenir Son Excellence le Ministre des Relations Extérieures, qu'il s'est adressé ce matin à Son Excellence M. de Champagny pour la demande de ses Passeports.

Il la prie en même tems d'agréer l'assurance de sa haute Considération.

(Signé) LAUDERDALE.

(Translation.)

(Translation.)

Paris, 6th October 1806.

THE Underfigned Minister Plenipotentiary of His Britannick Majesty, received late last Night the Note which his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs did him the Honour to address to him on the First of this Month.

The Underfigned learning that his Excellency M. de Champagny is authorized to grant him the Passports which he has demanded, and which he is on the Point of receiving, cannot refrain from observing to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in Answer to his Note, that he has some Difficulty in imagining from what Circumstances his Excellency has been able to infer, " that the British Government have resolved to forego the Prospect of Peace."

The Underfigned was sent to France to negotiate a Peace, at a Time when the Illustrious Minister, to whom his Excellency has paid so just a Tribute of Praise, presided over the Department for Foreign Affairs. This great Man then acted under the full Conviction, that he had received from France an Offer of Peace, on the Basis of *uti possidetis*, with the sole Exception of Hanover and of its Dependencies in favour of His Britannick Majesty. And, notwithstanding the Success of the Arms of His Britannick Majesty, as well in Italy as on the Continent of South America; and the Refusal of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias to ratify

ratify that Treaty, which in the Eyes of the French Government was equivalent to the most splendid Victory; not one new Proposition has been advanced on the Part of His Majesty, incompatible with the Principle which was at first proposed by the French Government, through the Channel of the Earl of Yarmouth, as the Basis of the Negotiation. It is not, surely, from such Conduct that the Inference can be drawn, "that the British Government have resolved to forego the Prospect of a Peace."

Are the Conditions which the Underfigned was ordered to propose as the Basis of a Peace between His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias and the French Government more of a Nature to have given rise to this Suspicion? Quit the Reverse. If a solid and durable Peace was the Object of the two Powers, these were such Conditions as Justice and Expediency demanded. *Justice*; because certainly nothing could be more equitable than to grant to His Sicilian Majesty and to the King of Sardinia a Compensation for their immense Losses on the Continent. *Expediency*; because, in order to insure the Duration of Peace, such an Arrangement of Boundaries as may prevent Disputes must always be preferable to that which furnishes to one of the Parties the Means and the Advantages of Attack. It was on this Principle that the proposed Evacuation of Dalmatia and Albania by the French Troops naturally suggested itself.

If,

It, therefore, the Undersigned has received Orders to demand his Passports, and to depart from France, it is certainly not because his Sovereign wishes to renounce Peace, but because His Majesty finds himself *obliged de sa*; the French Government not having consented to all the Conditions which were comprised in the Proposals originally made by them to His Britannick Majesty, and having moreover rejected as the Basis for the Treaty with Russia the just and reasonable Conditions which the Undersigned was authorized to propose.

The Undersigned has received with real Satisfaction the general Assurances of the Disposition of the French Government to renew the Negotiation at a future Period, as expressed in the official Note of his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He has seen with no less Pleasure, that the Tone and the Moderation observed in this Communication correspond with the Sentiments which accompany them. On this Subject his Excellency may rest assured, that the French Government could not in any way express a stronger Desire to see an End put to the Calamities of War, than that which His Britannick Majesty will invariably feel, whenever Peace can be concluded on Conditions compatible with the Honour of His Crown and the Interests of His Subjects.

The Undersigned ought here to conclude the official Answer which he has thought necessary to make to the Note of his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs. But he cannot pass over in

Silence one Part of this Note, where his Excellency wishes to convey the Idea, that the British Government seems no longer disposed to act on the same Principles which directed the Conduct of the great Man whom England has lately lost. The Under- signed, without being authorized to mention this Subject, nor even to introduce it in an official Paper, trusts in the known Goodness and Indulgence of his Sovereign, when he allows himself to make the following Observations on this Subject.

During Twenty-six Years of intimate and uninterrupted Connection with Mr. Fox, the Under- signed, as much as any one, has had an Opportunity of confidentially learning the Sentiments of that celebrated Man. From his Knowledge of them he is impressed with the strongest Conviction, that no Minister could give to the Instructions of which he was to be the Organ a more perfect Assent, or concur more effectually in their Execution, than Mr. Fox would have done, in giving to the Under- signed on the Part of His Britannick Majesty, such Orders as the Under- signed has in fact received; under Circumstances in which Peace (on the just and equitable Conditions which had been proposed to that Ministry) would have appeared to him impracticable.

How much would this Opinion have been strengthened in the Mind of that Minister, on perceiving the French Government refuse the just Demands of that illustrious Ally, who, by his Fidelity to His Britannick Majesty, has deserved all
the

the Interest of the King, that his Interests should be as dear to him as His own.

The Underfigued has the Honour to acquaint His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that he this Morning applied to his Excellency M. de Champagny for his Passports. At the same Time he requests him to accept the Assurance of his High Consideration.

(Signed) LAUDERDALE.

No. 56.

EXTRACT from a Dispatch from Mr. Arbuthnot to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated Buyukdéré, August 25th, 1806.—Received September 29th.

IT was Yesterday settled at the Porte that the present Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia should be recalled, and that Prince Charles Callimaki, the First Dragoman of the Porte, should be named to the Government of Moldavia, and Prince Alexander Suzzo to that of Wallachia; at the same Time Mr. Bano Hanchyry was appointed Dragoman in the Room of Prince Callimaki.

To give you a perfect Idea of the Disrespect with which Russia has been treated in this Instance, it is necessary that I should transmit to you an Extract from the Regulations respecting Moldavia and Wallachia, which were published in the Year 1802.

As no Accusation whatever has been brought against either of the Hospodars who are now removed, there can be no Excuse for breaking the Convention; by which it was stipulated with Russia that Seven Years should be the Period of each Prince's Government.

You will probably expect to hear what this Measure has originated with the French Ambassador; in effect there are Proofs sufficient that it is his Work.

(Inclosure.)

EXTRACT of a Regulation respecting the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, dated September 24th, 1802.

Le 24 Septembre 1802.

L Terme des Voïvodes sera désormais fixé à Sept Années complètes et entières, à dater du jour de leur Nomination, et tant qu'ils ne commettront point de delit avéré, ils ne seront pas destitués avant ce terme; en sorte que s'ils commettent un délit dans cette intervalle, la Sublime Porte en informera le Ministre de Russie, et si après verification faite de cette manière de part et d'autre, il conçoit et appert que le voïvode s'est effectivement rendu coupable d'un délit, la deposition sera permise dans ce cas seulement.

(Translation.)

(Translation.)
 September 24th, 1802.

THE Term of the Continuance of the Hospodars in their Governments shall from henceforth be fixed at Seven complete and entire Years, to date from the Day of their Nomination, and if they are not guilty of any open Offence, they shall not be displaced before that Term is expired; if they do commit an Offence during that Time, the Sublime Porte will inform the Minister of Russia of the Circumstance; and if, after due Examination is made into the Affair on both Sides, it shall appear that the Hospodar has really committed an Offence, in that Case only his Deposition shall be allowed.

No. 57.

EXTRACT from a Dispatch from Mr. Arbuthnot to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated Buyukdéré, September 29th, 1806.—
 Received November 9th.

Sir, Buyukdéré, 29th September 1806.

ON the 18th of this Month the Dragoman of the Porte communicated to Mr. Pifani* for my Information a Note which had been presented by the French Ambassador, a Copy of which I have herewith the Honour to inclose.

* First Dragoman or Interpreter attached to the British Mission.

(Inclosure.)

NOTE presented by the French Ambassador at the Porte, to the Reis Effendi
Pera, 16 Septembre 1806.

LE Souffigné General de Division Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des François Roi d'Italie a l'honneur d'exposer à Son Excellence le Reis Effendi ce qui suit.

Il vient d'être instruit d'une Manière positive quoiqu'indirecte que la legation de Russie a remis une Note à la Sublime Porte, dans laquelle il est dit que l'Empereur de Russie a refusé la Ratification du Traité de Paix signé a Paris par son Ministre Plenipotentaire. Ce refus place l'Europe dans la même position où elle se trouvoit il y a Six Semaines, mais il met à decouvert les projets de la Russie. Ce Traité de Paix stipuloit l'indépendance de la Republique des Sept Isles, et une semblable Stipulation éloignant les Russes de la Méditerranée où ils se sont établis pour attaquer sur plusieurs points l'Empire Ottoman, cette Stipulation, dis je, ne pouvoit point leur convenir.

Raguse étoit rendue à Son Indépendance sous la protection de la Sublime Porte; cette disposition mettant les Russes hors d'état d'entretenir des intelligences avec les Monténégrins et surtout avec les Serviens revoltés, cette disposition, dis-je étoit contraire à leurs vues.

Ce qui a sans doute renversé à Petersbourg l'Edifice de la Paix, est l'Article qui stipule l'indépendance

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ance de l'Empire Ottoman et l'intégrité de son Territoire. La Russie a senti alors qu'Elle ne pouvoit plus Lui enlever par la force des Provinces comme Elle l'a fait de la Crimée, ou lui en extorquer en tems de Paix comme Elle l'a fait de la Georgie et du Passage du Phafe.

Ce traité de Paix enfin laissant la France en Albanie et en Dalmatie plaçoit sur les Frontières de la Turquie le plus ancien de ses Alliés et le plus fidèle de Ses Amis, qui seroit resté et qui restera toujours pour sa defense.

Tels ont été les Motifs qui ont conduit le Cabinet de Peterbourg dans ce refus. Je ne m'abandonne à de vaines declamations ; je vous presente des faits ; je vous prie de les peser avec toute la Maturité qu'ils meritent.

Si dans ces Circonstances difficiles la Porte n'acquiesce pas le sentiment réel de ces dangers et de ses forces, si elle ne prend pas les Resolutions que lui commandent ses intérêts, je gemirai peut-être bientôt sur son Sort.

Le Souffigné a reçu l'ordre le plus positif de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, Roi d'Italie, de declarer à la Sublime Porte, que d'après les principes non seulement de l'Amitié mais même de la Neutralité la plus exacte, le Bosphore doit être fermé à tous les Batimens de Guerre Russes et autres Batimens de la même Nation chargés de troupes, de munitions, ou de vivres, et que ce passage ne peut leur être ouvert sans commettre

une hostilité envers la France, et sans donner à Sa Majesté Napoleon le Grand, le droit de traverser les États de l'Empire Ottoman pour aller sur le Niester combattre l'Armée Russe. Tout Renouveau ou Continuation d'alliance avec les Ennemis de la France tels que l'Angleterre, ou la Russie seroit non seulement une violation manifeste de la Neutralité, mais un concours de la Sublime Porte à la guerre que ces Puissances font à la France, et Sa Majesté se verroit dans la Nécessité de prendre des Mesures conformes à ses intérêts et à Sa Dignité.

La Sublime Porte ne peut conserver des Relations avec deux Legations de Naples, et Sa Majesté l'Empereur des François ne peut pas permettre que son auguste frère Napoleon Joseph Roi de Naples et des deux Siciles éprouve ici des difficultés qu'aucune Puissance amie de la France ne l'a fait éprouver.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur a porté des forces considérables et une Armée nombreuse en Dalmatie.— Cette Armée est établie pour la défense de l'Empire Ottoman, à moins qu'une Conduite equivoque de la part de la Porte et une Condescendance pour la Russie ou l'Angleterre, qui la mettroit encore sous leur dépendance, n'oblige Sa Majesté l'Empereur des François à déployer ses forces imposantes pour un but absolument contraire à celui qu'il s'étoit proposé.

Sa Majesté a ordonné au Souffigné d'exposer à la Sublime Porte avec autant d'Energie que d'Ami-
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les demandes qu'il vient de faire, afin qu'une réponse écrite lui soit faite et que cette réponse soit positive et catégorique.

Aucun délai ne doit plus être apporté, et Sa Majesté ne doute point que la Sublime Porte ne lui donne les Assurances qu' Elle desire et qui sont si conformes aux intérêts de cet Empire.

Le Souffigné ne fait point un vain étalage des forces imposantes du Grand Napoleon : ses amis savent les apprecier; ses Ennemis les ont senties. On connoit le Genie de Son Auguste Maître; ses résolutions sont sages mais promptes; son attachement à la personne de Sa Hauteffe est sincère. Il ne desire que l'indépendance, l'intégrité et la gloire de la Turquie; il ne veut, il ne demande rien— que de motifs pour se réunir à lui! Mais que de motifs aussi pour craindre de l'indisposer par une conduite timide, incertaine, ou ennemie! Les Circonstances sont telles, que la réponse de la Sublime Porte réglera la Conduite de mon Auguste Maître.

Que les Menaces des Ennemis de la France aient imposé point à la Sublime Porte; ils ont été vaincus et ils le seront toujours. Le Grand Napoleon employera tous les Moyens, pour la Gloire de Sa Hauteffe Selim III. son ami; et ses Moyens sont immenses; son Genie est plus grand encore.

Cette Note merite d'être soumise à la haute Sagesse de Sa Majesté l'Empereur Selim III. et Votre Excellence est priée de le faire le plus promptement possible.

Le Souffigné prie Son Excellence le Reis Effendi
d'agrèer l'expression de sa haute Considération.
(Signé) HORACE SEBASTIANI

(Translation.)

Pera, 16th September 1806.

THE Underfigned General of Division Ambassador of his Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, has the Honour to lay before his Excellency the Reis Effendi the following Considerations.

He has been positively informed, although in an indirect Manner, that the Russian Legation has delivered a Note to the Sublime Porte, in which it is said that the Emperor of Russia has refused to ratify the Treaty of Peace signed at Paris by his Plenipotentiary. This Refusal places Europe in the same Situation in which she was Six Weeks ago, but it unmasks the Projects of Russia. This Treaty of Peace stipulated for the Independance of the Seven Islands; a Stipulation which removing the Russians from the Mediterranean, where they had established themselves in order to attack the Ottoman Empire at various Points, could not be acceptable to them.

Ragusa was restored to its Independance under the Protection of the Sublime Porte; this Arrangement rendering it impossible for the Russians to keep

keep up their Intelligence with the Montenegrins and with the revolted Servians, was contrary to their Views.

Doubtless it is the Article which stipulates for the Independance of the Ottoman Empire and the Integrity of its Territory which has occasioned the the Rejection of the Peace at Petersburg ; Russia then perceived that she could no longer seize Provinces of that Empire by Force of Arms as she seized the Crimea, or extort them from her in Time of Peace, as she did with regard to Georgia and the Passage of the Dardanelles.

This Treaty of Peace, in fine, leaving the French in Albania and Dalmatia, placed upon the Frontiers of Turkey her most ancient Ally and her most faithful Friend, who would have remained and will ever remain ready to defend her.—Such are the Motives which have led the Cabinet of Petersburg to this Refusal. I do not give way to vain Declamation ; I lay Facts before you ; I beseech you to weigh them with all the Attention to which they are entitled.

If in these difficult Circumstances the Porte does not form a true Estimate of her Dangers and of her Force, if she does not form the Decision her Interests require of her, I shall perhaps ere long have to lament her Fate.

The Underigned has received the most positive Orders from his Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, to declare to the Sublime Porte,

Porte, that not only the Principles of Friendship, but those of the strictest Neutrality, require that the Bosphorus should be shut against all Russian Ships of War, as well as against every other Vessel of that Nation, bringing Troops, Ammunition, or Provisions; and that the said Passage cannot be opened to them without committing an Act of Hostility against France, and without giving His Majesty Napoleon the Great a Right of Passage over the Territories of the Ottoman Empire, in order to combat with the Russian Army on the Banks of the Dniester.

Any Renewal or Continuation of Alliance with the Enemies of France, such as England and Russia, would be not only a manifest Violation of the Neutrality, but an Accession on the Part of the Sublime Porte to the War which those Powers wage against France, and his Majesty would see himself compelled to take Measures conformable to his Interests and his Dignity.

The Sublime Porte cannot maintain her Relations with two Millions from Naples, and his Majesty the Emperor of the French cannot suffer his august Brother, Napoleon Joseph King of Naples and the Two Sicilies, to meet with Difficulties here which he does not experience from any Power in Amity with France.

His Majesty the Emperor has a large Army in Dalmatia: this Army is collected for the Defence of the Ottoman Empire, unless an equivocal Conduct

Conduct, on the Part of the Porte, and a Condescension towards Russia and England, which might again throw Her into their Power, should compel his Majesty the Emperor of the French, to bring forward his formidable Forces for a Purpose totally opposite to that which he had in View.

His Majesty has ordered the Undersigned to state to the Sublime Porte in the most friendly, though energetic Manner these Demands, for the Purpose of obtaining an Answer in Writing, and it is expected, that this Answer shall be positive and categorical.

No further Delay can be allowed; and his Majesty has no Doubt that the Sublime Porte will give him the Assurances he desires, and which are so much in Unison with the Interests of the Ottoman Empire.

The Undersigned has no Wish to make a vain Display of the formidable Forces of the great Napoleon; his Friends know how to estimate their Importance; his Enemies have felt their Power.

The Genius of his august Master is well known; his Determinations are wise and prompt, his personal Attachment to his Highness is sincere. He only seeks the Independance, the Integrity, and the Glory of Turkey. He desires nothing. He asks nothing. What Inducements to an Union with him! At the same Time what Reason to apprehend the Loss of his Goodwill by adopting a timid, uncertain, or inimical Line of Conduct! Under these Circumstances the Answer of the Sublime Porte will

will regulate the Conduct of my august Master. Let not the Threats of the Enemies of France impose upon the Sublime Porte; they have been vanquished, and they will ever be so. The great Napoleon will employ all his Resources for the Glory of his Highness Selim III. his Friend; and his Resources are immense, his Genius is still greater.

This Note is of sufficient Importance to be submitted to the profound Wisdom of his Majesty the Emperor Selim III. and your Excellency is requested to take the earliest Opportunity of laying it before Him.

The Undersigned requests his Excellency the Reis Effendi to accept the Assurance of his high Consideration.

(Signed) HORACE SEBASTIANI.

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